Howell v. Blackburn

139 N.E.2d 905, 236 Ind. 242, 1957 Ind. LEXIS 170
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 24, 1957
Docket29,417
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 139 N.E.2d 905 (Howell v. Blackburn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Howell v. Blackburn, 139 N.E.2d 905, 236 Ind. 242, 1957 Ind. LEXIS 170 (Ind. 1957).

Opinion

Bobbitt, J.

The parties hereto were candidates for the office of Mayor of the City of Huntington in the city election held on Tuesday, November 8, 1955. The City Election Board declared appellant Howell duly elected Mayor of such city and issued a certificate of election to him. A petition for recount 1 was then filed by appellee-contestor, and Recount Commissioners were duly appointed. After an examination of all the ballots cast for Mayor in such election, the Recount Commissioners found that appellant Howell had received 3,200 votes and appellee Blackburn had received 3,185 votes. Appellee then filed a petition for contest 2 in the Huntington Circuit Court alleging as grounds therefor, *248 “mistake or fraud in the official count of the votes” 3 cast for the office of Mayor of the City of Huntington, Indiana.

From a judgment declaring appellee Blackburn to be duly elected to the office of Mayor of Huntington this appeal is prosecuted.

Appellant assigns as error the overruling of his motion for a new trial. Among the specifications or reasons for a new trial are (1) error of the trial court in counting 101 ballots for appellee-contestor; and (2) in failing to count 86 ballots for appellant-contestee.

Appellee-contestor has assigned cross-errors as follows :

“1. The court erred in over-ruling the objections of the appellee to, and admitting in evidence and counting, as valid votes for appellant (contestor) the following exhibits offered by the appellant:
Numbers 30, 44, 50, 54, 66, 140, 147, 149, 153, 194, 219, 224, 255, 312, 317, 441, 452, 475, 516, 520, 525 and 533.
“2. The Court erred in sustaining the objections of the appellant to, and in refusing to admit in evidence and refusing to count the following exhibits as valid votes for the appellee (contestee) offered by the appellee:
Numbers 5, 11, 127, 128, 157, 163, 164, 176, 241, 242, 243, 295, 379, 466 and 511.”

These exhibits are original ballots; they are properly in the record and this court will examine them to determine whether in our judgment they were properly counted or excluded by the trial court. Lumm v. Simpson (1935), 207 Ind. 680, 684, 194 N. E. 341.

*249 *248 In the absence of fraud, election statutes generally will be liberally construed to guarantee to the elector an *249 opportunity to freely cast his ballot, to prevent his disfranchisement, and to uphold the will of the electorate. Brown v. Grzeskowiak (1951), 230 Ind. 110, 128, 101 N. E. 2d 639.

The rule by which we are governed in this case was ably stated in Conley v. Hile (1935), 207 Ind. 488, 499, 193 N. E. 95, and reaffirmed in Dowden v. Benham (1955), 284 Ind. 103, 109, 123 N. E. 2d 872, and is as follows:

“ ‘While the statutes seek to keep the voter’s ballot secret, so as to prevent corruption in elections, its primary purpose is to provide a means for the selection of officers by the free and untrammeled choice of honest, qualified voters; and, while a ballot which is intentionally mutilated, or on which the marking does not occur in the space provided by statute, or which is marked with characters other than those provided by statute, cannot be counted regardless of the apparent honesty and good intention of the voter, ballots will be counted which indicate an effort to comply with the statutory requirement as to the manner of marking, notwithstanding variation from the mark made by the average individual caused by unskill-fulness, physical infirmity, bad eyesight, or light, or conditions not conducive to accuracy; and where markings are in the proper place, and there is an effort _ to make the statutory cross-mark, irregularities in the marking will be attributed to those causes unless the ballot upon its face fairly imports an intentional dishonest purpose.’ ”

The statutory rules by which we are also governed and which apply to the situations with which we are here confronted, are as follows:

“Rule 1. The whole ballot is void if the voter ... (d) makes any mark thereon other than a cross X mark in a voting square or circle, or other than the writing in of a name for the purpose of voting; except that an erasure or a mark other than a cross X mark made in a voting square shall not make the ballot void, but shall render it blank as to *250 the office, party position or question in connection with which it is made. A cross X mark is any straight line crossing any other straight line at any angle, but no ballot shall be declared void or partially blank because a cross X mark thereon is irregular in form. In applying any provision of this section to a primary election, the term ‘voting square’ shall include the voting space at the left of the name of a candidate on the primary ballot.
“Rule 6. If the cross X mark touches a circle or a square, it shall be counted as if in such circle or square, but any mark other than a cross X mark in the circle or square, which touches no circle or square shall be treated as a distinguishing mark.
“Rule 7. Any ballot which shall bear any clearly evident distinguishing mark or mutilation shall be void, and shall not be counted, and any ballot, or part of a ballot, from which it is impossible to determine the elector’s choice of candidates, shall not be counted as to the candidate, or candidates, affected thereby.”
Acts 1947, ch. 156, §1, p. 481, being §29-5218, Burns’ 1949 Replacement.

Each of the parties hereto raises the question of waiver and estoppel in relation to certain ballots. See: Dobbyn v. Rogers (1948), 225 Ind. 525, 547, 76 N. E. 2d 570.

Where a party has successfully offered in the trial court a ballot essentially similar to one, the admission of which he now seeks to prevent, or where he successfully objected in the trial court to the admission of a ballot, essentially similar to one the admission of which he now seeks to effect, he is estopped to urge the admission or exclusion, as the case may be, of the relevant ballot. However, this rule is not applicable where there is a lack of similarity between the defects in the ballots to be compared.

Where the trial court’s actions with regard to both the ballot in question and the ballot, or ballots, with *251 which it is sought to be compared, has been assigned as error, or cross-error, and all of such ballots are before us on appeal, the comparison will be made as a matter of course.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Wyatt v. Wheeler
936 N.E.2d 232 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2010)
Campbell v. Board of School Commissioners
908 N.E.2d 1234 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2009)
Hefner v. Searson
590 N.E.2d 1081 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1992)
Mason v. Gohmann
498 N.E.2d 1344 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1986)
Wright v. Kinnard
262 N.E.2d 196 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1970)
Kupcha v. Harbin
252 N.E.2d 245 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1969)
Lorch v. Lohmeyer
247 N.E.2d 61 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1969)
Sims v. George
236 N.E.2d 820 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1968)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
139 N.E.2d 905, 236 Ind. 242, 1957 Ind. LEXIS 170, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/howell-v-blackburn-ind-1957.