In re Carbon Dioxide Industry Antitrust Litigation

155 F.R.D. 209, 1993 WL 661469
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedJuly 12, 1993
DocketNo. M.D.L. 940
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 155 F.R.D. 209 (In re Carbon Dioxide Industry Antitrust Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Carbon Dioxide Industry Antitrust Litigation, 155 F.R.D. 209, 1993 WL 661469 (M.D. Fla. 1993).

Opinion

ORDER

FAWSETT, District Judge.

This ease is before the Court upon the following matters:

1. Defendants’ Joint Motion to Compel Responses by Class Plaintiffs to Defendants’ Joint Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents and Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion and Defendants’ Certificate of Counsel Pursuant to Local Rule 3.04 (Doe. No. 161, filed May 27, 1993); Response of Plaintiff Sehwan’s Sales Enterprises, Inc. in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion to Compel Plaintiffs’ Production of Documents and Response to Interrogatories (Doc. No. 168, filed June 9, 1993); and Class Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion to Compel Responses by Class Plaintiffs to Defendants’ Joint Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents and Joint Motion to Set a Schedule for Discovery by All Parties (Doc. No. 172, filed June 14, 1993).

Defendants seek to compel discovery responses from non-class representatives, contending that “name” Plaintiffs are always subject to discovery, even though they have not been designated as class representatives. Class Plaintiffs, on behalf of the non-representative class members, argue that absent class members are generally not subject to discovery and therefore the non-representative “name” Plaintiffs in this action should not be subject to discovery either.

In the instant case, Defendants seek discovery from Plaintiffs who initially filed actions in this multi-district litigation as named Plaintiffs, but who subsequently were not chosen as representative parties for class purposes. By virtue of not being chosen as class representatives, these Plaintiffs remain as passive class members, on equal footing with all other non-representative class mem[212]*212bers.1 The efficiencies of a class action would be thwarted if routine discovery of absent class members is permitted, particularly on the issue of liability. In certifying the class, this Court found that the claims of the class representatives were typical of the class as a whole. This issue was expressly discussed in the discovery context at the Court’s initial hearing in this ease on October 28, 1992. Plaintiffs’ counsel stated that rather than having eleven or twelve class representatives, Plaintiffs would select three or four companies, and “those will be the cases if defendants want those will be the party plaintiffs if defendants want discovery, to whom they should address it.” (Doc. No. 22, p. 85). The Court then inquired of Mr. Burke, representing the Defendants, by asking: “Mr. Burke, is there any response to that?” to which Mr. Burke responded, “No, your Honor.” (Doe. No. 22, pp. 85-86). As this dialogue shows, Defendants were on notice that discovery would be limited to the class representatives.

Moreover, there is no indication that the information sought from the non-representative class members differs in any way from the information already provided by the class representatives. Defendants have not argued that they have a particularized need to obtain information not available from the class representatives. Absent a showing of such particularized need, the Court will not permit general discovery from passive class members. This determination is supported by the legal authority in this Circuit, see, e.g., Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1555-57 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883, 107 S.Ct. 274, 93 L.Ed.2d 250 (1986), as well as decisions from other courts in other Circuits. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 104 F.R.D. 559, 562 n. 1 (E.D.N.Y.1985); United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 101,104-05 (D.D.C.1976). The Court, following Eleventh Circuit precedent, is not persuaded by the rationale of Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921, 92 S.Ct. 957, 30 L.Ed.2d 792 (1972) and In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 260 (N.D.Ill.1979) upon which Defendants would rely.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Joint Motion to Compel Responses by Class Plaintiffs to Defendants’ Joint Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents (Doc. No. 161) is DENIED in accordance with this Order.

2. Defendants’ Joint Motion to Set a Schedule for the Production of Documents by All Parties and for Answers to Defendants’ Interrogatories by All Named Plaintiffs and Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion (Doe. No. 164, filed June 1,1993); Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Joint Motion to Set a Schedule for the Production of Documents by All Parties and for Answers to Defendants Interrogatories by All Named Plaintiffs (Doe. No. 169, filed June 9, 1993); and Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion to Set a Schedule for Discovery by All Parties (Doc. No. 172, filed June 4, 1993).

Defendants seek to require simultaneous production of all outstanding discovery and to include non-representative class members in its discovery requests. The Court has determined, above, that non-representative class members shall not be subject to discovery absent a showing of a particularized need for information that cannot be obtained from the class representatives.

In addition, all discovery requests that were previously subject to orders of this Court should have been completed. One party’s compliance with a Court Order may not be conditioned upon another party’s compliance.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Joint Motion to Set a Schedule for the Production of Documents by All Parties and for Answers to Defendants’ Interrogatories by All Named Plaintiffs (Doc. No. 164) is DENIED in accordance with this Order. Any discovery ordered produced by this Court that is still outstanding shall be produced within five (5) days from the date of this Order. Failure to [213]*213comply with this Order may result in the imposition of sanctions.

3. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Production of Computer Data in Response to Defendants’ Second Joint Document Request and Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 167, filed June 8, 1993); Notice of Withdrawal as to Plaintiff Seven-Up Bottling Company of Defendants’ Motion to Compel Production of Computer Data in Response to Defendants’ Second Joint Document Request (Doc. No. 173, filed June 15, 1993); Reply of Class Action Plaintiffs to Defendants’ Motion to Compel Production of Computer Data in Response to Defendants’ Second Joint Document Request (Doc. No. 175, filed June 16, 1993); and Individual Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Compel Production of Computer Data (Doe. No. 184, filed June 22, 1993).

In accordance with the rulings above, the only remaining issue in Defendants’ Motion is the production of computer data from individual, non-class Plaintiffs. Upon consideration, the Court will conduct a fifteen (15) minute telephonic hearing at 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, July 13, 1993 to consider Defendants’ Motion as it pertains to the individual, non-class Plaintiffs in this case. Counsel for Defendants shall be responsible for arranging the conference call connections and contacting the Court at 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, July 13, 1993, when all of the interested parties are connected.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
155 F.R.D. 209, 1993 WL 661469, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-carbon-dioxide-industry-antitrust-litigation-flmd-1993.