In re Goldman Sachs Mortgage Servicing Shareholder Derivative Litigation

42 F. Supp. 3d 473, 2012 WL 3293506
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 14, 2012
DocketNo. 11 Civ. 4544(WHP)
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 42 F. Supp. 3d 473 (In re Goldman Sachs Mortgage Servicing Shareholder Derivative Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Goldman Sachs Mortgage Servicing Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 42 F. Supp. 3d 473, 2012 WL 3293506 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

WILLIAM H. PAULEY III, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Michael G. Brautigam (“Brautigam”) and the Retirement Relief System of the City of Birmingham, Alabama (“Alabama Retirement Relief System,” with Brautigam, “Plaintiffs”) bring this consolidated shareholder derivative action on behalf of nominal defendant The Goldman Sachs Group (“Goldman”) against current and former members of Goldman’s board of directors and other Goldman executives (“Defendants”). Defendants move to dismiss the Verified, Consolidated and Amended Shareholder Derivative Complaint (“Complaint”) in its entirety. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND

I. The Defendants

Goldman is a Delaware corporation and provides diverse financial services. (Compl. ¶ 7.) In 2007, Goldman entered the loan servicing business when it purchased Litton Loan (“Litton”), a company specializing in servicing high-risk mortgages. (Compl. ¶ 38.) Goldman’s purchase of Litton made Goldman the twenty-third largest loan servicer in the country. (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 39.)

Defendants Lloyd C. Blankfein, Gary D. Cohn, John H. Bryan, Claes Dahlback, Stephen Friedman, William W. George, James A. Johnson, Lois D. Juliber, iLákshmi N. Mittal, James J. Schiro, Debra L. Spar, Ruth J. Simmons, and Rajat Gupta (“Director Defendants”) are current or former directors of Goldman. Defendant Larry B. Litton, Jr. was president of Lit[478]*478ton after Goldman acquired the firm. Defendant David Viniar is Goldman’s Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (collectively, with Director Defendants and Larry B. Litton, Jr., “Individual Defendants”).

II. Goldman’s Loan Servicing Business and TARP

In October 2008, Goldman entered the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), and received $10 billion from the federal government (“TARP Funds”), (Compl. ¶ 41.) As a condition of receiving TARP Funds, Goldman adopted restrictions on executive compensation until it repaid those funds. (Compl. ¶ 47.)

As an additional condition, Goldman participated in the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”). (Compl. ¶42.) HAMP required participants to modify loans for eligible borrowers to allow those borrowers to reduce their monthly mortgage payments. (Compl. ¶ 42.) Plaintiffs allege that Goldman did not commit sufficient resources and personnel to comply with HAMP. (Compl. ¶ 97.) For example, borrowers complained that Litton employees were unresponsive to inquiries and generally unwilling to help. (Compl. ¶ 97.) Plaintiffs also allege that Litton employees fraudulently signed, or “robo-signed,” thousands of foreclosure documents without checking their accuracy. (Compl. ¶ 103.)

In February 2009, Goldman settled with homeowners in a certified class action lawsuit alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“the Schaffer Settlement”). (Compl. ¶ 118.) Plaintiffs in that class action alleged that Litton improperly imposed late fees on borrowers. (Compl. ¶ 118.) In March 2009, the Congressional Oversight Panel issued a report stating that loan servicers were not responding to borrowers’ requests for loan modifications. (Compl. ¶ 52.)

On June 15, 2009, the U.S. Department of Treasury created the Office of the Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation. (Compl. ¶49.) That office was tasked with reviewing compensation structures and payments for the five senior executive officers and the next twenty most highly paid employees of TARP recipients. (Compl. ¶ 49.) On June 17, 2009, Goldman repaid the TARP Funds early and freed itself from TARP’s compensation restrictions. (Compl. ¶ 93.) Plaintiffs allege that Goldman was more concerned with executive compensation than borrowers’ interests. (Compl. ¶ 94.)

In March 2011, government regulators, including state attorneys general and the Justice Department, gave Goldman and other large mortgage loan servicers a settlement term sheet (the “Servicer Settlement Demand”). (Compl. ¶ 58.) The Servicer Settlement Demand provided a list of remedial steps for the loan servicers to take, including maintaining adequate staffing, implementing minimum experience and educational requirements for staff, and considering principal reductions for loan modifications. (Compl. ¶ 59.) Later that month, “several large banks” offered a counterproposal to the Servicer Settlement Demand, which rejected “key” remedies, such as reducing principal in loan modifications. (Compl. ¶ 60.)

Concurrently, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the “New York Fed”) began investigating Litton’s loan modification efforts. (Compl. ¶¶ 60, 105.) In September 2011, the New York Fed and Goldman entered into a consent order. (Compl. ¶ 106.) The New York Fed accused Goldman of engaging in, inter alia, “a pattern of misconduct and negligence relating to deficient practices in residential mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing.” [479]*479(Compl. ¶ 106.) The consent order required Goldman to hire an independent consultant to review Litton’s foreclosures and provide remediation to borrowers who were financially injured by Litton’s practices. (Compl. ¶ 107.)

Recently, Goldman sold Litton to Ocwen Financial Corporation (“Ocwen”) and agreed to retain liability for any penalties that the Government imposes because of Litton’s foreclosure and servicing practices. (Compl. ¶¶ 7,109.)

III. Goldman’s Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Business

Between 2005 and 2007, Goldman expanded its mortgage-backed securities business. (Compl. ¶ 64.) By 2006, Goldman had sponsored $162 billion worth of residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”). (Compl. ¶ 64.) Between September 2005 and October 2009, Goldman sold $11.1 billion worth of RMBS to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. (Compl. ¶ 67.)

Plaintiffs allege that Goldman knew that loans underlying the RMBS it sold were troubled and falsely represented that the loans complied with particular underwriting standards. (Compl. ¶ 112.) Goldman allegedly knew that the loans did not comply with underwriting standards because Goldman conducted due diligence on the loans prior to securitization. (Compl. ¶ 111.) Plaintiffs point to the fact that Goldman, by purchasing credit default swaps (“CDS”) on the RMBS it sold, bet that the loans underlying the RMBS would default. (Compl. ¶ 68.) Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and others sued Goldman for violations of federal securities laws arising from these alleged misrepresentations. (Compl. ¶¶ 114-15.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants knew from various sources, including their own internal reporting structures, about the decline of the residential mortgage industry and the deteriorating quality of subprime mortgages. (Compl. ¶¶ 69-89.)

Plaintiffs claim that the Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty when they (1) caused Goldman to accept TARP Funds but then failed to comply with conditions for accepting it; (2) allowed Litton employees to engage in “robo-signing”; and (3) caused Goldman to include troubled loans in its RMBS. Plaintiffs also assert claims for contribution and indemnification against the Individual Defendants.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

On a motion to dismiss, a court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor.

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Bluebook (online)
42 F. Supp. 3d 473, 2012 WL 3293506, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-goldman-sachs-mortgage-servicing-shareholder-derivative-litigation-nysd-2012.