Hodgson v. Stokely-Van Camp
This text of 330 F. Supp. 253 (Hodgson v. Stokely-Van Camp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
This is an action brought by the United States Secretary of Labor to enjoin Stokely-Van Camp from continuing claimed violations of § 7(a) and § 15(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.1 The case was submitted on the pleadings, briefs, and a stipulation of facts. The court heard oral argument.
At issue is whether defendant is entitled to claim a partial overtime exemption for certain employees at his Fairmont plant where these employees are engaged in the processing of vegetables which have been frozen for more than 24 hours.2 The court holds that it is so entitled.
Section 7(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended in 1966, provides for an exemption from the overtime provisions of the Act in regard to employees in an industry found by the Secretary to be of a seasonal nature.3 On June 30, 1967, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, pursuant to delegated authority, [255]*255found the fresh fruit and vegetable industry to be seasonal in nature insofar as it included the processing of fresh vegetables in their raw or natural state and operations or services necessary and incidental thereto.4 This finding expressly sought to exclude operations performed in connection with vegetables which had been frozen or otherwise removed from their raw or natural state. Subsequent to this, on October 20, 1967, the Administrator further found that a plant freezing and packaging consumer size packages and also freezing for bulk storage and later repackaging, would not qualify for the partial exemption in regard to those employees engaged in the repackaging operation and work incidental to it, where that work was being performed more than twenty-four hours after completion of the initial freezing process.5 The Administrator’s position was clarified on February 8, 1968, in Opinion Letter No. 754, where the Act was interpreted as allowing exemptions under § 7(c) and § 7(d) only in regard to operations performed upon commodities perishable in nature. The exemptions of § 7(c) and § 7(d) were deemed to be no longer applicable when an intervening operation such as freezing changed the condition of perishability.6
Plaintiff claims that the Secretary alone is charged by the Act with determining whether an industry is of a seasonal nature. Plaintiff further argues that since “industry” is defined by the act to include, “a trade, business, industry, or branch thereof, or group of industries, in which individuals are gainfully employed,” 7 the Secretary is free to define seasonal industry in such a manner as to include only a portion of defendant’s operation.
But the Secretary’s determination must be consistent with the terms of the law. Although a court will not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative official in the performance of his duty, Van Hoven Company v. Stans, 326 F.Supp. 827 (D.Minn.1971), it is clear that the extent of authority given to an administrative body by Congress is not left solely for the decision of that body. When an official is delegated authority to define terms, the definitions he adopts must be open to judicial review to determine whether they are in fact consistent with the statute itself and the intent of Congress. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U. S. 607, 64 S.Ct. 1215, 88 L.Ed. 1488 (1944); Opp Cotton Mills v. Adminis[256]*256trator of Wage and Hour etc., 312 U.S. 126, 61 S.Ct. 524, 85 L.Ed. 624 (1941).
A direct interpretation of the Act as constituted prior to the 1966 amendments is found in the case of Mitchell v. Oregon Frozen Foods Co., 145 F.Supp. 157 (D.Ore.1956), aff’d, 254 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 958, 79 S.Ct. 797, 3 L.Ed.2d 765 (1959), cert, dismissed, 361 U.S. 231, 80 S.Ct. 365, 4 L.Ed.2d 267 (1960). In this case the court held deferred packaging of frozen vegetables to be a part of “first processing” within the meaning of the Act, and that such work qualified for the partial overtime exemption provided by the Act even where such packaging took place beyond the end of the processing season. It is plaintiff’s position that this interpretation, which is directly contrary to his as reflected by the definition of industry to exclude operations performed after the commodities have ceased to be perishable, has been rendered inappropriate by the 1966 amendments.
This contention was recently considered in the ease of Shultz v. Twin City Foods, Inc., 314 F.Supp. 378 (W.D.Wash.1970),8 where the court, on facts similar to those at bar, after a detailed review of the legislative history surrounding the 1966 amendments, held that the Oregon Frozen Foods interpretation had not been changed by the amendments and thus the Administrator was in error in his finding that the § 7(c) exemption did not apply to packaging of frozen vegetables to the extent that such packaging was accomplished during periods when fresh commodities were being received and processed.9
Substantially the same arguments have been raised by plaintiff to deny defendant the exemption under § 7(d).10 These contentions were also answered in the Twin City Foods case. There the court held that the § 7(d) exemption is conditioned on a finding that the industry is one engaged in seasonal activity. The court felt there was nothing in either the statute or the legislative history to indicate that the determinative factor should be the type of service performed by the employee rather than the nature of the industry.11 In my view Shultz is a correct interpretation of the law.
The court finds that defendant’s processing of previously frozen vegetables at its Fairmont plant, during such periods when the plant is also receiving and processing fresh vegetables, qualifies for the partial overtime exemptions provided by § 7(c) and § 7(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The petition for an injunction is denied.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
330 F. Supp. 253, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 133, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11950, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hodgson-v-stokely-van-camp-mnd-1971.