In Re Butler

42 B.R. 777, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5478
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedJune 15, 1984
DocketBankruptcy PB 83-101
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 42 B.R. 777 (In Re Butler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Butler, 42 B.R. 777, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5478 (Ark. 1984).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES G. MIXON, Bankruptcy Judge.

On May 5, 1983 the debtors, Oregon B. Butler, Jr. and Lavelle Butler, filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Schedules were filed May 20, 1983. The disclosure statement and a proposed plan of reorganization were filed on September 2, 1983. The disclosure statement was approved after notice and a hearing as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1125.

On February 21, 1984 the debtors filed a “First Modification to Plan,” and the confirmation hearing was held on April 19, 1984 at Pine Bluff, Arkansas.

Objections to confirmation were filed by John Deere Company, International Harvester Credit Corporation, Massey Ferguson Credit Corporation, the Pioneer Production Credit Association, and The Federal Land Bank of St. Louis. The confirmation hearing was held on April 19, 1984 and, prior to the beginning of the testimony, John Deere Company withdrew its objection.

International Harvester Credit Corporation objects to the provision in the plan which proposes to pay its claim in full by the surrender of a “95 Combine.” International Harvester takes the position that it is undersecured, and the plan does not propose to pay the unsecured portion of its claim.

Massey Ferguson Credit Corporation objects and alleges that the plan is not feasible, that there is not a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation, and that the plan has not been proposed in good faith. Objection is also made to this creditor’s treatment under the plan, which proposes to pay zero because the debtors allege that they hold a setoff for breach of warranty.

Pioneer Production Credit Association lists numerous objections, including lack of good faith, unfair discrimination, not fair and equitable, not feasible, and, generally, failure of the plan to meet the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129.

The Federal Land Bank of St. Louis argues that the plan fails to comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1123 in that it does not specify if the Land Bank is fully or partially impaired or fully or partially secured and that there is no provision for payment of interest, as well as other objections.

After failing to obtain approval of the plan by all classes, the debtors orally moved that the plan nevertheless be confirmed under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).

The Court in reaching its decision has considered the following:

1. The bankruptcy petition and the schedules;
2. The original plan and disclosure statement filed on September 2,1983;
3. The exhibits attached to the disclosure statement;
4. The First Modified Plan of Reorganization;
5. The claims filed by all creditors;
6. The testimony of witnesses at the confirmation hearing on April 19, 1984;
7. Arguments and briefs submitted by counsel; and
8. The pleadings filed by the parties.

The plan cannot be confirmed for the reasons set out below:

For a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 to be confirmed, the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129 must be met. This section has eleven conditions for confirmation and all must be met except No. 8 which provides that each class must accept the plan, or be unimpaired. A plan may still be confirmed over the objection of one or more classes if the plan nevertheless satisfies all of the other requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) and the “cram down”

*780 standards set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). 5 Collier on Bankruptcy § 1129.03 (15th Ed.1982).

The Court in this discussion will consider the plan against each of these requirements in order. In addition to the consideration of objections raised by creditors, the Court has a mandatory independent duty to determine whether the plan has met all of the requirements for confirmation. See, In Re Economy Cast Stone Company, 16 B.R. 647 (1981); In Re Maxim Industries, Inc., 22 B.R. 611 (1982); Matter of Nikron, Inc., 27 B.R. 773 (1983); In Re Sullivan, 26 B.R. 677 (1982); In Re Coastal Equities, Inc., 33 B.R. 898 (1983).

I.

§ 1129(a)(1)

The plan complies with the applicable provisions of this chapter.

In the Court’s view, the plan does not comply with this section for several reasons. 11 U.S.C. § 1123 provides in part as follows:

(a) A plan shall—
(1) designate, subject to section 1122 of this title, classes of claims other than claims of a kind specified in section 501(a)(1), 507(a)(2), or 507(a)(6) of this title and classes of interests:
(2) specify any class of claims or interests that is not impaired under the plan;
(3) shall specify the treatment of any class of claims or interests that is impaired under the plan;
(4) provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class, unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment of such particular claim or interest;

Class IV are creditors whose claims are unsecured and exceed $500 in amount. Article III of the plan provides for the treatment of all classes under the plan. Not one sentence under Article III deals with treatment of claims in Class IV, except one indirect comment regarding interest. The plan does not state what percentage this class will receive, nor when it will be paid. In 5 Collier on Bankruptcy § 1123.01[3] (15th Ed.1982), it is stated:

Even though the plan proposes to pay creditors of a class the full amount of their claim at some date certain or over some specified period of time after the effective date of the plan, if the legal rights of such class are altered then such will be impaired since the class is not receiving cash payment on the effective date of the plan pursuant to § 1124(3). Therefore, § 1123(a)(3) requires the plan to specify the amount of payments to be made and the date when such payments will be due.

See, also, In Re Polytherm Industries, Inc., 33 B.R. 823 (1983).

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Bluebook (online)
42 B.R. 777, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5478, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-butler-areb-1984.