Hunt Construction Group, Inc. v. Garrett

938 N.E.2d 794, 2010 Ind. App. LEXIS 2369, 2010 WL 5087843
CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 14, 2010
Docket49A02-1001-CT-86
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 938 N.E.2d 794 (Hunt Construction Group, Inc. v. Garrett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Hunt Construction Group, Inc. v. Garrett, 938 N.E.2d 794, 2010 Ind. App. LEXIS 2369, 2010 WL 5087843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinions

OPINION

BARNES, Judge.

Case Summary

The Hunt Construction Group, Inc., and Mezzetta Construction, Inc., (collectively, "Hunt Construction")1 appeal the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment and the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to Shannon D. [797]*797Garrett. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Issues

Hunt Construction raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as:

I. whether the trial court properly granted Garrett's motion for partial summary judgment regarding Hunt Construction's vicarious liability; and
II. whether the trial court properly denied Hunt Construction's motion for summary judgment regarding its duty to Garrett.

Facts

The Indiana Stadium and Convention Building Authority ("Owner") hired Hunt Construction to act as the construction manager for the construction of Lucas Oil Stadium. The construction contract between Owner and Hunt Construction consisted of documents entitled "Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager" and "Indiana Stadium Project Safety Program."2 Additionally, Hunt Construetion entered into an agreement with the Indiana Department of Labor and Indiana Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("IOSHA") entitled "Partnership Agreement." Owner separately entered into agreements with contractors, including Baker Concrete Construction, Inc. ("Baker Concrete"). Hunt Construction did not 'enter into a contract with Baker Concrete or the other contractors.

On October 16, 2006, Garrett, an employee of Baker Concrete, was injured at the jobsite when another employee of Baker Concrete was removing a piece of forming material above her and the forming material fell, striking Garrett. Garrett sustained injuries to her head and left hand.

Garrett filed a complaint for negligence against Hunt Construction. Garrett then filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding Hunt Construction's duty to her. Garrett argued that Hunt Construction had assumed a nondelegable duty to her through its contract and that it had assumed a duty to her through its conduct. In response, Hunt Construction filed a cross motion for summary judgment. Hunt Construction responded that it was entitled to summary judgment because it did not have a duty to Garrett. Hunt Construction argued that vicarious liability through a nondelegable duty was improper because a principal/contractor relationship did not exist between Hunt Construction and Baker Concrete. Additionally, Hunt Construction argued that it did not assume a duty to Garrett through its contracts or through its conduct.

After a hearing, the trial court granted Garrett's motion for partial summary judgment and denied Hunt Construction's motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that Hunt Construction had "assumed, by both contract and conduct, a nondelegable duty of safety to all employees at the construction project, including employees of contractors and subcontractors" and that "in addition to liability for their own negligence, [Hunt Construction was] vicariously liable for the negligence of [Garrett's] employer, Baker Concrete Construction." App. pp. 697-98. Hunt Construction now appeals. _

Analysis

Hunt Construction appeals the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to Garrett regarding duty and the trial court's denial of Hunt Construction's mo-

[798]*798tion for summary judgment. Our standard of review for a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment is well settled. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Mangold v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind.2001). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the nonmovant. Mangold, 756 N.E.2d at 973. Our review of a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated to the trial court. Id. We must carefully review a decision on summary judgment to ensure that a party was not improperly denied its day in court. Id. at 974.

Garrett brought this negligence action against Hunt Construction. To prevail on a claim of negligence the plaintiff must show: (1) duty owed to the plaintiff by defendant; (2) breach of duty because of conduct falling below the applicable standard of care; and (8) compensable injury proximately caused by defendant's breach of duty. Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind.2010). The summary judgment motions here concern whether Hunt Construction had a duty to Garrett. Absent a duty there can be no negligence or liability based upon the breach. Id. Generally, whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide. Rhodes v. Wright 805 N.E.2d 382, 386 (Ind.2004).

I. Vicarious Liability

The trial court found that Hunt Construction was vicariously liable for the negligence of Baker Concrete. This finding was based on Garrett's argument that Hunt Construction owed her a nondelega-ble duty. In general, viearious liability is "indirect legal responsibility." Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind.1999) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1404 (5th ed.1979)). This doctrine applies where a party is legally responsible for the negligence of another, not because the party did anything wrong but rather because of the party's relationship to the wrongdoer. Id. Courts employ various legal doctrines to hold people vicariously liable, including respondeat superior, apparent or ostensible agency, agency by estoppel, and the non delegable duty doctrine. Id. Some doctrines are based in tort law, and some are based in agency law. Id. at 147-48.

In the construction context, "the long-standing general rule has been that a principal is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor." Carie v. PSI Energy, Inc., 715 N.E.2d 853, 855 (Ind.1999). However, "[wJhile a master is generally not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor, the master may be liable if the independent contractor was performing a non-delegable duty." Sword, 714 N.E.2d at 147 n. 4 (citing Bagley v. Insight Communications Co., 658 N.E.2d 584, 586, 588 (Ind.1995)). "A non-delega-ble duty is one that public policy holds to be so important that one party should not be permitted to transfer the duty (and its resultant liability) to another party." Id. Nondelegable duties encourage the employer of the contractor to participate in the control of work covered by the exceptions in order to minimize the risk of resulting injuries. Carie, 715 N.E.2d at 855.

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