In re: D.H.

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA24-972

Filed 20 August 2025

Cumberland County, No. 23JB000351-250

IN THE MATTER OF:

D.H.,

A juvenile.

Appeal by Cumberland County Department of Social Services from order

entered 4 June 2024 by Judge Toni King in Cumberland County District Court.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 April 2025.

Dawn M. Oxendine, for appellant-Cumberland County Department of Social Services.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender David W. Andrews, for defendant-appellee.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Megan Elizabeth Shook, for the State-appellee.

GORE, Judge.

Cumberland County Department of Social Services (“CCDSS”) appeals the

trial court’s disposition order that continued the delinquent juvenile’s custody with

CCDSS. CCDSS argues the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the

order, that the trial court failed to include findings to support continued custody with

CCDSS pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-2506(1)(c), and that the trial court lacked

competent evidence to determine his parents would not be able to make appropriate IN RE: D.H.

Opinion of the Court

arrangements to meet the juvenile’s needs. Upon review of the briefs and the record,

we vacate and remand.

I.

A petition was filed with the District Court, Cumberland County, after the

juvenile had brought a knife to school. The juvenile was charged with a misdemeanor

for using, threatening to use, or displaying a firearm or other deadly weapon and was

pre-adjudicated to secure custody in a detention facility. The juvenile orders entered

after each secure custody hearing prior to adjudication included findings that the

juvenile’s home was not an appropriate placement, and that the juvenile was a flight

risk having run away from his mother’s home multiple times. The trial court also

found that the juvenile was aggressive towards his mother when he became angry

and younger siblings were present in the home.

CCDSS received notice that it may be given non-secure custody of the juvenile

because his home was not an appropriate placement for him. The juvenile was

adjudicated delinquent after entering an admission to the weapon charge. The

juvenile was placed in nonsecure custody with CCDSS but remained in detention

until the disposition hearing or placement. The trial court continued secure custody

pending disposition and continued nonsecure custody with CCDSS. On 6 May 2024,

the disposition hearing occurred, and the trial court entered a Level 1 Disposition

requiring the juvenile to serve five days in detention and thereafter be released to

CCDSS for it to maintain physical and legal custody. The trial court also set a

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nonsecure and permanency planning hearing for 3 June 2024. Upon the juvenile’s

release from detention, CCDSS assumed nonsecure custody. The juvenile ran away

from CCDSS but returned two days later and was placed in a psychiatric hold at a

medical center. CCDSS timely filed an appeal of the Disposition Order.

II.

CCDSS appeals of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-2602(4). CCDSS argues the

trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order the juvenile’s continued custody

with CCDSS. Additionally, CCDSS argues even if the trial court had jurisdiction,

they failed to include findings as required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-2506(1)(c) to continue

custody with CCDSS. CCDSS also argues the trial court lacked competent evidence

tending to show the parents were unable to provide “alternative arrangements to

meet the juvenile’s needs.” We review a subject matter jurisdiction challenge de novo.

In re K.U.-S.G., 208 N.C. App. 128, 131 (2010). We also review de novo whether the

trial court followed a statutory mandate. In re G.C., 230 N.C. App. 511, 515–16

(2013).

CCDSS argues the trial court’s jurisdiction “terminated when it entered its

disposition order.” We disagree. CCDSS relies on In re K.C. to demonstrate that any

further orders entered after termination of jurisdiction are void. However, in In re

K.C., the trial court entered an order summarily dismissing the juvenile petitions and

this resulted in the “simultaneous termination of its jurisdiction.” 292 N.C. App. 231,

242–43 (2024). The facts in In re K.C. differ from the present case. Subject matter

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jurisdiction is initiated by the filing of the juvenile petition and does not cease until

the trial court terminates jurisdiction or the juvenile reaches 18 years of age.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1601(b) (2023). Disposition orders are not automatic terminations of

subject matter jurisdiction. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-2508 (2023) (providing different levels

of disposition and articulating the court’s authority to consider various disposition

alternatives, as discussed in N.C.G.S. § 7B-2506 (2023)).

In the present case, the trial court entered a Level 1 Disposition after

adjudicating the juvenile delinquent. The trial court also entered an Order to

continue nonsecure custody of the juvenile with CCDSS. Within the Disposition

Order, the trial court determined CCDSS would maintain legal and physical custody

of the juvenile and set a date for a PPH and nonsecure hearing. The Disposition

Order findings were in accordance with what is allowed under a Level 1 Disposition.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-2508(c) states,

Level 1—Community Disposition.—A court exercising jurisdiction over a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent . . . may provide for evaluation and treatment under G.S. 7B-2502 and for any of the dispositional alternatives contained in subdivisions (1) through (13) and (16) of G.S. 7B-2506.

Section 7B-2506(1)(c) provides for juveniles who require more supervision and care

to be placed in the custody of the department of social services in the county where

the juvenile resides. The trial court must include “a finding that the juvenile’s

continuation in the juvenile’s own home would be contrary to the juvenile’s best

interest.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-2506(1)(c) (2023). Further, the trial court is required to have

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review hearings for this placement “in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1.” Id.

These requirements not only suggest subject matter jurisdiction is ongoing but also

mandate the trial court’s duty to oversee the juvenile’s placement by referencing

section 7B-906.1. Therefore, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to require

CCDSS to maintain legal and physical custody of the juvenile because it had not

terminated its jurisdiction, and because the juvenile was not 18 years of age.

Next, CCDSS argues the trial court did not make the proper finding as

required in section 7B-2506(1)(c) to place a juvenile in the custody of CCDSS. As

previously stated, the trial court is required to include a finding that it is contrary to

the juvenile’s best interest to remain in his home. § 7B-2506(1)(c). The trial court

included the following findings in the Disposition Order:

1. That the juvenile shall be placed on a Level 1 Disposition. 2. That the juvenile shall serve 5 days in detention. Upon . . . serving the five days, the Department shall continue to maintain legal and physical custody of the juvenile pursuant to 7B-906.1. 3. That the Department continues to hold placement reviews. 4. That the Department as well as the juvenile’s attorney shall receive a copy of the Comprehensive Clinical Assessment and Psychological Assessment once they are returned, and that the Department shall take the appropriate steps to find appropriate placement. 5. That the PPH and Nonsecure hearing shall be scheduled for June 3, 2024, at 8:30 AM. 6. That the Department shall contact whoever is the evaluator if they need the psychological evaluation expedited.

The trial court complied with most of the statutory requirements within section 7B-

2506(1)(c), but it did not include the required finding that it is contrary to the

juvenile’s best interest to remain in the home. See § 7B-2506(1)(c). The trial court

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included the finding on an Order for Nonsecure Custody entered 24 June 2024, but

that does not cure what is missing in the Disposition Order. As in In re K.T.L., the

trial court must include a finding pursuant to section 7B-2506(1)(c) that it is contrary

to the best interest of the juvenile to remain in the home. 177 N.C. App. 365, 373

(2006). Accordingly, we must remand to the trial court for it to properly include the

finding required in section 7B-2506(1)(c).

CCDSS also argues the trial court lacked competent evidence that the

juvenile’s parents could not make appropriate arrangements to meet his needs.

CCDSS relies on N.C.G.S. § 7B-2501(d) that states,

the court may dismiss the case, or continue the case for no more than six months in order to allow the family an opportunity to meet the needs of the juvenile through more adequate home supervision, through placement in a private or specialized school or agency, through placement with a relative, or through some other plan approved by the court.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-2501(d) (2023). CCDSS points to In re Ferrell and asserts that the trial

court did not afford the parents an opportunity as provided in section 7B-2501(d). We

remanded In re Ferrell because the trial court awarded custody to the father and

failed to include “appropriate findings of fact” to support its decision to place the

juvenile in the father’s custody. 162 N.C. App. 175, 177 (2004). Additionally, there

was no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s decision. Id. While we agree

that there must be appropriate findings of fact, the basis for that decision was rooted

in section 7B-2501(c). Id. at 176–77. There are mandatory findings pursuant to

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section 7B-2501(c) that the trial court must include in the disposition order when

selecting a disposition. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-2501(c) (2023); In re N.M., 290 N.C. App.

482, 485 (2023). But CCDSS is not seeking review of that statutory section.

Here, CCDSS argues there is not competent evidence the parents were unable

to make appropriate arrangements pursuant to section 7B-2501(d). That section

provides discretion for the court to decide whether to dismiss or continue the case,

but it is not a mandatory requirement. See § 7B-2501(d). Accordingly, the trial court

possesses discretion to consider whether the parents could make appropriate home

arrangements but is not required to make that consideration determinative in the

disposition. This argument is without merit.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction

to enter the Disposition Order, and we vacate and remand to the trial court to correct

the Disposition Order to include the statutorily-required finding pursuant to section

7B-2506(1)(c).

VACATE AND REMAND.

Chief Judge DILLON and Judge TYSON concur.

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