[Cite as In re A.C., 2018-Ohio-386.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 105347
IN RE: A.C., ET AL. Minor Children
[Appeal by L.C., Mother ]
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case Nos. AD13908673, AD13908674, AD13908675, and AD14911228
BEFORE: Jones, J., E.A. Gallagher, A.J., and Blackmon, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 1, 2018 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Jonathan N. Garver The Brownhoist Building 4403 St. Clair Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44103
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
For CCDCFS
Michael C. O’Malley Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Anthony R. Beery Assistant County Prosecutor 4261 Fulton Parkway Cleveland, Ohio 44144
BY: Cheryl Rice Assistant County Prosecutor 8111 Quincy Avenue, Room 440 Cleveland, Ohio 44104
For P.B. (Father)
Jeffrey Froude P.O. Box 771112 Lakewood, Ohio 44107
Timothy A. Spurrier W.H. Hunt Legal Group L.L.C. 24500 Center Ridge Road, Suite 170 Westlake, Ohio 44145 Guardian ad litem for P.B.
Paul Berman 24105 Duffield Road Shaker Heights, Ohio 44122
For J.S. (Father)
Britta M. Barthol P.O. Box 670218 Northfield, Ohio 44067
Daniel J. Bartos Bartos & Bartos, L.P.A. 20220 Center Ridge Road, Suite 160 Rocky River, Ohio 44116
Guardian ad litem for J.S.
Suzanne F. Jucaitis P.O. Box 771661 Lakewood, Ohio 44107
For A.C.
John M. Stryker Stryker Law, Co., Ltd. 20006 Detroit Road, Suite 310 Rocky River, Ohio 44116
For T.H. (Maternal Grandmother)
Theodore Amata 12107 Mayfield Road, Suite 202 Cleveland, Ohio 44106 Guardian ad litem
Carla L. Golubovic P.O. Box 29127 Parma, Ohio 44129
Jonathan Z. Wilbur 13940 Cedar Road, Suite 246 Cleveland, Ohio 44118 LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.:
{¶1} Appellant, Mother, appeals the trial court’s ruling granting permanent
custody of her four children to the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family
Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} In 2013, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging that three of Mother’s children,
B.B., C.C., and A.C. were dependent, A.C. was abused, and requesting permanent
custody. The children were not in Mother’s custody at this time, having previously been
adjudicated dependent in 2011. They were in a maternal aunt’s custody, but the aunt
could no longer care for the children. The maternal grandmother moved to intervene in
the case, which the trial court granted.
{¶3} In 2014, the trial court granted permanent custody of the children to
CCDCFS, but this court reversed the decision, finding that the juvenile court failed to
comply with Juv.R. 29 when accepting B.B.’s, C.C.’s, and A.C.’s father’s (“Father 1”)
stipulation to the agency’s request for permanent custody; the case was remanded to the
trial court. In re A.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102351, 2015-Ohio-3673.
{¶4} In September 2014, Mother gave birth to J.S. with Father 2. The agency
filed a complaint alleging the child was dependent and requesting permanent custody of
the child. The case for the older three children, which, as mentioned, was remanded by
this court, and the new case were consolidated for the purposes of a new permanent custody trial. Maternal grandmother moved for legal custody of the three older children,
but not for J.S.
{¶5} The matter proceeded to trial in October 2016.
{¶6} CCDCFS social worker Mi-Lin Tate (“Tate”) testified that she had been the
family’s caseworker for almost two years. Mother’s three older children had been out of
her care and custody for over five years. The youngest child had been out of Mother’s
care and custody his entire life except for the first two days. Tate testified that the
agency remained committed to working toward reunification, which was the permanency
plan. Mother’s case plan included mental health, parenting, domestic violence services,
and meeting the children’s basic needs. Tate testified that basic needs was on Mother’s
case plan to ensure she could meet the children’s needs given her history of inconsistent
housing. Tate noted that Mother most recently lived with Father 2, but ended her
relationship with Father 2 just before trial and moved out. Mother was currently living
with relatives and did not have adequate housing for four children; thus, she lacked stable
housing.
{¶7} Tate testified that when visitations were scheduled weekly, Mother would
attend about fifty percent of the time. Eventually, due to Mother’s inconsistency and the
children’s poor reaction to the visits, the visits were reduced to every other week. Tate
testified that B.B. attends counseling to address her anger management and coping skills
and receives special education services at school. {¶8} Dr. Amy Justice conducted Mother’s psychological evaluation; she also
testified at trial. According to the results, Mother scored extremely low in terms of
intellectual function and was functionally illiterate. Dr. Justice reviewed Mother’s
mental health records and was concerned about her lack of consistency in mental health
treatment, opining that a lack of consistency inhibited Mother’s progress. Dr. Justice
was also concerned that Mother lacked comprehension with regard to why she did not
have custody of her children — Mother told the doctor that the three older children were
originally removed from her because they were biracial. Dr. Justice pointed out that
Mother’s inability to understand why her children were originally removed from her was
a concern because it was unlikely Mother could remedy the causes of removal if she still
could not recognize what the causes were.
{¶9} Dr. Justice recommended a number of services for Mother. The doctor
recommended domestic violence services because Mother remained in abusive
relationships and failed to understand that her most recent relationship was violent. Dr.
Justice also recommended sleep practice services because Mother slept during the day
and was awake at night, which was not conducive to raising children. Finally, Dr.
Justice opined that no service could rectify Mother’s intellectual deficits.
{¶10} Mother’s counselor at Recovery Resources testified that she was involved
with Mother for the ten months prior to trial. The counselor testified that she worked
with Mother on her anger issues and mental health diagnoses. The counselor noted that
Mother struggled with consistency in attending appointments, and had failed to show up to appointments for the last two months. The counselor felt Mother had made some
progress but any gains were inhibited by Mother’s inconsistency and Mother was in
danger of being terminated from services due to her failure to attend her appointments.
{¶11} The foster father testified that at the time the children came into custody
B.B. was having seizures, B.B. and C.C. had head lice, and A.C. was malnourished and
underweight. The children left foster care and were placed with a relative but returned
to foster care in 2013. When the children returned to the foster home, all three had head
lice. Since living with their foster family, B.B.’s seizures had stopped and the children
had no major health issues.
{¶12} According to the foster father, the children reacted poorly to the visits with
Mother. B.B. displayed anger and poor behavior around visitation time, but these
problems got better when the visits were reduced to every other week. C.C. was much
happier after the reduction in visits and told her foster father that she just “wants it to be
done and over with.”
{¶13} CCDCFS social worker Venita Wiggins (“Wiggins”) testified that she was
the previous social worker assigned to the family, and worked with the family for a
couple of years. During her time working with the family, Wiggins had regular contact
with maternal grandmother. Wiggins testified that based on her involvement with
maternal grandmother, she would not support granting legal custody to maternal
grandmother because it would not be in the children’s best interest. Wiggins expressed concern that grandmother had neglected her own children, including Mother, and that
grandmother’s previous home was unsanitary and unsafe.
{¶14} Maternal grandmother testified that she was seeking legal custody of the
older three children and was aware the children would be separated from their youngest
sibling if she was granted legal custody. Maternal grandmother admitted she had
neglected Mother and her other children when they were young. Grandmother thought
the juvenile court should grant custody of the four children to Mother because Mother
could care for her children but that she would take legal custody of three of the children if
the court did not grant custody to Mother.
{¶15} The Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) for the children recommended the trial
court grant permanent custody to the agency. The GAL noted that the foster family
provided for the children’s needs, live in a child-centered home, and the children were
“very happy” with their foster family. She opined that neither the parents nor maternal
grandmother could provide for the children. She stated that Mother had “no stability.
She doesn’t have stability of a relationship. She doesn’t have stability of housing. She
doesn’t have the ability to properly parent. She doesn’t have the insight into what her
children’s needs are.” The GAL noted that neither the fathers nor the maternal
grandmother could provide appropriately for the children.
{¶16} The juvenile court granted the agency’s motion for permanent custody.
Mother filed a notice of appeal. Father 1 and Father 2 are appealing the termination of
their parental rights concerning their respective children. See In Re A.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105336 (Father 1) and In Re J.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105344 (Father
2).
{¶17} Following oral argument in this matter, the parties were ordered, sua sponte, to brief the issue whether the trial court complied with 25 U.S.C. 1912 and this court’s holding in In Re: R.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 104434, 2016-Ohio-7897, with regard a trial court’s duty to inquire about a parent’s Native American ancestry. Post-briefing, this court remanded the case to the trial court to hold a hearing for the limited purpose of complying with this court’s decision in In Re: R.G. The trial court complied with our limited remand and issued a
journal entry finding that no Native American ancestry had been established.
{¶18} Mother raises one assignment of error for our review:
I. The judgment terminating Appellant’s parental rights and awarding permanent custody to the agency is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶19} In her sole assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court’s decision
to grant permanent custody of her children to CCDCFS was against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
Permanent Custody
{¶20} An agency may request permanent custody of a child as part of its original
abuse, neglect, or dependency complaint. R.C. 2151.353(A)(4). A juvenile court’s
decision to grant permanent custody will not be reversed as being against the manifest
weight of the evidence “if the record contains some competent, credible evidence from
which the court could have found that the essential statutory elements for permanent
custody had been established by clear and convincing evidence.” In re A.P., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 104130, 2016-Ohio-5849, ¶ 16. {¶21} When granting permanent custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.353, a trial court
must make two determinations. The court must first find that “the child cannot be
placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed
with either parent” in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(E). The court must also find that
permanent custody is in the best interest of the child pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D).
Placement with Mother
{¶22} Mother argues that the trial court’s determination that the children could not
be placed with her within a reasonable time is against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶23} As stated, to determine whether a child cannot or should not be placed with
a parent within a reasonable time, courts look to the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E).
If a court determines by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the following
exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot
be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either
parent. Id. A trial court need only find that one of the factors set forth in R.C.
2151.414(E) is met in order to properly find that a child cannot or should not be placed
with a parent. In re Baby Boy M, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91312, 2008-Ohio-5271, ¶
29-31. {¶24} “Clear and convincing evidence” is that measure or degree of proof that is
more than a “preponderance of the evidence,” but does not rise to the level of certainty
required by the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in criminal cases. In re M.S., 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101693 and 101694, 2015-Ohio-1028, ¶ 8. It “produces in the
mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
established.” Id. In determining whether a juvenile court based its decision on clear
and convincing evidence, a reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether
the trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the degree of proof. In re
T.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92816, 2009-Ohio-5496, ¶ 24, citing State v. Schiebel, 55
Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990).
{¶25} In this case, as it relates to Mother, the juvenile court found that the factors
set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (2), and (4) applied and (11) applied to Father 1. As
the court explained:
Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E), the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the minor child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with either parent due to one or more of the following factors:
(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parents have failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home.
*** (2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, intellectual disability, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent that is so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year.
***
(4) The parents have shown a lack of commitment toward the child.
(11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of the child pursuant to this section * * * .
{¶26} To support its finding under subsection (1), the trial court found that Mother
failed to benefit from case plan services including mental health services and basic needs.
The court stated that Mother failed to consistently attend appointments with mental
health service providers.
{¶27} Under (2), the trial court found that the parents had been diagnosed with
chronic mental and emotional illness that prevent them from providing an adequate
permanent home for the children.
{¶28} Under (4), the trial court found that the parents had demonstrated a
commitment to the children by visiting but had failed to financially support the children,
have not had suitable housing or employment, and therefore, cannot meet the basic needs
of the children.
{¶29} Under (11), the trial court found that Father 1 and Father 2 had previously
had their parental rights involuntarily terminated as to other children. {¶30} We find competent, credible evidence in the record to support the trial
court’s findings. Mother’s social worker testified that by the time of the permanent
custody trial, Mother had failed to remedy the conditions that caused the removal of her
children. Mother no longer had stable housing, was living with relatives, and did not
have appropriate housing for the children. Mother’s counselor at Recovery Resources
testified that she had been involved with Mother for ten months and while Mother had
made some progress on her goals, her progress was inhibited by her inconsistent
attendance at appointments and she was in danger of being terminated from the program.
{¶31} Mother was reevaluated by Dr. Justice prior to trial and Dr. Justice opined
that Mother had not sufficiently benefitted from services. Dr. Justice recommended
additional services for Mother, including one-on-one domestic violence counseling,
instead of the group counseling Mother had previously received. Dr. Justice
recommended additional domestic violence counseling for Mother because Mother did
not understand that she had been in a domestically violent relationship with Father 2;
therefore, although Mother had previously attended domestic violence classes, she
required more services. Dr. Justice recommended one-on-one counseling for Mother
due to Mother’s intellectual deficiencies.
{¶32} Dr. Justice further testified that Mother scored in the lowest two percent of
all people in terms of intellectual function and identified Mother as functionally illiterate.
Dr. Justice had concerns about Mother’s lack of consistency with mental health
treatment and her inability to understand why her children were not in her custody, including Mother’s belief that the agency took the children because they were biracial.
Dr. Justice was also concerned about Mother’s sleep habits, which included sleeping all
day and staying up all night and recommended sleep practice services.
{¶33} The family’s social worker, Tate, testified that Mother attended visits about
half of the time when they were scheduled weekly. The agency reduced the visits to
twice a month based on Mother’s inconsistency and the children’s poor reaction to visits.
{¶34} In light of the above, we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to
support the juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(E).
Best Interests of the Children
{¶35} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) further requires that
[i]n determining whether permanent custody is in the best interest of the child, the juvenile court must consider “all relevant factors,” including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state; (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶36} The juvenile court has considerable discretion in weighing these factors.
In re J.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105078, 2017-Ohio-7070, ¶ 53. The best interest
determination focuses on the child, not the parent. In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
101390, 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 59, citing In the Matter of: Austin Mayle, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
Nos. 76739 and 77165, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3379 (2000). Although the juvenile
court is required to consider each factor listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), no one factor is
given greater weight than the others pursuant to the statute. In re T.H., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 100852, 2014-Ohio-2985, ¶ 23, citing In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498,
2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532.
{¶37} Mother argues that the trial court’s decision to grant permanent custody of
the oldest three children was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the
maternal grandmother could have taken legal custody of the children. As Mother noted
in her brief on appeal, while consideration of whether the children can be placed with a
relative is not required by the statute, courts have held that the possibility of placement
with a relative ‘“is a matter that ought to be considered in connection with the child’s
interaction and relationship with the child’s parents, relatives, foster caregivers,
out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child.”’ In re S.F., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25318, 2013-Ohio-508, ¶ 23, quoting In re F.C., 2d
Dist. Montgomery No. 23803, 2010-Ohio-3113, ¶ 24.
{¶38} The record shows that the agency investigated maternal grandmother as a
possible placement; however, she did not file for legal custody of J.S. and the agency was
concerned with separating the siblings from one another. Maternal grandmother also
admitted that she had neglected her own two children and the first removal of Mother’s
three oldest children happened when they were living with maternal grandmother.
{¶39} The agency also had issues with maternal grandmother’s housing.
Maternal grandmother had recently moved out of state and, although her new house had
been deemed appropriate, she had lived in three different places in the ten months prior to
trial. Maternal grandmother also has legal custody of three other grandchildren and both
the agency and the GAL were concerned whether grandmother could handle additional
grandchildren. Finally, maternal grandmother testified that she believed that Mother
should have custody of the children and only filed for legal custody in case the court did
not grant custody to Mother. Maternal grandmother testified she fully believed Mother
could care for the children even though the children had not been in Mother’s care or
custody for over five years.
{¶40} The children had been placed with the same foster family the entire time,
except for the 14-month period where the three oldest children were committed to the
custody of a relative, and the foster family wished to adopt the children. The GAL testified that the children appeared more comfortable and bonded with their foster parents
than their biological parents.
{¶41} Next, Mother argues that the trial court erred in that it did not take the
wishes of eight-year-old B.B. and seven-year-old C.C. into account when considering
custody, contrary to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b). But R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) also involves
the child’s wishes as expressed by the child’s GAL. The GAL testified that the children
had negative reactions to visitation with their Mother but were bonded to their foster
family. B.B. displayed issues with anger and behavior when visits occurred, but these
problems reduced when the visits were reduced and C.C. appeared to be happier after the
reduction in visits and told the foster father that she “just wants it to be done and over
with.” As to the wishes of children ages seven and eight years old, the statute requires
the court to take “due regard for the maturity of the child” and the trial court expressly
stated it considered the wishes of the minor child as stated by the GAL, “though the court
has considered the age of the child.”
{¶42} Based on the facts in the record, we find clear and convincing evidence in
the record to support the juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(D).
Agency Made Reasonable Efforts
{¶43} Next, Mother contends that CCDCFS failed to make reasonable efforts to
reunite her with her children.
{¶44} R.C. 2151.419 provides: [A]t any hearing * * * at which the court removes a child from the child’s
home or continues the removal of a child from the child’s home, the court
shall determine whether the public children services agency * * * that filed
the complaint in the case, removed the child from home, has custody of the
child, or will be given custody of the child has made reasonable efforts to
prevent the removal of the child from the child’s home, to eliminate the
continued removal of the child from the child’s home, or to make it possible
for the child to return safely home. The agency shall have the burden of
proving that it has made those reasonable efforts.
{¶45} Mother argues that CCDCFS should have offered her more services,
services at an earlier date, and more follow-through on her services. Whether an agency,
however, made reasonable efforts pursuant to R.C. 2151.419 is based on the
circumstances of each case, not whether there was anything more the agency could have
done. See In re K.M.S., 3d Dist. Marion Nos. 9-15-37, 9-15-38, 9-15-39,
2017-Ohio-1412, ¶ 68.
{¶46} When this case commenced in 2013, Mother’s older children had already
been removed from her care and custody. The social worker, Tate, testified that
Mother’s case plan requirements included mental health, parenting and domestic violence
classes, and meeting the children’s basic needs. Tate testified that Mother had been
referred by previous caseworkers for parenting, and domestic violence services and she
referred Mother to Recovery Resources to address her mental health. Mother’s Recovery Resources counselor testified that while Mother was making some progress, she
had failed to show up for two months of appointments and was in danger of being
terminated from the program.
{¶47} The trial court recognized that Mother had transportation issues, which may
have prevented her from keeping some of her appointments at Recovery Resources, but
the court also noted that Mother should have informed her social worker so the social
worker could assist Mother with securing free transportation.
{¶48} Mother also contends that she was prejudiced by having a psychological
evaluation done just prior to trial. The record shows, however, that Mother’s
evaluation with Dr. Justice was not her first evaluation — Mother was previously
evaluated by the Juvenile Court Diagnostic Clinic and referred for services. Moreover,
Mother’s initial psychological evaluation appointment was scheduled several months
prior to trial, but Mother missed that appointment. Dr. Justice testified that had Mother
not missed the appointment, she would have had her report completed and there would
have been “three months or so to implement whatever recommendations there were
before trial[.]”
{¶49} Mother also contends that the agency did not make reasonable efforts as to
the children’s fathers and maternal grandmother. But, as mentioned, both fathers
appealed and could have raised that on appeal. The juvenile court denied maternal
grandmother’s motion for legal custody and maternal grandmother did not appeal the
court’s ruling. {¶50} Therefore, the trial court’s finding that the agency made reasonable efforts
to prevent the removal or continued removal of the children was supported by competent,
credible evidence in the record.
Guardian Ad Litem
{¶51} Mother argues that the there were multiple omissions in the GAL’s
investigation that call into question the thoroughness of her investigation and reliability of
her report and recommendation. Specifically, Mother claims that the GAL failed to
observe Father 2’s interaction with J.S. or conduct a home visit at Father 2’s house, did
not conduct a home visit at maternal grandmother’s house, and did not interview the
children’s previous GAL.
{¶52} The record belies her claims. The GAL attended multiple visitations with
J.S. but Father 2 failed to show up at the visits that the GAL attended. The GAL also
visited Father 2’s house and maternal grandmother’s house before maternal grandmother
relocated out of state. Finally, the GAL testified that she spoke with the GAL assigned
to the case that immediately preceded her.
{¶53} The record shows that the GAL’s investigation included reviewing the court
file, case file, discovery, reports, and court orders. The GAL testified that she visited the
homes of Mother, Father 1, and Father 2. She interviewed the parents, maternal
grandmother, maternal uncle, social workers, foster parents, the parents’ attorneys, the
children’s attorneys, service providers, and school personnel. She also interviewed the
children in their foster placement and at a visitation with their family. Finally, the GAL prepared a thorough report and recommendation, attended multiple hearings, and testified
at trial.
{¶54} There is nothing in the record that suggests that Mother was prejudiced by
the GAL’s investigation or report and recommendation.
{¶55} The juvenile court’s decision was supported by competent, credible
evidence in the record and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Accordingly, the court did not err by granting permanent custody of the children to
CCDCFS and Mother’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶56} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCURS; EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE OPINION
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., CONCURRING WITH SEPARATE OPINION: {¶57} I concur with the opinion of my learned colleagues but feel compelled to
write separately regarding my concerns about the suitability of the current foster care
placement.
{¶58} The evidence in this case is scant as to the living conditions in the foster
home. There was testimony that now living in the home are foster mother, foster father,
A.C., B.B., C.C. and J.S. III (the minors subject to the current litigation and companion
cases now before this court.)
{¶59} In addition to those six people, testimony reflects that there are an
unspecified number of tenants in the home whose identity was not revealed and there is
no testimony as to the backgrounds of these persons.
{¶60} In addition, there are numerous animals in the home as well as a suggestion
that there are also two adult, biological children of the foster parents in the home and,
again there is no testimony as to their backgrounds.
{¶61} There was no testimony offered that these other persons, i.e. tenants and
adult biological children have been investigated as to mental health issues, substance
abuse issues or criminal records.
{¶62} In addition, the record reflects that there are one and half bathrooms in the
foster home that are used by up to nine adults and the four children.
{¶63} For those reasons, although I agree to the permanent custody being awarded
to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services, I believe that the current
placement be investigated.