In Re Benford

14 B.R. 157, 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 79, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2936, 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 117
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky
DecidedSeptember 21, 1981
Docket19-30469
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 14 B.R. 157 (In Re Benford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Benford, 14 B.R. 157, 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 79, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2936, 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 117 (Ky. 1981).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MERRITT S. DEITZ, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

At issue is whether a secured creditor paid through a Chapter 13 plan is entitled to interest on its allowed claim, and if so at what rate. The secured creditor, The First National Bank of Louisville, has a security interest in the debtor’s 1979 Chevrolet Monte Carlo on which the outstanding loan balance is $6,626.60. The loan payoff at the time of filing, which the bank in its brief asserted was also the fair market value of the car, was $5,654.89. A court appointed appraiser, however, fixed the car’s value at $5,225.00, and that was the amount we fixed for the secured claim in confirming the plan.

Before we begin our analysis of the principal questions in this case, we first need to resolve a question regarding that portion of the bank’s claim which is unsecured. The confirmation provides that the bank is secured to the extent of $5,225.00 and unsecured to the extent of $1,401.60. The unsecured portion of the claim should instead be $429.89, the difference of $5,225.00 and the allowed claim, exclusive of unmatured interest, of $5,654.89.

The original figure for the unsecured amount is incorrect because it includes un-matured interest amounting to $971.71. *158 Pursuant to Section 502(b)(2), if objected to, unmatured interest is excluded from an allowed claim.

Benford also questions in her brief the value of $5,225 placed on the secured car. To some degree, she concedes the answer to the threshold question in this case— that the bank should be permitted to recover an amount equal to the car’s present value if the present value is paid over time.

But Benford contends that $5,225 exceeds the worth of the car; that $5,225 is the fair market value instead of the liquidation value — the value Benford claims should be used — and that the excessive value placed on the car compensates the bank for receiving payments over time on its claim. We reject this argument.

The car’s value of $5,225 was arrived at by an independent, court-appointed appraiser. No valuation hearing was requested and none was held. No one objected to the appraiser’s estimate and no alternative value was proposed. Further, nowhere in the appraisal is it indicated that the value arrived at was the fair market value or that the liquidation value was not taken into account; the debtor merely makes that assumption.

We therefore accept as an accurate estimate of the car’s worth the appraisal of $5,225, but do so without making any judgment on whether that figure is the fair market value, liquidation value, or a combination of the two. We reserve the question of what is the appropriate valuation method for a time when it is raised in the proper procedural framework. Accordingly, we cannot say that the car is overvalued, and, as the debtor suggests, that the overvaluation compensates the bank for receiving the car’s present value in the future.

With all supplemental questions aside, we come now to the crucial questions in this case — whether the bank is entitled to interest on its claim and if so at what rate.

The question of interest on Chapter 13 secured claims arises out of the requirement of Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) that a court confirm a plan only if,

with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan ... the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim;

The problem results when the value of a claim “as of the effective date of the plan” is paid through the plan over a period of time. One need not possess a great deal of business and financial acumen to appreciate that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow. More appropriately, $5,225 is worth more today than it will be in the future, or, stated in the obverse, $5,225 paid next year is worth less than $5,225 paid today.

To account for the obvious economic shortfall to the secured creditor paid over time, an incremental adjustment needs to be made. Courts without exception have concluded that the best way to provide a secured creditor paid over time with the equivalent of “the value, as of the effective date of the plan” of a claim is to fix an appropriate interest rate on the claim over the course of the payment period. We agree.

Awarding interest is the simplest and most straightforward method of providing for the present value equivalent of a claim. 1 We specifically reject the debtor’s implicit suggestion that the future equivalent of a claim’s present value can be provided by inflating the value of the secured property. It would be much more certain to work with an established interest rate, whatever it might be, than to fictitiously increase every secured claim at the time it is valued.

The difficulty, as reflected by the divergence of opinion on this issue, is in determining what rate of interest best reflects the present value equivalent of a claim paid over time.

We have examined all of the relevant case law in the area and find unsatisfactory *159 all of the methods for determining interest used thus far. The rates courts have set .have ranged from 9% 2 to a 25.98% annual percentage rate. 3 However, the interest rates applied are not nearly as important as the method used to arrive at them. What is of paramount importance is that the rate be reasonably responsive to current economic conditions.

We therefore concur with the spirit of the statement made by a district court in overruling a bankruptcy court’s allowance of a 10% rate of interest, “The rate established in In re Lum [of 10%] in 1979 is simply inadequate and unreasonable in 1980 and 1981 ...” 4

In that case, Memphis Bank & Trust Company v. Walker, the Court concluded that the contract rate of 15.98%, which approximated the average prime interest rate for the previous two'years, was most suitable, in light of all equities, to compensate the bank for not receiving the value of its secured claim immediately.

Other courts have also employed the contract rate approach for providing a present value equivalent. 5 They have relied in part on the legislative history of Section 502(b), the provision that disallows unmatured interest on a claim. That legislative history states a presumption that the “discount rate”, a term courts have used interchangeably with the phrase “present value equivalent”, is equivalent to the contract rate.

We note, however, that because this presumption is provided in the context of the allowability of claims, its applicability to this type of case, where present value needs to be maintained over time, may be somewhat limited.

The touchstone of providing present value of a claim to be paid in the future is responsiveness to current market conditions. A rule that the contract rate applies would lack such responsiveness.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
14 B.R. 157, 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 79, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2936, 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 117, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-benford-kywb-1981.