VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1] Marla Huesers appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting Stuart Hues-ers custody of their three children. Marla contends the trial court did not properly consider evidence of domestic violence. We reverse and remand.
[¶ 2] Marla and Stuart Huesers were married in July of 1988. The couple had three children: Misty, age 9; Charles, age 6; and, Zachary, age 5. Stuart and Marla separated in 1994 and Stuart brought an action for separation from bed and board. Following a period of separation and reconciliation, Stuart moved to amend the original complaint and filed for divorce. Throughout the proceedings involved in this case, there were allegations and admissions of domestic violence. The trial court found both parties were “quick to anger” and often “engage[d] in physical violence.” There was evidence that both parties committed domestic violence during the course of the marriage, but they did not direct this violence toward the children. There were eleven instances of domestic violence the trial court found to be “roughly proportional.” These instances began with arguments which escalated to physical abuse by both parties, with Marla hitting [221]*221Stuart and Stuart, in turn, sitting on Marla to restrain her.
[¶ 3] Further evidence was presented of three instances of domestic violence1 committed by Stuart alone. The first of these incidents occurred in Wisconsin. Marla had returned home from a bar and told Stuart how the men in the bar were “hitting on her.” Stuart became angry, grabbed her by the throat, and threw her in the bedroom. Marla called the police and Stuart spent a night in jail, but Marla later dropped all the charges. The second incident occurred in Portland, Oregon. Stuart alleged Marla had taken their son Charlie with her when she went skinny-dipping with another man. When she returned home, Stuart hit Marla in the face. The third incident occurred at the farm outside Garrison, North Dakota, after Marla returned home from town. Following an argument, Marla said she was going back to Garrison where she “was appreciated.” In response, Stuart pushed her out the door. Stuart admitted to each of these acts.
[¶ 4] In addition to these three instances, Marla also alleged Stuart committed other acts of domestic violence. She claimed Stuart pushed her down to the ground in front of a Garrison bar, and, on another occasion, threw her across their garage. The most recent act of domestic violence, Marla alleged, occurred in Bismarck when Stuart hit her in the mouth following an argument on Misty’s birthday. Stuart disputes Marla’s description of these events and denies he committed domestic violence on these occasions.
[¶ 5] The trial court placed sole physical custody with Stuart, finding his “past and present life style is preferable to that of Marla.” Marla challenges the trial court’s findings of fact, stating it did not properly consider the evidence of domestic violence when determining custody.
[¶ 6] A trial court’s custody determination is a finding of fact and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Ternes v. Ternes, 555 N.W.2d 355, 357 (N.D.1996); Krank v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844, 847 (N.D. 1995). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or if the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, has a definite and firm conviction that the trial court has made a mistake. Krank, 529 N.W.2d at 847 (citing Ludwig v. Burchill, 514 N.W.2d 674, 675 (N.D.1994)).
[¶ 7] In determining custody, a trial court must determine what is in the best interests of the child. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2. When there is evidence of domestic violence, it creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to the perpetrator of the domestic violence.1 Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 161 (N.D.1995). This presumption can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Id. Domestic violence is defined to include, “physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical force, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical force, or assault, not committed in self-defense, on the complaining family or household members.” N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-01(2). Although domestic violence is just one of thirteen factors a trial court must review when determining the best interest of a child, “in the hierarchy of factors to be considered, domestic violence predominates when there is credible evidence of it.” Ryan v. Flemming, 533 N.W.2d 920, 923 (N.D.1995).
[222]*222[¶ 8] We have considered several cases on the issue of domestic violence under the current statute. Ternes, 555 N.W.2d 355; Anderson v. Hensrud, 548 N.W.2d 410 (N.D.1996); Engh v. Jensen, 547 N.W.2d 922 (N.D.1996); Bruner v. Hager, 534 N.W.2d 825 (N.D.1995); Helbling v. Helbling, 532 N.W.2d 650 (N.D.1995); Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844. We are again asked to determine which parent bears the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption when there is evidence both parents were guilty of domestic violence. The statute does not speak directly to this issue, but in Krank, we stated,
“if domestic violence has been committed by both parents, the trial court [must] measure the amount and extent of domestic violence inflicted by both parents. If the amount and extent of domestic violence inflicted by one parent is significantly greater than that inflicted by the other, the statutory presumption against awarding custody to the perpetrator will apply only to the parent who has inflicted the greater domestic violence_”
529 N.W.2d at 850 (emphasis added). When the evidence shows an equal amount of domestic violence on the part of both parents, the presumption should apply to neither party. Id.
[¶ 9] The trial court measured the domestic violence which occurred during the course of the Huesers’ marriage, and then determined if there were enough instances of domestic violence on one side to apply the statutory presumption. It found the violence committed by Stuart was greater than the violence committed by Marla, but was not “significantly greater” as to require the presumption to apply. The trial court stated, “[t]here are at least eleven other incidents of violence during the marriage which would begin with arguments, rise to contact where Marla would attack Stuart and he would sit on her until she calmed down. These incidents are somewhat equal in severity....”
[¶ 10] The trial court recognized Stuart’s admission of the three instances where he was the sole perpetrator of domestic violence.
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VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1] Marla Huesers appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting Stuart Hues-ers custody of their three children. Marla contends the trial court did not properly consider evidence of domestic violence. We reverse and remand.
[¶ 2] Marla and Stuart Huesers were married in July of 1988. The couple had three children: Misty, age 9; Charles, age 6; and, Zachary, age 5. Stuart and Marla separated in 1994 and Stuart brought an action for separation from bed and board. Following a period of separation and reconciliation, Stuart moved to amend the original complaint and filed for divorce. Throughout the proceedings involved in this case, there were allegations and admissions of domestic violence. The trial court found both parties were “quick to anger” and often “engage[d] in physical violence.” There was evidence that both parties committed domestic violence during the course of the marriage, but they did not direct this violence toward the children. There were eleven instances of domestic violence the trial court found to be “roughly proportional.” These instances began with arguments which escalated to physical abuse by both parties, with Marla hitting [221]*221Stuart and Stuart, in turn, sitting on Marla to restrain her.
[¶ 3] Further evidence was presented of three instances of domestic violence1 committed by Stuart alone. The first of these incidents occurred in Wisconsin. Marla had returned home from a bar and told Stuart how the men in the bar were “hitting on her.” Stuart became angry, grabbed her by the throat, and threw her in the bedroom. Marla called the police and Stuart spent a night in jail, but Marla later dropped all the charges. The second incident occurred in Portland, Oregon. Stuart alleged Marla had taken their son Charlie with her when she went skinny-dipping with another man. When she returned home, Stuart hit Marla in the face. The third incident occurred at the farm outside Garrison, North Dakota, after Marla returned home from town. Following an argument, Marla said she was going back to Garrison where she “was appreciated.” In response, Stuart pushed her out the door. Stuart admitted to each of these acts.
[¶ 4] In addition to these three instances, Marla also alleged Stuart committed other acts of domestic violence. She claimed Stuart pushed her down to the ground in front of a Garrison bar, and, on another occasion, threw her across their garage. The most recent act of domestic violence, Marla alleged, occurred in Bismarck when Stuart hit her in the mouth following an argument on Misty’s birthday. Stuart disputes Marla’s description of these events and denies he committed domestic violence on these occasions.
[¶ 5] The trial court placed sole physical custody with Stuart, finding his “past and present life style is preferable to that of Marla.” Marla challenges the trial court’s findings of fact, stating it did not properly consider the evidence of domestic violence when determining custody.
[¶ 6] A trial court’s custody determination is a finding of fact and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Ternes v. Ternes, 555 N.W.2d 355, 357 (N.D.1996); Krank v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844, 847 (N.D. 1995). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or if the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, has a definite and firm conviction that the trial court has made a mistake. Krank, 529 N.W.2d at 847 (citing Ludwig v. Burchill, 514 N.W.2d 674, 675 (N.D.1994)).
[¶ 7] In determining custody, a trial court must determine what is in the best interests of the child. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2. When there is evidence of domestic violence, it creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to the perpetrator of the domestic violence.1 Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 161 (N.D.1995). This presumption can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Id. Domestic violence is defined to include, “physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical force, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical force, or assault, not committed in self-defense, on the complaining family or household members.” N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-01(2). Although domestic violence is just one of thirteen factors a trial court must review when determining the best interest of a child, “in the hierarchy of factors to be considered, domestic violence predominates when there is credible evidence of it.” Ryan v. Flemming, 533 N.W.2d 920, 923 (N.D.1995).
[222]*222[¶ 8] We have considered several cases on the issue of domestic violence under the current statute. Ternes, 555 N.W.2d 355; Anderson v. Hensrud, 548 N.W.2d 410 (N.D.1996); Engh v. Jensen, 547 N.W.2d 922 (N.D.1996); Bruner v. Hager, 534 N.W.2d 825 (N.D.1995); Helbling v. Helbling, 532 N.W.2d 650 (N.D.1995); Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844. We are again asked to determine which parent bears the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption when there is evidence both parents were guilty of domestic violence. The statute does not speak directly to this issue, but in Krank, we stated,
“if domestic violence has been committed by both parents, the trial court [must] measure the amount and extent of domestic violence inflicted by both parents. If the amount and extent of domestic violence inflicted by one parent is significantly greater than that inflicted by the other, the statutory presumption against awarding custody to the perpetrator will apply only to the parent who has inflicted the greater domestic violence_”
529 N.W.2d at 850 (emphasis added). When the evidence shows an equal amount of domestic violence on the part of both parents, the presumption should apply to neither party. Id.
[¶ 9] The trial court measured the domestic violence which occurred during the course of the Huesers’ marriage, and then determined if there were enough instances of domestic violence on one side to apply the statutory presumption. It found the violence committed by Stuart was greater than the violence committed by Marla, but was not “significantly greater” as to require the presumption to apply. The trial court stated, “[t]here are at least eleven other incidents of violence during the marriage which would begin with arguments, rise to contact where Marla would attack Stuart and he would sit on her until she calmed down. These incidents are somewhat equal in severity....”
[¶ 10] The trial court recognized Stuart’s admission of the three instances where he was the sole perpetrator of domestic violence. It found these instances demonstrated Stuart committed more domestic violence, but the trial court did not apply the statutory presumption against him. The trial court concluded these instances were provoked by Marla’s actions and should not be weighed against Stuart. The trial court stated, “Stuart committed domestic violence against Marla on three occasions in which she did not commit domestic violence, after actions by Marla that would have made most reasonable persons commit domestic violence. * * * [T]here is sufficient evidence to mitigate Stuart’s actions.... ” In its findings, the trial court did not make further reference to the other instances of domestic violence alleged by Marla. The other factors of section 14-09-06.2 were considered, and the trial court awarded custody to Stuart.
[¶ 11] Because of its rationalization for Stuart’s acts of physical violence, we cannot affirm the trial court’s custody determination. Although the trial court did make findings as to the domestic violence which occurred, it excused the three instances of domestic violence Stuart perpetrated because it found these incidents were provoked by Marla’s actions. Domestic violence is only mitigated when it is committed in self defense. N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-01(2). Domestic violence which is provoked by “button pushing” is not acceptable and cannot be weighed against the perpetrator. Anderson v. Hensrud, 548 N.W.2d at 413-414; Engh v. Jensen, 547 N.W.2d at 926; Heck, 529 N.W.2d at 164 (citation omitted). Domestic violence must be weighed against the perpetrator and custody cannot be granted to the perpetrator unless he or she can rebut the allegations by clear and convincing evidence, as the statute requires. A trial court cannot dismiss violent behavior merely because the behavior was instigated by nonviolent behavior. Although we do not condone Marla’s actions, these actions do not operate to mitigate or excuse Stuart’s acts of domestic violence.
[¶ 12] Because the trial court did not use the proper standard in measuring Stuart’s acts of domestic violence, we reverse and remand for the trial court to measure the acts of violence without the mitigation applied by the trial court.
[¶ 13] MESCHKE, NEUMANN and MARING, JJ., concur.