Wright v. Kinnard

262 N.E.2d 196, 147 Ind. App. 484, 1970 Ind. App. LEXIS 408

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 22, 1970
• Docket: 1169A220
• Status: Published

Opinions

Sharp, J.

The Plaintiff-Appellants herein originally filed this action in the Boone Circuit Court seeking judicial review and a declaratory judgment that the school reorganization plan for Boone County, Indiana, involving Eagle and Union Townships of that county, was invalid. The DefendantsAppellees filed a Motion to Dismiss and the trial court sustained such motion. However, on appeal the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint was reversed in Wright v. Kinnard, 144 Ind. App. 286, 245 N. E. 2d 835 (1969). For a companion case growing from the same controversy, see Wright v. Kinnard, 144 Ind. App. 286, 302; 245 N. E. 2d 844 (1969).

Upon remand this cause was tried by a Special Judge in the Boone Circuit Court upon the issue presented by Plaintiff-Appellants’ Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Defendant-Appellees’ Answer in General Denial. On October 29, 1969, the Boone Circuit Court entered its judgment denying relief to the Plaintiff-Appellants and in favor of the Defendant-Appellees. The sole contention on this appeal is that such judgment is contrary to law.

Involved herein as presented by a complicated factual situation is one major issue. The relevant facts must be clearly understood prior to a discussion of that issue.

The Boone County Committee for the Reorganization of School Corporations has. for many years been attempting to form a new reorganized school corporation by combining Eagle School Township and Union School Township into Eagle-Union School Corporation. The record before us discloses that approval of plans for such a corporation was gained from the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations in July of 1964. However, in September of 1964, the State Commission reversed itself and disapproved the formation of the Eagle-Union Community School Corporation on specific written grounds. On November 2, 1965, substantially the same plan which was disapproved by the State Commission in September of 1964, was again accepted by the State Commission. This acceptance was immediately tested by a lawsuit filed in the Boone Circuit Court and, after a change of venue to the Clinton Circuit Court, tried by Judge Everett Lucas of the latter court. Judge Lucas found the State Commission had no jurisdiction to approve the same or similar plan it had earlier disapproved, as such action was an arbitrary and capricious administrative action outside the scope of authority granted to the State Commission. The judgment in that case was not appealed; because of Plaintiff-Appellants’ contentions herein, we are compelled to set forth the j udgment in the Clinton Circuit Court case:

“The above causes were submitted for trial without the intervention of a jury, evidence was heard upon the issues raised upon Plaintiffs’ Verified Petition for Judicial Review as amended and the filing of transcript by the Defendant State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations, and the matter as to the issues raised under Plaintiffs’ Petition for Judicial Review, the same being Cause No. 19849, was taken under advisement, and the portion of the consolidated Cause No. 19350, was continued under the rulings heretofore made in such consolidated causes:

“And the Court being duly advised now finds the order, decision, and determination of the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations was contrary to any statutory authority given to the State Commission under Section 28-6115(3) in that the final comprehensive plan as is required by the provisions of said aforementioned statute within ninety (90) days after notification of previous non-approval; and that said State Commission- did not make an informal findings of fact nor were the alleged changes in the ‘Revised’ Final Plan of August 11, 1965., of sufficient probative value to be a basis in law to refute a contention that the new approval was an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion-, and that by reason of the fact that upon the record shown by the transcript of the proceedings by the County Committee that the State Commission was without jurisdiction to approve such final comprehensive plan since such transcript shows that the County Committee failed to follow the procedures required by law in the adoption of such final comprehensive plan providing for the merger of Eagle and Union Townships. “It is therefore considered, ordered and adjudged that the order, determination and decision of the State Commission for Reorganization purportedly approving the part of the Revised Comprehensive Plan for the Reorganization of School of Boone County Committee for the Reorganization of School Corporations is hereby set aside;

“Judgment for plaintiffs, and that defendants pay the costs of this action.

“Entered as Amended by the Court, April 14, 1966.” (Emphasis supplied).

The statutory power and duties of the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations are defined as relevant to this cause in Acts of 1959, ch. 202, § 6(3), p. 451, as amended, the same being Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. § 28-6115 (e), which reads as follows:

“(e) The state commission shall, within ninety (90) days after receipt of a reorganizational plan, hold a public hearing in the county to which such reorganizational plan mainly appertains at which residents of the county or of any school corporation affected in an adjacent county or any other interested party shall be afforded an opportunity to appear before the state commission and be heard with reference to such reorganization plan. The state commission shall not be required to hold a public hearing on any plan which in its judgment does not meet the minimum standrads fixed by the state commission or the other requirements of the act, unless the state commission prior to that time has given a written order to the county commission stating that for a specified geographical area, the meeting of such minimum standards would not be feasible. Whereupon the county committee shall make necessary amendments without the requirement of further public hearings by the county committee.

“After such hearing, the state commission shall within sixty (60) days approve in writing the entire plan, or any parts thereof applying to any proposed community school corporation included therein, found satisfactory and so notify in writing the county committee or county committees concerned.

“One (1) copy of the reorganization plan as so approved by the state commission, shall be returned to the county committee, together with all pertinent material submitted to the state commission by the county committee; the second copy of the reorganization plan as so approved shall be filed with the state commission as a permanent record; the third copy of the reorganization plan as so approved shall be filed with the recorder of the county from which such plan was submitted, to be filed as a permanent record in such county.

“If such reorganization or plan or part thereof submitted by any county committee is found by the state commission to be unsatisfactory, the state commission shall so notify in writing the county committee concerned within sixty (60) days after the date of the public hearing, stating the reasons for nonapproval and, upon request of the county committee, the state commission shall assist said county committee in revising the plan so as to make it satisfactory. Such revised plan shall be resubmitted to the state commission by the county committee within ninety (90) days after notification of nonapproval.”

Appellants contend the decision of Judge Lucas is res adjudicata as to the plan being considered herein and which was approved by the State Commission on April 11, 1967, in that it had already been adjudged that the State Commission was without authority and jurisdiction to consider that plan. Appellants say, then, that the plan approved April 11, 1967, is the same plan rejected by Judge Lucas in the Clinton Circuit Court case OR that it is a revision of that plan which is not sufficient to make it a legally new plan.

The basic elements of res adjudicata are fourfold: (1) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the matter now in issue was, .or might have been, determined in the former suit; (3) the particular controversy adjudicated in the former action must have been between the parties to the present suit; and (4) judgment in the former suit must have been rendered on the merits. See American National Bank and Trust Co. v. Hines, 143 Ind. App. 217, 239 N. E. 2d 589, 592 (1968) quoting Johnson et al. v. Knudson-Mercer Company, 167 Ind. 429, 79 N. E. 367 (1906). It is of great significance to this cause that we extensively examine the plans and the circumstances surrounding the proposed Eagle- Union School Corporation at the time Judge Lucas’ decision was made and then later when the plan approved by the State Commission on April 11, 1967, was introduced and tested below. The question is whether or not the April 11, 1967, plan is similar enough to the old plans, or a revision of them, so as to have identical issues, or issues which might have been raised which are identical. Within the context of res adjudicata, the rule we apply is aptly stated by I.L.E., Judgments § 352, p. 394:

“The estoppel of a judgment extends only to the facts and conditions as they were at the time the judgment was rendered, and to the legal rights and relations of the parties as fixed by the facts so determined; and when new facts or conditions intervene before a second suit, furnishing a new basis for the claims and defenses of the parties respectively, the issues are no longer the same, and hence the former judgment cannot be pleaded in bar to the subsequent action.”

The record reveals that at the time Judge Lucas’ decision was rendered the Lebanon Metropolitan School District had yet to form the Lebanon Community School Corporation. There was the very real availability of Eagle or Union or both townships joining with adjacent Lebanon schools in some way, or with some other contiguous school corporation. By the time the present plan herein under consideration was introduced and adopted, these alternative avenues were closed. This change in circumstances as to available geographic alternatives precludes application of the doctrine of res adjudicata to the judgment below.

The above conclusion deserves a fuller explanation. The Acts of 1959, ch. 202, § 5(8), p. 451, as amended and found as Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. 28-6111 (1948 Eepl.) contain the ■contents required of comprehensive plans such as the Eagle-Union plan at issue. That statute reads as follows:

“Any preliminary or final comprehensive plan of reorganization, adopted by the county committee before or after the date of this amendatory act [March 15, 1963], shall be sufficient as to form if it contains within its own terms or by reference the following for each proposed community school corporation:

(a) The name of the proposed community school corporation ;

(b) A general description of the boundaries of the community school corporation as provided in subsection (4) [Burns § 28-6107] ;

(c) The number on the board of school trustees; and whether they shall be elected or appointed;

(d) The manner in which the board of school trustees, other than the interim board, is to be elected, or appointed ;

(e) The disposition of assets and liabilities of any existing school corporation in instances where such school corporation is divided; and after the date of this amendatory act, if there is submitted or adopted with it the statement required by subsection (4) [Burns’ 28-6107] hereof.”

We note that of the five requirements, subsection (a) requires only the name of the new corporation, and subsection (e), dealing with assets of divided previously existing corporations, is not relevant to the present dispute. Thus, there are effectively only three requirements of substantive significance in this comprehensive plan.

The differences and similarities between the plan negated by Judge Lucas’ decision and the April 11, 1967, plan must be contained in these three requirements and the background in which they appear. It is true that the April 11, 1967, plan and the November 2, 1965, plan contain the exact same geographical boundaries: Eagle and Union townships. Judge Lucas found that the November 2, 1965, plan was merely a revision of the plan which had been turned down by the State Commission in September of 1964, and was therefore inappropriately approved because revisions of plan must be submitted within 90 days of disapproval. Burns’ Ind. Ann. Stat. § 28-6115 (e), supra. Presumably res adjudicata would apply if the April 11, 1967, plan were the same as, or a revision of, either previous plan, and the surrounding facts were not changed.

The April 11, 1967, plan has members of the school board elected by staggered terms, whereas the November 2, 1965, plan did not. A serious problem of a wholly new and inexpert board of school trustees taking office simultaneously was avoided. This difference in one of the three major requirements is important, but we do not wholly base our decision upon it. Rather, this difference, which is really only the solving of a practical problem, shows how the guidelines of the statute are practically worthless in deciding what is a new plan or a revised plan. In this case the geographic areas of the plans are identical, yet clearly the plan approved April 11, 1967 is legally a NEW PLAN and not a revision of an older rejected plan.

We base this decision on two major propositions; the factual background against which the April 11, 1967, plan was presented was completely different than earlier. The completion of the Lebanon Community School Corporation from the previous Lebanon Metropolitan School District closed a real and viable alternative to the Appellees County Committee. This change and the staggering of school board terms will alone justify the conclusion. In addition, in the absence of clear statutory guidelines on what is new and what is revised, we consider important'that the County Committee developed new preliminary plans, held hearings, and cooperated with the State Commission on its new hearings. The full procedure which afforded Appellants ample opportunity to participate and persuade was completed.

The April 11, 1967, plan being a new plan, with issues and variables that were not in existence and could not have arisen in the decision of Judge Lucas, res adjudicata is not applicable.

Appellants further complain that printed copies of the Preliminary Plans [of the April 11, 1967 plan] were not available to the public ten full days prior to the hearing held by the County Committee. We have been shown no statute which requires such Preliminary Plans be printed and available ten full days prior to the hearing; it is notice of the hearing which must be given at least ten days prior. At least one witness, Paul Swank, testified that such plans were available nine days before the hearing. Appellants have made no showing of substantial or irreparable harm, or, indeed, more than minor inconvenience. It is obvious that nothing unfair occured, nor were Appellants denied due process of law.

Finding no error, the judgment below is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Hoffman, P.J., concurs. Pfaff, J., dissents with opinion. White, J., not participating.