In Re Fursman Ranch

38 B.R. 907, 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 669, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5934, 11 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 985
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedApril 6, 1984
Docket16-30623
StatusPublished
Cited by33 cases

This text of 38 B.R. 907 (In Re Fursman Ranch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Fursman Ranch, 38 B.R. 907, 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 669, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5934, 11 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 985 (Mo. 1984).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOEL PELOFSKY, Bankruptcy Judge.

In the plan proposed by debtors, interest on the secured debt was to be paid at 8.5%. Two classes of secured creditors rejected the plan on that ground, also asserting that the plan was not feasible. In an Order dated December 2, 1983, the Court sustained the objection to the proposed interest rate and directed that the plan be redrawn to conform to the rate designated.

Debtor thereafter filed an amended plan which proposed to convey to Federal Land Bank (Land Bank) and to Northeast Kansas Production Credit Association (PCA) a portion of the real property in which the creditors held security interests while paying for the remaining retained real property in cash. An evidentiary hearing was held on this proposal. After the taking of evidence the Court ruled from the bench that this plan could not be confirmed because the values assigned by debtor to the real property to be conveyed to the creditors were too high. Debtor was given time to make an alternate proposal and did so, reducing the values of the real property be conveyed.

Both Land Bank and PCA objected to this 3rd amended plan as to the value assigned to the real property and feasibility. A hearing was held at which time the parties appeared by counsel and representatives. Evidence was heard and the matter taken under advisement.

Because the creditors have rejected the plan, if there is to be confirmation it must be in accordance with the provisions of Section 1129(b) of the Code, Title 11, U.S.C. Generally a plan may be confirmed under this section “if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims ... that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan”. As to secured claims, to be fair and equitable, the plan must provide:

“(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the lien securing such claims, whether the property subject to such lien is retained by the debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is subject to the lien securing such claims, free and clear of such lien, with such lien to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such lien on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this subpara-graph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such claims”.

As to property to be kept by debtor, the creditors will retain their liens. As to the property proposed to be surrendered, the lien will merge into possession by the secured creditor. The balance of the claim will be paid by deferred cash payments at the interest rate previously set by the Court. There is no sale proposed. It would appear that the plan proposed to give creditors the indubitable equivalent of their claims.

I

The concept of indubitable equivalence coined in In re Murel Holding Corporation, 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir.1935) arose in a factual context in which the holder of the first mortgage was asked to defer repayment of its claim, except for interest, for a period of ten years. The Court noted that confirmation of a reorganization without the consent of a secured creditor must be in the context of adequate protection that *909 was “completely compensatory”. 75 F.2d at 942. The court held that a creditor was entitled to either money or collateral and could not be compelled to wait a long time when adequate protection was dubious.

Whether expressly or otherwise the concept of adequate protection by indubitable equivalency is well settled in the case law. In re Cooper, 22 B.R. 718 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.1982); In re Greenwood Bldg. Supply, Inc., 23 B.R. 720 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1982); In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 B.R. 819 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.1982). Here the creditors concede that the value of the assets exceed the claims against them. The real issue to creditors is feasibility.

But it is necessary to discuss the concept of adequate protection in order to evaluate whether the plan here gives creditors the indubitable equivalent of their collateral. The Court holds that there is no statutory .bar in the Code to the plan proposed here to return part of the collateral and pay for the balance. Cf. Section 1124 of the Code.

II

There is a dispute as to whether debtor is taking a proper credit for the collateral it will surrender to Land Bank and PCA. The initial payback was rejected by the Court because the real estate values were too high. Land Bank property was valued at $600 per acre and PCA land at $1,000 per acre. In the calculations supporting the third amended plan debtor values the real estate from $475 to $780 per acre. Land Bank and PCA have requested the appointment of an independent appraiser to provide unbiased testimony as to the value of the real estate to be surrendered.

There has been testimony with respect to those values, based upon actual sales. While additional testimony may enable the Court to make more precise choices within the range of values, there is no dispute that appraisals are only estimates and even the price obtained at sale is influenced by the type of sale conducted and the amount of time available to find buyers. Matter of Crockett, 3 B.R. 365 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.1980). The motion for the appointment of an independent appraiser is denied as providing only surplusage.

When a lender takes a secured position in real estate it does so based upon a purchase price and current values as well as its best estimate of the future value of the property. None of these factors is insurance against a loss at the time of default and foreclosure. It is appropriate, therefore, for the Court to evaluate the real estate in the context of this plan, and not require that debtor sell the property or that creditor dispose of it before a value is fixed.

The land to be surrendered is both pasture and cropland. Three tracts are 80, 240 and 320 acres respectively and the fourth is 1187 acres. Generally, prices per acre for small tracts are better than those for larger tracts. Cropland is more valuable than pastureland. Substantial evidence has been introduced as to comparable sales and soil composition. Debtors have owned the property for so many years that purchase prices are not persuasive. The market is mildly depressed but there is activity.

No evidence was introduced to show the sale price of a large tract. Comparables for tracts of up to 320 acres were presented. These ranged from $269 per acre to $800 per acre. In its proposal debtor values the property from $475 to $780 per acre. The highest value is for cropland in smaller tracts.

The Court is obliged to value collateral “in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing ...

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
38 B.R. 907, 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 669, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5934, 11 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 985, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-fursman-ranch-mowb-1984.