Hogans v. State

176 S.W.3d 829, 2005 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1960, 2005 WL 2991486

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 9, 2005
• Docket: PD-1932-04
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

COCHRAN, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court

in which PRICE, WOMACK, KEASLER, HERVEY and HOLCOMB, JJ., joined.

In this case we hold that a court of appeals has jurisdiction to consider the merits of a claim that temporally arises before the act of adjudication if the claim directly and distinctly relates to punishment rather than to the decision to adjudicate.¹ However, because appellant raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that relates to the decision to adjudicate, it was properly dismissed on jurisdictional grounds by the court of appeals.²

I.

Appellant was originally charged with the felony offense of aggravated assault after he pulled a gun on a driver he had rear-ended. He entered a no contest plea to the charge. The trial court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed him on community supervision for seven years.

Five years later, appellant was involved in a pair of auto accidents with Cordell Roberts. The State filed a motion to adjudicate based on three alleged violations of his community supervision conditions: assault of Cordell Roberts; failure to report to his community supervision officer; and failure to pay supervision fees. The State offered evidence on all three counts, but most of the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing related to the assault.

At the adjudication hearing, Cordell Roberts testified that appellant rear-ended his car as Mr. Roberts, with two female friends, pulled out of a Jack-in-the-Box restaurant. When appellant got out of his car, came up to Mr. Roberts and threatened to kill him, Mr. Roberts drove off in fear. Appellant followed him and rear-ended him again, this time “on purpose.” Appellant again approached Mr. Roberts and again threatened him, screaming, “I’m going to whip your ass.” Appellant reached inside Mr. Roberts’s car and removed the keys from the car’s ignition. Appellant then pulled Mr. Roberts out of his car, threw him against the car, and punched him in the jaw.

Appellant also testified at the adjudication hearing. He said that he had just picked up his two children at school when Mr. Roberts pulled out of a parking lot, hit appellant’s car, and then fled the scene. Appellant followed him to get his license plate number. When Roberts made a sudden U-turn, appellant tried to avoid hitting him but his car’s brakes locked. Appellant testified that after this second collision, he walked up and reached into Roberts’s car to grab his keys to prevent Roberts from fleeing again. Appellant said that Roberts followed him as appellant walked back to his own car. Roberts tried to grab his keys back, but when appellant resisted, Roberts punched him in the head. Appellant then hit back in self-defense.

Other defense witnesses testified that appellant did not appear angry after the car wreck, that he was worried about his kids in his car, and that he had asked that the police be called.

Defense counsel also called appellant’s children (ten-year-old Jerron and eight-year-old Kieara) to testify during the adjudication hearing. Both children testified that appellant punched Roberts, but that Roberts never hit appellant.³

At the end of the adjudication hearing, the trial judge found “not true” on the failure to pay allegation, and “true” on the failure to report and assault allegations. In adjudicating appellant on the original aggravated assault charge, the trial judge said that he found the assault allegation to be the more important violation, in part because appellant “put his own children in high risk.” After adjudicating appellant’s guilt, the trial judge began the sentencing hearing.

During the sentencing hearing, Raynard Fontenot testified about the original “road rage” incident for which appellant had been placed on deferred adjudication. Mr. Fontenot testified that the traffic was bumper-to-bumper on Richmond Avenue in Houston when appellant ran into him at a very slow speed. Mr. Fontenot got out of his car to see what the damage was. Appellant also got out of his car, with his hand behind his back. When Mr. Fonte-not asked appellant what he had in his hand, appellant pulled out a gun, walked toward Mr. Fontenot, and put the gun to his neck. The two exchanged a few words, and then, when a police officer walked up, appellant fled.

The state closed its punishment case, and the defense put on three witnesses who all testified that they thought appellant was still a good candidate for regular probation.

Appellant appealed his conviction on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the adjudication hearing when his attorney called his children to testify — an error which he alleged also affected his rights in the punishment phase. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating, in part, that “[a]n appeal may only be taken from the proceedings occurring after the adjudication of guilt, such as assessment of punishment.”⁴

n.

Under Article 42.12, Section 5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the defendant violates a condition of deferred-adjudication community supervision, he is entitled to a hearing “limited to the determination by the court of whether it proceeds with an adjudication of guilty on the original charge. No appeal may be taken from this determination.”⁵ The Texas Legislature has decreed that the courts of appeals do not have jurisdiction to consider claims relating to the trial court’s determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge.⁶ Thus, if an appeal raises a claim of purported error in the adjudication of guilt determination, a court of appeals should dismiss that claim without reaching the merits.⁷

However, that same statute continues: “After an adjudication of guilt, all proceedings, including assessment of punishment, pronouncement of sentence, granting of community supervision, and defendant’s appeal continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred.”⁸ In Issa v. State⁹ we held that when “a trial court finds that an accused has committed a violation as alleged by the State and adjudicates a previously deferred finding of guilt, the court must then conduct a second phase to determine punishment.”¹⁰

Thus, the defendant is entitled to a punishment hearing after the adjudication of guilt, and the trial judge “must allow the accused the opportunity to present evidence” in mitigation of punishment.¹¹ In later cases, however, we decided that this requirement is satisfied as long as the defendant has an opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of guilt, either before or after adjudication.¹² For example, we stated in Pearson v. State, “It is immaterial that the opportunity to present evidence came before the actual words of adjudication.”¹³

Thus, “although an appellant cannot appeal the trial court’s decision to adjudicate guilt, an appellant sentenced under a guilty plea agreement can appeal aspects of the ‘second phase to determine punishment.’ ”¹⁴ Consequently, while a defendant may not raise on direct appeal a claim of ineffective assistance (or even an absence) of counsel that allegedly occurred at the proceeding to adjudicate guilt,¹⁵ he may raise on direct appeal a claim of ineffective assistance that allegedly occurred at the punishment proceeding.¹⁶

The question remains: when mitigation or other punishment evidence is presented before adjudication, is it still “second phase” evidence that may be the subject of an appeal? The State argues that the answer is no — nothing that occurs before adjudication can be appealed because of the Section 5(b) rule that prohibits an appeal from a trial court’s determination to adjudicate guilt on the original charge. Appellant, on the other hand, argues that “anything that contributes to punishment must be reviewed, even if it happened during the adjudication hearing.”

Both of these positions are too extreme. As good advocates, both the State and the defense seek a touchdown, but the law lies on the fifty-yard line. As to the State’s position: if a defendant is not absolutely entitled to a separate sentencing hearing from which he may appeal punishment issues, then his right to appeal should not be thwarted by rolling the adjudication and sentencing hearings into one, thereby denying him an appeal of all aspects of the punishment evidence or procedures. At least in the context of combined adjudication-sentencing hearings, evidence and procedures that relate directly and distinctly to the sentence imposed are cognizable on direct appeal even when the events themselves occur before the magic words, “I find you guilty.”

On the other hand, appellant’s position proves too much; all evidence or procedures “contribute” to punishment, at least in the sense that, but for the decision to adjudicate, there would be no punishment to assess.¹⁷ The fact that a defendant may appeal sentencing claims that temporally occur during adjudication “proceedings” does not give an appellate court jurisdiction to consider any issue framed as a punishment issue.¹⁸ Rather, the asserted error must directly and distinctly concern the second phase; the claim must, on its face, relate to the sentence imposed, not to the decision to adjudicate. Any other rule would eviscerate the Section 5(b) bar on direct appeals of the decision to adjudicate. Appellant’s proposed rule— that any error occurring during the adjudication hearing which can be shown to have affected punishment is cognizable — does just that.

III.

In appellant’s case, the adjudication and punishment hearings were separate, and the allegation of ineffectiveness was rooted in counsel’s actions at the adjudication hearing. Appellant claims that his trial counsel’s act of calling his children to testify was constitutionally deficient assistance because the children contradicted appellant’s version of events. Appellant argues that the “ineffectiveness extended to the punishment the court assessed, which was demonstrated by the fact that the court referred to the defense’s own evidence just before sentencing appellant to imprisonment, when he was eligible for community supervision.” In sentencing appellant, the court stated,

Well, besides your technical alleged violations and the one I found, which is not significant enough to revoke or adjudicate, I would not have done it on the technical reporting; but you come in here on a case from May the 7th, 2003, where you do have your two minor children in the car, Kieara and [Jerron]. You have a minor fender bender. And I’m not concerned about whose fault it was; but the way you reacted. You took out after the guy, and by your own testimony, and Defense Exhibit 1 and 2, it was a major collision. It appears that was a rear-end collision. It wasn’t a tap. The real truth is you went after the guy with the kids in the car and endangered their lives and hit the Complainant, Mr. Roberts. Which not only did you endanger your children, you endangered Mr. Roberts, his passengers.

Then after doing that, that didn’t stop you. You go out and take the law into your own hands and you go and retrieve the car keys of this man, which is a pretty dangerous act. That man, if it had been another person, maybe had a gun or something, there may have been a dead body out there. I don’t know where you’re coming from. I don’t quite understand it. You are now, I consider, a danger to society. What’s going to happen next time you go out and have a minor fender bender? I don’t know what happens to you, but the next time it might result in a death. And one of the responsibilities of the Court is to protect society from defendants. It’s not only looking out for your welfare and what we’re going to do to rehabilitate you at some point, we have to look at protecting society. And to keep you on probation so you can go out and have another temper tantrum when you have another fender bender and something else triggers you and you pull a gun and assault somebody, it may be more dangerous than this Court, and me personally, would be very responsible for.

I’m not going to assess your punishment at 20 years, but I’m going to assess your punishment at five years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

The trial judge’s statement does indeed show that he based his punishment decision on the evidence of the more recent “road rage” incident that formed the basis of the motion to adjudicate. But that same statement shows that the judge also based his adjudication decision on the evidence of the more recent “road rage” incident. In this case the appellate claim— ineffective assistance in calling appellant’s children as witnesses during the adjudication hearing — does not directly and distinctly affect only the “second phase.”¹⁹ Surely, all evidence offered during an adjudication hearing will “affect” or “impact” punishment. This “spill over” effect is natural, appropriate, and encouraged in our law.²⁰ The fact that evidence may be probative to both the decision to adjudicate and to the assessment of an appropriate punishment does not convert adjudication evidence into punishment evidence.²¹

Here, the court of appeals correctly dismissed appellant’s appeal, not because the purported error temporally occurred during the adjudication hearing, but because the purported error directly affected the decision to adjudicate. Its effect upon the trial court’s sentencing decision was simply part of the natural “spill over” effect of all evidence that shows the circumstances under which an offense occurred. That evidence is offered to prove criminal liability even though it may also be highly probative in determining an appropriate sentence.

Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals’s dismissal of appellant’s claim.

JOHNSON, J., filed a concurring opinion. KELLER,P.J., filed a dissenting opinion. MEYERS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

1 . We granted appellant’s sole ground for review:

The court of appeals erred in holding that appellant could not appeal his conviction, when the error claimed affected the punishment assessed, as well as the trial court's decision to adjudicate guilt.

2 . Hogans v. State, No. 14-03-00897-CR, 2004 WL 2251162, 2004 Tex.App. LEXIS 8927 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004).

3 .Jerron testified that his dad "turned around and then hit the boy.... The boy didn't hit my dad.” Kieara testified that, after the second wreck, "my dad had got out and took the keys out of the man’s car, and the man had got out and my dad had punched him and they ran down the street. And my dad came back to check on me and Jerron.” Kieara said she did not see the man "do anything” to her dad.

4 . Hogans v. State, 2004 WL 2251162, at *1, 2004 Tex.App. LEXIS 8927 at *2.

5 . Tex.Code Crim. Proc art. 42.12, § 5(b).

6 . Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) ("under the terms of the [deferred adjudication] statute, no appeal may be taken from the hearing in which the trial court determines to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge”). The Legislature’s prohibition includes all complaints related to the trial court's decision to proceed to an adjudication of guilt, except for those challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 667-68 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (recognizing applicability of "void judgment” exception to the deferred adjudication proceedings).

7 . Connolly v. State, 983 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (stating that "as there is nothing in the Texas Constitution which guarantees the right to appeal a criminal conviction, that right is only as provided by the legislature. It naturally follows that when a legislative enactment says an accused may not appeal a determination to adjudicate, there is no right to do so”).

8 . Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 5(b).

9 . 826 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

10 . Id. at 161.

11 . Id.

12 . Pearson v. State, 994 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Hardeman v. State, 1 S.W.3d 689, 690-91 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) ("Issa does not stand for the absolute right to a separate punishment hearing. Instead, it requires the defendant to have the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of guilt if not afforded during adjudication.”).

13 . Pearson, 994 S.W.2d at 179.

14 . Kirtley v. State, 56 S.W.3d 48, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.2001).

15 . Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d at 2. Certain constitutional claims may, of course, be raised in a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. See id. ("even if appellant's right to counsel was violated, he may not use direct appeal as the vehicle which to seek redress”) (emphasis added); Olowosuko v. State, 826 S.W.2d 940, 942 n. 2.(Tex.Crim.App.1992) (Overstreet, J., concurring) (noting that defendant’s complaint concerning the voluntariness of his plea of "true” was, in reality, a challenge to the trial court's decision to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge, and his remedy, if any, is by way of post-conviction writ of habeas corpus); Tillman v. State, 919 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d).

16 . Kirtley, 56 S.W.3d at 51.

17 . For example, one might plausibly argue that "but for” Officer Obie’s illegal search of the probationer, the rock of cocaine would never have been found. And if the rock of cocaine were never found, no motion to adjudicate would have been filed and no decision to adjudicate would have been made, so obviously no sentence would have been imposed. In that sense, the purportedly illegal search "contributes” to the defendant’s sentence.

18 . See Butler v. State, 135 S.W.3d 866, 868 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). The court explained,

“Although framed as challenges to post-adjudication rulings, i.e., challenges to the trial court's denial of his motions for new trial and its evidentiary ruling admitting the prosecutor's affidavit, the substance of appellant’s first, second, and third issues are in fact impermissible challenges to the trial court's decision to proceed to adjudication of appellant's guilt. In support of these issues, appellant argues that his pleas were involuntary because he was not taking the proper bipolar medication at the time of the adjudication proceeding. That appellant’s first, second, and third issues constitute a challenge to the trial court's decision to proceed to adjudication becomes apparent when read in the context of the record in this case.”

Id.

19 . Of course, had appellant’s counsel called his two children to testify to their eyewitness account of the "road rage” incident during the punishment phase, then the elicitation of that same evidence could have formed the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.

20 . See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071 § 2(d)(1) ("in deliberating on the issues submitted under Subsection (b) of this article, the jury shall consider all evidence admitted at the guilt or innocence stage and the punishment stage, including evidence of the defendant’s background or character or the circumstances of the offense that militates for or mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty”).

21 . Compare Pearson v. State, 994 S.W.2d at 179. In that case, prior to adjudication, Pearson was sworn and testified in response to questions from his attorney as to "anything you would like to address the Court on regarding the sentencing.” Id. If Pearson had raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to this exchange, although it arose before adjudication, the issue would have been cognizable. The purported error, had it been raised, would have been clearly, distinctly, and directly related to punishment, not to the decision to adjudicate.