PAIR, Associate Judge :
Challenged by this petition for review is Minimum Wage Order No. 72.1 (MWO-72.1) of the District of Columbia Minimum Wage and Industrial Safety Board (the Board).1 Petitioners are employers of persons in the hotel, restaurant and allied occupations, and feel aggrieved by the Board’s order because it requires them to pay higher wages and make other improvements in the employer-employee relationship.
The order superseded, effective June 13, 1972, Minimum Wage Order No. 10 (MWO-10), “Hotel, Restaurant and Allied [297]*297Occupations”, effective August 15, 1968.2 We stayed, pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, § 36-409(b), the effectiveness of MWO-72.1 pending final decision on the petition for review or further order of the court, but only insofar as it applied to those petitioners who filed in this court an undertaking sufficient to guarantee payment of the wage differential to the employees involved, in the event the order is sustained.3
As provided by the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Act (the Act), D.C.Code 1973, § 36-406(a), the Board, prior to the entry of MWO-72.1, conducted an investigation and determined that a “substantial number of workers in the occupations affected by MWO-10 were receiving wages insufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to protect health.” The Board thereupon convened an Ad Hoc Advisory Committee (the committee) and charged it to consider, inquire into and report to the Board its recommendations regarding a minimum wage for such workers. The committee was charged, pursuant to Section 36-406 (e), to consider also and make recommendations to the Board in regard to allowances for gratuities received by such employees and for board, lodging, and other services customarily furnished by the employer.
Composition of the committee as governed by statute4 consisted of three employer representatives, three employee representatives, and three representatives of the public.5
The letters of appointment of the employer and employee members of the committee instructed that they were to represent respectively all employers and employees in the occupations involved. The letters of appointment of the representatives of the public instructed that they were to represent the public. Such instructions were repeated in the charge to the committee at its opening meeting on December 8, 1971.
Notice of the appointment of the committee was published in the D.C. Register on December 13, 1971, together with a notice that a public hearing would be scheduled following action by the Board upon the committee’s recommendations. The committee met five times during the period December 8, 1971 to February 4, 1972, after which it reported to the Board its recommendations in regard to (1) a minimum wage, (2) allowances for meals, lodging and gratuities, (3) allowances for special conditions, (4) minimum wage for learners, (5) part-time rate, (6) split shift and excessive spread of hours, and (7) uniforms.
The first three meetings of the committee were devoted to reviewing the exhibits submitted by the staff of the Minimum Wage and Industrial Safety Board and debating the merits of two basic issues, i. e., an increase in the minimum wage and a provision for learners’ rates. At their fourth meeting, the committee proceeded to vote on the various issues upon which the Board had asked them to advise. The pri[298]*298mary issue to be resolved was the minimum wage rate to be recommended to the Board. On this issue the committee split 6 to 3 in favor of a $2.25 hourly rate. The debate of the committee indicated that the labor and public members were in the majority with the representatives of industry opposed. On four other issues — split shift, uniform allowance, part-time rate and tip credit — the split was the same, and on two issues — meal allowance and lodging allowance — the vote was 8 to 1, with the interest identification of the dissenter not discernible from the record. The vote on one issue, that of a learner’s rate, not previously applicable to this industry, resulted in industry and public representatives joining together to prevail over unified labor opposition.6
While debate on all of the aforementioned issues had been spirited, the degree of industry’s opposition to the recommendations of the advisory committee (primarily the $2.25 minimum wage) did not become apparent until their final meeting at which the only item of business was the adoption of the committee’s report as an accurate statement of the voted recommendations. When the vote was called the three industry members registered no response. After an inquiry from Board Chairman Newman, one industry member explained that “[w]e feel we don’t want to have any part of it” and that the previous meeting “was a very reckless day insofar as the restaurant industry is concerned.” After the allegation of recklessness was spoken to by the labor members, one of the industry’s members moved that no report be issued and that the entire matter be referred back to the Board to begin anew. The motion was seconded by another industry member and then explained as follows:
Mr. Bryant [industry member]: This motion is based on the following: Mr. Joseph A. Beavers is a member of the D.C. Minimum Wage Board and is also a member of the Joint Executive Board of the Hotel, Restaurant, and Bartenders International Union. Since Wage Order No. 10 deals with the hotel and restaurant industry, Mr. Beavers has a clear conflict of interest. He should not have participated in the selection of this Committee, and should not have participated in our deliberations.
We recommend that a new committee be appointed without Mr. Beavers’ participation, and that he remove himself from any participation in the process of revising Wage Order No. 10.
Chairman Fortune [public member]: May I ask you, who is Mr. Beavers?
Mr. Richardson [labor member] : Right here is Mr. Beavers.
Chairman Fortune [public member]: I’m sorry.
Have you finished speaking to your motion? [Emphasis added.]
This is the first indication in the record under review that the industry was concerned about Mr. Beavers’ membership on the Minimum Wage and Industrial Safety Board and his presence at the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee meetings.
Both labor and public members, as it appears from the record, registered some dismay at the motion and the colloquy below is illustrative of their attitude:
Miss McConnell [public member] : May I ask a question of the employer members of the Committee ?
[299]*299If you felt there was a conflict of interest in the makeup of this Committee, why wasn’t the question raised before. We have operated for six weeks in an attempt to answer the charge which was placed on us as an ad hoc committee?
Mr. Hollywood [industry member]: There’s always the hope, I think, is that we can come out with what we feel is a reasonable resolving—
Miss McConnell [public member] : Hold it.
In other words, what you’re saying is that you disagree with the contents of the report and the conflict of interest is not the essential matter.
Mr. Hollywood [industry member] : No. I think as the meetings progressed, it became apparent to us that there were grounds possibly for a conflict of interest. I might have brought it up earlier, but due to unfortunate circumstances I possibly would have — I was absent for two meetings because of situations beyond my control.
Miss McConnell [public member] : You weren’t absent at many meetings, Mr. Hollywood. We just didn’t have those meetings.
Mr. Hollywood [industry member] : I know I missed a meeting.
Chairman Fortune [public member]: A meeting is all you missed.
Mr. Richardson [labor member] : There were no actions taken at that meeting. They were tabled because of your absence.
Chairman Fortune [public member]: It was just discussion.
Mr. Hollywood [industry member]: They called and said they were discussing $2.50. I nearly fell out of my chair.
# :}{ ‡
Mr. Richardson [labor member]: If the figure had come out the way you wanted it to, Mr. Reid, there wouldn’t have been any conflict of interest.
Mr. Reid [industry member] : Possibly. If it hadn’t come out your way, there probably would have been some conflict of interest charged against us. (Emphasis added.)
The motion to send the matter back to the Board was defeated 6 to 3 and the recommendation of the advisory committee was passed around for signature. The three industry members refused to sign the recommendation and went on record as declining to participate in the signing. The recommendation was then transmitted to the Board.
The Board prepared a proposed revision of MWO-10 containing the recommendations of the committee and scheduled a public hearing as required by the Act.7 Notice of the hearing scheduled for March 17, 1972, containing a summary of the major provisions of the proposed revised wage order, was published in the local newspapers and the D.C. Register.8
On February 29, 1972, attorneys for Dot-nick, Inc., a member of the affected industry, wrote to Board member Beavers and asked him to recuse himself from the proceedings and on March 2, 1972, brought an action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against Board members Newman, Beavers and Austin and the Board itself.9 The complaint was premised upon the asserted conflict of interest of Board member Beavers, the fact that none [300]*300of the labor members of the ad hoc advisory committee represented the allied occupations and the fact that the committee’s recommendation violated Phase II economic guidelines and regulations promulgated pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. The relief sought was to have the Board proceedings declared invalid or void ab initio and to enjoin the Board from continuing the proceeding and to enjoin Board member Beavers from participating in any way in the revision of Wage Order No. 10.
Judge Belson entered a memorandum opinion and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction holding (1) that the complaint failed to allege any clear violation of statute or deprivation of due process of law and, (2) that there was a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The case was brought to this court on motion for an emergency appeal and injunction pending appeal and it was in all respects denied.10
The public hearing commenced March 17, 1972, and was reconvened March 20, 1972, to allow additional presentations. After the close of the hearing, the record was kept open until April 1, 1972, to permit the filing of additional written statements. At the hearing a total of 40 principal witnesses appeared to testify and five others submitted statements. During the 15-day period that the record was kept open eight additional written statements were filed. The fifty-three submissions provided the Board with a cross-section of community opinion on the issue before it. Nineteen of those presenting statements were from the affected business community and eleven were employees or spokesmen for unions whose membership would be affected by the Board’s proposed action. The remaining participants included three members of the clergy, the non-voting delegate to the United States House of Representatives, and representatives of various consumer, community development, political and women’s organizations. Except for those who sought a minimum wage higher than that proposed by the Board, all who presented their views, save those from the business community, favored the $2.25 per hour rate.
On April 13, 1972, the Board, on the basis of detailed findings of fact, adopted — effective June 13, 1972 — the proposed revised wage order for the occupations involved, and issued its Order No. 72.1, superseding MWO-10, as amended. Notice of the Board’s action was published in the Washington Post on April 19, 1972, and in the D.C. Register on May 1, 1972. The Board’s decision and order were brought here for review pursuant to the Act, as amended. D.C.Code 1973, § 36-409(a).
We address at the outset petitioners’ contention that the Board was without authority to promulgate MWO-72.111 because if the Board has no such authority the controversy is necessarily concluded since petitioners’ other contentions would, in that event, be purely academic. Urging that MWO-72.1 should not be permitted to stand, petitioners say first that contrary to the intention of the Congress the Board, by its action, has established for employees in the hotel, restaurant and allied occupations a minimum wage in excess of that prescribed by the Act, D.C.Code 1973, § 36-403. We do not agree.
[301]*301The very purpose of the Act was to provide broader coverage, improve standards of minimum wage and overtime compensation protection, and improve means of enforcement. To this end and consistent with its “Findings and Declaration of Policy”, D.C.Code 1973, § 36-401, the Congress, by Section 36-403(a) of the Act, provided first:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, every employer shall pay to each of his employees (A) the wage established for each such employee in a wage order issued under this subchapter or (B) wages at the following rates :
(i) not less than $1.25 an hour during the year beginning February 1, 1967,
(ii) not less than $1.40 an hour during the year beginning February 1,
1968, and
(iii) not less than $1.60 an hour thereafter, whichever is higher.
(2) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees whose wage rates are governed by Minimum Wage Order Number 10 (effective August 15, 1964), as revised under subsection (c) (2) of this section, wages at the following rates:
(A) not less than $1.25 an hour during the year beginning August 1, 1967,
(B) not less than $1.40 an hour during the year beginning August 1, 1968, and
(C) not less than $1.60 an hour thereafter.12
While it appears that the treatment provided for employees whose wages were then controlled by MWO-10 was different from that provided for all other employees, we have found nothing in the plain language employed in Section 36-403(a), (b) and (c) which gives any indication that the Congress intended, as insisted by petitioners, to freeze on and after August 1, 1968, the wage rates of employees affected by MWO-10.
Our dissenting colleagues express the view that, notwithstanding the statutory authority of the Board to reconsider and revise upward the wage rates of employers in the several occupations in the District of Columbia, the Congress really intended that employees whose wage rates were then controlled by MWO-10 may obtain increases in their minimum wages only by a special act of Congress. The majority does not read the statute or its legislative history to require such an incongruous result.
The fact is that the Congress, by D.C. Code 1973, § 36-406, provided specifically to the contrary, saying:
(a) At any time after a wage rate within a wage order has been in effect for one year the [Board] may on [its] own motion reconsider such wage rate If, after investigation, the [Board is] of the opinion that any substantial number of workers in the occupation covered by such wage order are receiving wages insufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to protect health [it] may convene an ad hoc advisory committee for the purpose of considering and inquiring into and reporting [302]*302to the [Board] on the subject investigated by the [Board] and submitted by [it] to such committee.
It seems clear, therefore, that all that was intended by D.C.Code 1973, § 36-403(a)(2) and (b)(2) was (1) to delay for a period of six months the application of the new minimum wage rates to employees affected by MWO-10, and'(2) to require that on and after August 1, 1968, the rate of overtime compensation for such employees be fixed by the Board after a public hearing. Support for this view is found in the legislative history of the act. Thus, in H.R.Rep.No. 552 (to accompany H.R. 8126), 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), it is said at page 371:
As to Minimum Wage Order No. 10, which became effective on August 15, 1964, the bill directs that it remain in full force and effect (modified to include men as well as women) until August 15, 1967 .... On the same date, the overtime wage rate will be established by the Board, by wage conference procedure and public hearing for employees in the occupations covered by the order. On August 15, 1968, the minimum rate . . . becomes effective as to such employees.
To the same effect it is said at page 14 of the Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House, H.R.Rep.No. 2175, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) :
Hotel and restaurant employees. — The House bill provided that the minimum wages established in the bill would apply to hotel and restaurant employees covered by minimum wage order No. 10, revised to cover men as well as women employees, approximately a year after such wages were to apply to other employees. . . . The conference substitute is the same as the House bill, except that the delay in the application of the minimum wages is set at 6 months.
Shedding perhaps even brighter light on this aspect of the controversy is the record of the proceedings when H.R. 8126 reached the floor of the Senate. At page 750 of the Congressional Record, January 20, 1966, it was explained that:
The Senate version empowers the [Board] to issue wage orders in excess of the statutory floor in order to provide employees with wages sufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to protect health.
Senator Javits, with specific reference to the service trades (such as motels, hotels, and restaurants), expressed his concern that the increased operational cost caused by a wage increase might result in a reduction in the labor force and a consequent deprivation of services needed by the city.
Senator Morse, who managed the bill on the floor, replied at page 751 of the Record for that day:
With regard to the particular businesses the Senator has mentioned, restaurants, hotels, and motels, I have given a great deal of attention to that question, because we wanted to be absolutely certain that we would be completely fair to restaurants and hotels. I know of no evidence in the record presented to the committee that gives any support to claims that we are unfair to restaurants and motels if we adopt the minimum floor. ... I have talked with hotel and restaurant operators in many other cities. Their attitude has been that they wished they could have the guaranteed income that such operators get in the District of Columbia, because of the tremendous tourist trade that flows into the city 12 months a year.
Then followed efforts to amend the bill by striking those sections providing for the issuance of wage orders in excess of the statutory floor. Senator Morse pointed out (and this appears at page 760 of the Record, January 20, 1966) that the wage board procedure for amending minimum wage orders had prevailed in. the District of Columbia since 1918. It appears at [303]*303page 763 of the Record for the same day that the amendment was rejected by a vote of 42 to 28 and 30 not voting.
We have examined S.Rep.No. 864, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), with particular reference to the comments at page 8 on the “[ijssuance of revised and new wage order” and found no basis whatsoever for petitioners’ contention that Congress intended to exclude from the beneficent purposes of D.C.Code 1973, § 36-406, employees affected by MWO-10.
We conclude, therefore, that the Board did not exceed its statutory authority when, after procedures prescribed by D.C. Code 1973, §§ 36-406 and 36^107(a), (b) and (c), it promulgated MWO-72.1.
Petitioners urge next that MWO-72.1 is fatally defective because it contains new and amended definitions and regulations which were beyond the power of the Board to adopt. Much the same contention was made in Allentuck v. District of Columbia Min. W. & I. Safe. Bd., D.C. App., 261 A.2d 826, 831 (1969). Brought into question in that case was a wage order containing, in addition to minimum wage and overtime compensation rates, definitions of such as “employees compensated by commission,” “workers under the age of 18,” “handicapped workers,” “apprentices,” “adult learners,” “split shifts,” “uniforms,” “travel expenses,” “deductions,” “allowances for meals and lodging,” “basis of payment,” “time of payment,” “required records,” and “issuance of wage statements.” It was contended that, with the exception of wage rates, such definitions were in fact regulations within the purview of D.C.Code 1973, § 36-408, rather than a statement of “terms and conditions” for the purposes of D.C.Code 1973, § 36-407(c).13 Rejecting the contentions, this court delared:
Congress made a dual delegation of legislative rule-making authority. Both § 36-407 (b), authorizing wage orders, and § 36-408 (a), authorizing regulations, contain broad grants of power to “effectuate” or “carry out the purposes of this Act.” . . . The specific expression of matter for regulations in § 36-408 (b) and (c) cannot be taken as an indication by Congress that such cannot also be the subject of a wage order. The test is whether those provisions are necessary to “effectuate” the purposes of the Act or to “carry out the purposes of [a wage order], * * * to prevent the circumvention or evasion of it, and * * * to safeguard the minimum wage rates and overtime compensation established in [such wage order].” Indeed, when the Act was adopted, wage orders contained such provisions. In the entire context of this minimum wage structure, we think that the Congress may fairly be taken to have intended the form of a wage order issued here. [261 A.2d at 831.]
So it is in the case at bar. The definitions complained of by petitioners, together with the detailed delineation of minimum wage standards, are nothing more than statements of such terms and conditions as are calculated to assist the Board “to (1) carry out the purposes of such order, (2) to prevent the circumvention or evasion of it, and (3) to safeguard the minimum wage rates and overtime compensation established in it.” 14
Petitioners urge, however, that even if the Board had authority to promulgate MWO-72.1, the order should not be permitted to stand because it was adopted without first giving the notice required by the Act. D.C.Code 1973, § 36-408(d), and the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C.APA), D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1509.
[304]*304The short answer to this contention is that, as pointed out above, the Board was not concerned with the adoption of any proposed regulation — but rather with the definitions and minimum wage standards proposed by the committee for the purposes of § 36-407(c).
It is undisputed in the record that notice of the “Proposed Revised Wage Order” was published as required by D.C. Code 1973, § 36-407 (a);15 that the notice set forth the time and place of the public hearing; that it contained a “summary of the major provisions of the proposed revised wage order,” including proposed definitions ; and that the proposed wage order, the recommendations of the ad hoc committee, wage data, cost of living budgets, and related materials would be available at the public hearing and prior thereto at the office of the Board. Whatever may be said, therefore, respecting the application of the D.C. APA to the proceedings, certainly it required no more than the Board accomplished by the notice it published of the public hearing to consider the proposed revision of MWO-10.
But, say the petitioners, the public hearing preliminary to the revision of MWO-10 was a contested case within the purview of the D.C. APA,16 and that they were not accorded the due process considerations mandated by D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1509.17
But what petitioners have apparently overlooked is that the jurisdiction of this court to review orders of the Board was not conferred by the D.C. APA but rather by the Act, as amended (most recently in 1970), D.C.Code 1973, § 36-409(a), well after the effective date of the D.C. APA. By this amendment it was provided that:
Any person aggrieved by an order [of the Board] . . . may obtain a review ... in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals by filing . a written petition .... The review shall be governed by the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act.
Thus, the organic act, § 36-409(a), requires review by this court on petition of any person aggrieved by an order of the Board. Significantly enough, the Congress did not condition such review upon the existence of a contested case or require the application of all provisions of the D.C. APA.
Moreover, while the organic act provides for a hearing, it prescribes also the procedures the Board is required to follow, providing by D.C.Code 1973, § 36-407(a), that:
The [Board] shall publish a notice once a week, for four successive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation printed in the District of Columbia, stating that [it] will . . . hold a public hearing at which all interested persons will be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. . . . [Emphasis added.]
The emphasized phrases, we believe, do not comport with the notion that the statutory [305]*305scheme requires a “contested case” type hearing.
In this connection, we observe first that the procedural safeguards provided by the D.C. APA in “contested cases” require that “all parties thereto shall be given reasonable notice of the afforded hearing,” D.C. Code 1973, § 1-1509(a). This notice is consistent with the requirements of fundamental due process if the proceeding is one at which legal duties or privileges are to be adjudicated. See Mullane v. Central Hanover B. and T. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). In contrast, the organic act in this case mandates general notice by publication, which would be of questionable constitutionality at best were this a proceeding adjudicating the rights of specific parties.
Secondly, we note that D.C.Code 1973, § 36-407, mandates a “public hearing” at which not “specific parties” but instead “all interested persons” are afforded opportunity to be heard. This language comports not with that found in the “contested case” provision of the D.C. APA but instead with rulemaking provisions which require that prior to the adoption of any rule the agency shall give “notice of the intended action so as to afford interested persons opportunity to submit data and views either orally or in writing, as may be specified in such notice.” D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1505(a). The only distinction in the provision at hand, D.C.Code 1973, § 36-407(a), is that an oral or public hearing is not left to the option of the Board but is instead required.
Thirdly, the statutory requirements of a “public hearing” and that “a reasonable opportunity to be heard shall be afforded to all interested persons” are inconsistent with the contested case concept which contemplates a full evidentiary hearing with the right of cross-examination. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 92 S.Ct. 1941, 32 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972).
The argument is made, however, that if this case is not a “contested case” then review is precluded by D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1510, which appears to limit judicial review to “contested cases.” It seems beyond dispute, however, that all that the Congress intended in this regard was that our review should be controlled by D.C. APA standards.
Under the circumstances, the D.C. APA could have further application in this controversy only if, as urged by petitioners, the wage board proceeding was a contested case. Crucial to the inquiry, therefore, is the character of the proceedings involved, i. e., whether at the public hearing the Board functioned in a quasi-judicial capacity in the resolution of the immediate rights of specific individuals or in a quasi-legislative capacity in the implementation, pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, § 36-401(a) and (b) of the purposes of the Act.
A somewhat similar question was presented in Citizens Ass’n of Georgetown, Inc. v. Washington, D.C.App., 291 A.2d 699 (1972). Involved in that case were interim amendments to the zoning regulations proposed by the petitioner. We pointed out that the Zoning Commission, in its consideration of the proposed amendments, “must play a role beyond resolution of the legal rights of specific parties”, and that:
The decision . . . will depend upon the compilation and analysis of exhaustive information concerning the economic, environmental and aesthetic ramifications of various modes of development Policy decisions must be made; and the opinions of a wide cross section of interested citizens may well be considered. The Zoning Commission’s evaluation of the area would not rest upon the status of any particular property, nor would the peculiar problems of any one individual in the area be of paramount concern. In short, a proceeding before [306]*306the Zoning Commission on amendments relating to an area of a city lacks the specificity of subject matter and result, indicative of an adjudicatory proceeding. The proceeding is a quasi-legislative hearing conducted for the purpose of obtaining facts and information, and views of the public pertinent to the resolution of a policy decision, [/d. at 704-705.]
The essential difference between a quasi-judicial and a quasi-legislative hearing was spelled out with clarity in Jones v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 303-304, 323 F.2d 306, 308-309 (1963). There is was said:
A legislative hearing relates to “the making of a rule for the future.” As distinguished from a judicial inquiry, it is a non-adversary proceeding which seeks to devise broad policy applicable to the public generally, or a substantial segment thereof, rather than to individual parties. In such hearings, “it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used.” Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 1515, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960). While fact finding may to some extent be involved in the process, the due process requirements of confrontation and cross-examination, the hallmarks of the judicial inquiry, are not necessarily present. Rather the quasi-legislative inquiry tends to consult broad relevant data available from surveys, studies and published experience, free from the limitations of confrontation and cross-examination. Initially, the quasi-legislative inquiry depends on staff work. As here, the staff report often is presented to the interested public with the invitation to appear at a public hearing to oppose or praise. . . . [Footnote omitted.]
See also American Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 123 U.S.App.D.C. 310, 314-317, 359 F.2d 624, 628-631 (1966).
What Professor Davis said on this subject is particularly illuminating:
Adjudicative facts are the facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and properties. Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are generally facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion. [K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Requirement of Hearing, § 7.02 at 413 (1958).]
It does not appear from the administrative record in this case that there were any disputed questions of adjudicative facts or that any immediate legal right of any specific party was presented to the Board for resolution or adjudication.
From this it must follow that the proceeding conducted by the Board lacked the “specificity of subject matter and result, indicative of an adjudicatory proceeding.” Citizens Ass’n of Georgetown, Inc. v. Washington, supra; Allentuck v. District of Columbia Min. W. & I. Safe. Bd., supra. Compare Capitol Hill Restoration Soc. v. Zoning Commission, D.C.App., 287 A.2d 101 (1972), where the subject of controversy was the immediate “Legal rights, duties, [and] privileges of specific parties” in a proposed planned unit development which was conditioned upon a change in zoning.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, our dissenting colleagues insist, upon the authority of Allentuck v. District of Columbia Min. W. & I. Safe. Bd., supra, that the proceedings conducted by the Board — looking toward the amendment of MWO-10— were in a contested case within the purview of § 1-1502(8) of the D.C. APA. As a matter of fact, both the proceedings conducted by the Board in Allentuck and oral argument in this court on the petition for review were completed prior to October 21, 1969, the effective date of the D.C. APA. It is, therefore, difficult to understand how [307]*307it could have been thought that the issue addressed and resolved by this court in Al-lentuck was whether Wage Board proceedings are or are not contested cases. In our view, the Allentuck case holds, in this connection, no more than that the Board must make at the conclusion of a Wage Board proceeding “sufficient basic findings and a reasoned application of [such] findings to agency policy and the law,” as a condition precedent to meaningful judicial review. Furthermore, as we related earlier, this court said in Allentuck v. District of Columbia Min. W. & I. Safe. Bd., supra, that Congress “made a dual delegation of legislative rule-making authority.” [261 A.2d at 831; emphasis supplied.]
We turn now to petitioners’ contention that the Ad Hoc Committee was improperly constituted; specifically, that no employer representative of the “Allied Occupations” was appointed to membership on the committee.
The Act, D.C.Code 1973, § 36-406(b), provides with respect to the composition of the committee that:
The committee shall be composed of not more than three persons representing the employers in such occupation, of an equal number representing employees in such occupation, and of not more than three persons representing the public.
The term “occupation” is defined by the Act, D.C.Code 1973, § 36-402(6), as “ . . . any occupation . . . group of occupations or industries ... in which employees are gainfully employed.” Put simply, therefore, the substance of the statutory requirement in this case was that three members of the committee must represent employers in the group of occupations affected by the proposed revision of MWO-10, i. e., the “Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Occupations.” See Andree & Seedman v. Administrator of W. & H. Division, Etc., 74 App.D.C. 240, 242, 122 F.2d 634, 636 (1941).
Each employer representative appointed to the committee was advised first by his letter of appointment that:
The term “hotel, restaurant, and allied occupations” includes such businesses as hotels, motels, rooming houses, apartment houses, clubs, restaurants, catering services, carry-out shops, as well as food preparation and food service activities in retail stores, schools, hospitals, nursing homes, homes for the aged, homes for children, and charitable and religious organizations. You, as employer member on the committee, will represent all of these types of businesses.
Thereafter and prior to the commencement of its deliberations, the committee was charged by the Board that:
Each employer member represents all types of businesses included within the definition of the occupations ....
We have examined the transcript of the proceedings at the several sessions of the committee, together with pertinent exhibits, and have examined also the transcript of the proceedings at the public hearing. We have, however, found nothing that persuades us that the interests of employers in the “Allied Occupations” were not adequately represented, advanced and fully protected.
Petitioners complain next of Board member Beavers’ participation in the revision of MWO-10, contending that throughout the Board’s consideration of the proposed revision, Mr. Beavers was possessed of a disqualifying conflict of interest for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1962). But in United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 548, 81 S.Ct. 294, 308, 5 L.Ed.2d 268 (1961), the Supreme Court, citing with approval United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 18, 47 S.Ct. 1, 71 L.Ed. 131 (1926), made it crystal clear:
The obvious purpose of the statute is to insure honesty in the Government’s [308]*308business dealings by preventing federal agents who have interests adverse to those of the Government from advancing their own interests at the expense of the public welfare. .
Accord, Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Abramson, 295 F.Supp. 87 (D.Minn.1969).
Specifically, what petitioners complain of is that Mr. Beavers, as an employee representative on the Board, was also Business Agent for the Cooks, Pantry and Kitchen Employees Union, Local 209, and was also a member of the Joint Executive Board of Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO of Washington, D.C.18
If this had been a quasi-judicial proceeding and it were shown that a member of the Board conducting the proceeding had an interlocking employment, such as that possessed by Board member Beavers, we would reverse out of hand. But this was not an adjudicative proceeding. It was a proceeding quasi-legislative in character conducted by a tripartite board. Because of the nature of a tripartite board and its function, the representatives of the interest groups involved can by interplay negotiate and achieve a result acceptable to a majority of the Board. What this means in terms of procedure is that the viewpoint of each sector represented will not be obscured for lack of a spokesman.
In this case the result sought by the representative of the employers was a wage rate which would not price their enterprise out of business by rendering them noncompetitive while that sought by the representative of the employees was a living wage and job security. The result sought by the representative of the public was one consistent with the congressional mandate as expressed in the “Findings and Declaration of Policy”, viz., the accomplishment of a wage rate “sufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to protect health” and, of course, to provide an inducement to work.
The inescapable fact is, therefore, that two members of the Board were expected to be partisan (one in the interest of employees and the other in the interest of employers).19 Such has been the statutory scheme since the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Law was first enacted.20 Moreover, as pointed out above, such is the very nature of a tripartite tribunal for, as Professor Davis points out,
two members are frankly partial or partisan, and only the third member is in theory or in fact impartial or neutral. The partisan members are sometimes even in the employ of parties on each side. . . . [K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Bias § 12.03 at 157 (1958); emphasis supplied.]
In Arnold v. United States Air Lines, Inc., 296 F.2d 191, 195 (7th Cir. 1961), the [309]*309court, commenting on the essential bipartisan nature of the “System Board”, a tripartite tribunal, established to arbitrate disputes between air carriers and their employees, said:
Members of such boards are not in legal contemplation, or in fact, supposed to be neutral arbitrators. . . . And, provision is made for designation of a “neutral person” ... in event of deadlock. The board is bipartisan rather than impartial and disinterested. . The chairman was a representative of United. His participation on United’s behalf . . . made him no more or less partial than any other person identified with United’s interest would have been. It was not a disqualification. .
In Young v. Neale, 457 S.W.2d 358 (Ky.1970), a case arising from an administrative proceeding to fix the prevailing wage rates for the construction of public projects, it was contended, as do the petitioners in the case at bar, that “due process” was denied when no opportunity was afforded to interrogate a member of the Wage Board with respect to his prejudice or bias. In disposing of the contention, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, distinguishing a case involving the trial of a teacher on charges of misconduct, said at 362:
The proceedings before the Board in the present case do not constitute a trial of that nature. In addition, the Board members are selected on the basis of their interest in the subject matter. Apparently, it was the determination of the legislature that the varying interests would counterbalance each other, and . such does not constitute a disqualification. Therefore an inquiry of the Board members with respect to their favorable interest in the segment of society they were chosen to represent was irrelevant and improper. .
See also J. Abbott & Son, Inc. v. Holderman, 46 N.J.Super. 46, 133 A.2d 705 (1957).
We have examined the authorities relied upon by petitioners as support in their vigorous assault on the qualifications of Board member Beavers and find them in-apposite. Almost without exception, the subject of concern in those cases was the qualifications of an administrative officer, functioning in a quasi-judicial capacity, who, because of a personal, private and sometime beneficial — if not pecuniary — interest in the outcome of the controversy, was found to be possessed of a disqualifying conflict of interest. None of such cases, however, involved a challenge to the qualifications of any member of a tripartite tribunal selected because of his special interest in the subject matter. See and compare Board of Ed. v. International U. of Op. Eng., Loc. No. 68, 109 N.J.Super. 116, 262 A.2d 426 (1970). While neither employee nor employer bias of a member of a tripartite tribunal has been considered a disqualifying interest, it has been held otherwise with respect to the public or neutral member of such tribunal. See, in this connection, Thomas v. Ramberg, 245 Minn. 474, 73 N.W.2d 195 (1955).
Petitioners attach great significance to Board member Beavers’ presence and participation at meetings of the committee. They say nothing, however, in regard to Board member Austin’s presence and participation at such meetings. It would perhaps have been an exercise of better judgment if both Board members Beavers and Austin had elected to avoid attendance at any of the meetings of the committee. But we have found nothing in the Act, as amended, or in Reorganization Order No. 36 which prohibited such attendance.
With respect to the participation of Mr. Beavers in the deliberations of the committee, all that appears from the record is that, at the first meeting, he made a comment in clarification of a statement by a member of the committee; and that, at the second meeting, he made two comments which in our view were of little, if any, consequence.
[310]*310Board member Austin attended three meetings of the committee and made two brief comments at the second meeting. It does not appear that there was any further participation at meetings of the committee by either Mr. Beavers or Mr. Austin, or that the members of the committee regarded them other than as interested spectators. Certainly, it cannot be said with reason that the very presence of Mr. Beavers was prejudicial since the function of the committee was to do no more than inquire and report with recommendations to the Board of which both Mr. Beavers and Mr. Austin were members.
Petitioners contend finally that the findings21 upon which the Board based its MWO-72.1 were without support in substantial evidence in the whole of the administrative record.
With regard to the issue of the amount of wages sufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to protect health, the Board had before it two basic budgets. The first, submitted by an employer member of the committee, had an annual cost of $3,373. The second, prepared by the Board’s staff, had an annual cost of $4,991.18.
Because this was a major issue in the proceeding the Board was careful to note the inadequacies in the employer submission.22 In choosing to use instead the budget prepared by its own staff to arrive at the conclusion that an employed person requires a wage of at least $2.40 an hour in order to provide adequate maintenance and to protect health, the Board likewise felt it important to explain its conclusion.23 We think that the Board’s finding is supported by the evidence and has a rational basis and therefore will not be disturbed on review.
Petitioners contend also that while the Board accurately determined the amount of wages paid in the Washington metropolitan region by fair employers for work of like or comparable character by looking to regional wage reports, the Board impermissibly used that same data to find the fair and reasonable value of the work performed, and thereby made the finding that the two were the same, i. e., in the range of $1.90 to $2.06 an hour. Peti[311]*311tioners assert that had Congress intended the Board to consider actual wages paid as an indicator of the fair and reasonable value of work performed it would not have made this a separate criterion for consideration in the revision process. It strikes us that the amount of wages paid “are of obvious importance to the consideration and determination of at least minimal values of services.” Application of Wells Plaza Corp., 10 A.D.2d 209, 198 N.Y.S.2d 322, 328, aff’d, 8 N.Y.2d 975, 204 N.Y.S.2d 351, 169 N.E.2d 12 (1960). See J. Abbott & Sons, Inc. v. Holderman, 46 N.J.Super. 46, 133 A.2d 705, 712-713 (1957). We see no real significance in the fact that the two criteria are separate in the statute and can therefore find no fault with the Board’s use of the same basic evidence to make findings under both.
Our review reveals that the wage order of the Board was not arbitrary and capricious (D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1510 (3)(A)) and its findings are supported by substantial evidence (D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1510(3) (E),24 these being the two review standards in the D.C. APA which apply to this review. Once we are satisfied that these standards have been met, our review function is at an end because, as pointed out in J. Abbott & Son, Inc. v. Holderman, supra, 133 A.2d at 712:
[W]'hat constitutes a proper minimum wage varies with the viewpoint of the finder, and with that very matter in contemplation, the Legislature constituted the wage board with an especially constructed composite viewpoint. The courts therefore not merely lend to the board’s report a presumption of reasonableness and validity; but only with much reluctance and where there is manifest abuse would they set aside a wage fixed by the board, because of the excessiveness or inadequacy of the amount.
Petitioners complain, nevertheless, that the Board in arriving at its conclusion improperly gave greater weight to the first of the three statutory criteria spelled out in the Act.25 Reasoning to its basic finding and conclusion, the Board said:
In giving weight to the three criteria the Board considers the intent of Con[312]*312gress in Section 1(a) and (b) of the . . . Act [D.C.Code 1973, § 37-401 [36] (a) and (b) ] that it is declared to be the policy of the Act to correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate the payment of wages insufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to protect health.
The Board finds in order to correct the abuses set forth in Section 1(a) of the . . . Act it is necessary to give greater weight to the amount of wages sufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to protect health than the other two statutorily prescribed criteria. Accordingly, the Board finds that a minimum wage of $2.25 an hour will effectuate the purposes of the . . . Act without causing economic hardship to businesses in the District of Columbia.
In Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 145, 61 S.Ct. 524, 533, 85 L.Ed. 624 (1940), the Supreme Court said in regard to three similar criteria set forth in the Fair Labor Standards Act:
The fact that Congress accepts the administrative judgment as to the relative weights to be given to these factors in each case when that judgment in other respects is arrived at in the manner prescribed by the statute, instead of attempting the impossible by prescribing their relative weight in advance for all cases, is no more an abandonment of the legislative function than when Congress accepts and acts legislatively upon the advice of experts as to social or economic conditions without re-examining for itself the data upon which that advice is based.
On this record, agreement with' the Board’s rationale and its conclusion is compelled. A minimum wage sufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to protect health is the very substance of the statutory command. J. Abbott & Son, Inc. v. Holderman, supra. Thus, the Congress having committed to the Board administrative judgment as to the relative weight to be given the three criteria, it would be an exercise in irresponsibility were this court to substitute its judgment. See New Jersey State Hotel-Motel Ass’n v. Male, 105 N.J.Super. 174, 175, 251 A.2d 466, 467 (1969). From all of the foregoing, it must follow that the order of the Board is
Affirmed.