1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR 2 THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 3 4 IN RE: CASE NO. 19-06636-EAG11 CDT DE SAN SEBASTIAN INC Chapter 11 5
6 Debtor(s) ADVERSARY NUMBER: 22-00007-EAG 7 VIP ENERGY CONSULTANTS CORP 8 Plaintiff(s) 9 WALLACE VAZQUEZ SANABRIA; 10 CESAR NEGRETTE MUNIZ, LUIS 11 RAMIREZ ANDUJAR, PEDRO GARCIA FILED & ENTERED ON SEP/08/2023 12 MEJIAS; EDUARDO RODRIGUEZ 13 VAZQUEZ; ISABEL NEGRONI 14 SERRANO, JOSE RAMON CINTRON, BANCO POPULAR DE PUERTO RICO, 15 INC., CENTRO DE DIAGNOSTICO Y 16 TRATAMIENTO DE SAN SEBASTIAN 17 INC., CENTRO DE MEDICINA & 18 CIRUGIA AMBULATORIA DE SAN 19 SEBASTIAN, THE CONJUGAL 20 PARTNERSHIP OF EDUARDO 21 RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ AND ISABEL 22 NEGRONI SERRANO 23 Defendant(s) 24 25 OPINION AND ORDER 26 Pending before the court are two motions for sanctions against attorney James P. Conlan. The first was filed under Bankruptcy 9011 by debtor/defendant CDT de San Sebastián, Inc. (“CDT”).1 27 28 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to “Bankruptcy Code” or to specific statutory sections are to the 29 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. All references to “Bankruptcy Rule” are to the 1 The second was filed under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 by defendants Isabel 2 Negroni Serrano, Eduardo Rodriguez Vazquez, and their conjugal partnership (collectively, 3 “Negroni-Rodriguez”).2 Conlan opposed both motions. 4 I. Jurisdiction 5 This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 6 1334 and 157(a), Local Civil Rule 83K(a), and the General Order of Referral of Title 11 7 Proceedings to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico dated July 19, 1984 (Torruella, C.J.). This is a core proceeding in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). 8 II. The Movants’ Positions 9 10 As mentioned above, CDT asks the court to impose sanctions against Conlan under Bankruptcy 11 Rule 9011(b). Negroni-Rodriguez also do but include under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 too. CDT also requests the referral of Conlan to a magistrate judge or disciplinary committee for further 12 disciplinary action. The movants allege that they have spent extensive time defending their 13 respective clients from Conlan’s attempts to relitigate matters previously resolved by the court and 14 responding to filings so numerous, incomprehensible, and convoluted as to have multiplied the 15 proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously. Additionally, Negroni-Rodriguez requests the entry of 16 an order granting their unopposed request for sanctions against VIP. VIP has failed to appear 17 through counsel regarding the motion for sanctions against it. 18 CDT served Conlan with a safe-harbor letter on November 9, 2021. It alleges that Conlan failed 19 to withdraw the challenged papers or correct them. CDT argues that Conlan’s pattern of filing 20 motions not warranted by existing law, without factual foundation, for improper purposes, and 21 with the intent to harass caused unreasonable delay of the proceedings, needlessly increased the cost of litigation, and has continued. CDT further argues that the court denied remedies pursued in 22 the main case by Conlan, related to three main matters: 23 24
25 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and all references to “Rule” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. All references to “Local Bankruptcy Rule” are to the Local Bankruptcy Rules of the United States Bankruptcy Court for 26 the District of Puerto Rico. And all references to “Local Civil Rule” are to the Local Rules of Civil Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. 27 2 Bankruptcy Rule 9011(c)(1)(A) requires that a motion for sanctions under the rule be made “separately from other 28 motions or requests.” Consequently, the court can grant relief to Negroni-Rodriguez but only under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and against Conlan. See Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 244 (1st Cir. 2010). 29 1 1. Allowance of administrative expenses allegedly incurred by VIP grounded on its alleged 2 ownership of estate property. 3 2. The valuation of estate property which VIP argued secured its claim. 4 3. VIP’s objections to Banco Popular’s proofs of claim, the stipulation between CDT and Banco Popular, and the plan confirmation. 5 Despite multiple attacks by VIP, all its numerous attempts to reinstate its secured status failed. It 6 remains an unsecured creditor subject to the terms of the confirmed plan. 7 Negroni-Rodriguez allege that VIP and Conlan filed numerous motions unsupported by 8 fact or law, without proper investigation, requesting remedies not warranted by law, in a frivolous 9 fashion, in a clear abuse of process, without authorization by the court, and relitigating matters 10 previously resolved. Negroni-Rodriguez also request non-monetary sanctions in the form of an 11 order enjoining Conlan from filing further motions in the main case and adversary proceeding. 12 Negroni-Rodriguez served Conlan with its safe-harbor letter on May 9, 2023. 13 CDT alleges that its attorney spent 193.30 hours defending it from the challenged papers filed 14 by Conlan, which resulted in legal fees of $39,060.00. Negroni-Rodriguez allege that their attorney similarly spent 160.70 hours, for a total amount of $21,642.17 in legal fees. 15 III. Conlan’s Position 16 17 Conlan’s position is that sanctions do not proceed on any of the grounds argued by the movants. 18 He argues that the order confirming the plan should still be revoked due to the “fraud perpetrated by the parties.” Conlan states that “[i]n each case, VIP exercised its standing to report the felonious 19 acts as new evidence or as fraud that in respondent’s eyes provided fresh grounds for a new Rule 20 9024 motion to reconsider a disallowed secured claim that, as it happens, was initially disallowed 21 without a contest.” He says, 22 There was no vexatious or piecemeal litigation. On the contrary: at all times, Respondent 23 complied with his duties to the tortfeasors to give them notice that his client was planning to bring a RICO cause of action against them, in part because of the pattern of 11 U.S.C. 24 152 violations that had occurred in the case. At all times, respondent provided the Court 25 notice of these violations as 18 U.S.C. 4 requires. At all times, even when he was ill and was unable to perform well, respondent litigated his client’s cause diligently in 26 bankruptcy in an attempt to reduce the injury to his client’s business and property.
27 According to Conlan, “movants did not complete their duty to moot VIP’s standing at RICO by 28 curing the very real injury to VIP’s property that they had knowingly and fraudulently caused.” 29 1 In response to the monetary sanctions requested by Negroni-Rodriguez, Conlan argues that 2 their attorney was representing part of the time debtor CDT and unreasonably duplicating the work 3 of CDT’s attorney. If the services were not “reasonably likely to benefit the estate” or “necessary 4 to the administration of the case,” Conlan argues principles of “reasonableness” precludes the court from awarding compensation to the professional, citing section 330(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I) and (II). Conlan 5 also argues that, even if VIP’s filings were completely incomprehensible, the court cannot award 6 CDT monetary sanctions for $3,240 in fees related to issues still pending on appeal and outside 7 the scope of this proceeding.3 8 IV. Sanctions 9 a. Bankruptcy Rule 9011 10 11 Bankruptcy Rule 9011 states: 12 (b) REPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a petition, pleading, written motion, or other 13 paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 14 circumstances, 15 (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 16 unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 17 (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by 18 existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 19 (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 20 specifically, so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 21 opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 22 (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically, so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 23 24 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(b). “This rule ‘emphasizes responsible behavior on the part of [attorneys]’ 25 and requires them ‘to conduct [themselves] in a manner bespeaking reasonable professionalism 26 and consistent with the orderly functioning of the judicial system.’” In re Hermosilla, 2011 Bankr. 27 3 On September 12, 2022, the district court entered judgment on case number 22-1140 (SCC) dismissing VIP’s appeal 28 with prejudice. Also, on September 7, 2023, the district court entered judgment on case number 22-1162 (GMM) dismissing VIP’s appeal, in part, for lack of jurisdiction; and affirming the court’s order denying VIP’s third motion 29 for reconsideration. At the time of this order, there is no pending appeal. 1 LEXIS 4285, *8 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011). “A violation of Rule 11 . . . might be caused by 2 inexperience, incompetence, willfulness, or deliberate choice.” Sylver v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs. (In 3 re Sylver), 214 B.R. 422, 428 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1997).4 “[Bankruptcy] Rule 9011 demands that 4 counsel’s actions comport with an objective standard of lawyerly performance.” In re Hermosilla, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4285 at *8. 5 “Courts generally apply an objective standard to determine whether a document was 6 presented for an improper purpose. Courts may infer the purpose of a filing from the consequences 7 of the motion, such as delaying the proceedings or creating ‘a persistent pattern of clearly abusive 8 litigation.’” White v. Burdick (In re CK Liquidation Corp.), 321 B.R. 355, 365 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 9 2005) (citation omitted) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Alla Medical Services, Inc., 855 F.2d 1470 10 (9th Cir. 1988)). “[Bankruptcy] Rule 9011(b)(1) prohibits presentation of a document for an 11 improper purpose. The rule lists harassment, delay or needless increase in litigation costs, but the 12 list is not exhaustive.” Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9011.04[7][a] (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer, 13 16th ed.). 14 However, it is pertinent to clarify that: [T]he court may not infer an improper purpose based solely on a finding that the legal 15 claims or contentions are frivolous, in the sense of not being supported by existing 16 law or a nonfrivolous argument for the extension of existing law, in violation of [Bankruptcy] Rule 9011(b)(2). This is because a finding that a paper was filed for an 17 improper purpose allows the court to impose sanctions on a represented party as well 18 as on the party’s attorney. In contrast, a simple finding that a frivolous legal argument has been asserted permits sanctions to be imposed only against a party’s attorney. A 19 represented party may not be sanctioned for the assertion of frivolous legal arguments or contentions. Therefore, the “improper purpose” of [Bankruptcy] Rule 20 9011(b)(1) must be something more than mere assertion of frivolous or unfounded 21 legal arguments or contentions that violate [Bankruptcy] Rule 9011(b)(2).”
22 Id. ¶ 9011.04[7][c].
23 “The focus is not whether the claim asserted was frivolous, but whether the attorney 24 conducted an adequate inquiry into the facts and the law before filing the claim.” In re Hermosilla, 25 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4285 at *8. “Whether a litigant breaches his or her duty to conduct a 26 reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law depends on the objective reasonableness of the 27
28 4 Because Bankruptcy Rule 9011 is derived from Rule 11, “Rule 11 jurisprudence is largely transferable to [Bankruptcy] Rule 9011 cases.” Featherston v. Goldman (In re D.C. Sullivan Co.), 843 F.2d 596, 598 (1st Cir. 1988). 29 1 litigant’s conduct under the totality of the circumstances.” CQ Int'l Co. v. Rochem Int'l, Inc., USA, 2 659 F. 3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2011). “In assessing whether an attorney’s actions were objectively 3 unreasonable ‘a court may infer intent from a total lack of factual or legal basis for a suit.”’ Burda 4 v. M. Ecker Co., 2 F.3d 769, 777 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Overnite Transp. Co. v. Chicago Indus. Tire Co., 697 F.2d 789, 794-95 (7th Cir. 1983)). 5 The court has discretion to impose sanctions against attorneys under Bankruptcy Rule 6 9011. If the court finds that Bankruptcy Rule 9011 has been violated “it may impose ‘an 7 appropriate sanction’ upon the parties that have violated the rule.” Kristan v. Turner (In re Kristan), 8 395 B.R. 500, 504 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008). However, the court is not required to do so. In re Alonso, 9 546 B.R. 1, 11 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2016). 10 Bankruptcy Rule 9011 provides in pertinent part: 11 A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. 12 Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, 13 or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, and order directing 14 payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. 15 16 (A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2). 17 18 (B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims 19 made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 20 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(c)(2). Factors that a court should consider when determining to impose 21 Bankruptcy Rule 9011(c) include: 22 whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; whether it was part of a pattern of activity, or an isolated event; whether it infected the entire pleading, or 23 only one particular count or defense; whether the person has engaged in similar 24 conduct in other litigation; whether it was intended to injure; what effect it had on the litigation process in time or expense; whether the responsible person is trained in 25 the law; what amount, given the financial resources of the responsible person, is needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case; what amount is needed 26 to deter similar activity by other litigants. 27 Dibbs v. Gonsalves, 921 F. Supp. 44, 55 (D.P.R. 1996) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes to 28 Rule 11); In re Alonso, 546 B.R. at 12. 29 1 As to the purpose of Bankruptcy Rule 9011 sanctions, the First Circuit Bankruptcy 2 Appellate Panel stated the following: 3 Sanctions generally serve a dual purpose of deterrence and compensation. With respect to deterrence, a court should limit the sanction to “what is sufficient to deter 4 repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” With respect to compensation, reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses incurred as a result 5 of the sanctionable conduct may appropriately form the basis of a Bankruptcy Rule 6 9011 sanction.
7 Kristan v. Turner (In re Turner), 395 B.R. at 510 (citations omitted). Monetary sanctions “must be 8 ‘appropriate;’ and an ‘appropriate’ sanction ‘may include an order to pay . . . the amount of the 9 reasonable expenses incurred because of the [improper] filing . . ., including a reasonable 10 attorney’s fee.’” Bay State Towing Co. v. Barge Am. 21, 899 F.2d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 1990) 11 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11). “While reaffirming the inherent power of the district court to issue sanctions on counsel, 12 the First Circuit has reiterated that these powers should be ‘exercised with restraint and 13 circumspection.’” Pimentel-Soto, 957 F.3d 82, 87 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Horn, 14 29 F.3d 754, 760 (1st Cir. 1994)). “The court should impose sanctions which are fair, reasonable, 15 and bear some relation to both the attorney’s ability to pay and his culpability.” Holling v. United 16 States, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20121, *13, (E.D. Mich. 1995), R. & R. adopted, Holling v. United 17 States, 934 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Mich. 1996). 18 Also, a bankruptcy court may issue injunctions or restrictions on further filings if: 19 (1) the litigant receives notice and a chance to be heard before the court enters the order; (2) there is an adequate record of the cases or abusive activities undertaken by 20 the litigant; (3) the court makes a substantive finding that the claims brought were 21 frivolous or were brought with the intent to harass the parties; and (4) the scope of the injunction is narrowly prescribed to fit the abuse that the court seeks to prevent. 22 Kristan v. Turner (In re Turner), 395 B.R. at 511. 23 b. Counsel’s Liability for Excessive Costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 24 Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that: 25 [a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United 26 States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the 27 excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such 28 conduct.
29 1 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 2 Although both Rule 9011 and § 1927 have this same underlying purpose, the conduct which triggers their operation is different. Rule 9011 comes into play when an 3 attorney or a party signs and submits a pleading or other paper, the contents of which 4 have not been subject to a reasonable inquiry or which is not well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 5 modification, or reversal of existing law. In contrast, § 1927 is directed against conduct which unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies the proceedings in any case. 6 To an extent these two provisions overlap, so that the same act may constitute a 7 violation of either or both of them. 8 In re Sowers, 97 B.R. 480, 484 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989). “[T]he fairest reading of section 1927 and 9 its legislative history suggests that the statute’s purpose is both to ‘deter frivolous litigation and 10 abusive practices by attorneys and to ensure that those who create unnecessary costs also bear 11 them.’” Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 247 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Riddle & Assocs., P.C. v. Kelly, 414 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2005)). 12 The First Circuit Court has stated that: 13 Behavior is ‘vexatious’ when it is harassing or annoying, regardless of whether it is 14 intended to be so. Thus, if an attorney's conduct in multiplying proceedings is 15 unreasonable and harassing or annoying, sanctions may be imposed under section 1927. The attorney need not intend to harass or annoy by his conduct nor be guilty 16 of conscious impropriety to be sanctioned. It is enough that an attorney acts in disregard of whether his conduct constitutes harassment or vexation, thus displaying 17 a ‘serious and studied disregard for the orderly process of justice.’ (Citations 18 omitted).
19 Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626, 632 (1st Cir. 1990).
20 “The appropriate inquiry under § 1927 is ‘on a course of conduct.’” Castellanos Grp. Law 21 Firm, L.L.C. v. FDIC (MJS Las Croabas Props.), 545 B.R. 401, 421 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016) (quoting 22 Bowler v. United States INS, 901 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. N.Y. 1995)). “There must be some causal 23 connection between the conduct and the continuation of proceedings that otherwise would not have 24 occurred.” Id. 25 V. Fact Findings and Legal Analysis In the present case and under a totality of the circumstances analysis, the court finds that 26 sanctions are warranted against Conlan pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011(c) and under 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1927. The record is filled with numerous filings that attempted to relitigate the court’s final and 28 unappealable order denying the secured status of VIP’s claim (Bankr. Dkt. No. 134). A year after 29 1 the final order was entered by the court and became unappealable, VIP commenced a consistent 2 and extensive battle to relitigate the status of its proof of claim. The movants identified numerous 3 filings attempting to relitigate the secured status of VIP’s proof of claim. After a review of the 4 challenged papers, the court concludes that the intent of the following filings was to improperly relitigate final and unappealable court’s orders in violation of Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b)(1): 5 1. Objection to Banco Popular’s claims numbers 16, 17, 18, and 19 (Bankr. Dkt. No. 268). 6 2. Motion to file amended proof of claim number 15 arguing that its claim was presented in 7 the Property Registry as a mechanics lien perfected pursuant to 29 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, 8 § 196. (Bankr. Dkt. No. 284). 9 3. Objection to the third amended stipulation by CDT and Banco Popular as modified, 10 alleging VIP’s secured status (Bankr. Dkt. No. 285). 11 4. Motion for reconsideration regarding the court’s order denying the motion to amend proof 12 of claim number 15 (Bankr. Dkt. No. 347). 13 5. Motion requesting administrative payment in the amount of $172,663.20 arguing that 14 “under the Law of Restitution, VIP Energy Consultants Corp. is entitled to cost-savings arising from DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION’s unlicensed invasion of its exclusive right to 15 use its tax-exempt machinery to generate electricity.” (Bankr. Dkt. No. 348). 16 6. Amended claim number 15-3 asserting, once again, a secured claim (Bankr. Dkt. No. 386). 17 7. Objection to confirmation of debtor’s plan of reorganization (Bankr. Dkt. No. 413). 18 8. Motion to supplement VIP’s omnibus objection to claims filed by Banco Popular (Bankr. 19 Dkt. No. 419). 20 9. Answer to objection to claim (Bankr. Dkt. No. 424). 21 10. Objection to claim 16,17,18, and 19 by Claimant Banco Popular (Bankr. Dkt. No. 432). 22 11. Adversary proceeding against CDT, Banco Popular, Eduardo Rodriguez Vazquez, Isabel 23 Negroni Serrano and their conjugal partnership; among other parties (Adv. Proc. No. 22- 24 0007). As part of the allegations included in the adversary proceeding, VIP requested the 25 disallowance of Banco Popular claims 16-1, 17-1, 18-1 and 19-1 (Bankr. Dkt. No. 436). 12. Reconsideration on the disallowance of the secured claim (Bankr. Dkt. No. 440). 26 13. Opposition to CDT’s request for writ of cancellation, arguing that the matter was not ripe 27 for adjudication. VIP re-alleged it had a secured claim and that the adversary proceeding 28 was pending adjudication. (Bankr. Dkt. No. 487). 29 1 14. Motion for reconsideration of the court’s order denying its opposition for entry of writ 2 (Bankr. Dkt. No. 534). 3 15. Requests to stay of the confirmation order pending the resolutions of the adversary 4 proceeding and the two appeals (Bankr. Dkt. No. 539). 16. Urgent motion requesting the court to vacate the order to the Registrar for the cancelation 5 of the lien and to impose a stay on the distributions under the confirmed plan (Bankr. Dkt. 6 No. 550). 7 The numerous and extensive papers filed flouted procedural rules, disregarded the finality of 8 the court’s orders, and therefore, were filed vexatiously and for an improper purpose. Also, the 9 numerous filings and papers contained convoluted, incomprehensible, and unintelligible legal and 10 factual arguments in violation of Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b)(2) and (b)(3). The filings also 11 contained incomprehensible references to an excessive number of exhibits. Numerous examples 12 of incomprehensible and/or convoluted filings were identified by the movants. After a thorough 13 review, the court finds that the following papers demonstrate a consistent pattern of papers which 14 contain convoluted, incomprehensible, and unintelligible legal and factual arguments: 1. Objection to Banco Popular’s claims numbers 16, 17, 18, and 19 (Bankr. Dkt. No. 268). 15 2. Motion to inform regarding official translations and errata for omnibus Objection to 16 BPPR’s secured claims (Bankr. Dkt. No. 282). 17 3. Objection to third amended stipulation between CDT and Banco Popular (Bankr. Dkt. No. 18 285). 19 4. Motion submitting documents in support of tables in objection to third amended stipulation, 20 including 22 exhibits (Bankr. Dkt. No. 288). 21 5. Request for extension of time to reply to motions filed by CDT and/or Banco Popular 22 regarding dockets number 295, 296, and 308 (Bankr. Dkt. No. 328). 23 6. Motion for allowance of administrative payment for debtor-in-possession’s use of VIP 24 Energy Consultants Corp. personal property to generate electricity (Bankr. Dkt. No. 348). 25 7. Motion requesting extension of time to respond to Wallace Vazquez Sanabria, Esquire’s application for compensation and motion to request the court to preserve the docket in light 26 of the concealment that would arise from granting Banco Popular’s motions to strike 27 (Bankr. Dkt. No. 383). 28 29 1 8. Opposition to sanctions and Motion to disqualify Wallace Vazquez Sanabria (Bankr. Dkt. 2 No. 391). 3 9. Objection to confirmation of debtor’s plan of reorganization (Bankr. Dkt. No.413). 4 10. Motion for reconsideration of order approving the disclosure statement (Bankr. Dkt. No. 415). 5 11. Motion to supplement VIP’s omnibus objection to claims filed by Banco Popular (Bankr. 6 Dkt. No. 419). 7 12. Answer to objection to claim (Bankr. Dkt. No. 424). 8 13. Objection to claim 16,17,18, and 19 by Claimant Banco Popular (Bankr. Dkt. No. 432). 9 14. Reconsideration on the disallowance of the secured claim (Bankr. Dkt. No. 440). 10 15. Additional reconsideration to the approval of the disclosure statement (Bankr. Dkts. Nos. 11 450 and 451). 12 16. Motion to strike document (Bankr. Dkt. No. 457). 13 17. Opposition to Motion for entry of Order and Motion to show cause why confirmed plan 14 ought not be rescinded and/or revoked (Bankr. Dkt. No. 463). 18. Motion for reconsideration of the court’s order denying its opposition for entry of writ 15 (Bankr. Dkt. No. 534). 16 19. Requests to stay of the confirmation order pending the resolutions of the adversary 17 proceeding and the two appeals (Bankr. Dkt. No. 539). 18 20. Opposition to Banco Popular’s Motion to inform sounding as motion to hold in abeyance 19 adjudication of VIP’s motion (Bankr. Dkt. No. 541). 20 21. Urgent motion requesting the court to vacate the order to the Registrar for the cancelation 21 of the lien, to hold in abeyance consummation of the plan and to impose a stay on the 22 distributions under the confirmed plan (Bankr. Dkt. No. 550). 23 22. Opposition to urgent motion on risk of denial of due process and other grounds (Bankr. 24 Dkt. No. 613). 25 23. Motion to inform intervenor motion to amend the partial judgment in the adversary proceeding (Bankr. Dkt. No. 643). 26 24. Objection to Application for Final Decree as ruled-barred and unripe (Bankr. Dkt. No. 27 658). 28 29 1 Also, Conlan flouted the rules by filing numerous supplements, replies and amendments to re- 2 litigate matters in disregard to the finality of the court’s orders, such as the following additional 3 papers: 4 1. Motion submitting documents in support of tables in objection to third amended stipulation, including 22 exhibits (Bankr. Dkt. No. 288). 5 2. Motion to supplement VIP’s omnibus objection to claims filed by Banco Popular (Bankr. 6 Dkt. No. 419). 7 3. Opposition to Banco Popular’s Motion to Inform sounding as motion to hold in abeyance 8 adjudication of VIP’s motion (Bankr. Dkt. No. 541). 9 4. Opposition to Banco Popular’s Motion to Inform sounding as motion to hold in abeyance 10 adjudication of VIP’s motion (Docket number 541). 11 Behind the theories and accusations of fraud and mishandling by CDT, its principals, and 12 Banco Popular, Conlan’s primary objective was to improperly alter the court’s final order by which 13 VIP’s proof of claim was deemed unsecured. The court notes that by November 2021, Conlan was 14 lengthily and incomprehensively replying, objecting, or responding to almost every filing and order in the case. Such filings multiplied unreasonably and vexatiously the proceedings. The court 15 warned Conlan on several occasions regarding his conduct. However, he continued filing papers 16 with convoluted and unintelligible legal and factual arguments. 17 The adversary proceeding also evinces Conlan’s consistent and improper attempts to alter the 18 unsecured status of VIP’s proof of claim and to relitigate final orders. The pleading was convoluted 19 and unintelligible, containing allegations of fraud and racketeering. The pleading attempted to void 20 a final and unappealable state court judgment. The adversary proceeding re-challenged the value 21 of the collateral, the secured status of Banco Popular’s proof of claims and the right of ownership 22 of the photovoltaic system installed in CDT’s premises. All these matters had been previously 23 resolved by legal proceedings and orders, either in the state court or in this bankruptcy court. The 24 complaint, again, evidenced Conlan’s inconformity with this court’s determination of the 25 unsecured status of VIP’s proof of claim. It led to the Negroni- Rodriguez sanctions motion against Conlan. 26 The court notes that Conlan has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation. In Conlan v. 27 Mid-Atlantic Region Comm'n on Higher Educ., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197463, *6 (D.P.R. 2016), 28 the district court dismissed with prejudice a complaint filed by Conlan and found that the pleading 29 1 “overall” contained an “incomprehensible narrative and convoluted allegations which ultimately 2 do not state a plausible claim against any particular defendant.” 3 An objective review of the record supports the imposition of sanctions. Conlan’s inconformity 4 with the development of CDT’s bankruptcy reorganization motivated and resulted in the intentional, improper, unreasonable, and vexatious multiplication of the proceedings. Conlan 5 pursued unsupported legal remedies, disregarded the finality of court’s orders, and overtaxed the 6 parties’ and court’s resources in violation of Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. These 7 extensive and numerous filings prolonged the bankruptcy case unreasonably. The court finds that 8 these papers were filed for the improper purpose of delaying the CDT’s reorganization despite its 9 compliance with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. These numerous filings constitute a 10 persistent pattern of abusive litigation. 11 Also, Conlan’s litigation tactics exceeded the levels of acceptability. Among Conlan’s 12 excessive litigation tactics, the court highlights his unfounded personal accusations against 13 attorneys; his attempts to attribute to himself, on a personal level, “harms” under the alleged fraud 14 schemes; and his continued attempts to represent VIP even after withdrawing as its legal representative. 15 For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that the Negroni-Rodriguez’s request for 16 monetary sanctions against Conlan are warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Therefore, the court 17 orders Conlan to pay them the amount of $3,000.00 in monetary sanctions. 18 Also, for the reasons set forth above, the court finds that CDT’s requests for monetary sanctions 19 against Conlan are warranted under Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b). Therefore, the court orders Conlan 20 to pay CDT the amount of $3,000.00 in monetary sanctions. 21 Additionally, the court finds that non-monetary sanctions against Conlan are appropriate. 22 Conlan is hence barred from filing any papers or motions in representation of VIP in the main case 23 and the adversary proceeding. If VIP needs to appear in either, it must do so through new legal 24 representation. The court, in its discretion, concludes that all other remedies requested by the 25 movants are unnecessary under the totality of the circumstances of these proceedings. Although the monetary sanctions imposed by the court are less than the movants requested, the court believes 26 27 28 29 1 dollar amount of the imposed sanctions is sufficient to deter repetition of the sanctione 2 | |conduct.° 3 ||/VI. Conclusion The court grants Negroni-Rodriguez’s request for monetary sanctions against Conlan unde 5 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (Bankr. Dtk. No. 609; Adv. Proc. Dkt. No. 105). Therefore, the court orders ‘ Conlan to pay them the amount of $3,000.00.00 in monetary sanctions. Also, the court grants CDT’s requests for monetary sanctions against Conlan unde Bankruptcy Rule 901 1(c) (Bankr. Dkt. No. 389; supplemented at Bankr. Dkt. No. 636). Therefore ° the court orders that Conlan pay CDT the amount of $3,000.00 in monetary sanctions. ° Additionally, the court finds that non-monetary sanctions against Conlan also ar +0 appropriate. Conlan is hence barred from filing any papers or motions in representation of VIP 1 11 | \the main case and the adversary proceeding. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. ‘8 In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 8 day of September, 2023. 14 15 cl. S74 7 Edward A. United States Bankruptcy 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The court also notes that even though the court strongly urged Conlan on several occasions to hire separate counse ° sctend against the sanction motions, Conlan repeatedly represented to the court that he did not have the resource