Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa

439 U.S. 60, 99 S. Ct. 383, 58 L. Ed. 2d 292, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 141, 26 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 635

Opinions

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Holt is a small, largely rural, unincorporated community located on the northeastern outskirts of Tuscaloosa, the fifth largest city in Alabama. Because the community is within the three-mile police jurisdiction circumscribing Tuscaloosa’s corporate limits, its residents are subject to the city’s “police [and] sanitary regulations.” Ala. Code § 11-40-10 (1975).¹ Holt residents are also subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the city’s court, Ala. Code § 12-14-1 (1975),² and to the city’s power to license businesses, trades, and professions, Ala. Code § 11-51-91 (1975).³ Tuscaloosa, however, may collect from businesses in the police jurisdiction only one-half of the license fee chargeable to similar businesses conducted within the corporate limits. Ibid.

In 1973 appellants, an unincorporated civic association and seven individual residents of Holt, brought this statewide class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama,'⁴ challenging the constitutionality of these Alabama statutes. They claimed that the city’s extraterritorial exercise of police powers over Holt residents, without a concomitant extension of the franchise on an equal footing with those residing within the corporate limits, denies resi dents of the police jurisdiction rights secured by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court denied appellants’ request to convene a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.) and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Characterizing the Alabama statutes as enabling Acts, the District Court held that the statutes lack the requisite statewide application necessary to convene a three-judge District Court. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered the convening of a three-judge court, finding that the police jurisdiction statute embodies “ ‘a policy of statewide concern.’ ” Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 525 F. 2d 653, 655 (1975), quoting Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89, 94 (1935).

A three-judge District Court was convened, but appellants’ constitutional claims fared no better on the merits. Noting that appellants sought a declaration that extraterritorial regulation is unconstitutional per se rather than an extension of the franchise to police jurisdiction residents, the District Court held simply that “[e]qual protection has not been extended to cover such contention.” App. to Juris. Statement 2a. The court rejected appellants’ due process claim without comment. Accordingly, appellees’ motion to dismiss was granted.

Unsure whether appellants’ constitutional attack on the Alabama statutes satisfied the requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.) for convening a three-judge district court, we postponed consideration of the jurisdictional issue until the hearing of the case on the merits. 435 U. S. 914 (1978). We now conclude that the three-judge court was properly convened and that appellants’ constitutional claims were properly rejected.

I

Before its repeal,⁵ 28 U. S. C. §2281 (1970 ed.) required that a three-judge district court be convened in any case in which a preliminary or permanent injunction was sought to restrain “the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute . . . .” Our decisions have interpreted § 2281 to require the convening of a three-judge district court “where the challenged statute or regulation, albeit created or authorized by a state legislature, has statewide application or effectuates a statewide policy.” Board of Regents v. New Left Education Project, 404 U. S. 541, 542 (1972). Relying on Moody v. Flowers, 387 U. S. 97 (1967), appellees contend, and the original single-judge District Court held, that Alabama's police jurisdiction statutes lack statewide impact.

A three-judge court was improperly convened in Moody because the challenged state statutes had “limited application, concerning only a particular county involved in the litigation . . . .” Id., at 104. In contrast, appellants’ constitutional attack focuses upon a state statute that creates the statewide system under which Alabama cities exercise extraterritorial powers. In mandatory terms, the statute provides that municipal police and sanitary ordinances “shall have force and effect in the limits of the city or town and in the police jurisdiction thereof and on any property or rights-of-way belonging to the city or town.” ⁶ Clearly, Alabama’s police jurisdiction statutes have statewide application. See, e. g., Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U. S. 105, 107 (1967). That the named defendants are local officials is irrelevant where, as here, those officials are “functioning pursuant to a statewide policy and performing a state function.” Moody v. Flowers, supra, at 102; Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, supra, at 94-95. The convening of a three-judge District Court was proper.

II

Appellants’ amended complaint requested the District Court to declare the Alabama statutes unconstitutional and to enjoin their enforcement insofar as they authorize the extraterritorial exercise of municipal powers. Seizing on the District Court’s observation that “ [appellants] do not seek extension of the franchise to themselves,” appellants suggest that their complaint was dismissed because they sought the wrong remedy.

The unconstitutional predicament in which appellants assertedly found themselves could be remedied in only two ways: (1) the city’s extraterritorial power could be negated by invalidating the State’s authorizing statutes or (2) the right to vote in municipal elections could be extended to residents of the police jurisdiction. We agree with appellants that a federal court should not dismiss a meritorious constitutional claim because the complaint seeks one remedy rather than another plainly appropriate one. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.” Rule 54(c). Thus, although the prayer for relief may be looked to for illumination when there is doubt as to the substantive theory under which a plaintiff is proceeding, its omissions are not in and of themselves a barrier to redress of a meritorious claim. See, e. g., 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart, & J. Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 54.62, pp. 1261-1265 (2d ed. 1976). But while a meritorious claim will not be rejected for want of a prayer for appropriate relief, a claim lacking substantive merit obviously should be rejected. We think it is clear from the pleadings in this case that appellants have alleged no claim cognizable under the United States Constitution.

A

Appellants focus their equal protection attack on § 11-40-10, the statute fixing the limits of municipal police jurisdiction and giving extraterritorial effect to municipal police and sanitary ordinances. Citing Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U. S. 621 (1969), and cases following in its wake, appellants argue that the section creates a classification infringing on their right to participate in municipal elections. The State’s denial of the franchise to police jurisdiction residents, appellants urge, can stand only if justified by a compelling state interest.

At issue in Kramer was a New York voter qualification statute that limited the vote in school district elections to otherwise qualified district residents who (1) either owned or leased taxable real property located within the district, (2) were married to persons owning or leasing qualifying property, or (3) were parents or guardians of children enrolled in a local district school for a specified time during the preceding year. Without deciding whether or not a State may in some circumstances limit the franchise to residents primarily interested in or primarily affected by the activities of a given governmental unit, the Court held that the statute was not sufficiently tailored to meet that state interest since its classifications excluded many bona fide residents of the school district who had distinct and direct interests in school board decisions and included many residents whose interests in school affairs were, at best, remote and indirect.

On the same day, in Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (1969), the Court upheld an equal protection challenge to a Louisiana law providing that only "property taxpayers” could vote in elections called to approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility system. Operation of the utility system affected virtually every resident of the city, not just property owners, and the bonds were in no way financed by property tax revenue. Thus, since the benefits and burdens of the bond issue fell indiscriminately on property owner and nonproperty owner alike, the challenged classification impermissibly excluded otherwise qualified residents who were substantially affected by and directly interested in the matter put to a referendum. The rationale of Cipriano was subsequently called upon to invalidate an Arizona law restricting the franchise to property taxpayers in elections to approve the issuance of general obligation municipal bonds. Phoenix v. Kolodsiejski, 399 U. S. 204 (1970).

Appellants also place heavy reliance on Evans v. Cornman, 398 U. S. 419 (1970). In Evans the Permanent Board of Registry of Montgomery County, Md., ruled that persons living on the grounds of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a federal enclave located within the geographical boundaries of the State, did not meet the residency requirement of the Maryland Constitution. Accordingly, NIH residents were denied the right to vote in Maryland elections. This Court rejected the notion that persons living on NIH grounds were not residents of Maryland:

“Appellees clearly live within the geographical boundaries of the State of Maryland, and they are treated as state residents in the census and in determining congressional apportionment. They are not residents of Maryland only if the NIH grounds ceased to be a part of Maryland when the enclave was created. However, that 'fiction of a state within a state’ was specifically rejected by this Court in Howard v. Commissioners of Louisville, 344 U. S. 624, 627 (1953), and it cannot be resurrected here to deny appellees the right to vote.” Id., at 421-422.

Thus, because inhabitants of the NIH enclave were residents of Maryland and were "just as interested in and connected with electoral decisions as they were prior to 1953 when the area came under federal jurisdiction and as their neighbors who live off the enclave,” id., at 426, the State could not deny them the equal right to vote in Maryland elections.

From these and our other voting qualifications cases a common characteristic emerges: The challenged statute in each case denied the franchise to individuals who were physically resident within the geographic boundaries of the governmental entity concerned. See, e. g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U. S. 289 (1975) (invalidating provision of the Texas Constitution restricting franchise on general obligation bond issue to residents who had “rendered” or listed real, mixed, dr personal property for taxation in the election district); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966) (invalidating Virginia statute conditioning the right to vote of otherwise qualified residents on payment of a poll tax); cf. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970) (invalidating Georgia statute restricting county school board membership to residents owning real property in the county). No decision of this Court has extended the “one man, one vote” principle to individuals residing beyond the geographic confines of the governmental entity concerned, be it the State or its political subdivisions. On the contrary, our cases have uniformly recognized that a government unit may legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political processes to those who reside within its borders. See, e. g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343-344 (1972); Evans v. Comman, supra, at 422; Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U. S., at 625; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 91 (1965); Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621 (1904). Bona fide residence alone, however, does not automatically confer the right to vote on all matters, for at least in the context of special interest elections the State may constitutionally disfranchise residents who lack the required special interest in the subject matter of the election. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U. S. 719 (1973); Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U. S. 743 (1973).

Appellants’ argument that extraterritorial extension of municipal powers requires concomitant extraterritorial extension of the franchise proves too much. The imaginary line defining a city’s corporate limits cannot corral the influence of municipal actions. A city’s decisions inescapably affect individuals living immediately outside its borders. The granting of building permits for high rise apartments, industrial plants, and the like on the city’s fringe unavoidably contributes to problems of traffic congestion, school districting, and law enforcement immediately outside the city. A rate change in the city’s sales or ad valorem tax could well have a significant impact on retailers and property values in areas bordering the city. The condemnation of real property on the city’s edge for construction of a municipal garbage dump or waste treatment plant would have obvious implications for neighboring nonresidents. Indeed, the indirect extraterritorial effects of many purely internal municipal actions could conceivably have a heavier impact on surrounding environs than the direct regulation contemplated by Alabama’s police jurisdiction statutes. Yet no one would suggest that nonresidents likely to be affected by this sort of municipal action have a constitutional right to participate in the political processes bringing it about. And unless one adopts the idea that the Austinian notion of sovereignty, which is presumably embodied to some extent in the authority of a city over a police jurisdiction, distinguishes the direct effects of limited municipal powers over police jurisdiction residents from the indirect though equally dramatic extraterritorial effects of purely internal municipal actions, it makes little sense to say that one requires extension of the franchise while the other does not.

Given this country’s tradition of popular sovereignty, appellants’ claimed right to vote in Tuscaloosa elections is not without some logical appeal. We are mindful, however, of Mr. Justice Holmes’ observation in Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 355 (1908):

“All rights tend to declare themselve absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached. . . . The boundary at which the conflicting interests balance cannot be determined by any general formula in advance, but points in the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side.”

The line heretofore marked by this Court’s voting qualifications decisions coincides with the geographical boundary of the governmental unit at issue, and we hold that appellants’ case, like their homes, falls on the farther side.

B

Thus stripped of its voting rights attire, the equal protection issue presented by appellants becomes whether the Alabama statutes giving extraterritorial force to certain municipal ordinances and powers bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). “The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit legislation merely be cause it is special, or limited in its application to a particular geographical or political subdivision of the state.” Fort Smith Light Co. v. Paving Dist., 274 U. S. 387, 391 (1927). Rather, the Equal Protection Clause is offended only if the statute’s classification “rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425 (1961); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U. S. 552, 556 (1947).

Government, observed Mr. Justice Johnson, “is the science of experiment,” Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 226 (1821), and a State is afforded wide leeway when experimenting with the appropriate allocation of state legislative power. This Court has often recognized that political subdivisions such as cities and counties are created by the State “as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them.” Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161, 178 (1907). See also, e. g., Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U. S., at 108; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 575 (1964). In Hunter v. Pittsburgh, the Court discussed at length the relationship between a State and its political subdivisions, remarking: “The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon [municipal] corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State.” 207 U. S., at 178. While the broad statements as to state control over municipal corporations contained in Hunter have undoubtedly been qualified by the holdings of later cases such as Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., supra, we think that the case continues to have substantial constitutional significance in emphasizing the extraordinarily wide latitude that States have in creating various types of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon them.⁷

The extraterritorial exercise of municipal powers is a governmental technique neither recent in origin nor unique to the State of Alabama. See R. Maddox, Extraterritorial Powers of Municipalities in the United States (1955). In this country 35 States authorize their municipal subdivisions to exercise governmental powers beyond their corporate limits. Comment, The Constitutionality of the Exercise of Extraterritorial Powers by Municipalities, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 151 (1977). Although the extraterritorial municipal powers granted by these States vary widely, several States grant their cities more extensive or intrusive powers over bordering areas than those granted under the Alabama statutes.⁸

In support of their .equal protection claim, appellants suggest a number of “constitutionally preferable” governmental alternatives to Alabama's system of municipal police jurisdictions. For example, exclusive management of the police jurisdiction by county officials, appellants maintain, would be more “practical.” From a political science standpoint, appellants’ suggestions may be sound, but this Court does not sit to determine whether Alabama has chosen the soundest or most practical form of internal government possible. Authority to make those judgments resides in the state legislature, and Alabama citizens are free to urge their proposals to that body. See, e. g., Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S., at 179. Our inquiry is limited to the question whether “any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify” Alabama's system of police jurisdictions, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U. S., at 732, and in this case it takes but momentary reflection to arrive at an affirmative answer.

The Alabama Legislature could have decided that municipal corporations should have some measure of control over activities carried on just beyond their “city limit” signs, particularly since today’s police jurisdiction may be tomorrow’s annexation to the city proper. Nor need the city’s interests have been the only concern of the legislature when it enacted the police jurisdiction statutes. Urbanization of any area brings with it a number of individuals who long both for the quiet of suburban or country living and for the career opportunities offered by the city’s working environment. Unincorporated communities like Holt dot the rim of most major population centers in Alabama and elsewhere, and state legislatures have a legitimate interest in seeing that this substantial segment of the population does not go without basic municipal services such as police, fire, and health protection. Established cities are experienced in the delivery of such services, and the incremental cost of extending the city’s responsibility in these areas to surrounding environs may be substantially less than the expense of establishing wholly new service organizations in each community.

Nor was it unreasonable for the Alabama Legislature to require police jurisdiction residents to contribute through license fees to the expense of services provided them by the city. The statutory limitation on license fees to half the amount exacted within the city assures that police jurisdiction residents will not be victimized by the city government.

“Viable local governments may need many innovations, numerous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal arrangements to meet changing urban conditions.” Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U. S., at 110-111. This observation in Sailors was doubtless as true at the turn of this century, when urban areas throughout the country were temporally closer to the effects of the industrial revolution. Alabama’s police jurisdiction statute, enacted in 1907, was a rational legislative response to the problems faced by the State’s burgeoning cities. Alabama is apparently content with the results of its experiment, and nothing in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that it try something new.

C

Appellants also argue that “governance without the franchise is a fundamental violation of the due process clause.” Brief for Appellants 28. Support for this proposition is alleged to come from United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234 (WD Tex.) (three-judge District Court), summarily aff’d, 384 U. S. 155 (1966), which held that conditioning the franchise of otherwise qualified voters on payment of a poll tax denied due process to many Texas voters. Appellants’ argument proceeds from the assumption, earlier shown to be erroneous, supra, at 66-70, that they have a right to vote in Tuscaloosa elections. Their conclusion falls with their premise.

Ill

In sum, we conclude that Alabama’s police jurisdiction statutes violate neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

Footnotes

1

The full text of § 11-40-10 provides:

“The police jurisdiction in cities having 6,000 or more inhabitants shall cover all adjoining territory within three miles of the corporate limits, and in cities having less than 6,000 inhabitants and in towns, such police jurisdiction shall extend also to the adjoining territory within a mile and a half of the corporate limits of such city or town.

“Ordinances of a city or town enforcing police or sanitary regulations and prescribing fines and penalties for violations thereof shall have force and effect in the limits of the city or town and in the police jurisdiction thereof and on any property or rights-of-way belonging to the city or town.”

2

“The municipal court shall have jurisdiction of all prosecutions for the breach of the ordinances of the municipality within its police jurisdiction.” Ala. Code § 12-14^1 (b) (1975).

3

In pertinent part § 11-51-91 provides:

“Any city or town within the state of Alabama may fix and collect licenses for any business, trade or profession done within the police jurisdiction of such city or town but outside the corporate limits thereof; provided, that the amount of such licenses shaE not be more than one half the amount charged and collected as a license for like business, trade or profession done within the corporate limits of such city or town, fees and penalties excluded . . . .”

Although not at issue here, Ala. Code § 11-52-8 (1975) imposes a duty on the municipal planning commission “to make and adopt a master plan for the physical development of the municipality, including any areas outside of its boundaries which, in the commission’s judgment, bear relation to the planning of such municipality.” Under Ala. Code §§ 11-52-30 and 11-52-31 (1975), also not contested here, the municipal planning commission is required to adopt regulations governing the subdivision of land within its jurisdiction, which includes all land lying within five miles of the municipality’s corporate limits and not located within the corporate limits of any other municipality.

4

This suit was instituted prior to the 1975 recompilation of the Alabama Code. Other than minor stylistic changes, § 11-40-10 and § 11-51-91 are identical to their predecessors, Ala. Code, Tit. 37, §§ 9 and 733 (1958) respectively. Section 12-14-1 abolished the recorder’s courts created under is predecessor, Ala. Code, Tit. 37, §585 (1958), and replaced them with municipal courts having similar extraterritorial jurisdiction.

5

Pub. L. 94-381, § 1, Aug. 12,1976, 90 Stat. 1119.

6

Ala. Code § 11-40-10 (1975) (emphasis added). The Alabama Supreme Court has recognized the mandatory nature of § 11-40-10. In City of Leeds v. Town of Moody, 294 Ala. 496, 319 So. 2d 242 (1975), the court rejected the contention that the city of Leeds had, by discontinuing police and fire protection in its police jurisdiction, “waived and relinquished its police jurisdiction over the area.” Id., at 502, 319 So. 2d, at 246. “Since a municipality cannot barter away a governmental power specifically delegated to it by the legislature, ... it follows that it also cannot waive or relinquish such power.” Ibid. See also Trailway OH Co. v. Mobile, 271 Ala. 218, 224, 122 So. 2d 757, 762 (1960) (“[Section] 9 of Title 37 [now § 11-40-10], describing the territorial extent of the municipal police jurisdiction and the incidents thereof, and § 733 of Title 37 [now § 11-51-91], as amended, authorizing and regulating the fixing and collecting of licenses within the police jurisdiction of cities and towns, are general laws, and, as such, they are considered part of every municipal charter”); Coursey v. City of Andalusia, 24 Ala. App. 247, 247-248, 134 So. 671 (1931) (“Under the statute [§ 11-40-10] the police jurisdiction extends to all the adjoining territory within a mile and a half of the corporate limits of said city, and . . . ordinances of the city enforcing police or sanitary regulations . . . have force and effect not only in the limits of the city, but also in the police jurisdiction thereof”).

7

In this case residents of the police jurisdiction are excluded only from participation in municipal elections since they reside outside of Tuscaloosa’s corporate limits. This “denial of the franchise,” as appellants put it, does not have anything like the far-reaching consequences of the denial of the franchise in Evans v. Cornman, 398 U. S. 419 (1970). There the Court pointed out that “[i]n nearly every election, federal, state, and local, for offices from the Presidency to the school board, and on the entire variety of other ballot propositions, appellees have a stake equal to that of other Maryland residents.” Id., at 426. Treatment of the plaintiffs in Evans as nonresidents of Maryland had repercussions not merely with respect to their right to vote in city elections, but with respect to their right to vote in national, state, school board, and referendum elections.

8

Municipalities in some States have almost unrestricted governmental powers over surrounding unincorporated territories. For example, South Dakota cities

“have power to exercise jurisdiction for all authorized purposes over all territory within the corporate limits . . . and in and over all plaees, except within the corporate limits of another municipality, within one mile of the corporate limits or of any public ground or park belonging to the municipality outside the corporate limits, for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community, and of enforcing its ordinances and resolutions relating thereto.” S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 9-29-1 (1967).

North Dakota’s statutory grant of extraterritorial municipal powers is similarly broad:

“Except as otherwise provided by law, a governing body of a municipality shall have jurisdiction:

“2. In and over all places within one-half mile of the municipal limits for the purpose of enforcing health and quarantine ordinances and regulations and police regulations and ordinances adopted to promote the peace, order, safety, and general welfare of the municipality.” N. D. Cent. Code §40-06-01 (2) (1968).

Cities in many States are statutorily authorized to zone extraterritorially, see, e. g., Ariz. Rev. -Stat. Ann. § 9-240-B-21 (c) (1977); Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.36 (1970); N. D. Cent. Code § 11-35-02 (1976), a power not afforded Alabama municipalities. See Roberson v. City of Montgomery, 285 Ala. 421, 233 So. 2d 69 (1970).

By setting forth these various state provisions respecting extraterritorial powers of cities, we do not mean to imply that every one of them would pass constitutional muster. We do not have before us, of course, a situation in which a city has annexed outlying territory in all but name, and is exercising precisely the same governmental powers over residents of surrounding unincorporated territory as it does over those residing within its corporate limits. See Little Thunder v. South Dakota, 518 F. 2d 1253 (CA8 1975). Nor do we have here a case like Evans v. Cornman, swpra, where NIH residents were subject to such “important aspects of state powers” as Maryland’s authority “to levy and collect [its] income, gasoline, sales, and use taxes” and were “just as interested in and connected with electoral decisions as . . . their neighbors who live[d] off the enclave.” 398 U. S., at 423, 424, 426.

Appellants have made neither an allegation nor a showing that the authority exercised by the city of Tuscaloosa within the police jurisdiction is no less than that exercised by the city within its corporate limits. The minute catalog of ordinances of the city of Tuscaloosa which have extraterritorial effect set forth by our dissenting Brethren, post, at 82-84, n. 10, is as notable for what it does not include as for what it does. While the burden was on appellants to establish a difference in treatment violative of the Equal Protection Clause, we are bound to observe that among the powers not included in the “addendum” to appellants’ brief referred to by the dissent are the vital and traditional authorities of cities and towns to levy ad valorem taxes, invoke the power of eminent domain, and zone property for various types of uses.