IN RE ENOVIX CORPORATION SECURITIES LITIGATION

District Court, N.D. California·Decided July 23, 2024·No. 3:23-cv-00071·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 6 7 MAURICE L. TWITCHELL, et al., Case No. 23-cv-00071-SI

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 v. DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS SAC 10 ENOVIX CORPORATION, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 105 11 Defendants.

12 13 Now before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Amended Class Action 14 Complaint. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court found this matter appropriate for 15 resolution without oral argument and vacated the hearing set for July 19, 2024. For the reasons set 16 forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion to dismiss. 17 19 I. Factual Background 20 This proposed securities fraud class action is brought against Enovix Corporation 21 (“Enovix”); co-founder and former CEO Harrold Rust; Executive Chairman Thurman J. Rodgers; 22 and other individual officers. The factual background of this lawsuit is described more fully in the 23 Court’s Prior Order granting the motion to dismiss the consolidated complaint. Dkt. No. 97 (“Prior 24 Order”). 25 To re-state, “Enovix is an early-stage technology company that purports to make a new type 26 of lithium-ion (‘Li-ion’) battery that is smaller and stronger than conventional Li-ion batteries.” 27 Dkt. No. 102 (“SAC”) ¶ 2. Based in Fremont, California, Enovix has been developing its technology 1 2012 and 2017, the company “could produce small quantities of Li-ion batteries to provide to 2 potential customers as samples, but not at commercially viable levels.” Id. 3 In February 2021, Enovix announced its plans to go public. Id. ¶ 3. Rather than going public 4 through a traditional initial public offering, Enovix underwent what is known as a “de-SPAC 5 merger,” merging with Rodgers Silicon Valley Acquisition Corp. (“RSVAC”).1 Id. ¶¶ 3, 64. 6 RSVAC was “a public special purpose acquisition company known as a ‘SPAC’ or ‘blank check’ 7 company . . . whose lone stated purpose is to acquire a private company.” Id. ¶ 59. At the same 8 time, “Enovix set an ‘ambitious goal’ to both develop its own U.S.-based manufacturing line and to 9 begin delivering products to customers (generating the Company’s first product revenue) by the 10 second quarter of 2022.” Id. ¶ 77. “Specifically, Enovix estimated it would manufacture one battery 11 every two seconds, which would require four manufacturing lines capable of producing 550 UPH 12 [units per hour].” Id. At the time it made this forecast, Enovix had no product revenue to date. Id. 13 ¶ 76. 14 In early 2020, Enovix started the process of procuring custom manufacturing equipment for 15 its first production factory, “Fab-1,” to be located in Fremont. Id. ¶ 5. Enovix outsourced the 16 development and production of a large portion of the Fab-1 equipment to Shenzhen Yinghe 17 Technology Co. Ltd. (“Yinghe”) in China. Id. Enovix had an “Equipment Procurement Review” 18 in place to govern the procurement of the equipment from Yinghe. Id. ¶ 6. This document included 19 “requirements that the equipment pass critical quality tests before Enovix accepted delivery[,]” 20 including that the equipment had to pass a “Factory Acceptance Test.” Id. ¶¶ 6-7. 21 According to the SAC, “two key quality control tests” are known as the “Factory Acceptance 22 Test” (“FAT”) and “Site Acceptance Test” (“SAT”). Id. ¶ 85. “The FAT is performed offsite at the 23 equipment vendor’s factory to make sure that the equipment is designed properly, functions 24 correctly, and meets the customer’s specifications. To conduct the FAT, the new manufacturing 25 equipment is set up at the vendor’s factory and tested in accordance with a detailed plan agreed upon 26 by the purchaser and the equipment vendor.” Id. ¶ 86. “The SAT is the next critical quality control 27 1 procedure[,]” and takes place once the manufacturing equipment has been installed on site at the 2 customer’s facility. Id. ¶¶ 91-92. “To conduct the SAT, the equipment vendor sends 3 representatives—typically the same engineers who designed the system and conducted the FAT— 4 to install the equipment, configure it, conduct tests, and verify that the equipment operates 5 correctly.” Id. ¶ 92. The SAC alleges, “Due to Covid-19-related travel restrictions in late 2020 and 6 early 2021, Enovix’s engineers were never permitted to travel to China to participate in the FAT.” 7 Id. ¶ 8. 8 “[A]round November and December 2020, with 3 or 4 iterations of testing spaced half a 9 month to a month apart[,]” the first FAT for the Yinghe-made Fab-1 equipment took place. Id. ¶ 9. 10 The equipment failed the FAT. Id. Yinghe continued working on the equipment and kept testing 11 for months, to no avail. Id. ¶ 10. Yinghe conducted the final FAT in April 2021, and “the equipment 12 failed yet again.” Id. 13 According to the SAC, “That is when Defendants Rust and Rodgers decided to secretly 14 waive the requirement that the equipment pass the FAT and had it airlifted to Fremont.” Id. ¶ 105. 15 “In April 2021, Rust called Rodgers and proposed to fly the Yinghe equipment from China to 16 Fremont to avoid a potential three-month delay due to global shipping backlogs[.]” Id. Rodgers 17 approved the plan. Id. They “planned to ‘catch up later’ with continued improvement efforts and 18 testing after installing the equipment in Fremont. They spent $1.4 million to prematurely fly over 19 the equipment so they could tell investors that the Fab-1 equipment had arrived and was installed as 20 the critical Merger [with RSVAC] was awaiting shareholder approval.” Id. ¶ 11. 21 On June 24, 2021, the Company issued a “Proxy Statement and Prospectus” (hereinafter 22 referred to as “Proxy Statement”) soliciting shareholder approval of the merger. Id. ¶ 65. The 23 Company filed the Proxy Statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on 24 Form 424B3 the same day. Id. On July 14, 2021, the merger closed. Id. ¶ 69. 25 In the meantime, once the Yinghe equipment came to Fremont in late April 2021, Enovix’s 26 engineers installed the equipment at Fab-1 without the assistance of Yinghe’s engineers. Id. ¶¶ 12, 27 106. Plaintiffs allege that “Enovix’s engineers struggled for months to get the Fab-1 equipment 1 Yinghe’s engineers to travel to California and help work on and test the equipment. They fared no 2 better.” Id. ¶ 13. According to Former Employee 2, Yinghe’s staff stayed in the United States for 3 almost a year, from fall 2021 until September 2022. Id. ¶ 112. Even with a year of combined efforts, 4 the equipment still never passed the SAT. Id. ¶ 124. 5 The SAC alleges, “In the second half of 2022, Enovix began to gradually reveal that the 6 continued setbacks to the Fab-1 manufacturing equipment not only delayed the Company’s goal of 7 recognizing material product revenue by Q2 2022, but also pushed back the development of 8 Enovix’s next generation of manufacturing equipment, which had been expected to build upon the 9 original Fab-1 line’s success.” Id. ¶ 156. By June 2022, the Fab-1 equipment was producing less 10 than 10% of the expected production rate. Id. ¶ 14. By December 2022, the production had 11 increased to about 100 UPH, or less than 20% of the expected rate. Id. ¶¶ 14, 170. 12 Plaintiffs argue that disclosures made on November 1, 2022; January 3, 2023; and October 13 3, 2023, caused the share price to fall, harming investors. 14 On November 1, 2022, after the close of trading, Enovix released a “Letter to Our 15 Shareholders,” reporting that Enovix realized just $8,000 in revenue for Q3 2022. Id. ¶ 160. The 16 letter stated that Enovix “would be ‘dialing back’ its work on improving the ‘Gen1’ lines at Fab-1 17 in favor of shifting its focus to its future ‘Gen2’ lines . . . because the supposed ‘improvements’ to 18 Fab-1 that they had vaguely alluded to previously were not having the desired results. Consequently, 19 Enovix ‘anticipate[d] achieving lower overall output from Fab-1 in 2023.’” Id. ¶ 17.

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IN RE ENOVIX CORPORATION SECURITIES LITIGATION, (N.D. Cal. 2024).

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