OPINION
Justice McCAFFERY.
The issue presented in this case is whether a municipal ordinance regulating the sale of certain tobacco items and other potential drug paraphernalia is preempted by state law. We conclude that the ordinance is inconsistent with the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, and, accordingly, is preempted.
On January 23, 2007, the Philadelphia City Council enacted an ordinance to
[a]mend[ ] Chapter 9-600 of The Philadelphia Code, entitled “Service Businesses,” to add new provisions to prohibit the sale, from certain retail establishments, of “blunts,” “loosies,” cigarette papers, cigars and other items that may be otherwise legal but that are commonly used as drug paraphernalia, under certain terms and conditions.
City of Philadelphia Bill No. 060345-AAA, as amended on 11/30/06, at 1.
The ordinance was designed “to correct and control a[] growing trend among Philadelphia youth and others to purchase cigars, empty the tobacco from those cigars, and substitute marijuana and/or stronger illegal drugs into the cigar wrapping.” Memorandum of Law of the City of Philadelphia and Robert Solvibile in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for' a Preliminary Injunction, dated 2/21/07, at 2 (hereinafter “2/21/07 City Memorandum of Law”). To this end, the ordinance banned the sale of flavored cigars and other tobacco products that are preferred by illicit drug users as vehicles for smoking marijuana and other illegal drugs, and also banned the sale of cigars and other tobacco products in quantities of less than three. No mens rea provision was included in the [151]*151above ordinance; hence, the mere sale of the listed items constituted a violation, without regard to the seller’s intent or knowledge. In addition, the ordinance prohibited the sale of single or flavored tobacco products or of drug paraphernalia within 500 feet of a school, recreation center, day care center, church, or community center, “regardless of the intent as to use of the item.” Philadelphia Code §§ 9-622(5)(a) and 9-629(2); see also 2/21/07 City Memorandum of Law at 2-3. Violators of the ordinance were subject to a fine of up to $2,000, and to revocation of their business privilege license. Philadelphia Code §§ 9-622(6)(f) and 9-629(4).
On January 30, 2007, Holt’s Cigar Company and other tobacco retailers, manufacturers, and trade associations (hereinafter collectively “Holt’s Cigar”) challenged the ordinance by filing a complaint against the City of Philadelphia and Robert D. Solvibile, in his official capacity as acting commissioner of the Department of Licenses and Inspections (hereinafter the “City”). Holt’s Cigar sought, inter alia, a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the ordinance and a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was preempted by the drug paraphernalia provisions of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter the “Act”)1 which bars the delivery of drug paraphernalia under circumstances where the offender knew or reasonably should have known that the paraphernalia would be used to introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of the Act. See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(33). The trial court issued a consent order granting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the ordinance, and the parties agreed to submit the case on the pleadings and certain stipulated facts and documents. On March 9, 2007, the court issued its final disposition, holding that the ordinance was preempted by the Act. See Trial Court Order, dated 3/9/07. More specifically, the trial court concluded that the ordinance was inconsistent with the Act [152]*152because the ordinance “converts a specific intent offense into a strict liability one.” Trial Court Opinion, dated 3/9/07, at 9.
The City filed a timely appeal to the Commonwealth Court. On June 23, 2008, a divided Commonwealth Court issued its ruling in a published opinion, affirming in part and reversing in part. Holt’s Cigar Company, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 952 A.2d 1199 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (en banc).2 The Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s order insofar as it deemed preempted the ordinance provisions banning the sale of single or flavored cigars or other tobacco product. Id. at 1205-06. However, the Commonwealth Court further concluded that the ordinance’s provision banning the sale of certain tobacco products or other potential drug paraphernalia within 500 feet of a school or other community building was a zoning regulation, and hence was not preempted pursuant to the preemption clause of the Act. Id. at 1207-08; see text, infra.
Both parties petitioned this Court for allowance of appeal, and the petitions were granted and consolidated, with the City designated as Appellants and Cross-Appellees, and Holt’s Cigar designated as Cross-Appellants and Appellees. The sole issue was rephrased by this Court for clarity as follows:
Does the General Assembly’s inclusion of a scienter requirement in the crimes established by 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(33) preempt Philadelphia Code §§ 9-622(5)(a) and 9-629(2), which impose civil penalties for the sale of enumerated products without requiring a showing of seller’s intent?
Holt’s Cigar Company, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 601 Pa. 572, 975 A.2d 1081 (2009).
[153]*153This case presents a pure question of law, for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope is plenary. See Nutter v. Dougherty, 595 Pa. 340, 938 A.2d 401, 412 n. 20 (2007). We must first consider the source of authority under which Philadelphia may exercise self-governance.
Municipalities “possess only such powers of government as are expressly granted to them and as are necessary to carry the same into effect.” Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of the Borough of Oakmont, 600 Pa. 207, 964 A.2d 855, 862 (2009) (quoting City of Philadelphia v. Schweiker, 579 Pa. 591, 858 A.2d 75, 84 (2004)). As a city of the first class pursuant to the First Class City Home Rule Act,3 Philadelphia “may exercise all powers and authority of local self-government and shall have complete powers of legislation and administration in relation to its municipal functions.” 53 P.S. § 13131. Under the concept of home rule, the ability of a locality to exercise municipal functions is limited only by its home rule charter, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and enactments of the General Assembly. Schweiker, supra at 84; 53 Pa.C.S. § 2961. In addition, grants of municipal power to a home rule municipality are to be “liberally construed in favor of the municipality.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 2961. Thus, in analyzing a home rule municipality’s exercise of power, we resolve ambiguities in favor of the municipality. Nutter, supra at 411.
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OPINION
Justice McCAFFERY.
The issue presented in this case is whether a municipal ordinance regulating the sale of certain tobacco items and other potential drug paraphernalia is preempted by state law. We conclude that the ordinance is inconsistent with the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, and, accordingly, is preempted.
On January 23, 2007, the Philadelphia City Council enacted an ordinance to
[a]mend[ ] Chapter 9-600 of The Philadelphia Code, entitled “Service Businesses,” to add new provisions to prohibit the sale, from certain retail establishments, of “blunts,” “loosies,” cigarette papers, cigars and other items that may be otherwise legal but that are commonly used as drug paraphernalia, under certain terms and conditions.
City of Philadelphia Bill No. 060345-AAA, as amended on 11/30/06, at 1.
The ordinance was designed “to correct and control a[] growing trend among Philadelphia youth and others to purchase cigars, empty the tobacco from those cigars, and substitute marijuana and/or stronger illegal drugs into the cigar wrapping.” Memorandum of Law of the City of Philadelphia and Robert Solvibile in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for' a Preliminary Injunction, dated 2/21/07, at 2 (hereinafter “2/21/07 City Memorandum of Law”). To this end, the ordinance banned the sale of flavored cigars and other tobacco products that are preferred by illicit drug users as vehicles for smoking marijuana and other illegal drugs, and also banned the sale of cigars and other tobacco products in quantities of less than three. No mens rea provision was included in the [151]*151above ordinance; hence, the mere sale of the listed items constituted a violation, without regard to the seller’s intent or knowledge. In addition, the ordinance prohibited the sale of single or flavored tobacco products or of drug paraphernalia within 500 feet of a school, recreation center, day care center, church, or community center, “regardless of the intent as to use of the item.” Philadelphia Code §§ 9-622(5)(a) and 9-629(2); see also 2/21/07 City Memorandum of Law at 2-3. Violators of the ordinance were subject to a fine of up to $2,000, and to revocation of their business privilege license. Philadelphia Code §§ 9-622(6)(f) and 9-629(4).
On January 30, 2007, Holt’s Cigar Company and other tobacco retailers, manufacturers, and trade associations (hereinafter collectively “Holt’s Cigar”) challenged the ordinance by filing a complaint against the City of Philadelphia and Robert D. Solvibile, in his official capacity as acting commissioner of the Department of Licenses and Inspections (hereinafter the “City”). Holt’s Cigar sought, inter alia, a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the ordinance and a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was preempted by the drug paraphernalia provisions of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter the “Act”)1 which bars the delivery of drug paraphernalia under circumstances where the offender knew or reasonably should have known that the paraphernalia would be used to introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of the Act. See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(33). The trial court issued a consent order granting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the ordinance, and the parties agreed to submit the case on the pleadings and certain stipulated facts and documents. On March 9, 2007, the court issued its final disposition, holding that the ordinance was preempted by the Act. See Trial Court Order, dated 3/9/07. More specifically, the trial court concluded that the ordinance was inconsistent with the Act [152]*152because the ordinance “converts a specific intent offense into a strict liability one.” Trial Court Opinion, dated 3/9/07, at 9.
The City filed a timely appeal to the Commonwealth Court. On June 23, 2008, a divided Commonwealth Court issued its ruling in a published opinion, affirming in part and reversing in part. Holt’s Cigar Company, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 952 A.2d 1199 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (en banc).2 The Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s order insofar as it deemed preempted the ordinance provisions banning the sale of single or flavored cigars or other tobacco product. Id. at 1205-06. However, the Commonwealth Court further concluded that the ordinance’s provision banning the sale of certain tobacco products or other potential drug paraphernalia within 500 feet of a school or other community building was a zoning regulation, and hence was not preempted pursuant to the preemption clause of the Act. Id. at 1207-08; see text, infra.
Both parties petitioned this Court for allowance of appeal, and the petitions were granted and consolidated, with the City designated as Appellants and Cross-Appellees, and Holt’s Cigar designated as Cross-Appellants and Appellees. The sole issue was rephrased by this Court for clarity as follows:
Does the General Assembly’s inclusion of a scienter requirement in the crimes established by 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(33) preempt Philadelphia Code §§ 9-622(5)(a) and 9-629(2), which impose civil penalties for the sale of enumerated products without requiring a showing of seller’s intent?
Holt’s Cigar Company, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 601 Pa. 572, 975 A.2d 1081 (2009).
[153]*153This case presents a pure question of law, for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope is plenary. See Nutter v. Dougherty, 595 Pa. 340, 938 A.2d 401, 412 n. 20 (2007). We must first consider the source of authority under which Philadelphia may exercise self-governance.
Municipalities “possess only such powers of government as are expressly granted to them and as are necessary to carry the same into effect.” Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of the Borough of Oakmont, 600 Pa. 207, 964 A.2d 855, 862 (2009) (quoting City of Philadelphia v. Schweiker, 579 Pa. 591, 858 A.2d 75, 84 (2004)). As a city of the first class pursuant to the First Class City Home Rule Act,3 Philadelphia “may exercise all powers and authority of local self-government and shall have complete powers of legislation and administration in relation to its municipal functions.” 53 P.S. § 13131. Under the concept of home rule, the ability of a locality to exercise municipal functions is limited only by its home rule charter, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and enactments of the General Assembly. Schweiker, supra at 84; 53 Pa.C.S. § 2961. In addition, grants of municipal power to a home rule municipality are to be “liberally construed in favor of the municipality.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 2961. Thus, in analyzing a home rule municipality’s exercise of power, we resolve ambiguities in favor of the municipality. Nutter, supra at 411.
Notwithstanding the principle that a home rule municipality’s exercise of local authority is not lightly intruded upon, we have recently explained that there are three closely related forms of state preemption of local lawmaking authority. Nutter, supra at 404. In express preemption, “a statute specifically declares it has planted the flag of preemption in a field.” Id. (citing Department of Licenses and Inspections, Board of License and Inspection Review v. Weber, 394 Pa. 466, 147 A.2d 326, 327 (1959)). In field preemption, a “statute is silent on supersession, but proclaims a course of regulation [154]*154and control which brooks no municipal intervention.” Id. (citing Weber, supra).
Finally, pursuant to the doctrine of conflict preemption, which is the only form of preemption at issue in the instant case, a local ordinance that contradicts, contravenes, or is inconsistent with a state statute is invalid. Id.; Mars Emergency Medical Services, Inc. v. Township of Adams, 559 Pa. 309, 740 A.2d 193, 195 (1999) (citing Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Association v. City of Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 374, 77 A.2d 616, 620 (1951)). For conflict preemption to be applicable, the conflict between the statute and the ordinance must be irreconcilable. City Council of the City of Bethlehem v. Marcincin, 512 Pa. 1, 515 A.2d 1320, 1326 (1986). Further, the ordinance in question must be considered in light of the objectives of the General Assembly and the purposes of the relevant statute. A local ordinance may not stand as an obstacle to the execution of the full purposes and objectives of the Legislature. Huntley, supra at 863. But “it has long been the established general rule, in determining whether a conflict exists between a general and local law, that where the legislature has assumed to regulate a given course of conduct by prohibitory enactments, a municipal corporation with subordinate power to act in the matter may make such additional regulations in aid and furtherance of the purpose of the general law as may seem appropriate to the necessities of the particular locality and which are not in themselves unreasonable.” Mars Emergency, supra at 195 (citation omitted).
A relevant example of this Court’s invalidation of a local ordinance based on conflict preemption is Mazzo v. Board of Pensions and Retirement of the City of Philadelphia, 531 Pa. 78, 611 A.2d 193 (1992). The issue in Mazzo concerned the denial of pension benefits to public employees who had been charged with criminal misconduct related to public employment. Pursuant to the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act (PEPFA),4 public employees who have been charged with criminal conduct, but found not guilty, shall receive all their [155]*155pension benefits. Id. at 195 (citing 43 P.S. § 1313(b)). However, pursuant to the challenged City of Philadelphia ordinance, public employees who had been charged with criminal conduct were ineligible to receive their pension benefits unless they had been both restored to their position of employment and found not guilty of the charges. This Court held that there was “an obvious conflict” between the PEPFA and the city ordinance at issue. Id. at 195. We concluded that there was no indication in the PEPFA’s language that political subdivisions were free to impose further conditions upon the restoration of benefits than were mandated by the statute. Id. at 195-96. We recognized that, in enacting the PEPFA, the General Assembly sought to promote integrity in public employment by deterring criminal conduct. In addition, we recognized a second, implied objective of the General Assembly in enacting PEPFA, ie., to ensure that individuals who have accumulated pension savings are not unjustly deprived of this important property interest. In sum, in Mazzo, we held the city ordinance invalid because it was in “plain conflict with PEPFA’s directive that benefits be paid if the accused employee is not found guilty” of the charged criminal misconduct. Id. at 197. Mazzo is an example of a case in which the conflict between the state and local enactments was irreconcilable because the ordinance added an additional requirement, which was implicitly barred by the statute and which stood as an obstacle to one of the implied objectives of the legislature.
In other relevant precedents, this Court has held that a local ordinance was not preempted. In Marcincin, supra, the city ordinance at issue limited an incumbent mayor to two terms in office. Although the city had the authority to fix the term and tenure of city officials under the Third Class City Charter Law,5 the ordinance was challenged as in conflict with a section of the state Election Code providing that elected officers, including the mayor, “shall be eligible to reelection.” Marcincin, supra at 1321-23 and n. 1 (quoting 53 P.S. § 35701). Based on the text of the statute, we determined that the term “reelection” did not “connote[ ] an infinite [156]*156number of successive opportunities of election to the same municipal office.” Id. at 1323. Therefore, because the statute neither addressed the matter of term limits, nor barred the city from doing so, we concluded that the statute and the city ordinance did not irreconcilably conflict. Id. at 1321, 1326.
In two other cases, this Court upheld the validity of local ordinances imposing additional business regulations that were in excess of or in addition to the standards required by state law. In Department of Licenses and Inspections v. Weber, 394 Pa. 466, 147 A.2d 326, 327 (1959), the ordinance at issue was a section of the Philadelphia City Health Code that required beauty shops to have a city license and to meet safety and sanitation standards set by the city. A beauty shop owner challenged the ordinance, claiming that it was preempted by the Beauty Culture Act,6 which required state licensing of beauty shops and also set forth regulations relevant to safety of the patrons and cleanliness of the facility. This Court concluded that the ordinance was not preempted because it facilitated the purpose of the Beauty Culture Act by serving cleanliness, enhancing sanitation, and preserving health. Weber, supra at 330. Furthermore, rather than conflicting with the Beauty Culture Act, the ordinance supplemented the safety and health standards set forth in the statute, as illustrated in the following examples:
The State requires that floors be kept “in a clean and sanitary condition” [ ]; the City says they shall be free of cracks and holes and so constructed as to admit of rapid cleansing. The State grounds an operator who is knowingly suffering from a contagious or infectious disease; the City ... requires operators to submit to annual chest x-ray examinations, also to abstain from narcotics, and not to be under the influence of alcohol while administering treatments. The State says that tools shall be cleaned and sterilized, the City specifies the degree of heat and the content of chemical preparations to be used in the sterilizing process; etc., etc. Moreover, the City has added requirements not included in the State statute. Thus, beauty shops [157]*157must have certain lighting; they must be unhospitable to insects and rodents by the erection of barriers to their visits; operators must not smoke while serving patrons; equipment must be fireproof and asphyxiation-proof....
Weber, supra at 330.
Thus, because the regulations set forth in the ordinance promoted the protective purpose of and were not inconsistent with the Beauty Culture Act, we held that the ordinance was not preempted.
Weber’s holding relied on an earlier, similar case in which the ordinance in question was enacted by the city of Pittsburgh to regulate the operation of restaurants. Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Association v. City of Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 374, 77 A.2d 616 (1951). The title of the ordinance made clear that it was designed to “carry into effect in the City of Pittsburgh the provisions of the Act of Assembly of 1945, P.L. 926, to safeguard the public health within the [C]ity of Pittsburgh.” Restaurant Association, supra at 618 (quoting a portion of the title of the ordinance). The Restaurant Association challenged the ordinance, claiming, inter alia, that it was inconsistent with, and thus was preempted by the Act of 1945, P.L. 926, which had the same purpose and covered the same area as the ordinance. Restaurant Association, supra at 618.
In Restaurant Association, we reiterated the general principle that local municipalities “may regulate certain occupations by imposing restrictions which are in addition to, and not in conflict with, statutory regulations.” Id. at 620. We also noted that “sanitary standards and appropriate regulations in the case of restaurants in a large city ... no doubt are [ ] quite different from those applicable to rural communities, in view, among other conditions, of the unusually larger number of patrons and the congestion of buildings with consequent special problems of their construction and ventilation.” Id. We held that the ordinance was not preempted, except for some provisions that were contradictory to specific provisions of the statute. For example, we concluded that the statute [158]*158preempted the following provisions of the ordinance: penal provisions that were more drastic than those in the statute, and provisions that required fines to be paid to the city instead of, as in the statute, to the county. Thus, in Restaurant Association, we upheld the challenged ordinance, except with respect to those provisions that clearly and directly were inconsistent with and contradictory to the statute.
In the instant case, the challenged city ordinance provides as follows:
§ 9-622. Cigarettes and Tobacco Products.
(5) Retail Businesses
(a) It shall be unlawful for any retail business to sell or furnish by gift, purchase or other means any of the following:
(.1) any cigarette, cigar, tiparillo, cigarillo or other tobacco product, singly or in packages of fewer than three or other than in the package, box, carton or other container provided by the manufacturer, importer or packager which bears a health warning required by federal law, except that hotels, restaurants that seat at least 25 patrons, and specialty tobacco stores (as defined in Section 9-622(4)) may sell in small quantities cigars for which the retail price is at least one dollar ($1) per cigar;
(.2) cigar or cigarette rolling papers;
(.3) any tobacco item that can be considered “drug paraphernalia” under Section 9-629;
(.4) any flavored tobacco item including any flavored cigarette, cigar, tiparillo, cigarillo or other tobacco product, except that the term “tobacco product” shall not include a package of loose tobacco, snuff, chewing tobacco, dipping tobacco, or pipe tobacco, where the package is that provided by the manufacturer, importer or packager which bears a health warning required by federal law, and provided that this subsection (.4) shall not apply to cigarettes in packages of 20 or more included in the directory published pursuant [159]*159to Section 301 of the Pennsylvania Tobacco Product Manufacturer Directory Act, 35 P.S. Section 5702.301.
(6) Enforcement and Penalties
(f) ... any person who violates subsection 9-622(5) shall be subject to the following penalties:
(i) Any person who violates the provisions of subsection 9-622(5) shall be subjected to a fine of not less than three hundred dollars ($300) and not more than seven hundred dollars ($700) for each violation committed during calendar year 2005; ... nineteen hundred dollars ($1,900) for each violation committed during calendar year 2008; and two thousand dollars ($2,000) for each violation committed thereafter.
(ii) In addition to the penalties outlined above, the Department of Licenses and Inspections may revoke the business privilege license of any person violating the provisions of subsection 9-622(5).
§ 9-629. Drug Paraphernalia, Blunt Cigars, and Similar Items.
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person, including any retail business, to sell or offer for sale any of the following: (a) Any item that constitutes drug paraphernalia, as that term is defined in the Pennsylvania Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. § 780-102, where the seller knows, or under the circumstances reasonably should know, that it would be used to convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance in violation of that Act, especially any of the following:
(.1) Containers, bags, capsules, balloons, envelopes and other containers used, intended for use or designed for use in packaging small quantities of controlled substances, as well as cigars, cigarettes and related items intended for use in concealing or holding such substances;
[160]*160(.2) Objects used, intended for use or designed for use in ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing marihuana, cocaine, hashish or hashish oil into the human body, such as: (.a) Cigars sold singly, flavored cigars known as “blunts,” unflavored “blunts,” flavored and unflavored blunt wraps, cigarette rolling papers, cigarillos, and tiparillos;
(.b) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic or ceramic pipes with or without screens, permanent screens, hashish heads or punctured metal bowls;
(.c) Water pipes;
(.d) Carburetion tubes and devices;
(.f) Smoking and carburetion masks;
(.g) Roach clips; meaning objects used to hold burning material such as a marihuana cigarette that has become too small or too short to be held in the hand;
(.h) Chamber pipes;
(.i) Carburetor pipes;
(.j) Electric pipes;
(.k) Air-driven pipes;
(.1) Chillums;
(.m) Bongs;
(.n) Ice pipes or chillers;
(.o) Miniature cocaine spoons and cocaine vials;
(.p) Rose and pen combinations.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person, including any retail business, to sell or offer for sale -within five hundred (500) feet of a school, recreation center, day care center, church, or community center any of the items identified in either Section 9-622(5) or Section 9-629(1), regardless of the intent as to use of the item.
(4) Penalties
(a) In addition to the penalties as presently provided by law, any person in violation of this Section shall be subject [161]*161to a civil penalty of seven hundred dollars ($700) for each violation committed during calendar year 2005; ... nineteen hundred dollars ($1,900) for each violation committed during calendar year 2008; and two thousand dollars ($2,000) for each violation committed thereafter.
(b) In addition to the penalties outlined above, the Department of Licenses and Inspections may revoke the business privilege license of any person violating the provisions of this Section.
Philadelphia Code §§ 9-622 and 9-629 (emphasis added).
As previously noted, Sections 9-622(5)(a) and 9-629(2) include no mens rea element. Rather, the sale of certain tobacco products (§ 9-622(5)(a)), or the sale of a whole list of potential drug paraphernalia within 500 feet of a school or a variety of other community buildings (§ 9-629(2)), constitutes a violation of the ordinance regardless of the seller’s intent or knowledge.7
The delivery, which includes the sale, of drug paraphernalia has also been prohibited by the General Assembly through enactment of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. However, in contrast to the ordinance challenged in this appeal, the Act expressly and unmistakably sets forth a mens rea element, as follows:
(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:
(33) The delivery of, possession with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that it would be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce [162]*162into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this act.
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(33) (emphasis added).
The statutory definition of “drug paraphernalia” is as follows:
“Drug Paraphernalia” means all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this act. It includes, but is not limited to: [here follows a long list of potential drug paraphernalia, including scales, several chemicals, kitchen-type equipment as well as more specialized equipment, all sorts of containers, syringes and needles, various pipes].
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, a court or other authority should consider, in addition to all other logically relevant factors, [1] statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use, [2] prior convictions, if any, of an owner or of anyone in control of the object ..., [3] the proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this act, [4] the proximity of the object to controlled substances, [5] the existence of any residue of controlled substances on the object, [6] direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to deliver it to persons who he knows, or should reasonably know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation of this act, [7] the innocence of an owner or of anyone in control of the object, as to a direct violation of this act should not prevent a finding that the object is intended for use or designed for use as drug paraphernalia, [8] instructions, oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use, [9] descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its use, [10] national and local advertising [163]*163concerning its use, [11] the manner in which the object is displayed for sale, [12] whether the owner, or anyone in control of the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer of tobacco products, [13] direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the objects to the total sales of the business enterprise, [14] the existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object in the community, and [15] expert testimony concerning its use.
35 P.S. § 780-102 (emphases in second paragraph added).
Thus, whether an item is drug paraphernalia for purposes of the Act is a determination for the court, which should consider all relevant factors, including legitimate uses for the item; the intent of and statements by the item’s owner; how the item is displayed for sale; and whether the owner is a legitimate supplier, such as a licensed distributor or dealer of tobacco products.8 The Act recognizes that some drug paraphernalia have legitimate as well as illegitimate uses, and, in contrast to the ordinance, one of the Act’s implicit objectives is to not penalize those who sell dual-use items for legitimate uses.
Finally, by the inclusion of an explicit savings clause, the Act makes clear that it does not preempt all local enactments; it preempts only those that are inconsistent:
Nothing in this act relating to drug paraphernalia shall be deemed to supersede or invalidate any consistent local ordinance, including zoning and nuisance ordinances, relating to the possession, sale or use of drug paraphernalia.
35 P.S. § 780-141.1 (emphasis added).
Thus, the General Assembly’s intent was not to occupy the entire field with the Act; rather, it was to allow consistent [164]*164local ordinances relating to the possession, sale, or use of drug paraphernalia. The question before us is whether the challenged ordinance is consistent or irreconcilably conflicts with the Act. A seller of a dual-use item violates the Act only if he or she knows or reasonably should know that the dual-use item is to be used for an illegal, drug-related purpose. In contrast, a seller of certain dual-use items violates the ordinance by merely engaging in the sale, with no consideration as to whether the item was sold for a legitimate use or for an illegal, drug-related purpose, and no consideration of the seller’s state of mind or intent.
The presence of a mens rea element in the statute and the absence of a mens rea element in the ordinance for the same proscribed conduct, ie., selling certain dual-use items, constitute an irreconcilable conflict between the two enactments. Although the ordinance does not stand as an obstacle to the primary purpose of the Act, ie., to decrease the unauthorized use of controlled substances, the ordinance does contradict an implied objective of the Act to protect those who sell dual-use items for legitimate purposes.9 Similar to the ordinance in Mazzo, supra, and to limited portions of the ordinance in Restaurant Association, supra, the ordinance here is inconsistent with the state enactment, and the ordinance is thus preempted.
[165]*165The City argues that there is no conflict between the Act and the ordinance because the former provides for criminal penalties and the latter is a civil statute. We do not agree. Our focus is directed toward the particular conduct proscribed by the Act and by the ordinance; the nature or severity of the penalties imposed is not determinative and does not eliminate the conflict arising from the discrepancy with respect to mens rea for a particular course of proscribed conduct.
The City further suggests that the General Assembly was simply silent as to the possible imposition of per se liability for the delivery of dual-use items. The City argues that, pursuant to Nutter, supra, such silence should not be interpreted as a legislative intent to prohibit local regulation of the sale of dual-use items in a manner free of a scienter requirement. See Nutter, supra at 403, 409-10 & n. 19, 413-14, 416 (declining to conclude that local regulation of campaign contributions to candidates for municipal office was preempted by the Election Code,10 where the General Assembly was silent as to statewide contribution limits). Again, we cannot agree with the City, and we conclude that Nutter is inapposite. With regard to offenses involving delivery of drug paraphernalia, the General Assembly was far from silent as to the mens rea element. The Act expressly requires that an offender know or reasonably should know that the drug paraphernalia would be used in conjunction with a controlled substance in violation of the Act; thus, a seller of a dual-use item for legitimate purposes is protected from any penalty under the Act.
Thus, in sum, we affirm the Commonwealth Court’s holding insofar as it concluded that Section 9-622(5)(a) was preempted by the Controlled Substances Act; however, we reverse the Commonwealth Court’s holding with regard to Section 9-629(2). Our conflict preemption analysis applies equally to Sections 9-622(5)(a) and 9-629(2), and both are preempted under the same rationale.11
[166]*166Based on the foregoing analysis, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Justices EAKIN and BAER join the opinion.
Justice SAYLOR files a concurring opinion.
Chief Justice CASTILLE files a dissenting opinion in which Justices TODD and ORIE MELVIN join.