IN RE ENOVIX CORPORATION SECURITIES LITIGATION

District Court, N.D. California·Decided October 7, 2025·No. 3:23-cv-00071·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 6 7 IN RE ENOVIX CORPORATION Case No. 23-cv-00071-SI

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 10 Re: Dkt. No. 175 11

12 13 Now before the Court is defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. No. 14 175. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter suitable for resolution without 15 oral argument and VACATES the hearing set for October 17, 2025. For the reasons set forth below, 16 the Court GRANTS the motion. 17 19 I. Factual Background 20 The factual background of this case is stated more fully in the Court’s prior orders on the 21 motions to dismiss. See Dkt. Nos. 97, 116. To re-state, “Enovix is an early-stage technology 22 company that purports to make a new type of lithium-ion (‘Li-ion’) battery that is smaller and 23 stronger than conventional Li-ion batteries.” Dkt. No. 102 (“SAC”) ¶ 2. Based in Fremont, 24 California, Enovix has been developing its technology since 2007. Id. ¶ 75. In 2012, Enovix began 25 “work on the manufacturing approach[.]” Id. Between 2012 and 2017, the company “could produce 26 small quantities of Li-ion batteries to provide to potential customers as samples, but not at 27 commercially viable levels.” Id. 1 its first production factory, “Fab-1,” to be located in Fremont. Id. ¶ 5. Enovix outsourced the 2 development and production of a large portion of the Fab-1 equipment to Shenzhen Yinghe 3 Technology Co. Ltd. (“Yinghe”) in China. Id. Enovix had an “Equipment Procurement Review” 4 in place to govern the procurement of the equipment from Yinghe. Id. ¶ 6. This document included 5 “requirements that the equipment pass critical quality tests before Enovix accepted delivery[,]” 6 including that the equipment had to pass a “Factory Acceptance Test.” Id. ¶¶ 6-7. 7 According to the SAC, “two key quality control tests” are known as the “Factory Acceptance 8 Test” (“FAT”) and “Site Acceptance Test” (“SAT”). Id. ¶ 85. “The FAT is performed offsite at the 9 equipment vendor’s factory to make sure that the equipment is designed properly, functions 10 correctly, and meets the customer’s specifications. To conduct the FAT, the new manufacturing 11 equipment is set up at the vendor’s factory and tested in accordance with a detailed plan agreed upon 12 by the purchaser and the equipment vendor.” Id. ¶ 86. “The SAT is the next critical quality control 13 procedure[,]” and takes place once the manufacturing equipment has been installed on site at the 14 customer’s facility. Id. ¶¶ 91-92. “To conduct the SAT, the equipment vendor sends 15 representatives—typically the same engineers who designed the system and conducted the FAT— 16 to install the equipment, configure it, conduct tests, and verify that the equipment operates 17 correctly.” Id. ¶ 92. 18 “[A]round November and December 2020, with 3 or 4 iterations of testing spaced half a 19 month to a month apart[,]” the first FAT for the Yinghe-made Fab-1 equipment took place. Id. ¶ 9. 20 The equipment failed the FAT. Id. Yinghe continued working on the equipment and kept testing 21 for months, to no avail. Id. ¶ 10. Yinghe conducted the final FAT in April 2021, and “the equipment 22 failed yet again.” Id. The SAC alleges, “Due to Covid-19-related travel restrictions in late 2020 23 and early 2021, Enovix’s engineers were never permitted to travel to China to participate in the 24 FAT.” Id. ¶ 8. 25 Meanwhile, in February 2021, Enovix announced its plans to go public by merging with 26 Rodgers Silicon Valley Acquisition Corp. (“RSVAC”), “a public special purpose acquisition 27 company known as a ‘SPAC’ or ‘blank check’ company . . . whose lone stated purpose is to acquire 1 According to the SAC, in April 2021 “Defendants Rust and Rodgers decided to secretly 2 waive the requirement that the equipment pass the FAT and had it airlifted to Fremont.” Id. ¶ 105. 3 “. . . Rust called Rodgers and proposed to fly the Yinghe equipment from China to Fremont to avoid 4 a potential three-month delay due to global shipping backlogs[.]” Id. Rodgers approved the plan. 5 Id. They “planned to ‘catch up later’ with continued improvement efforts and testing after installing 6 the equipment in Fremont. They spent $1.4 million to prematurely fly over the equipment so they 7 could tell investors that the Fab-1 equipment had arrived and was installed as the critical Merger 8 [with RSVAC] was awaiting shareholder approval.” Id. ¶ 11. 9 On June 24, 2021, the Company issued a “Proxy Statement and Prospectus,” soliciting 10 shareholder approval of Enovix’s merger with Rodgers Silicon Valley Acquisition Corp. Id. ¶ 65. 11 The Company filed the Proxy Statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on 12 Form 424B3 the same day. Id. On July 14, 2021, the merger closed. Id. ¶ 69. 13 In the meantime, once the Yinghe equipment came to Fremont in late April 2021, Enovix’s 14 engineers installed the equipment at Fab-1 without the assistance of Yinghe’s engineers. Id. ¶¶ 12, 15 106. Plaintiffs allege that “Enovix’s engineers struggled for months to get the Fab-1 equipment 16 operating at full capacity, but their efforts failed. Eventually the Company agreed to pay for 17 Yinghe’s engineers to travel to California and help work on and test the equipment. They fared no 18 better.” Id. ¶ 13. According to Former Employee 2, Yinghe’s staff stayed in the United States for 19 almost a year, from fall 2021 until September 2022. Id. ¶ 112. Even with a year of combined efforts, 20 the equipment still never passed the SAT. Id. ¶ 124. 21 The SAC alleges, “In the second half of 2022, Enovix began to gradually reveal that the 22 continued setbacks to the Fab-1 manufacturing equipment not only delayed the Company’s goal of 23 recognizing material product revenue by Q2 2022, but also pushed back the development of 24 Enovix’s next generation of manufacturing equipment, which had been expected to build upon the 25 original Fab-1 line’s success.” Id. ¶ 156. By June 2022, the Fab-1 equipment was producing less 26 than 10% of the expected production rate. Id. ¶ 14. By December 2022, the production had 27 increased to about 100 UPH, or less than 20% of the expected rate. Id. ¶¶ 14, 170. 1 3, 2023, caused the share price to fall, harming investors. 2 On November 7, 2022, Enovix announced that defendant Rodgers, previously Chairman of 3 the Board, would become Executive Chairman of Enovix. Id. ¶¶ 39, 168. That day, Rodgers 4 released a statement, stating, “We have poorly communicated on the status of Fab-1.” Id. ¶ 168. 5 Rodgers explained that the decision to charter the world’s largest airplane to fly the manufacturing 6 equipment from China “violated our sacred Equipment Procurement Review (EPR) specification by 7 waiving a key milestone called Factory Acceptance Test (FAT), which required that a team of 8 Enovix engineers fly to multiple Chinese factories, and personally observe each piece of Fab-1 9 equipment running at full speed before we approved shipment. But those factories stopped receiving 10 guests due to COVID, and we decided to waive the FAT milestone and catch up later.” Id. 11 Rodgers went on to state,

12 The catch up would have occurred at the Site Acceptance Test (SAT) 13 milestone, which required their engineers to come to Enovix to demonstrate full functionality, but the equipment vendors were not 14 allowed to travel and we installed our equipment with our employees and local contractors. We are still paying for the months we gained 15 and then gave back due to equipment problems. 16 Id. On November 10, 2022, Enovix announced it would bring in Ajay Marathe as Chief Operating 17 Officer. Id. ¶ 173. On December 29, 2022, Enovix announced defendant Rust would “retire” from 18 his role as President and CEO and as a member of the Board of Directors. Id. ¶ 174. Enovix replaced 19 Rust that same day. Id. 20 On January 3, 2023, after the close of trading, defendant Rodgers hosted a special 21 presentation for shareholders. Id.

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