In re: Aleli A. Hernandez

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 11, 2017
• Docket: CC-16-1228-LKuF CC-16-1244-LKuF
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED APR 11 2017 1 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL 2 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 4 5 In re: ) BAP No. CC-16-1228-LKuF ) BAP No. CC-16-1244-LKuF 6 ALELI A. HERNANDEZ, ) (consolidated appeals) ) 7 Debtor. ) Bk. No. 8:15-bk-10563-TA ______________________________) 8 ) ASSET MANAGEMENT HOLDINGS, ) 9 LLC, ) ) 10 Appellant, ) ) 11 v. ) M E M O R A N D U M* ) 12 ALELI A. HERNANDEZ, ) ) 13 Appellee. ) ______________________________) 14 15 Argued and Submitted on March 23, 2017 at Pasadena, California 16 Filed - April 11, 2017 17 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court 18 for the Central District of California 19 Honorable Theodor C. Albert, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding _________________________ 20 Appearances: Vanessa M. Haberbush of Haberbush & Associates LLP 21 argued for Appellant Asset Management Holdings, LLC; Gregory M. Salvato of Salvato Law Offices 22 argued for Appellee Aleli A. Hernandez. _________________________ 23 24 Before: LAFFERTY, KURTZ, and FARIS, Bankruptcy Judges. 25 26 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 27 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may 28 have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 INTRODUCTION 2 Debtor filed a chapter 72 case in 2010 and obtained a 3 discharge, including a discharge of her personal liability on two 4 debts secured by deeds of trust against her residence. More than 5 four years later, Debtor filed a subsequent chapter 13 case. On 6 her schedules, Debtor listed her residence and the two debts 7 secured by that residence. Because the amount of the senior lien 8 exceeded the value of the residence, Debtor indicated her intent 9 to avoid the junior lien held by Appellant’s predecessor-in- 10 interest pursuant to § 506(a). She listed the debt to the junior 11 lienholder on Schedule D as a secured debt of $0, and again on 12 Schedule F as an unsecured debt of $278,396.71. 13 Appellant Asset Management Holdings, LLC (“AMH”) objected to 14 confirmation for lack of good faith and moved to dismiss the 15 chapter 13 case on eligibility grounds. The bankruptcy court 16 ruled that Debtor’s debts did not place her over the eligibility 17 limits because the debt to AMH did not need to be included in the 18 eligibility calculation. The court found that the debt should 19 not be treated as secured because the lien was avoidable under 20 § 506(a), nor should it be treated as unsecured because Debtor’s 21 personal liability on the debt had been discharged in her prior 22 chapter 7 case. The bankruptcy court also found that the plan 23 was filed in good faith. Accordingly, the court denied the 24 motion to dismiss and confirmed the plan, and AMH appealed. 25 We AFFIRM. 26 27 2 28 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532.

-2- 1 FACTS 2 Aleli Hernandez obtained a discharge in an individual 3 chapter 7 case filed in April 2010. Among the debts listed in 4 the chapter 7 case were two debts secured by deeds of trust 5 against Debtor’s residence in Mission Viejo, California (the 6 “Mission Viejo Property”). 7 Nearly five years later, on February 5, 2015, Debtor filed 8 the instant chapter 13 case. On Schedule A, Debtor listed the 9 Mission Viejo Property with a value of $950,000; on Schedule D, 10 she again listed two deeds of trust against the residence, a 11 first deed of trust in favor of “Chase” in the amount of 12 $1,036,490.00 and a second deed of trust in favor of SW Linear 13 Investment Group, LLC (“SW Linear”) in the amount of $0, with the 14 notation “Motion to Avoid Lien to be filed.” Debtor also listed 15 SW Linear on Schedule F with an unsecured debt of $278,396.71, 16 again with the notation “Motion to Avoid Lien to be filed.” 17 Debtor filed a proposed chapter 13 plan on February 19, 2015. 18 AMH filed a proof of claim for $459,221.60 on June 15, 2015. 19 On May 22, 2015, Debtor filed a motion under § 506 to value 20 SW Linear’s lien at $0.3 On June 3, 2015, before the lien 21 valuation matter was heard, SW Linear and AMH4 filed a motion to 22 3 23 Debtor’s motion was entitled “Motion to Avoid Junior Lien on Principal Residence [11 U.S.C. § 506(d)].” However, because 24 avoidance will not occur until Debtor completes her plan, we refer to such a motion as a “motion to value lien at zero.” 25 4 According to pleadings filed in the bankruptcy court, AMH 26 is an “affiliate of and successor in interest to SW Linear Investment Group, LLC.” Pleadings in the bankruptcy court were 27 initially filed jointly by SW Linear and AMH. Beginning in 28 (continued...)

-3- 1 dismiss Debtor’s chapter 13 case on the ground that Debtor’s 2 debts exceeded the limits established by § 109(e). SW Linear/AMH 3 argued that if its lien were valued at zero, it would have an 4 unsecured claim of $459,221.60; thus, Debtor’s unsecured debts 5 would exceed the $383,175 limit under § 109(e). Alternatively, 6 SW Linear/AMH argued that if its lien were not valued at zero, 7 Debtor’s secured debts would total $1,494,734.97 ($1,035,513.37 + 8 $459,221.60), thus exceeding the secured debt limit of 9 $1,149,525. 10 Over the next year, beginning on June 17, 2015, the 11 bankruptcy court held five hearings on plan confirmation and the 12 motion to dismiss. During that time the parties submitted two 13 more rounds of briefs on the eligibility issue. In the meantime, 14 at the July 8, 2015 hearing, the bankruptcy court granted 15 Debtor’s motion to value her residence for purposes of valuing SW 16 Linear’s junior lien at zero. 17 On August 18, 2015, AMH filed a Second Amended Objection to 18 Confirmation, arguing that Debtor’s plan was not filed in good 19 faith because it was filed primarily to avoid AMH’s lien and 20 prevent foreclosure. AMH also asserted that Debtor and her 21 husband had “engaged in a lengthy 5 year succession of serial and 22 individual filings to prevent foreclosure of the [Mission Viejo 23 Property],” citing Debtor’s 2010 chapter 7 filing, her husband’s 24 2012 chapter 7 filing, and the instant chapter 13. 25 26 27 4 (...continued) 28 August 2015, AMH began filing pleadings solely in its own name.

-4- 1 At the final hearing on confirmation and on the motion to 2 dismiss held June 15, 2016, the bankruptcy court denied AMH’s 3 motion to dismiss, overruled AMH’s objection to confirmation, and 4 confirmed Debtor’s plan. AMH timely appealed both orders.5 5 JURISDICTION 6 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 7 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(A) and (L). We have jurisdiction under 28 8 U.S.C. § 158. 9 ISSUES 10 Did the bankruptcy court err in denying AMH’s motion to 11 dismiss Debtor’s chapter 13 case on eligibility grounds? 12 Did the bankruptcy court err in overruling AMH’s objection 13 to confirmation? 14 STANDARDS OF REVIEW 15 Eligibility determinations under § 109 involve issues of 16 statutory construction and conclusions of law, including 17 interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, which we review de novo. 18 Smith v. Rojas (In re Smith), 435 B.R. 637, 642 (9th Cir. BAP 19 2010). 20 The bankruptcy court’s determination regarding a debtor's 21 good faith in proposing a chapter 13 plan for confirmation is a 22 factual finding that we review for clear error. Meyer v. Lepe 23 (In re Lepe), 470 B.R. 851, 855 (9th Cir. BAP 2012). 24 25 26 27 5 The appeals were consolidated by order of a BAP motions 28 judge on September 19, 2016.

-5- 1 DISCUSSION 2 A. The bankruptcy court did not err in denying AMH’s motion to 3 dismiss on eligibility grounds. 4 Under the version of § 109(e) in effect when Debtor filed 5 her chapter 13 petition, eligibility for chapter 13 was limited 6 to individuals with regular income who owed, as of the petition 7 date, “noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than 8 $383,175 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less 9 than $1,149,525.” Eligibility debt limits are strictly 10 construed. Soderlund v. Cohen (In re Soderlund), 236 B.R. 271, 11 274 (9th Cir. BAP 1999). 12 Eligibility is ordinarily determined by examining the 13 debtor’s originally filed schedules, checking only to see if 14 those schedules were made in good faith. Henrichsen v. Scovis 15 (In re Scovis), 249 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2001). At the same 16 time, the bankruptcy court need not take a mechanical approach to 17 determining eligibility by ignoring readily ascertainable 18 circumstances, such as where a lien is clearly undersecured. 19 See id. at 983 (“By merely looking at the value of Debtors’ 20 residence, the first deed [of] trust, and the judgment lien, it 21 is clear that [creditor’s] judgment lien is undersecured to a 22 significant extent.”). The unsecured portion of undersecured 23 debt is ordinarily counted as unsecured for § 109(e) eligibility 24 purposes. Id.; In re Smith, 435 B.R. at 647-48. 25 The question presented in this appeal is whether the debt 26 owed to AMH should be counted at all in determining Debtor’s 27 eligibility for chapter 13. The bankruptcy court concluded that 28 it should not. The court ruled that the debt should not be

-6- 1 counted as a secured debt because AMH’s lien was wholly unsecured 2 on the petition date and thus was subject to being valued at zero 3 pursuant to § 506(b); and the debt should not be counted as an 4 unsecured debt because Debtor’s personal liability for the debt 5 had been discharged in her prior chapter 7 case. On appeal, AMH 6 contends that this conclusion was error because Debtor’s 7 discharge did not affect its lien and thus on the petition date, 8 AMH had an in rem (secured) claim against the estate. 9 Alternatively, AMH contends that the debt should have been 10 included in the unsecured debt calculation as a claim against the 11 estate, relying on Ninth Circuit chapter 12 eligibility cases and 12 bankruptcy court chapter 13 cases. However, controlling 13 authority does not support AMH’s position. 14 The salient facts and eligibility issues presented in this 15 appeal are virtually identical to those presented in this Panel’s 16 recent decision in Free v. Malaier (In re Free), 542 B.R. 492 17 (9th Cir. BAP 2015), which controls the outcome here. See 18 People’s Capital and Leasing Corp. v. Big3D, Inc. (In re Big3D, 19 Inc.), 438 B.R. 214, 226 (9th Cir. BAP 2010) (noting that this 20 Panel regards “precedents established in its prior published 21 decisions as binding on the Panel absent changes in the 22 Bankruptcy Code or controlling decisions by the Ninth Circuit 23 Court of Appeals or United States Supreme Court”). 24 In Free, this Panel held, as a matter of first impression, 25 that debtors who had previously obtained a chapter 7 discharge of 26 their personal liability for wholly unsecured junior liens 27 against their residence were not required to include that debt as 28 an unsecured debt for purposes of the chapter 13 eligibility

-7- 1 calculation. The Panel agreed with the analysis of In re Shenas, 2 No. 11-41332 EDJ, 2011 WL 3236182 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 28, 3 2011). There, the bankruptcy court ruled, under similar facts, 4 that because the unsecured portion of the debt was no longer 5 enforceable against the debtor, it was not allowable as an 6 unsecured claim in the chapter 13 case. As such, debtors did not 7 owe any unsecured debt to the creditor for purposes of the 8 unsecured debt limitation of § 109(e). In re Free, 542 B.R. at 9 496 (citing In re Shenas, 2011 WL 3236182, at *1). 10 The Panel in Free reasoned that its holding was not in 11 conflict with Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991), a 12 case that has been cited in other eligibility cases to support 13 the inclusion of wholly unsecured discharged debts in the 14 eligibility calculation. See, e.g., In re Scotto-DiClemente, 463 15 B.R. 308 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2012), aff’d sub nom., In re DiClemente, 16 2012 WL 3314840 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2012). In Johnson, the Supreme 17 Court held that a mortgage lien that secured an obligation for 18 which a debtor’s personal liability has been discharged in a 19 chapter 7 liquidation was a claim subject to inclusion in an 20 approved Chapter 13 reorganization plan. The Supreme Court 21 observed that the term “debt” is defined as “liability on a 22 claim” and is thus coextensive with the term “claim.” Therefore, 23 the Court concluded that the mortgage lien was a claim within the 24 terms of § 101(5) because the mortgage lien holder retained a 25 “right to payment” in the form of its right to the proceeds from 26 the sale of the debtor’s property. 501 U.S. at 84. Observing 27 that “a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of 28 enforcing a claim--namely, an action against the debtor in

-8- 1 personam--while leaving intact another--namely, an action against 2 the debtor in rem[,]” id., the Court held that the bankruptcy 3 court must allow a claim “if it is enforceable against either the 4 debtor or his property[,]” id. at 85 (emphasis in original). 5 Johnson was not an eligibility case, and the Panel in Free 6 interpreted Johnson as deciding only whether an in rem claim for 7 which personal liability has been discharged could properly be 8 addressed in a chapter 13 plan, not whether such a claim needed 9 to be included in the eligibility calculation. See In re Free, 10 542 B.R. at 497. 11 The Free Panel concluded: 12 [W]e do not see how the purposes of a chapter 13 reorganization are met by counting the discharged 13 unsecured obligations of the chapter 20 debtor in the eligibility calculation. Assuming the case is filed in 14 good faith and proper chapter 13 purposes—such as curing an arrearage on a first mortgage or paying 15 priority tax debt—are present, it makes no sense to include in the debt limit calculation a claim for which 16 the right to payment has been discharged. Neither the Code nor case law compels inclusion of the discharged 17 in personam liability in such calculation. 18 Id. at 501. 19 AMH acknowledges the holding of Free but argues that the 20 debt must be included as a secured debt, an issue that Free did 21 not analyze. Alternatively, AMH urges this Panel to disregard 22 Free and hold that AMH’s claim should be counted as unsecured. 23 1. The AMH debt should not be included in the eligibility 24 calculation as a secured debt. 25 AMH argues that when the in rem liability of a secured 26 claim remains after the in personam liability is extinguished, 27 the debt must be considered when evaluating the debt limitation 28

-9- 1 eligibility requirements under chapter 13, citing the chapter 12 2 eligibility cases of Quintana v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re 3 Quintana) (Quintana I), 107 B.R. 234 (9th Cir. BAP 1989), aff’d 4 sub nom., Quintana v. Commissioner (In re Quintana) (Quintana 5 II), 915 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1990); and Davis v. Bank of America 6 (In re Davis) (Davis I), Nos. CC–11–1692–MkDKi, ND 11–10994–RR, 7 2012 WL 3205431 (9th Cir. BAP Aug. 3, 2012), aff’d sub nom., 8 Davis v. U.S. Bank, N.A. (In re Davis) (Davis II), 778 F.3d 809 9 (9th Cir. 2015). 10 In the Quintana cases, a judgment creditor had agreed to 11 waive any right to a deficiency judgment against the debtors 12 after sale of the real property subject to its judgment lien. 13 Debtors asserted that the creditor’s waiver made the judgment a 14 nonrecourse obligation and thus only the secured value of the 15 judgment lien needed to be included toward the aggregate debt 16 limit for a family farmer. The bankruptcy court disagreed; on 17 appeal, this Panel held that because the term “aggregate debts” 18 includes “all types of debts,” and because the creditor retained 19 a right to payment against the real property, the entire amount 20 needed to be included in the eligibility calculation. Quintana 21 I, 107 B.R. at 237. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 22 on somewhat narrower grounds, holding that because the property 23 had not yet been sold, the waiver had no relevance to the 24 calculation. Quintana II, 915 F.2d at 517. 25 In the Davis cases, the debtor had discharged her personal 26 liability in a chapter 7 case. Although her secured debts 27 exceeded the chapter 12 eligibility limit, the debtor argued that 28 because her personal liability had been discharged, only the

-10- 1 aggregate debt secured by her real property had to be counted. 2 The bankruptcy court disagreed. On appeal, the BAP, citing 3 Quintana I and Quintana II, reasoned that the entire amount of 4 the debt should be included because the full amount continued to 5 be a claim against the collateral. On further appeal to the 6 Ninth Circuit, that court held that the term “aggregate debts” in 7 § 101(18)(A) included “the unsecured portion of a creditor’s 8 claim from which the debtor has been discharged in an earlier 9 chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.” Davis II, 778 F.3d at 10 812. 11 AMH interprets Davis II’s holding that aggregate debts 12 include the unsecured portion of a creditor’s claim from which 13 the debtor has been discharged in an earlier chapter 7 to mean 14 that undersecured but discharged claims against property of the 15 debtor must count towards the chapter 13 debt limits as a secured 16 debt. 17 However, the Panel in Free expressly rejected reliance on 18 these chapter 12 eligibility cases, finding that they were not 19 controlling because they considered only the aggregate debt 20 limit, and none of them addressed revival of discharged in 21 personam liability. In re Free, 542 B.R. at 499. 22 AMH acknowledges that a debtor may avoid a partially or 23 wholly unsecured lien in a chapter 13 but argues that § 109(e) 24 limits the eligibility analysis to the petition date and that 25 even if a debtor may be able to avoid an unsecured lien, the 26 avoidance does not become final until the debtor receives a 27 28

-11- 1 discharge.6 However, this argument ignores Ninth Circuit 2 authority that in making the eligibility determination, the court 3 need not ignore circumstances that will permit the court to 4 easily ascertain whether a debt should be classified as secured 5 or unsecured, see In re Scovis, 249 F.3d at 983, and that the 6 unsecured portion of undersecured debt is counted as unsecured 7 for § 109(e) eligibility purposes, id.; In re Smith, 435 B.R. at 8 647-48. As such, we see no basis for AMH’s argument that its 9 claim should be classified as secured for eligibility purposes, 10 and AMH has cited no authority supporting such a conclusion. 11 2. The AMH debt should not be included in the eligibility 12 calculation as an unsecured debt. 13 Alternatively, AMH contends that the unsecured portion of 14 its claim should be included as an unsecured debt in the 15 eligibility calculation. AMH asks this Panel to ignore Free and 16 follow the holdings of In re Scotto-DiClemente, 463 B.R. 308; and 17 In re Wimmer, 512 B.R. 498 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). In both of 18 those cases, the bankruptcy courts applied the reasoning of 19 Johnson (i.e., that if a claim is enforceable against either 20 21 6 In HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Blendheim (In re Blendheim), 803 F.3d 477, 497 (9th Cir. 2015), a case decided while this 22 matter was pending in the bankruptcy court, the Ninth Circuit 23 Court of Appeals held that a chapter 13 debtor may avoid the unsecured portion of a lien upon successful completion of a 24 chapter 13 plan even if the debtor is not eligible for a discharge. 25 26 In footnote 9 of its opening brief, AMH acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit BAP has so held, citing Boukatch v. MidFirst 27 Bank (In re Boukatch), 533 B.R. 292, 301 (9th Cir. BAP 2015). In light of Blendheim and Boukatch, we construe AMH’s argument to be 28 that a lien avoidance is not final until the debtor successfully completes her plan.

-12- 1 debtor or debtor’s property it may be provided for in a chapter 2 13 plan) to conclude that the unsecured portion of an in rem 3 claim must be included in the chapter 13 eligibility calculation 4 despite a prior chapter 7 discharge. In re Scotto-DiClemente, 5 463 B.R. at 311-14; In re Wimmer, 512 B.R. at 510-12. 6 AMH also cites various California bankruptcy court cases 7 ruling that a chapter 20 debtor may not eliminate the unsecured 8 portion of a lien-stripped claim for plan purposes. In re Hill, 9 440 B.R. 176, 178-84 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010); In re Akram, 259 10 B.R. 371 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2001); In re Gounder, 266 B.R. 879 11 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2001). However, in addition to the fact that 12 these authorities are not binding on this Panel, none of them 13 involve eligibility determinations, and to apply their reasoning 14 here would require us to ignore Free. We decline to do so. 15 Apparently recognizing that the relevant authorities are not 16 in its favor, AMH argues that as a matter of policy, not 17 including the discharged unsecured portion of a secured claim in 18 a chapter 13 filed subsequent to a chapter 7 would destroy the 19 rights of creditors holding undersecured claims and cause 20 unnecessary litigation in chapter 7 bankruptcies: AMH contends 21 that if creditors risk losing both their secured and unsecured 22 claims by debtors who first file a chapter 7 to wipe out their in 23 personam liability (while intending to then file a chapter 13 to 24 wipe out the in rem liability), creditors will bring objections 25 in every chapter 7 bankruptcy where their claim is undersecured 26 in the form of an objection to the discharge of the in personam 27 liability or a motion to dismiss the chapter 7 as a bad faith 28 filing. At the same time, AMH argues, debtors would not be

-13- 1 seriously harmed because if their debts are over the chapter 13 2 eligibility limits they may file chapter 11 instead. 3 To be blunt, this argument is nonsensical. A secured 4 creditor could not prevail on an objection to discharge or a 5 motion to dismiss for bad faith in a chapter 7 case on grounds 6 that a debtor intended to file a subsequent chapter 13 to 7 eliminate the creditor’s lien. AMH (and undoubtedly every other 8 undersecured lien creditor) is unhappy that its entire claim may 9 be eliminated through serial chapter 7 and chapter 13 filings, 10 but binding precedent holds that in the absence of bad faith, 11 there is no prohibition on doing so. 12 In sum, AMH has not presented any argument or authority that 13 would warrant departure from our holding in Free. The bankruptcy 14 court did not err in ruling that AMH’s claim did not need to be 15 included as either a secured or unsecured debt in calculating 16 chapter 13 eligibility in this case. 17 B. The bankruptcy court did not err in overruling AMH’s bad 18 faith objection to confirmation. 19 AMH argues that Debtor’s bankruptcy petition was not filed 20 in good faith because its sole purpose was to strip AMH’s lien, 21 pointing out that Debtor does not have significant unsecured 22 claims or other issues that need to be dealt with in the chapter 23 13. AMH contends that permitting Debtor’s case to proceed would 24 permit her to improperly circumvent the rule that a lien may not 25 be stripped in a chapter 7. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 26 (1992). 27 To determine whether a chapter 13 case was filed in bad 28 faith, the bankruptcy court should consider:

-14- 1 (1) whether the debtor misrepresented facts in his petition 2 or plan, unfairly manipulated the Bankruptcy Code, or otherwise 3 filed his chapter 13 petition or plan in an inequitable manner; 4 (2) the debtor’s history of filings and dismissals; 5 (3) whether the debtor only intended to defeat state court 6 litigation; and 7 (4) whether egregious behavior is present. Leavitt v. Soto 8 (In re Leavitt), 171 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999). 9 The bankruptcy court declined to dismiss the case on bad 10 faith grounds because controlling case law did not support the 11 conclusion that a chapter 20 filing is per se bad faith. This 12 observation is correct. See Johnson, 501 U.S. at 87; In re 13 Blendheim, 803 F.3d at 500; In re Free, 542 B.R. at 501. AMH 14 argues that the bankruptcy court failed to take into account the 15 totality of the circumstances, but the record does not support 16 this conclusion. And AMH points to nothing in the record to 17 indicate that Debtor misrepresented facts, unfairly manipulated 18 the Bankruptcy Code, filed her chapter 13 petition or plan in an 19 inequitable manner, had a history of multiple bankruptcy filings, 20 was attempting to defeat state court litigation, or exhibited 21 egregious behavior. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the 22 bankruptcy court erred in finding that Debtor’s petition and plan 23 were filed in good faith. 24 CONCLUSION 25 For the reasons explained above, the bankruptcy court did 26 not err in denying AMH’s motion to dismiss on eligibility 27 grounds, nor did it err in overruling AMH’s objection to 28 confirmation. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

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