Russell, Judge.
The court, after three times stating that market value is the measure of damages in a condemnation case, charged that if the jury should find from the evidence “that this property has some unique or special use to the owner or to his benefit, so that fair market value that would ordinarily be realized on the'sale of property would not afford just and adequate compensation for the owner for the taking of this property, then in that event you would determine what constitutes just and adequate compensation without restricting yourself to the market value of the property so taken, that is, the market value as such.” That the charge is proper when supported by evidence that the property has a unique pecuniary value to the owner which could not be realized on the open market, is supported by Fulton County v. Cox, 99 Ga. App. 743 (109 SE2d 849); Polk v. Fulton County, 96 Ga. App. 733 (4) (101 SE2d 736); Georgia Power Co. v. Pittman, 92 Ga. App. 673 (89 SE2d 577); Housing Authority of Savannah v. Savannah Iron &c. Works, 91 Ga. App. 881 (87 SE2d 671); Housing Authority of Augusta v. Holloway, 63 Ga. App. 485 (11 SE2d 418); Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 120 Ga. 268, 280 (48 SE 15, 1 AC 734); Elbert County v. Brown, 16 Ga. App. 834 (8) (86 SE 651). But this instruction is beset with pitfalls and has caused reversal where the appellate court determined there was no evidence to support the proposition that actual market value as determined by the willing-seller, wanting-buyer yardstick would not suffice. It is cause for reversal where there is no evidence of unique value to the owner, State Hwy. Dept. v. Thomas, 106 Ga. App. 849 (128 SE2d [517]*517520), but not where the evidence shows the property has some unique and special value to him alone. Fulton County v. Cox, 99 Ga. App. 743 (2), supra. It must show unusual circumstances “which would make an appreciable distinction,” Georgia Power Co. v. Pittman, 92 Ga. App. 673, 676, supra, and is proper where the jury is not “bound to find” that two measures coincide, State Hwy. Dept. v. Robinson, 103 Ga. App. 12, 15 (118 SE2d 289). The evidence should show that the value to the owner theory is applicable. State Hwy. Dept. v. Cochran, 108 Ga. App. 61 (2) (131 SE2d 802).
The evidence to authorize a jury instruction need not be substantial or direct; it is enough if there is even slight evidence consisting of inferences drawn from the testimony. Harper v. Hall, 76 Ga. App. 441 (2) (46 SE2d 201); Bowie Martin, Inc. v. Dews, 73 Ga. App. 73 (1) (35 SE2d 577). This is true even though the great preponderance of evidence tends to show that a supposed state of facts does not exist. Hawkins v. State, 80 Ga. App. 496 (2) (56 SE2d 315). There is sufficient testimony coming from one of the condemnor’s witnesses to authorize a jury inference that in the present case an owner-value approach to valuation would be different from a market-value approach. Strictly speaking, there are three recognized techniques for determining market value: replacement cost new less depreciation, income, and comparable sales. The appraiser was undoubtedly discussing these methods in arriving at the two valuations he gave, but he referred to one of them as value to the investor and the other as value to the owner. He “estimated what it would be worth as an income property . . . to a buyer to buy it and to use it, and also considered what it would be worth to the present owner, the top value it could be worth to the present owner.” The values resulting from the two methods were different. The witness then explained that the difficulty was that the land was located in a heavy traffic area surrounded by large enterprises, and was high priced. The building on it used as a garage did not represent an improvement in accordance with the nature of the land because of its small size. There were not many garages in the area, and the witness did not know of another garage built like that one.
[518] Thus, from the testimony of the condemnor’s assessor it appears that it would be difficult to duplicate the property in anything like a comparable location. As to this the condemnee testified: “I would say it is one of the best [locations for the business], it is as close as you could get into town. I am only three blocks from the Candler Building, you can leave your car there, park it, have the work done, go to town and come back. It is in walking distance and a location like that is hard to find.” He also testified that a move would ruin his business, and “I have been looking all over town trying to find a comparable location that I could buy. I haven’t been able to touch anything with what they have offered me. So, I was just hanging on to a sinking ship, you would say, there.” The reason why no comparable property could be found comes out clearly in the testimony of the condemnor’s appraiser that ordinarily such property would be put to a more expensive use from the standpoint of buildings and fixtures, and from other testimony that the land was in a heavy traffic area surrounded by large enterprises and was high priced. The owner was running a tune-up and brake shop, and it cannot be assumed that his was a primarily transient business; in fact, he testified that the move (presumably to a location farther out, where he would lose the advantage of being within walking distance of large office buildings) would ruin his business. Every person who has an established business or even a residence in a location which cannot be duplicated within the immediate area suffers a loss which is particular and unique to him and not shared by members of the general public dealing in such property and buying and selling it for profit. Market value is not necessarily just and adequate compensation to them, for market value presupposes not only a buyer willing to purchase but a seller willing to sell. If the property must be duplicated for the business to survive, and if there is no substantially comparable property within the area, then the loss of the forced seller is such that market value does not represent just and adequate compensation to him.
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Russell, Judge.
The court, after three times stating that market value is the measure of damages in a condemnation case, charged that if the jury should find from the evidence “that this property has some unique or special use to the owner or to his benefit, so that fair market value that would ordinarily be realized on the'sale of property would not afford just and adequate compensation for the owner for the taking of this property, then in that event you would determine what constitutes just and adequate compensation without restricting yourself to the market value of the property so taken, that is, the market value as such.” That the charge is proper when supported by evidence that the property has a unique pecuniary value to the owner which could not be realized on the open market, is supported by Fulton County v. Cox, 99 Ga. App. 743 (109 SE2d 849); Polk v. Fulton County, 96 Ga. App. 733 (4) (101 SE2d 736); Georgia Power Co. v. Pittman, 92 Ga. App. 673 (89 SE2d 577); Housing Authority of Savannah v. Savannah Iron &c. Works, 91 Ga. App. 881 (87 SE2d 671); Housing Authority of Augusta v. Holloway, 63 Ga. App. 485 (11 SE2d 418); Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 120 Ga. 268, 280 (48 SE 15, 1 AC 734); Elbert County v. Brown, 16 Ga. App. 834 (8) (86 SE 651). But this instruction is beset with pitfalls and has caused reversal where the appellate court determined there was no evidence to support the proposition that actual market value as determined by the willing-seller, wanting-buyer yardstick would not suffice. It is cause for reversal where there is no evidence of unique value to the owner, State Hwy. Dept. v. Thomas, 106 Ga. App. 849 (128 SE2d [517]*517520), but not where the evidence shows the property has some unique and special value to him alone. Fulton County v. Cox, 99 Ga. App. 743 (2), supra. It must show unusual circumstances “which would make an appreciable distinction,” Georgia Power Co. v. Pittman, 92 Ga. App. 673, 676, supra, and is proper where the jury is not “bound to find” that two measures coincide, State Hwy. Dept. v. Robinson, 103 Ga. App. 12, 15 (118 SE2d 289). The evidence should show that the value to the owner theory is applicable. State Hwy. Dept. v. Cochran, 108 Ga. App. 61 (2) (131 SE2d 802).
The evidence to authorize a jury instruction need not be substantial or direct; it is enough if there is even slight evidence consisting of inferences drawn from the testimony. Harper v. Hall, 76 Ga. App. 441 (2) (46 SE2d 201); Bowie Martin, Inc. v. Dews, 73 Ga. App. 73 (1) (35 SE2d 577). This is true even though the great preponderance of evidence tends to show that a supposed state of facts does not exist. Hawkins v. State, 80 Ga. App. 496 (2) (56 SE2d 315). There is sufficient testimony coming from one of the condemnor’s witnesses to authorize a jury inference that in the present case an owner-value approach to valuation would be different from a market-value approach. Strictly speaking, there are three recognized techniques for determining market value: replacement cost new less depreciation, income, and comparable sales. The appraiser was undoubtedly discussing these methods in arriving at the two valuations he gave, but he referred to one of them as value to the investor and the other as value to the owner. He “estimated what it would be worth as an income property . . . to a buyer to buy it and to use it, and also considered what it would be worth to the present owner, the top value it could be worth to the present owner.” The values resulting from the two methods were different. The witness then explained that the difficulty was that the land was located in a heavy traffic area surrounded by large enterprises, and was high priced. The building on it used as a garage did not represent an improvement in accordance with the nature of the land because of its small size. There were not many garages in the area, and the witness did not know of another garage built like that one.
[518] Thus, from the testimony of the condemnor’s assessor it appears that it would be difficult to duplicate the property in anything like a comparable location. As to this the condemnee testified: “I would say it is one of the best [locations for the business], it is as close as you could get into town. I am only three blocks from the Candler Building, you can leave your car there, park it, have the work done, go to town and come back. It is in walking distance and a location like that is hard to find.” He also testified that a move would ruin his business, and “I have been looking all over town trying to find a comparable location that I could buy. I haven’t been able to touch anything with what they have offered me. So, I was just hanging on to a sinking ship, you would say, there.” The reason why no comparable property could be found comes out clearly in the testimony of the condemnor’s appraiser that ordinarily such property would be put to a more expensive use from the standpoint of buildings and fixtures, and from other testimony that the land was in a heavy traffic area surrounded by large enterprises and was high priced. The owner was running a tune-up and brake shop, and it cannot be assumed that his was a primarily transient business; in fact, he testified that the move (presumably to a location farther out, where he would lose the advantage of being within walking distance of large office buildings) would ruin his business. Every person who has an established business or even a residence in a location which cannot be duplicated within the immediate area suffers a loss which is particular and unique to him and not shared by members of the general public dealing in such property and buying and selling it for profit. Market value is not necessarily just and adequate compensation to them, for market value presupposes not only a buyer willing to purchase but a seller willing to sell. If the property must be duplicated for the business to survive, and if there is no substantially comparable property within the area, then the loss of the forced seller is such that market value does not represent just and adequate compensation to him.
Troncalli, the condemnee, testified that he personally built the building on a lot which he had purchased at a very reasonable cash outlay from an estate; that he personally handfitted the [519] buttresses on the corner posts and put in sliding, disappearing doors; that he rented out some of the parking spaces and turned over the transmission repair business to a younger man who leased some of the space in order to take care of the automatic transmission work for him. Asked if it was a good location for his business, he replied, “I would say it is one of the best, it is as close as you could get into town. I am only three blocks from the Candler Building, you can leave your car there, park it, have the work done, go to town, and come back. It is in walking distance and a location like that is hard to find.” He testified that in his opinion the value of the property was $45,000 because, “I base that on the property and the building, the improvements that I have put in it at $43,000. One thousand dollars I would say for moving, because I have hydraulic lifts that are imbedded in the cement and all, and $1,000 to say to get started into a business again. . . I have gone as much as three or four miles out and I still can’t find anything. . . I looked at one on Courtland Street [a block away] and it was only 50 feet, and the man asked $60,000 for it. . . It is a case of having to find a place of business to replace the business. After you get 58 years old, you don’t get a job, nobody will give you a job. I have got to find a place.” He was then specifically asked, “And the value of this property to you, in your opinion is how much?” to which he replied $45,000. It is true that on cross examination opposing counsel asked him what the market value of the property was in his opinion and he replied with the same figure, but this by no means demands the conclusion that he considered the value to himself and the market value as being the same thing. Everything he said showed him to be a garage man without legal training who had personally built a building and worked up a business that (again in the language of the condemnor’s witness) was worth more to him than to the ordinary investor. The inference is explicit that this particular use, with this particular building and business, is unique to this particular man. His statement, in fact, was: “Well, just to be truthful about it, get down to the fact, I wouldn’t sell it for 45 [$45,000] if I was on a free market.”
It is contended that the “unique value” theory should be na.r[520] rowed so as to become applicable only if (a) only one person in the world could or would want to put the property to the use in question, and (b) no other property in the world would be equally suitable for that use. Such a situation may, at some time or place, have existed, but no example of it comes readily to mind. A merely aesthetic or sentimental value is not sufficient. The value must be pecuniary, but that pecuniary value, as to a certain piece of property in regard to its present use, may well be unique to the present owner, in a situation where he can find no other property equally well suited and there is no taker on the open market at the pecuniary value of the property to him. In such a case there is no market value, which presupposes a willing-buyer willing-seller situation. As stated in Housing Authority of Sav. v. Savannah Iron &c. Works, 91 Ga. App. 881 (3), supra: “The measure of damages for property taken by the right of eminent domain, being compensatory in its nature, is the pecuniary loss sustained by the owner, taking into consideration all relevant factors. Ordinarily this loss is represented by the fair market value of the property interest taken, but it may be the fair and reasonable value of the property taken if in fact the market value would not coincide with the actual value thereof.” No other measure except the loss sustained by the owner can in these circumstances measure up to the constitutional requirement of “just and adequate compensation.” The instruction in this case, which has been approved in many cases cited, supra, is merely that if the unique or special use to the owner is such that fair market value would not afford just and adequate compensation to the owner, then the jury may consider what would afford just and adequate compensation without restricting themselves to market value as such. If there is a pecuniary value to the owner not shared by enough members of the general public to create an equivalent value in the open market, the jury must, in assessing damages, ask themselves what a just and adequate monetary compensation to the owner would be. Any instruction less than this, under the evidence in this case, would in the opinion of the majority be a failure to measure up to constitutional provisions.
In any event, of course, the instruction viewed from the stand[521] point of the verdict was of no consequence. If it be assumed that the condemnee considered market value and value to him separately, he is in the position of seeking to recover $45,000 in in either event. If under the testimony of the condemnor’s witness Matthews there was a difference, then the value to the owner was $26,200 and the market value was $24,500. The jury, however, returned a verdict for $37,250, so it obviously considered either or both of Matthews’ estimates too low, just as it considered the condemnee’s valuation too high. There was no other testimony as to value to the owner, but there was testimony fixing market value at $23,600, $41,500 and $43,000. This court construes T'roncalli’s testimony to mean that the property had a higher value to him than the market value of the property. If this is correct, the instruction given was necessary under the evidence. If incorrect, then the jury could only have found under Troncalli’s testimony that market value and value to him coincided, so any error would be harmless. As to Matthews, the witness for the condemnor, this witness definitely placed the value to the investor or market value as less than the value to the owner, but, if we are wrong in this, the error is again harmless since the verdict returned was without question based on estimates of market value.
The trial court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.
Felton, C. J., and Nichols, P. J., concur. Frankum and Pannell, JJ., concur in the judgment. Bell, P. J., Jordan, Hall and Eberhardt, JJ., dissent.