In Re Gilbert G. BEEZLEY, Debtor. Gilbert G. BEEZLEY, Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA LAND TITLE COMPANY, Appellee

Ninth Circuit

In Re Gilbert G. BEEZLEY, Debtor. Gilbert G. BEEZLEY, Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA LAND TITLE COMPANY, Appellee

994 F.2d 1433, 93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4051, 93 Daily Journal DAR 6956, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 26666, 1993 WL 186662

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJune 4, 1993

Docket91-55809,

StatusPublished

Cited by161 cases

This text of 994 F.2d 1433 (In Re Gilbert G. BEEZLEY, Debtor. Gilbert G. BEEZLEY, Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA LAND TITLE COMPANY, Appellee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In Re Gilbert G. BEEZLEY, Debtor. Gilbert G. BEEZLEY, Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA LAND TITLE COMPANY, Appellee, 994 F.2d 1433, 93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4051, 93 Daily Journal DAR 6956, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 26666, 1993 WL 186662 (9th Cir. 1993).

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PER CURIAM:

Debtor Gilbert G. Beezley appeals the decision of the Ninth Circuit BAP, affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of his motion to reopen his bankruptcy case under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), and we affirm.

Beezley argues that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion to reopen his case. See In re Herzig, 96 B.R. 264, 266 (9th Cir. BAP 1989) (bankruptcy court’s refusal to reopen a closed case under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) reviewed for an abuse of discretion). We disagree. Based on the assumption that amendment was necessary to discharge the debt, Beezley sought to add an omitted debt to his schedules. Beezley’s, however, was a no asset, no bar date Chapter 7 case. After such a ease has been closed, dischargeability is unaffected by scheduling; amendment of Beezley’s schedules would thus have been a pointless exercise. See American Standard Ins. Co. v. Bakehorn, 147 B.R. 480, 483 (N.D.Ind.1992); In re Stecklow, 144 B.R. 314, 317 (Bankr.D.Md.1992); In re Tucker, 143 B.R. 330, 334 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1992); In re Peacock, 139 B.R. 421, 422 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1992); In re Thibodeau, 136 B.R. 7, 10 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992); In re Hunter, 116 B.R. 3, 5 (Bankr.D.D.C.1990); In re Mendiola, 99 B.R. 864, 865 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1989). If the omitted debt is of a type covered by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A), it has already been discharged pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727. If the debt is of a type covered by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(B), it has not been discharged, and is non-dischargeable.¹ In sum, reopening here in order to grant Beezley’s request would not have “accord[ed] relief to” Beez-ley; thus, there was no abuse of discretion.

AFFIRMED.

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PER CURIAM:

Debtor Gilbert G. Beezley appeals the decision of the Ninth Circuit BAP, affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of his motion to reopen his bankruptcy case under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), and we affirm.

Beezley argues that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion to reopen his case. See In re Herzig, 96 B.R. 264, 266 (9th Cir. BAP 1989) (bankruptcy court’s refusal to reopen a closed case under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) reviewed for an abuse of discretion). We disagree. Based on the assumption that amendment was necessary to discharge the debt, Beezley sought to add an omitted debt to his schedules. Beezley’s, however, was a no asset, no bar date Chapter 7 case. After such a ease has been closed, dischargeability is unaffected by scheduling; amendment of Beezley’s schedules would thus have been a pointless exercise. See American Standard Ins. Co. v. Bakehorn, 147 B.R. 480, 483 (N.D.Ind.1992); In re Stecklow, 144 B.R. 314, 317 (Bankr.D.Md.1992); In re Tucker, 143 B.R. 330, 334 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1992); In re Peacock, 139 B.R. 421, 422 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1992); In re Thibodeau, 136 B.R. 7, 10 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992); In re Hunter, 116 B.R. 3, 5 (Bankr.D.D.C.1990); In re Mendiola, 99 B.R. 864, 865 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1989). If the omitted debt is of a type covered by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A), it has already been discharged pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727. If the debt is of a type covered by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(B), it has not been discharged, and is non-dischargeable.¹ In sum, reopening here in order to grant Beezley’s request would not have “accord[ed] relief to” Beez-ley; thus, there was no abuse of discretion.

AFFIRMED.

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994 F.2d 1433, 93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4051, 93 Daily Journal DAR 6956, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 26666, 1993 WL 186662, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-gilbert-g-beezley-debtor-gilbert-g-beezley-appellant-v-ca9-1993.

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