Hyde v. Cotton

2011 OK 31, 255 P.3d 411, 2011 Okla. LEXIS 32, 2011 WL 1468394

• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma
• Decided: April 19, 2011
• Docket: 108,367, 108,374
• Status: Published

Opinions

COLBERT, V.C.J.

T1 The questions presented are: (1) whether it was proper for the Workers' Compensation Court to grant a motion for summary judgment; (2) is the district court's finding of a common law marriage between the decedent and his common law wife binding as to the employer and the Workers' Compensation Court; and (8) whether common law wife meets the definition of surviving spouse set forth in the workers' compensation statutes. This Court holds that summary judgment is not a procedure available in a workers' compensation proceeding; the district court's determination of the decedent's marital status is binding on the Workers' Compensation Court; and the common law wife in this proceeding meets the statutory definition of a surviving spouse.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

T2 Christopher Allen Hyde (Decedent) was employed by J & C Casing Pullers & Plugging, LLC (Employer) as an oilfield hand. On August 27, 2008, the oil well, where Decedent was working, blew up and left Decedent seriously injured. Decedent died later that day. Employer admits that Decedent died while in the course of employment.

13 On September 15, 2008, Judy Hyde, Decedent's mother (Mother), filed a claim for death benefits in the Workers' Compensation Court and Decedent's four minor children were listed as Decedent's heirs at law. Mother filed the claim on behalf of all of the children. However, Mother is the legal guardian for only one of the minor children.

"I 4 On November 26, 2008, Angela Cotton, claiming to be Decedent's common law wife (Wife), filed another claim for death benefits in the Workers' Compensation court. In the Form 3, Wife designated herself as the Personal Representative and listed two of Decedent's four children as heirs at law.

5 Between the time Mother filed a claim for death benefits and Wife filed a claim for death benefits in the Workers' Compensation Court, Wife filed a Petition for Letters of Administration and Determination of Heirs in the District Court of Lincoln County requesting appointment as Personal Representative of Decedent's estate. Mother filed an objection to Wife's appointment as Personal Representative and requested that she be appointed Personal Representative of Decedent's estate instead. Mother later withdrew her written objection to Wife's appointment. She preferred to litigate Wife's status as Decedent's common law wife in the Workers' Compensation Court instead of the district court. On November 7, 2008, the district court found that Decedent and Wife were common law married, that Wife was Decedent's surviving spouse, and that Decedent had four children. Wife and the children were all determined to be heirs at law. The district court appointed Mother and Wife as co-administrators of Decedent's estate.

I 6 In the workers' compensation proceedings, each of the parties filed numerous motions for a prehearing conference due to discovery conflicts, guardian ad litem issues, objections to the inability to take depositions, continuance of the trial due to mediation, and other problems. After mediation failed, Wife filed a motion for summary judgment. On November 18, 2009, the Workers' Compensation judge heard arguments regarding Wife's motion for summary judgment. By order dated February 3, 2010, he granted Wife's motion for summary judgment. Employer and Mother appealed to the three judge panel.

T7 On appeal, Employer and Mother argued that summary judgment in Workers' Compensation proceedings is not authorized by the Rules of the Workers' Compensation Court. The three judge panel affirmed the trial tribunal's decision by order on May 18, 2010. Employer and Mother brought separate appeals to this Court and the appeals were consolidated.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

T8 Legal issues are presented in this case as to whether summary judgment is permissible in Workers' Compensation Court and whether the findings of the district court were binding on the Workers' Compensation Court. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Kluver v. Weatherford Hosp. Auth., 1993 OK 85, ¶ 14, 859 P.2d 1081, 1084.

III. ANALYSIS

T9 Workers' Compensation is a creature of statute and as such cannot operate outside of the limitations designed by the Legislature. Mohn v. Ky. Fried Chicken, 1999 OK CIV APP 133, ¶ 9, 994 P.2d 99, 102. The Workers' Compensation Court is legislatively authorized "to adopt reasonable rules within its respective areas of responsibility including the rules of procedure for the Court en bane, after notice and public hearing, for effecting the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act" subject to approval by this Court. Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 1.2(E) (Supp.2010). Rule 2 of the Workers' Compensation Act provides: "Any matter of practice or procedure not specifically dealt with either by the Workers' Compensation Act or by these rules will be guided by practice or procedure followed in the district courts of this state." Okla. Stat. tit. 85, app. This rule is designed to guide the Workers' Compensation Court on matters not specifically dealt with by its own rules. It does not serve as an avenue to adopt the rules and procedures that govern the district courts. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, app. (Supp.2002). Summary judgment is a procedural mechanism to be used in district court and, absent any legislative action expanding its use, cannot be used in workers' compensation proceedings. Id. at Rule 18.

T10 Workers' compensation, as a whole, is designed to be a summary adjudication process. That process is achieved by filing a Form 9, Motion to Set for Trial, which will allow the judge to decide the issue in question. Okla. Stat. tit. 85, ch. 4, app., Rule 19. A party cannot use Rule 2 to create an entirely new mechanism or procedure in workers' compensation by incorporating district court rules. For instance, in Snyder v. Smith Welding & Fabrication, this Court refused to allow parties in the Workers' Compensation Court to use the district court's motion for new trial. The Court stated that a motion for new trial is "a procedural device [that is] unauthorized and unavailable in the compensation court procedure." 1986 OK 35, ¶ 7, 746 P.2d 168, 170. Summary judgment is not available in workers' compensation proceedings because the Legislature did not confer that power upon the Workers' Compensation Court. A motion for summary judgment in workers' compensation proceedings is not a proper means of adjudication and is therefore, impermissible.

§Y11 "When a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered a judgment in relation to any subject within its jurisdiction, the presumption arises that it had before it sufficient evidence to authorize it to render such judgment...." Lee v. Harvey, 1945 OK 63, ¶ 5, 156 P.2d 134, 135. The parties' attempt to cireumvent the district court's judgment amounts to a collateral attack on the judgment which is prohibited. "A collateral attack on a judicial proceeding is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or to deny its force and effect in some manner not provided by law; that is, in some other way than by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or motion for a new trial." State ex rel. Comm'n of Land Office v. Corp. Comm'n, 1979 OK 16, ¶ 9, 590 P.2d 674, 677 (citing Watkins v. Jester, 1924 OK 888, 229 P. 1085; Pettis v. Johnston, 1920 OK 224, 190 P. 681). The Lincoln County district court is a court of general jurisdiction and judgments from that court must be recognized by its sister courts. The district court's order was rendered in November 2008. Mother participated in the proceedings of the district court and had the opportunity to appeal the adverse decision, but did not do so. Her brief to the three judge panel states that she "made the tactical decision to acquiesce in [Wife's] appointment as Co-Personal Representative, preferring that her status as a common-law wife be litigated in [Workers' Compensation Court]".

112 Employer argues that the district court's judgment is not applicable to it because it was not a party to the probate proceedings. Even though Employer was not a party to the probate action, the issue of marital status was determined by the district court and Employer is bound by that decision. The attempt to have the same issue adjudicated before another court is barred by issue preclusion. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Little, 2004 OK 74, ¶ 24 & n. 47, 100 P.3d 707, 718-19 ("As a general rule, the doctrine of preclusion operates to enjoin successive attempts to relitigate the same issue in different forums.") ("[Olnee a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, the same parties or their privies may not relitigate that issue in a suit brought upon a different claim.").

Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of facts and issues actually litigated and nee-essarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or their privies. An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined.... An issue is necessarily determined if the judgment would not have been rendered but for the determination of that issue. Additionally, the party against whom issue preclusion is interposed must have had a 'full and fair opportunity' to litigate the critical issue in the earlier case.

Wilson v. City of Tulsa, 2004 OK CIV APP 44, ¶ 9, 91 P.3d 673, 677 (citing Nealis v. Baird, 1999 OK 98, ¶ 51, 996 P.2d 438, 458). The issue of Decedent and Wife's marital status was resolved by the district court in Lincoln County during the probate proceedings. It was necessary to the probate proceedings for the court to make a finding of Decedent's heirs at law. The court found that Wife and Decedent were in fact common law married and that Wife is Decedent's surviving spouse. It also found Wife to be Decedent's heir at law.

13 Employer argues that Mother was party to the probate proceedings, not Employer, and thus it cannot be bound by the decision of the district court. We cannot agree. Privity exist between Employer and Mother which allows the holding of the probate court to be binding against Employer too. "To be in privity, a party must 'actually have the same interest, character, or capacity as the party against whom the prior judgment was rendered'" Id. ¶ 11, 91 P.3d at 677. "[The existence of privity depends upon the circumstances and requires 'a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right'" Id. Employer and Mother have the same interest in regards to Wife's status as surviving spouse. Both parties had the same opportunity in which to have the issue of marital status determined by a court; however, the district court ruled before the issue was addressed by the Workers' Compensation Court. Thus, the Workers' Compensation Court and Employer are both bound by the judgment of the district court.

114 The district court's finding that Wife is Decedent's surviving spouse and an heir at law is sufficient to establish her claim of surviving spouse entitled to death benefits per the Workers' Compensation Act.¹ The Workers' Compensation Court was bound by that finding. For a surviving spouse to recover death benefits, he or she must be "legally married to a worker at the time of the worker's death, [and] is required only to show that he or she meets the statutory definition of a surviving spouse, rather than that he or she received one-half or more of their support from the employee." In re Bryan, 2003 OK 70, ¶ 19, 76 P.3d 653, 659.

Y15 During the probate proceedings, Lincoln County district court held that Decedent and Wife were common law married; Wife was Decedent's common law spouse at the time of his death; and Wife was an heir at law. An adjudication of status by a court of "unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters" is sufficient to accord that same status in a court of limited jurisdiction, such as the Workers' Compensation Court. Powers v. Dist. Ct. of Tulsa Cnty., 2009 OK 91, ¶ 16, 227 P.3d 1060, 1073.

16 The finding of the district court was offered and considered by the trial tribunal when it found "[Wife] to be entitled to all benefits of surviving wife pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act." Although the trial tribunal erred by using a summary judgment procedure, its evidentiary finding that Wife met the definition of surviving spouse in the Workers' Compensation Act will not be disturbed on appeal. Therefore, Wife is entitled to death benefits as a surviving spouse.

IV. CONCLUSION

The three judge panel erred in affirming the trial tribunal's decision to grant summary judgment in this matter because summary judgment is not proper in workers' compensation proceedings. While the trial tribunal reached the correct result, it used an erroneous procedure to do so. McMillan v. Lane Wood & Co., 1961 OK 95, ¶ 0, 361 P.2d 487, 488, (syl. no. 4 by the court). Wife should have filed a Form 9 and attached the probate order from the district court to establish that the issue of marriage had been decided. Despite the fact that Employer was not a party to the probate proceedings, it was in privity with Mother. The adjudication of Wife's status as spouse was binding against both Employer and the Workers' Compensation Court. Finally, Wife's status as surviving spouse is sufficient to establish her entitlement to death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. Accordingly, the order of the three judge panel is vacated, and the cause is remanded to the Workers' Compensation Court for an award consistent with this opinion.

ORDER OF THREE JUDGE PANEL VACATED; TRIAL TRIBUNAL VACATED; CAUSE REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION.

CONCUR: COLBERT, V.C.J.; KAUGER, WATT, EDMONDSON, REIF, COMBS, JJ. CONCUR IN PART; DISSENT IN PART: WINCHESTER, GURICH, JJ.

1 . The Workers' Compensation Act defines a surviving spouse as "only the employee's spouse living with or actually dependent upon the employee at the time of his injury or death, or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of desertion by the employee" Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 3.1(A)(2).