In Re: Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litigation

236 F. Supp. 3d 150, 2017 WL 680378, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23486
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedFebruary 21, 2017
DocketMisc. No. 2016-2210
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 236 F. Supp. 3d 150 (In Re: Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re: Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litigation, 236 F. Supp. 3d 150, 2017 WL 680378, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23486 (D.D.C. 2017).

Opinion

*154 MEMORANDUM OPINION

Amit P. Mehta, United States District Judge

Anthem, Inc., a health benefits and health insurance company, suffered a massive cyberattack on its computer systems sometime between December 2014 and January 2015. The hackers stole personally identifiable information and personal health information of approximately 80 million people. Amongst those whose information was compromised were federal employees who receive their health insurance through the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program. Some individuals whose information was compromised filed suit against Anthem, Inc., its affiliates, and involved third-party corporations, ultimately leading to consolidation of those cases in the form of a class-action, multidistrict litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

On May 13, 2016, Lead Plaintiffs in the multidistrict litigation issued a-subpoena for documents to the United States Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”), the agency responsible for negotiating and administering the federal government’s health insurance contracts with Anthem, Inc., and its affiliates. Those contracts authorize OPM to conduct audits of the insurance carriers’ information technology systems (“IT systems”). Lead Plaintiffs’ subpoena seeks records relating to OPM’s IT systems audits of Anthem, Inc., and its affiliates, both before and after the cyber-attack. The agency released a portion of the documents responsive to the subpoena but withheld others, claiming that the deliberative process privilege protected all the withheld documents from disclosure and the law enforcement privilege also protected certain of those documents. Lead Plaintiffs then filed, in this court, a Motion to Compel OPM to disclose the withheld records.

After the benefit of substantial briefing, oral argument, and in camera review of the documents in question, the court finds *155 that most of documents withheld by OPM are protected by the deliberative process privilege. Some of the withheld documents or portions thereof, however, contain only factual information. As to those records or portions of records, the court concludes that neither the deliberative process nor the law enforcement privilege applies. Accordingly, the court grants in part and denies in part the Lead Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Anthem’s Contract with the Office of Personnel Management

Anthem, • Inc. (“Anthem”) provides health benefits and health insurance services to millions of individuals through a nationwide network of affiliate and third-party entities. 1 See In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 15-2617, 2016 WL 3029783, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016); Pis.’ Mot. to Compel Compliance with Subpoena Duces Tecum, ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Pis.’ Mot.], at 1-2 & n.3. 2 To provide these services, Anthem, its affiliates, and the third-party entities maintain a common computer database of current and former members’ personal information. See In re Anthem, 2016 WL 3029783, at *2. This information includes, but is not limited to, individuals’ Social Security numbers, home addresses, and confidential medical information. See Pis.’ Mot. at 2.

Amongst those Anthem serves are federal employees. The United States Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) negotiates and administers the federal government’s contracts with insurance providers, including Anthem. See Non-Party Resp’t’s Mem. in Opp’n to Pis.’ Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 5 [hereinafter Gov’t’s Opp’n], at 2. By statute, OPM’s Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) has authority to periodically conduct audits of entities receiving OPM funds or benefits, such as insurance carriers that contract to provide services to federal employees. See 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2(1); Gov’t’s Opp’n at 2-3; Gov’t’s Opp’n, Deck of Norbert E. Vint, ECF No. 5-2 [hereinafter Vint Decl.]', IT 3. Consistent with that statute, Anthem’s contract with OPM authorizes OIG to audit Anthem’s IT systems. See 'Pis.’ Mot. at 3.

OIG’s IT systems audits benefit both OPM and the audited entity. The audits “are designed to identify weaknesses [in the audited entity’s IT systems] so that the audited entity may institute appropriate safeguards against threats.” Gov’t’s Opp’n, Deck of Nicholas Hoyle, ECF No. *156 5-3 [hereinafter Hoyle Decl.], ¶ 4. The overarching goal is for OIG to “evaluate the effectiveness of the entity’s preventive measures and recommend remedies as needed” so as to “assist the audited entity with preventing criminal actors from stealing and exploiting [the] personal identifiable information and protected health information” of federal employee-enrollees. Id. The audit has the simultaneous effect of keeping OPM abreast of the audited entity’s present compliance.with its federal contract and federal law. Generally speaking, the audit assesses several “general IT security controls: security management, physical access controls; logical access controls; network security; business continuity; configuration management; and segregation of duties.” Id. ¶ 7.

OIG’s audit takes several steps to , complete. The process begins with two on-site investigations, after which OIG .discusses its “preliminary, concerns” with the audited entity and ensures it has all the information it needs to proceed with the audit. See id. ¶¶ 11-12. Next, equipped with the hec-essary information, OIG analyzes vulnerabilities in the IT system and produces a draft audit report, which it releases to the audited entity for response and factual corrections. See id. ¶¶ 13, 21; Vint Decl. ¶ 7. Finally, OIG publishes a final audit report, which takes account of any corrections the audited entity made to the draft audit report, the audited entity’s written response to the draft audit report, and OIG’s “final determination regarding its findings and recommendations.” Hoyle Decl. ¶ 13; accord Vint Decl. ¶ 7.

B. OIG’s Audits of Anthem’s IT Systems

In 2013, OIG audited Anthem’s IT systems (“the 2013 Audit”) and generated a report with findings and recommendations for addressing identified weaknesses in Anthem’s systems. See Pis.’ Mot. at 3; Gov’t’s Opp’n at 3; Pis.’ Mot., Ex. D [hereinafter 2013 Final Audit Report]. OPM’s internal discussions- regarding Anthem continued after the 2013 Audit concluded. OPM’s Audit Resolution Branch reviewed the recommendations in the 2013 Final Audit Report and evaluated whether Anthem had appropriately implemented them — a process known as “closing out” a recommendation. See Gov’t’s Opp’n at 3-4.

One of the key issues that arose during the 2013 Audit was that Anthem, citing company policy, refused to allow OIG auditors to connect their equipment to Anthem’s-network to conduct a configuration compliance test. See 2013 Final Audit Report at 9-10; see also Pis.’ Mot. at 4.

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236 F. Supp. 3d 150, 2017 WL 680378, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23486, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-anthem-inc-data-breach-litigation-dcd-2017.