[Cite as In re A.C., 2019-Ohio-4788.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE A.C. : No. 108236 A Minor Child :
[Appeal by A.C., Father] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 21, 2019
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. AD18900944
Appearances:
Wargo Law, L.L.C., and Leslie E. Wargo, for appellant.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony R. Beery and Cheryl Rice, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
Appellant, A.C. (“Father”), appeals an order of the Juvenile Division
of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas (the “juvenile court”) granting legal
custody of his daughter (“A.C.”) to her maternal great-uncle (“Uncle”). Father
claims the following three errors: 1. The trial court erred by denying the Father’s motion for continuance because the Father had a medical issue, thus, precluding him from testifying at the hearing.
2. The trial court erred by denying the Father’s motion for first extension of temporary custody.
3. The trial court erred by denying the Father’s request for a new social worker.
4. Because the trial court did not continue the hearing after Father became ill and did not grant the Father’s motion for a first extension of temporary custody, it did not have all the competent and credible evidence before it to render a decision to grant permanent custody to the uncle.
We find no merit to the appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In January 2018, the Cuyahoga County Department of Child and
Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”) filed a complaint alleging that A.C. was
a neglected and dependent child due to her parents’ failure to care for her special
medical needs. A.C. was born prematurely and remained hospitalized for four
months after birth due to a heart condition and problems with her immune system.
The complaint for temporary custody further alleged that (1) A.C.’s mother
(“Mother”) and Father were unwilling to follow medical advice; (2) Mother had
untreated mental health and substance abuse issues; and (3) A.C.’s older brother,
K.J., was already in the emergency custody of CCDCFS due to Mother’s failure to
provide for his medical needs. The agency also filed two motions for emergency
predispositional temporary custody. Following a hearing in February 2018, the
court granted emergency custody of A.C. to CCDCFS, and A.C. was placed in the care of Uncle. Thereafter, in March 2018, Father filed a motion requesting that legal
custody be granted to himself with an order of protective supervision. A magistrate
denied the motion. Father objected to the magistrate’s decision, and the trial court
overruled the objections.
In July 2018, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify custody and asked the
court to grant legal custody of A.C. to Uncle. Prior to a hearing on the motion, Father
filed a motion for extension of temporary custody and for removal of the assigned
social worker.
On October 25, 2018, the court held a hearing on the parties’
competing motions, beginning with Father’s request for the removal of the assigned
case worker. Father alleged that extended family members of the assigned case
worker, Rosalind Bailey (“Bailey”), were close friends with members of Mother’s
family, including Uncle. He claimed that “Bailey’s cousin Ryan and [Uncle] are very
good friends.” (Father’s motion for first extension of temporary custody and request
for a new social worker p. 2.) He further alleged that “Ms. Bailey knows his wife’s
mother and grandmother and was consequently aware of his wife being on the outs
with her family over money,” and that he and Mother know Bailey’s grandmother
and have been in her home. (Father’s motion for first extension of temporary
custody and request for a new social worker p. 2.)
Father alleged at the hearing that his stepchild played at Bailey’s
grandmother’s home and that Bailey’s grandmother lives down the street from
Uncle. (Tr. 6.) Father also alleged that Mother’s mother has been friends with Bailey’s grandmother “for years” and that they live in close proximity to each other.
(Tr. 6.) Bailey denied these allegations and denied that any of her relatives live
anywhere near Uncle. (Tr. 6.) Indeed, Bailey testified that both of her grandmothers
are deceased; one grandmother died before Bailey was born and her other
grandmother passed away in 2014, long before A.C. was born. (Tr. 16.) Bailey also
stated that she does not know any of the individuals named in Father’s motion. (Tr.
16.) According to Bailey, Father wanted her removed from the case because he did
not like the information she relayed to him from A.C.’s medical providers. She
explained:
So I guess with that information, he didn’t want me to be on the case because he didn’t like the information that I spoke to him that was given to me from the service providers.
(Tr. 10.)
Father’s lawyer nevertheless argued that Father does not trust Bailey
and believes “she has spoken falsely about facts in the case” and, therefore, Father
did not feel he could work with her. Counsel argued that Father loves A.C. and
“could have done much better if he had a different social worker who [sic] he could
trust.” (Tr. 19.) Father admitted that he did not work his case plan the way he should
have, but asserted his failure to do so was because he did not get along with Bailey.
(Tr. 19.) He asked the court to extend temporary custody in order to allow him the
opportunity to work on his case plan with a different case worker.
The magistrate denied Father’s motion to remove A.C.’s case worker.
Based on the parties’ arguments and Bailey’s testimony, the magistrate found no genuine conflict between Bailey and Father. (Tr. 23.) The court, therefore,
proceeded to a hearing on CCDCFS’s motion to modify the temporary custody of
A.C. and award legal custody of A.C. to Uncle.
Bailey testified that A.C.’s older brother, K.J., was already in the legal
custody of Uncle. Therefore, if the court were to grant legal custody of A.C. to Uncle,
the siblings would be together. (Tr. 25.) Mother’s case plan required her to complete
parenting and domestic violence classes, undergo mental health treatment, and
demonstrate that she can provide for A.C.’s basic needs. (Tr. 27.) According to
Bailey, Mother made no attempt to complete any of these objectives. (Tr. 27.)
Father’s case plan also required him to complete parenting and
domestic violence classes, have regular visits with A.C., and complete a
psychological assessment through the court psychiatric clinic. Father was given an
appointment for the psychological assessment, but he rescheduled it three times and
failed to show up for the third appointment. (Tr. 29-30.) The court clinic closed his
case pursuant to a policy that limits appointments to no more than three
rescheduled appointments, and Father never completed the assessment. (Tr. 29.)
Bailey testified that the psychological assessment was necessary
because (1) the agency received reports that Father used excessive discipline with
K.J., who was 11 years old, (2) Father refused necessary medical care for A.C., and
(3) Mother and Father failed to obtain proper medical care for K.J., while K.J., who
is A.C.’s half-brother, was still in Mother’s custody. (Tr. 30.) The domestic violence assessment was a necessary component of
Father’s case plan because Father used excessive discipline on K.J., and the court
had issued a no-contact order prohibiting Father from having contact with K.J. (Tr.
32.) There were also concerns that Father was negatively influencing Mother’s
decisions regarding A.C.’s care. (Tr. 32.)
Father was given a copy of his case plan as well as referrals for
domestic violence and parenting classes at several agencies, including West Side
Community House, Fatherhood Initiative, Cleveland Heights Collaborative, and
others. Father was assigned to a case manager at West Side Community House, who
informed Bailey that Father did not want to interact with him. (Tr. 33.) The agency
had referred Father for services at Family Solutions before Bailey was assigned to
the case, and Father also refused those services. (Tr. 34.)
Visitation with A.C. started in February 2018. Bailey testified that
Father came to one visit in March, one doctor’s appointment in April, and two visits
in May 2018. Father had no visits with A.C. between May 2018 and October 25,
2018, the day of the hearing on CCDCFS’s motion for legal custody to Uncle. West
Side Community House stopped scheduling visits in July 2018, because Father
repeatedly failed to show up. (Tr. 35.)
Bailey testified that A.C. was “doing great” in Uncle’s care. Uncle
ensures that she receives all medical treatments, including regular physical and
occupational therapy. A.C. did not receive services through Help Me Grow,
however, because her parents never granted permission for the program, and their permission was required while she was in temporary custody. (Tr. 36.) Bailey
testified that Uncle had also passed all background checks, had an appropriate
home, and had legal custody of A.C.’s half-brother, K.J.
Bailey opined that an order granting legal custody of A.C. to Uncle
was in the child’s best interest. Although there was still time for an extension of
temporary custody, Bailey believed an immediate award of legal custody to Uncle
was better for A.C. because A.C. needs permanency. Bailey testified that neither
parent had demonstrated the ability to care for A.C.’s special medical needs. A.C.
requires regular physical and occupational therapy and regular visits to a
pulmonologist for treatment of pulmonary hypertension. (Tr. 40-42.) A.C. also has
ongoing issues related to her premature birth and was still going to a preemie clinic.
(Tr. 40.) Bailey testified that legal custody would be better for A.C. than an extension
of temporary custody because Father has not worked on his case plan and has not
demonstrated that he is able to care for A.C.’s medical needs. (Tr. 42-43.) Although
Father interacts with A.C. appropriately and expresses his love for her, he has not
demonstrated that he can support A.C. financially. (Tr. 38-39.)
Father arrived over an hour late for the hearing and missed most of
Bailey’s testimony. After Bailey’s testimony, the magistrate reviewed the statement
of understanding with Uncle, explaining his responsibilities with respect to A.C. if
he were awarded legal custody. Uncle indicated that he understood and accepted
the responsibilities. (Tr. 53.) The court then recessed to give Father an opportunity
to consult with his lawyer before taking the stand. However, when the hearing resumed, Father’s trial counsel informed the court that Father had a panic attack,
was having trouble breathing, and left the courthouse. Counsel requested a
continuance of the hearing due to a medical emergency. (Tr. 62.) The magistrate
denied the continuance on grounds that Father arrived late for the hearing, he knew
he was due to testify next and knew he was likely going to be arrested pursuant to
an active arrest warrant. (Tr. 63-64.)
Thereafter, the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) recommended that the
court grant legal custody of A.C. to Uncle. The GAL explained that A.C. has “really
flourished” in Uncle’s care and that A.C.’s medical conditions have been improving.
Uncle is Mother’s uncle and has facilitated a healthy relationship between Mother
and A.C. (Tr. 68.)
The magistrate granted CCDCFS’s motion to award legal custody of
A.C. to Uncle. Father objected to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court overruled
father’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision. Father now appeals the
trial court’s judgment.1
II. Law and Analysis
A. Continuance
In the first assignment of error, Father argues the trial court erred in
denying his request for a continuance of the hearing. He contends he was precluded
1 Mother has not appealed the trial court’s judgment. from testifying due to a medical condition and that the trial court’s denial of a
continuance violated his right to due process.
The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 423 N.E.2d
1078 (1981). An abuse of discretion implies a decision that is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 144 Ohio St.3d 571,
2015-Ohio-4915, 45 N.E.3d 987, ¶ 13. When applying the abuse of discretion
standard, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court. Vannucci v. Schneider, 2018-Ohio-1294, 110 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.).
The right to parent one’s children is a fundamental right protected by
the Due Process Clause of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. In re M.W.,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103705, 2016-Ohio-2948, ¶ 9. A fundamental requirement
of due process is notice and the opportunity to be heard. Id.
However, a parent’s right to be present at a custody hearing is not
absolute. In re C.K., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108313, 2019-Ohio-4167, ¶ 20, citing
In re M.W. at ¶ 10. While courts must ensure that due process is provided in
parental termination proceedings, “a parent facing termination of parental rights
must exhibit cooperation and must communicate with counsel and with the court in
order to have standing to argue that due process was not followed in a termination
proceeding.” In re Q.G., 170 Ohio App.3d 609, 2007-Ohio-1312, 868 N.E.2d 713,
¶ 12 (8th Dist.). Any potential prejudice to a party denied a continuance is weighed against a trial court’s “right to control its own docket and the public’s interest in the
prompt and efficient dispatch of justice.” Unger at 67.
In Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 423 N.E.2d 1078, the Ohio Supreme
Court noted that “[t]here are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a
continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in
the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the
trial judge at the time the request is denied.” Id. at 67. In Unger, the court identified
certain factors a court should consider in evaluating a motion for a continuance.
These factors include:
the length of the delay requested; whether other continuances have been requested and received, the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; and other relevant factors, depending on the unique facts of each case.
Id. at 67-68.
Juv.R. 23 is also instructive and provides that “[c]ontinuances shall
be granted only when imperative to secure fair treatment for the parties.”
Loc.R. 49(C) of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Juvenile Division,
further provides:
No case will be continued on the day of trial or hearing except for good cause shown, which cause was not known to the party or counsel prior to the date of trial or hearing, and provided that the party and/or counsel have used diligence to be ready for trial and have notified or made diligent efforts to notify the opposing party or counsel as soon as he/she became aware of the necessity to request a postponement. This rule may not be waived by consent of counsel. Counsel requested a continuance on the day of trial due to an alleged
medical emergency. Although counsel reported that Father was having trouble
breathing and went to the emergency room, the court noted that Father arrived an
hour late for the hearing and was aware of an outstanding arrest warrant that was
likely to result in his arrest. In other words, the court concluded that Father’s
purported medical emergency was dilatory and contrived. Indeed, Father had
previously used dilatory tactics by filing motions asking for the magistrate to recuse
herself, for a new GAL, and for a new case worker. In his request for a new case
worker, he claimed he and Mother knew Bailey’s grandmother and that Bailey’s
grandmother was intimately familiar with Mother’s family. Yet, Bailey testified that
her grandmother passed away in 2014, long before A.C. was born. A medical
emergency could be a legitimate basis for a continuance. But in this case, the trial
court had a justifiable reason to believe that Father was manipulating the process
rather than suffering a true medical emergency. We find no abuse of discretion in
denying the requested continuance under these circumstances.
The first assignment of error is overruled.
B. Legal Custody to Uncle
In the second assignment of error, Father argues the trial court erred
in denying Father’s motion for an extension of temporary custody. In the fourth
assignment of error, Father argues the trial court lacked competent, credible
evidence on which to grant legal custody to Uncle because Father was unable to testify at the hearing due to a medical emergency. We discuss these assigned errors
together because they are interrelated.
R.C. 2151.011(B)(21) defines legal custody as:
a legal status that vests in the custodian the right to have physical care and control of the child and to determine where and with whom the child shall live, and the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the child and to provide the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to any residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.
Thus, legal custody is significantly different from permanent custody. In re T.R.,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102071, 2015-Ohio-4177, ¶ 32. Unlike permanent custody,
where parental rights are completely terminated, parents who lose legal custody
retain residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.2 Id.;
R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(c). And although legal custody is intended to be permanent,
parents may, under certain circumstances, petition the court for reunification with
their children in the future. R.C. 2151.42(B).
Because legal custody is a less drastic remedy than permanent
custody, the trial court applies a less stringent evidentiary standard. “Unlike in a
permanent custody proceeding, where an agency’s burden is by clear and convincing
evidence, the standard in legal custody proceedings is a preponderance of the
evidence.” In re M.D.R., 11th Dist. Portage Nos. 2018-P-0032 and 2018-P-0033,
2019-Ohio-1054, ¶ 16; see also In re G.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103706, 2016-
2 Wherea child is placed in legal custody of another person, the parents retain “the privilege of reasonable visitation,” the right to “consent to adoption,” “the privilege to determine the child’s religious affiliation,” and “the responsibility of support.” R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(c). Ohio-5242, ¶ 15. “Preponderance of the evidence means ‘evidence that’s more
probable, more persuasive, or of greater probative value.’” In re J.B., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 103521, 2016-Ohio-5513, ¶ 54, quoting In re C.V.M., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 98340, 2012-Ohio-5514, ¶ 17. We review the record to determine if
the trial court’s judgment is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. In re
D.G.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107921, 2019-Ohio-3571, ¶ 25.
A manifest weight of the evidence challenge concerns “‘the inclination
of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of
the issue rather than the other.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678
N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990). A reviewing
court “‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility
of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
[factfinder] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice
that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Id., quoting State
v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “the weight to be given the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of facts.” State
v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus.
“Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is particularly competent
to decide ‘whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular
witnesses,’ we must afford substantial deference to its determinations of credibility.”
Barberton v. Jenney, 126 Ohio St.3d 5, 2010-Ohio-2420, 929 N.E.2d 1047, quoting State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3709, 11
(Aug. 22, 1997).
We will not reverse an award of legal custody absent an abuse of
discretion. In re C.D.Y., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108355, 2019-Ohio-4262, ¶ 8.
When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Vannucci, 2018-Ohio-1294, 110
N.E.3d 716, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.). However, where the court’s decision on the child’s best
interests is not supported by competent, credible evidence, then it is unreasonable
and may be reversed. In re J.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108139, 2019-Ohio-3666,
¶ 17, citing In re Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d 445, 455, 751 N.E.2d 552 (7th Dist.2001),
and Bechtol v. Bechtol, 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 550 N.E.2d 178 (1990), syllabus.
The statutory scheme governing the award of legal custody does not
include a specific test or set of criteria, but Ohio courts, including this court, have
held that the juvenile court must base its decision to award legal custody on the best
interest of the child. In re B.B., 2016-Ohio-7994, 74 N.E.3d 904, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.); In
re B.J., 2017-Ohio-315, 81 N.E.3d 975, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.); In re C.N., 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 27119, 2016-Ohio-7322, ¶ 26.
In determining the best interest of the child in a legal custody case,
the juvenile court must consider all relevant factors, and may look to the factors
listed under R.C. 2151.414(D) for guidance even though these factors apply to
permanent custody decisions. In re M.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105168, 2017-
Ohio-7481, ¶ 11. Those factors include the interaction of the child with the child’s parents, relatives, and caregivers; the wishes of the child, as expressed directly by
the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem; the custodial history of the child;
and the child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement. R.C. 2151.414(D).
The magistrate found that Father failed to complete a psychological
assessment, failed to complete parenting and domestic violence education services,
did not consistently visit A.C., and did not consistently attend A.C.’s medical
appointments even though he was permitted to do so. (Magistrate’s decision
Oct. 29, 2018.) The magistrate also found that Father failed to make “significant
progress on the case plan” and that “progress has not been made in alleviating the
causes for the removal of the child from the home.” Id.
The record supports the trial court’s findings. Bailey testified that
Father did not complete any of his case plan objectives. He rescheduled the
psychological assessment through the court clinic three times and failed to appear
for the third and final appointment. The clinic’s policy precluded Father from
scheduling any more appointments. (Tr. 29, 31.)
Father was assigned to a case manager at West Side Community
House, where he could have completed parenting and domestic violence classes.
According to Bailey, Father did not want to interact with the case manager, and the
case manager was unable to help him with services. Before Bailey was involved in
this case, the agency referred Father to Family Solutions for services, but Father also
refused its services. (Tr. 33.) Thus, the evidence showed that Father was not willing to cooperate with agency services designed to help him meet the objectives of his
case plan so that he could be reunited with A.C.
Bailey testified that Father failed to regularly visit A.C. Visits started
in February 2018. Father came to one visit in March, one doctor’s appointment in
April, and two visits in May. Father failed to attend any visits after May 2018, and
West Side Community House officially stopped all visits in July 2018, because
Father was not attending visits. (Tr. 35.) Thus, at the time of the legal custody
hearing, Father had not seen A.C. in five months.
Father now blames Bailey for his failure to make progress on his case
plan. He asserts that Bailey “caused him consternation in completing his case plan
and seeing his daughter.” (Appellant’s brief at 19.) He also asserts he was unable to
work on his case plan due to a broken leg. (Tr. 46.) However, Bailey testified that
she accommodated Father as much as possible. Pursuant to Father’s request, Bailey
communicated with Father exclusively through emails. (Tr. 10.) She emailed Father
to inquire about his progress and to provide him with information regarding A.C.’s
doctor’s appointments, therapy sessions, and “all the information he needs.” (Tr.
10.) Even after Father’s visits were stopped, Bailey continued trying to arrange
visits. (Tr. 34-36.) Moreover, Father could have completed parenting and domestic
violence education classes at West Side Community House without interacting with
Bailey, but Father did not want to engage with the case worker there anymore than
he wanted to work with Bailey. Father blamed Bailey for his failure to complete any of his case plan objectives even though he made no effort to pursue services that
involved no interaction with Bailey.
Furthermore, the GAL stated at the hearing that he believed an award
of legal custody to Uncle was in A.C.’s best interest. The GAL advised the court that
A.C.’s health conditions have improved since she has been in Uncle’s care. (Tr. 68.)
He further stated that Uncle facilitates a loving relationship between A.C. and
Mother. He explained:
[W]hen I was there visiting, the mother was also there and I saw her — she has a great bond with her child and was holding her and, you know, they seem very happy together. So I’m in agreement with legal custody to [Uncle].
(Tr. 68.) Thus, A.C.’s wishes, as expressed by the GAL, were for an order granting
legal custody to Uncle.
Therefore, there was competent, credible evidence that A.C. was
thriving in Uncle’s care and that Father was not making an effort to remedy the
problems that caused A.C. to be removed from his care. A.C. had a bonded
relationship with Uncle and very little interaction with Father. Furthermore, Bailey
testified that A.C. needs a permanent home. We cannot say that awarding legal
custody of A.C. to Uncle was an abuse of discretion under these circumstances.
Father, nevertheless, argues the trial court should have given him an
extension of temporary custody rather than awarding legal custody to Uncle.
However, an extension of legal custody may only be granted if the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the extension is in the best interest of the child, there has been significant progress on the case plan of the child, and there is reasonable cause to believe that the child will be reunified with one of the parents or otherwise permanently placed within the period of extension.
R.C. 2151.415(D)(1). In other words, if the court finds that an extension is not in the
child’s best interest or that reunification is not likely in the next six months, it is not
required to grant an extension of temporary custody. In re Da.B., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 105886, 2018-Ohio-689, ¶ 17. See also In re C.M., 9th Dist. Summit
No. 24380, 2009-Ohio-943, ¶ 24 (“Where the trial court finds that it is in the best
interest of a child to be placed in legal custody as a permanent disposition, the trial
court must necessarily deny an extension of temporary custody.”); In re G.B., 2d
Dist. Greene No. 2017-CA-30, 2017-Ohio-8759 (Denial of extension of temporary
custody was not an abuse of discretion where father failed to substantially comply
with four objectives of his case plan and permanent custody was in the children’s
best interest.).
As previously stated, the trial court found, and the record
demonstrates, that Father failed to make any significant progress on his case plan
and that he failed to remedy the conditions that caused A.C.’s removal. Rather than
work on his case plan, Father blamed others for his failure. It was, therefore,
doubtful that A.C. could be reunified with Father within six months. We, therefore,
find no abuse of discretion in denying Father’s request for an extension of temporary
custody.
The second and fourth assignments of error are overruled. C. Request for New Social Worker
In the third assignment of error, Father argues that the trial court’s
judgment should be reversed because the trial court denied his request to remove
the assigned case worker.
Father cites no legal authority to support his argument, and we have
found no precedent addressing this issue. It is, therefore, an issue of first
impression. In the absence of any legal authority dictating otherwise, we review the
trial court’s decision denying Father’s request to remove the assigned case worker
for an abuse of discretion since an appellate court reviews a juvenile court’s custody
decision for an abuse of discretion. In re V.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 102903,
103061, and 103367, 2015-Ohio-4991, ¶ 52.
In his motion to have the case worker, Bailey, removed, Father alleged
that one of Bailey’s grandmothers had a personal relationship with Mother’s family.
Father’s motion further alleged that “he and his wife know Ms. Bailey’s
grandmother[.]” Bailey testified, however, that both of her grandmothers are
deceased; one grandmother died before she was born and the other grandmother
died in 2014, long before A.C. was born. (Tr. 16.) Bailey also denied that she or her
family had any connections to Mother’s family, and Father provided no evidence of
any relationship between the families other than his bald accusations. The trial
court assessed Bailey’s demeanor while testifying and found her testimony credible.
In the absence of any contradictory evidence, we have no reason to doubt Bailey’s credibility and, therefore, find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s judgment
denying Father’s motion to remove the assigned case worker.
The third assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR