Conley v. Hile

193 N.E. 95, 207 Ind. 488, 1934 Ind. LEXIS 278
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 12, 1934
DocketNo. 26,094.
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 193 N.E. 95 (Conley v. Hile) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Conley v. Hile, 193 N.E. 95, 207 Ind. 488, 1934 Ind. LEXIS 278 (Ind. 1934).

Opinion

Fansler, C. J.

Appellee contested the election of appellant as judge of the Elkhart superior court. There was a judgment for appellee. The county canvassing board certified appellant to have been elected by nine votes upon the returns made by the precinct election *493 boards, and he was commissioned by the governor. Appellee instituted proceedings for a recount. The recount commissioners, as a result of the count, certified the contestor as receiving a majority of twenty-one votes. The county commissioners found for the contestor. There was an appeal to the circuit court, and it appears from the conclusions of law that the court, from its examination of the ballots introduced in evidence, found the contestor to have received a majority of one hundred and twelve votes. There was judgment accordingly that the contestor was duly elected. It was stipulated and agreed that the contestor, appellee, had received 9206, and the contestee, appellant, 9152 legal and uncontested ballots. 2139 ballots were introduced in evidence, of which 1249, 667 for appellant and 582 for appellee, were rejected by the court and not counted.

Appellant moved to dismiss the action on the ground that a judge of a superior court is not a county, township, or municipal officer, and that, therefore, the circuit court had no jurisdiction to try the case. The statute concerning elections, §7597 et seq., Burns 1926, provides in §7612 (§29-2201 et seq., Burns 1933, §7413, Baldwin’s 1934) :

“. . . all contests for district and circuit offices, not otherwise provided in this act, shall be tried in the county giving the largest vote for such office at such election; . . .”

There is a prior provision for contesting the seat of the person elected to the house of representatives, but there is no other provision concerning judges or prosecuting attorneys, and the section must be deemed to apply to a contest of the office of judge of the circuit or superior courts and of prosecuting attorneys. While the question was not raised, this court recognized such to be the rule in the case of William v. Bell (1915), 184 Ind. 156, 110 N. E. 753.

*494 *493 Appellant moved to suppress the certificate of the *494 recount commissioners for the reason that the petition for the recount did not show that the petitioner was an elector, and that, since only electors are entitled to contest an election, the petition for recount should not be granted. The statute, §7587, Burns 1926, §29-2101, Burns 1933, §7388, Baldwin’s 1934, provides that any candidate for office desiring to contest the election, may petition for a recount. There is no provision that the petition must show that he is an elector, or qualified to hold the office. It merely requires that he shall have been a candidate for the office. The next section provides that:

“Upon the petition of such candidate, duly verified, showing that he desires to contest such election, and honestly believes that there was a mistake or fraud committed in the official count, and that he desires a recount of the ballots cast at said election for the office for which he was a candidate, and upon proof that he has served a written notice upon the opposing candidate of the time and place of such application, five days before the hearing, and upon his furnishing a written undertaking, with sufficient freehold surety, that he will pay all the costs of such recount, the court or judge shall grant the prayer of said petition and order said recount to be made.”

Appellant contends that, because the petition did not allege that the petitioner “honestly believes that there was a mistake or fraud,” it is not sufficient. The word “honestly” is surplusage. One either believes a thing or does not believe it, and it is inconceivable that one might “dishonestly” believe something to be true. The petition was verified upon information and belief, and this sworn statement that he believes there was a mistake or fraud is sufficient, and would be no stronger if it had contained the word “honestly.” The petition is sufficient. ■

*495 *494 In his amended motion to suppress the certificate of *495 the recount commissioners, it is alleged that the recount board adjourned during certain intervals, notwithstanding the legislative provision that no adjournments shall be had until the count is finished. It appears further that none of the keys to the receptacles in which the ballots had been placed were ever delivered to the Democratic member of the board of canvassers. But it is not alleged that the merits of the recount were affected by such irregularities, and the rights of the contestor cannot be forfeited or controlled by irregularities on the part of officials for which he was in no way responsible and which he could ' not control.

The purpose of the recount and contest statutes is to determine the result of the election as evidenced by the legal ballots of the qualified voters. In the absence of a showing of an invasion of the rights of the parties, the statutes will be liberally construed to accomplish their purpose, and mere irregularities on the part of officers will be disregarded.

Appellant predicates error upon the refusal of the court to grant him a trial by jury. It is well settled that election contests are not triable by jury. Pedigo v. Grimes (1888), 113 Ind. 148, 13 N. E. 700, and cases there cited; Gordon v. Corning (1910), 174 Ind. 337, 92 N. E. 59.

The other questions presented by appellant involve the sufficiency of the findings of fact, and the sufficiency of the evidence; that is to say the correctness of the ruling of the trial court as to the legality of certain ballots. The court made twenty-four special findings of fact, upon which were announced six conclusions of law. In the findings of fact the court described approximately two thousand ballots, going into detail as to the manner of marking, but in all but a few instances failed to find the ultimate *496 fact as to whether the marking constitutes a distinguishing mark such as is condemned by the statute and the decisions of this court. Following these findings, and in the first four so-called conclusions of law, the court described by number more than two thousand ballots, which are declared to be either legal or illegal votes for the plaintiff or the defendant. The special findings in most instances are not sufficient to sustain these conclusions since ultimate facts are not found. The last two conclusions of law are: “That the Contestor has a majority of one hundred twelve (112) of the votes cast for the office of Judge,” and that “The law is with the Contestor.” But if this cause were reversed because of the insufficiency of the special findings, it would no doubt come here again on appeal, involving the merits of the ballots which mainly constitute the evidence, and eventually this court would be required to pass upon the merits of the case.

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Bluebook (online)
193 N.E. 95, 207 Ind. 488, 1934 Ind. LEXIS 278, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/conley-v-hile-ind-1934.