GEWIN, Circuit Judge:
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure this private antitrust action was placed en banc by the Court. The original trial resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, John J. Terrell, and against the defendants, Household Goods Carriers’ Bureau (hereinafter Household Goods or the Bureau) and ten individual carriers in the amount of $375,000 (trebled to $1,125,-000). The trial court entered judgment on the verdict against the Bureau but entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the individual carriers. The majority of the panel that originally heard the case on appeal vacated the judgment against the Bureau and remanded the case for a new trial.1 Upon rehearing en banc, the majority of this court is of the opinion that the judgment entered by the trial court against the Bureau should be affirmed on the issue of liability but reversed and remanded on the issue of damages. Since the intricate and voluminous facts of this case were fully developed in the majority and dissenting opinions of the original panel, we present only a skeletal outline.
I
Plaintiff-appellee Terrell developed and attempted to market a national “mileage guide” for use in quickly computing the highway mileage between over 775 “key points” — cities, towns, and military bases in the United States and Canada. A guide of this nature is commercially marketable for such commonplace but important computations as rates to be charged by freight haulers or movers of household goods; travel allowances to be paid to government, military, or civilian personnel by their respective employers; and moving allowances to be paid military families under orders to transfer. Prior to 1961, when [155]*155Terrell first attempted to market his guide, all or substantially all, national mileage guides in use had been computed, manufactured and marketed by Rand McNally and Company2 under an agreement with the defendant Bureau.
Household Goods Carriers’ Bureau is a trade association and tariff bureau that represents some 1700 members, carriers of household goods; it is organized under the authority of the Reed-Bullwinkle Act3 and approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Through power of attorney executed by each of its members it has authority to file a joint tariff with the Commission. The legality of this arrangement is not disputed. It is the agreement between the Bureau and Rand McNally that provides the foundation for Terrell’s antitrust claim. By that agreement the Bureau obligated itself to purchase from Rand McNally a minimum number of 22,500 mileage guides at a fixed price; all guides in excess of the minimum were to be sold to the Bureau or to its members at a discount. In addition, Rand McNally agreed not to sell its guides to other purchasers at a price below the Bureau’s discounted price. Many were sold at a higher price. A further agreement gave the Bureau the right to negotiate personally with certain other agencies and reserved to Rand McNally the right to deal with all others. Finally, the Bureau was accorded controlling influence in determining the scope and content of the Rand McNally guides.
Although the Rand McNally guide was the only one on the market, it was noticeably inadequate for many of the purposes for which it was used. A eombination of factors caused the guide to show longer than necessary distances between key points.4 There was evidence to the effect that members of the Bureau and other motor carriers accepted and even encouraged these overstatements because their transportation charges were computed from the guide’s mileage tables. On the other hand, many agencies that pay employees or carriers for travel on a per mile basis showed a preference for a more current guide that reflected the shortest possible reliable distances. In addition, the close relationship between the Bureau and Rand McNally gave the Bureau a degree of control over other elements of the guide, including the designation of “key points.” Agencies that made computations involving non-listed points were thus put to the time and expense of making extra computations. A noticeable omission in this regard was the failure of the Bureau guide to provide a convenient means of calculating distances between military bases.
To fill this marked competitive gap came Mr. Terrell with a guide designed to meet the needs of the Bureau’s unsatisfied customers. In computing his guide, Terrell included all major roads accessible by automobile. He planned to recompute a new guide every two years from the most recent maps available. In computing all of his distances, he used the shortest reliable figures available; and his guide included a ready means of including over 400 military bases in the computations.
Plaintiff began selling his product in 1961, and found a willing customer in the Oilfield Haulers’ Association, a 500 [156]*156member trade association and tariff bureau whose members transported oilfield machinery. Continued solicitation yielded substantial interest and a highly favorable report from the Finance Center of the U. S. Department of Defense (Finance Center),5 despite efforts by defendants to discredit the guide. Early in 1964, plaintiff convinced Rocky Ford Van Lines (Rocky Ford), a Household Goods affiliate, to withdraw from the Bureau and affiliate with the Oilfield Haulers. By using the different and generally lower mileages reflected in the Oilfield Haulers’ guide, Rocky Ford sought to introduce competitive rates among the Household Goods haulers.
Accordingly, Rocky Ford began the transfer procedure by informing Household Goods of its desire. The Bureau responded with the “Wyche letter” — a strongly worded letter questioning the accuracy of Terrell’s guide, threatening a complaint to the ICC, and stressing the undesirable competitive effects on the industry that would flow from the adoption of a competitive guide. The contents of the letter were passed on to the Oilfield Haulers’ Association. Shortly after becoming aware of this letter, plaintiff filed this suit and a related libel suit. The libel suit, which was settled by consent decree, is the basis of a defense of res judicata raised by the Bureau on this appeal. Despite the letter, Rocky Ford consummated its changeover to the Terrell guide; and the Oilfield Haulers signed a contract for a revised guide early in 1964. Terrell and Rocky Ford then began a joint effort to convince the Defense Traffic Management Service (DTMS), the government agency which controls the shipment of household goods for military personnel,6 to accept and act on competitive bids computed from Terrell’s guide.
At this stage, Terrell’s prospects seemed excellent. He had one tariff bureau as an established customer; the Finance Center had responded favorably to his overtures; and, most importantly, he had an inroad to the influential Household Goods Carriers’ Bureau. He was cultivating an ambitious expectation that competitive necessity would require the Bureau’s members to accept a guide like his once the impact of Rocky Ford’s competition was felt. On the other hand, the Bureau, although nominally only a tariff bureau, had identifiable interests in limiting plaintiff’s access to the market.
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GEWIN, Circuit Judge:
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure this private antitrust action was placed en banc by the Court. The original trial resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, John J. Terrell, and against the defendants, Household Goods Carriers’ Bureau (hereinafter Household Goods or the Bureau) and ten individual carriers in the amount of $375,000 (trebled to $1,125,-000). The trial court entered judgment on the verdict against the Bureau but entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the individual carriers. The majority of the panel that originally heard the case on appeal vacated the judgment against the Bureau and remanded the case for a new trial.1 Upon rehearing en banc, the majority of this court is of the opinion that the judgment entered by the trial court against the Bureau should be affirmed on the issue of liability but reversed and remanded on the issue of damages. Since the intricate and voluminous facts of this case were fully developed in the majority and dissenting opinions of the original panel, we present only a skeletal outline.
I
Plaintiff-appellee Terrell developed and attempted to market a national “mileage guide” for use in quickly computing the highway mileage between over 775 “key points” — cities, towns, and military bases in the United States and Canada. A guide of this nature is commercially marketable for such commonplace but important computations as rates to be charged by freight haulers or movers of household goods; travel allowances to be paid to government, military, or civilian personnel by their respective employers; and moving allowances to be paid military families under orders to transfer. Prior to 1961, when [155]*155Terrell first attempted to market his guide, all or substantially all, national mileage guides in use had been computed, manufactured and marketed by Rand McNally and Company2 under an agreement with the defendant Bureau.
Household Goods Carriers’ Bureau is a trade association and tariff bureau that represents some 1700 members, carriers of household goods; it is organized under the authority of the Reed-Bullwinkle Act3 and approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Through power of attorney executed by each of its members it has authority to file a joint tariff with the Commission. The legality of this arrangement is not disputed. It is the agreement between the Bureau and Rand McNally that provides the foundation for Terrell’s antitrust claim. By that agreement the Bureau obligated itself to purchase from Rand McNally a minimum number of 22,500 mileage guides at a fixed price; all guides in excess of the minimum were to be sold to the Bureau or to its members at a discount. In addition, Rand McNally agreed not to sell its guides to other purchasers at a price below the Bureau’s discounted price. Many were sold at a higher price. A further agreement gave the Bureau the right to negotiate personally with certain other agencies and reserved to Rand McNally the right to deal with all others. Finally, the Bureau was accorded controlling influence in determining the scope and content of the Rand McNally guides.
Although the Rand McNally guide was the only one on the market, it was noticeably inadequate for many of the purposes for which it was used. A eombination of factors caused the guide to show longer than necessary distances between key points.4 There was evidence to the effect that members of the Bureau and other motor carriers accepted and even encouraged these overstatements because their transportation charges were computed from the guide’s mileage tables. On the other hand, many agencies that pay employees or carriers for travel on a per mile basis showed a preference for a more current guide that reflected the shortest possible reliable distances. In addition, the close relationship between the Bureau and Rand McNally gave the Bureau a degree of control over other elements of the guide, including the designation of “key points.” Agencies that made computations involving non-listed points were thus put to the time and expense of making extra computations. A noticeable omission in this regard was the failure of the Bureau guide to provide a convenient means of calculating distances between military bases.
To fill this marked competitive gap came Mr. Terrell with a guide designed to meet the needs of the Bureau’s unsatisfied customers. In computing his guide, Terrell included all major roads accessible by automobile. He planned to recompute a new guide every two years from the most recent maps available. In computing all of his distances, he used the shortest reliable figures available; and his guide included a ready means of including over 400 military bases in the computations.
Plaintiff began selling his product in 1961, and found a willing customer in the Oilfield Haulers’ Association, a 500 [156]*156member trade association and tariff bureau whose members transported oilfield machinery. Continued solicitation yielded substantial interest and a highly favorable report from the Finance Center of the U. S. Department of Defense (Finance Center),5 despite efforts by defendants to discredit the guide. Early in 1964, plaintiff convinced Rocky Ford Van Lines (Rocky Ford), a Household Goods affiliate, to withdraw from the Bureau and affiliate with the Oilfield Haulers. By using the different and generally lower mileages reflected in the Oilfield Haulers’ guide, Rocky Ford sought to introduce competitive rates among the Household Goods haulers.
Accordingly, Rocky Ford began the transfer procedure by informing Household Goods of its desire. The Bureau responded with the “Wyche letter” — a strongly worded letter questioning the accuracy of Terrell’s guide, threatening a complaint to the ICC, and stressing the undesirable competitive effects on the industry that would flow from the adoption of a competitive guide. The contents of the letter were passed on to the Oilfield Haulers’ Association. Shortly after becoming aware of this letter, plaintiff filed this suit and a related libel suit. The libel suit, which was settled by consent decree, is the basis of a defense of res judicata raised by the Bureau on this appeal. Despite the letter, Rocky Ford consummated its changeover to the Terrell guide; and the Oilfield Haulers signed a contract for a revised guide early in 1964. Terrell and Rocky Ford then began a joint effort to convince the Defense Traffic Management Service (DTMS), the government agency which controls the shipment of household goods for military personnel,6 to accept and act on competitive bids computed from Terrell’s guide.
At this stage, Terrell’s prospects seemed excellent. He had one tariff bureau as an established customer; the Finance Center had responded favorably to his overtures; and, most importantly, he had an inroad to the influential Household Goods Carriers’ Bureau. He was cultivating an ambitious expectation that competitive necessity would require the Bureau’s members to accept a guide like his once the impact of Rocky Ford’s competition was felt. On the other hand, the Bureau, although nominally only a tariff bureau, had identifiable interests in limiting plaintiff’s access to the market. First, as representative and spokesman for its 1700 members, the Bureau was concerned that plaintiff’s shorter mileages would bring competition and reduced profits for its members.7 Secondly, the Bureau itself derived a substantial income through its arrangement with Rand McNally for distribution of the guides.8
Shortly after circulation of the Wyche letter, plaintiff’s rosy future began to blacken. The Finance Center, with some prodding from the Bureau, reversed its position and decided not to adopt plaintiff’s guide. A large scale battle for influence before the DTMS allegedly resulted in a full blown picture of lack of trust and confidence in Mr. Terrell; ultimately, DTMS, working in connection with the Bureau and the Finance Center, refused to interpret the regulation in Mr. Terrell’s favor. The Oilfield [157]*157Haulers defaulted on their contract and began using the Bureau’s guide. Frustrated in its attempts to gain competitive advantage in its services for DTMS, Rocky Ford returned to using the Bureau guide. Mr. Terrell was eliminated from competition. The jury found the elimination unlawful and measured the injury to Mr. Terrell in the amount of $375,000.
II
A. The Wyche Letter
At trial and on the original appeal, appellants took the position that the Wyche letter was inadmissible in its entirety because it had been the subject of litigation in the previously settled libel suit and, therefore, under the doctrine of res judicata, was not a proper subject of litigation in a second suit. We cannot accept this contention. The majority of the original panel concluded that subject to the limitations mentioned in the opinion, the letter was indeed admissible in evidence in the antitrust suit.9 Moreover, it is well established that in a proper case one wrongful act may be the subject of two or more separate and distinct causes of action.10 In the instant ease, for example, the letter plainly represented the invasion of two separate and distinct primary rights, the one a personal right not to be subjected to libelous statements, and the other a business right to enter competition freely.11 Thus, we conclude that the letter and its libelous nature were properly admitted to show an intention or a scheme to restrain trade, the prior libel suit notwithstanding.
Appellants vigorously assert, however, that the court committed prejudicial error in failing to exclude the allegedly libelous portions of the letter and in failing to impress upon the jury that damages could not be awarded for any injury growing out of the libel.12 We agree in part. The original majority found reversible error because the entire letter went to the jury as evidence without adequate limiting instructions and after undue emphasis by plaintiff’s attorney on its allegedly libelous portions. In our opinion plaintiff’s attorney’s emphasis on the known falsity of the letter, while entirely proper on the issue of defendants’ intent to exclude competition unlawfully, implicitly invited the jury to award damages for the libel. Moreover, we are in agreement with the original majority in their conclusion that the trial court’s limiting instruction was not sufficient to alleviate this very real [158]*158danger that the jury would apply an improper measure of damages.13
B. The DTMS Finance and Center Incidents
In an attempt to comply with the teaching of Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.14 and United Mine Workers v. Pennington,15 the trial court issued a pre-trial order declaring that:
Plaintiff [Terrell] cannot recover any damages for any injury or damage which was caused or alleged to have been caused by any action of the Finance Center, DTMS, or any other agency of the United States of America. . .
The order also prohibited counsel for plaintiff from referring without the court’s prior consent to any of the dealings between plaintiff or defendants and either of the two government agencies involved. Nonetheless, a flood of evidenee tending to show attempts by both parties to influence the respective government agencies was offered with the court’s approval after defendants put into evidence a memorandum by the U. S. Army Chief of Finance.16 The memorandum made numerous accusations to the effect that plaintiff had been “extremely aggressive” and had “generally misrepresented the facts” in attempting to influence the Defense Department to accept his guide. All of this evidence was properly admissible in the court’s discretion to show the “purpose and character of the transaction under scrutiny”,17 to rebut the insinuations put into evidence by the defendants, and to prove the existence of a conspiracy between the Bureau and Rand McNally. By the terms of the lower court’s pretrial order, however, plaintiffs may not recover any damages for business lost as a result of attempts to influence government officials.18
[159]*159From our examination of the record, we are critically aware of the absence of emphasis throughout the trial on the important distinction that we have articulated above. Although both sides took pains to argue thoroughly the facts of the alleged attempts to influence, the court and attorneys made only fleeting reference to the limitation imposed by the court’s pre-trial order. There was no limiting instruction given upon introduction of the evidence and only a brief paragraph in the court’s instruction to the jury cautioning that:
Plaintiff cannot recover and you will not allow any damages in this case for any injury or damages which was caused, or is alleged to have been caused, by any action of the Finance Center, Defense Transportation Management Service, or any other agency of the United States of America.
In light of the voluminous testimony heard by the jury, we do not think that the above quoted instructions were sufficient to overcome the substantial likelihood that the jury would, and in fact did, award damages for the loss of the government business.
C. Proof of Damages
To prove his damages, plaintiff sought to show by expert testimony the profits lost on account of defendants’ unlawful conduct between 1962 and the year of the trial — 1968. In doing so the expert assumed that plaintiff would have sold 22,500 copies of his guide every two years at $15.00 per copy; he arrived at a projected gross income of $1,350,000 for the years 1962-1968 inclusive. From this figure he deducted his projected biannual expenses to reflect an anticipated profit of $880,000. The procedure followed is acceptable provided each element of the projection is supported by proven facts. Although. generally lenient in allowing damages in antitrust matters,19 courts must not permit a damage verdict to be based on speculation.20
In this case, plaintiff relies on Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Services, Inc.,21 as justification for adopting as its projected sales volume per edition the minimum number of guides to be purchased by the Bureau as specified in the most recent agreement between Rand McNally and the Bureau. We conclude, as did the original majority, that Cherokee is inapposite here. In that case, the plaintiff’s participation in the market prior to defendant’s illegal activities was a special circumstance justifying an inference that “but for” the defendant’s illegal activities, plaintiffs would have been in the same position in the market as defendants. In this case, there was proven no special set of circumstances to make valid a similar “but for” proposition. To assume that plain[160]*160tiff could fully penetrate the Bureau’s market is pure speculation and requires the further and totally unsubstantiated assumption that the Bureau would not take competitive steps by revising its own guide or sponsoring a general reduction of rates by its members.
In light of the considerations discussed in this portion of our opinion (Part II) and after an independent examination of the evidence of injury offered by plaintiff, we are of the firm conviction that the record does not reflect evidence properly submitted to the jury that is sufficient to support the sizeable verdict here involved.
Proof essential to recovery of damages in antitrust litigation has been the subject of many Clayton Act claims. . . . The rule thereby established may be summed up thus: The fact of damages, as well as the amount thereof, is entirely a question of sufficiency of evidence. In every case, the question is whether the data of which the evidence consists is such that a just and reasonable inference and estimate thereof can reasonably be drawn from the evidence so that a verdict will not be based on mere speculation or guesswork.22
Although we may not ordinarily substitute our judgment for that of the jury, we are required to exercise that judgment in determining whether it is likely that the jury was actually swayed by considerations not properly before it. In fairness to both parties we do not think that the jury could reasonably have arrived at a verdict of $375,000 unless it was influenced by one or more of the above discussed improper considerations. A retrial of the damages issue is therefore necessary. We reverse the judgment of the district court insofar as it affirms the jury’s award of damages and remand only on the issue of damages.
Ill
We do not deem it necessary to require a retrial on the issue of defendant’s liability. On this question we agree with the original dissent that there is ample evidence to support a finding by the jury that the Sherman Act has been violated.
Terrell showed the existence of the monopoly, the vigorous efforts of Household and Rand McNally to preserve that monopoly, that Terrell’s directory, so often on the verge of success, was destroyed by his competitors and the monopoly remains intact to the disadvantage of the shipping public.23
The evidence of the record convinces us that the Bureau could be found guilty either of conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of § 1, of the Sherman Act24 or of monopolization in violation of § 2.25
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are liberal in favoring the admissibility of evidence if there is any theory justifying its admission, and the trial judge is given broad discretion in making this determination.26 The jury [161]*161heard no evidence that it was not entitled to hear on this issue. Res judicata does not make the Wyche letter inadmissible in this antitrust action. Evidence relating to the transactions with the government are admissible under Pennington to show the “purpose and character” of the Bureau’s dealings in non-governmental transactions.27 The district court’s judgment on the issue of liability is affirmed.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.