Higuera v. Martinez

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 12, 2024
• Docket: 3:23-cv-01083
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VICTOR HIGUERA, Case No.: 3:23-cv-1083-BTM-KSC

12 Petitioner, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DENYING PETITION FOR 14 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 15 KELLY MARTINEZ, Sheriff, (2) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 16 Respondent. APPEALABILITY 17 18 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 Before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 21 § 2254 (“Petition” or “Pet.”) filed by Victor Higuera, (“Higuera” or “Petitioner”), a state

22 prisoner proceeding pro se. ECF No. 1. In his Petition, Higuera challenges his San Diego 23 Superior Court conviction and sentence for transporting a controlled substance for sale in 24 case number SCE423445. See id. at 1.1 The Court has reviewed the Petition (ECF No. 1), 25 the Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer (ECF 26

27 1 Page numbers for the Petition, Answer, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 28 1 Nos. 6, 6-1), the lodgments (ECF No. 7), Petitioner’s Traverse (ECF No. 8), and all the 2 supporting documents submitted by both parties. For the reasons discussed below, the 3 Court DENIES the Petition and DENIES a certificate of appealability. 4 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 5 On August 22, 2022, Higuera pleaded guilty in San Diego County Superior Court to 6 one count of transporting methamphetamine for sale, in violation of Cal. Health & Safety 7 Code § 11379(a). ECF No. 7-1 at 1. On September 28, 2022, the trial court sentenced 8 Higuera to three years in prison. Id. at 5. 9 Higuera did not appeal his conviction. But on March 20, 2023, he filed a petition for 10 writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. ECF No. 7-2. In it, he raised a single 11 claim––his right to equal protection has been violated by his sentence to county jail and 12 the application of California’s scheme for awarding custody credits. See id. at 3–11. The 13 California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or citation on April 26, 14 2023. ECF No. 7-3. 15 Higuera filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court on June 5, 16 2023, raising the same claim he raised in the state supreme court. ECF No. 1. Respondent 17 filed an Answer on July 31, 2023. ECF No. 6. Petitioner filed his Traverse on September 18 12, 2023. ECF No. 8. 19 III. SCOPE OF REVIEW 20 Higuera’s Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective 21 Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under 22 AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted unless the adjudication: (1) resulted in a 23 decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established 24 federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 25 of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. 26 § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 27 A federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s 28 determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only 1 whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 2 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). In order to 3 grant relief under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court “must be convinced that an appellate panel, 4 applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the 5 finding is supported by the record.” See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 6 2004). 7 A court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state court applied a 8 rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a 9 case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See 10 Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable 11 application” clause if the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle from 12 Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a 13 particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable application” clause requires that the 14 state court decision be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state 15 court’s application of clearly established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” 16 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue 17 the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant 18 state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 19 Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 20 (2000). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas 21 relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s 22 decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. 23 Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 24 Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks 25 through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the basis for 26 the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805– 27 06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” 28 federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine 1 whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 2 established Supreme Court law. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 3 However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas 4 corpus claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of 5 the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court 6 decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly established 7 federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or principles set 8 forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 9 U.S. at 72. 10 IV. DISCUSSION 11 As noted above, Higuera raises a single claim in his federal petition––that his 12 constitutional right to equal protection has been violated by his sentence to county jail. 13 ECF No. 1 at 6. Specifically, Higuera argues he is unable to earn the same amount of 14 custody credits in county jail as some inmates serving sentences in state prison. Id.; see 15 also Traverse at 3–4. Higuera raised this claim in his habeas petition to the California 16 Supreme Court and it was denied without comment or citation. ECF Nos. 7-2, 7-3. Thus, 17 because there is no reasoned decision from the state court, this Court must conduct an 18 independent review of the state court record to determine whether the denial of the claim 19 was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law. See Himes, 336 20 F.3d at 853. 21 Before addressing Higuera’s claim, a brief overview of the relevant sentencing law 22 is helpful. California’s Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (“Realignment Act”), 23 “significantly change[d] the punishment for some felony convictions” in California. People 24 v. Scott, 58 Cal. 4th 1415, 1418 (Cal. 2014); see also Mainez v. Gore, 2017 WL 6453595, 25 at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2017). In passing the Realignment Act, the legislature stated: 26 “Criminal justice policies that rely on building and operating more prisons to address 27 community safety concerns are not sustainable, and will not result in improved public 28 safety.” Cal. Penal Code § 17.5(a)(3). To address this concern, the legislature found that 1 “California must reinvest its criminal justice resources to support community-based 2 corrections programs and evidence-based practices that will achieve improved public 3 safety returns on this state’s substantial investment in its criminal justice system.” Cal. 4 Penal Code § 17.5(a)(4). It further found that “[r]ealigning low-level felony offenders who 5 do not have prior convictions for serious, violent, or sex offenses to locally run community- 6 based corrections programs . . . will improve public safety outcomes among adult felons 7 and facilitate their reintegration back into society.” Cal. Penal Code § 17.5(a)(5). To that 8 end, the Realignment Act shifted responsibility for housing and supervising certain “low- 9 level felony offenders” from the state to the individual counties. See Cal. Penal Code § 10 1170(h)(3). Thus, “once probation has been denied, [California] felons who are eligible to 11 be sentenced under realignment . . . serve their terms of imprisonment in local custody 12 rather than state prison.” People v. Cruz, 207 Cal. App. 4th 664, 671 (Cal. 2012). Persons 13 convicted of more serious and/or violent felony offenses not subject to section 1170(h) are 14 generally sentenced to state prison. Id. 15 Pursuant to the Realignment Act, Higuera’s felony conviction for one count of 16 transporting methamphetamine for sale subjected him to the provision under which he is 17 to serve his sentence in county jail, as opposed to a state prison. See Cal. Health & Safety 18 Code § 11379(a) (stating persons convicted of that section “shall be punished by 19 imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code”); Cal. Penal 20 Code § 1170(h) (stating such offenses “shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment in a 21 county jail for 16 months, or two or three years”). Petitioner argues this amounts to an 22 equal protection violation because inmates who, like Higuera, are sentenced to county jail 23 are only able to earn custody credits up to 50% of the time served, see Cal. Penal Code § 24 4019(f), while some state prison inmates can earn credits up to a rate of 66% of time served, 25 see Cal. Code Regs. § 3043.2(b)(5).2 26

27 2 The only inmates eligible to earn credits at a 66% rate are: (1) inmates assigned custody 28 1 The Equal Protection Clause requires, generally, that similarly situated defendants 2 be treated similarly. See City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 3 439 (1985). Equal protection is violated by intentional discrimination against a person 4 based on his or her membership in a protected class, Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 5 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or by intentional treatment of a member of an identifiable class 6 differently from other similarly situated individuals without a rational basis for the 7 difference in treatment, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Here, 8 because no protected class is implicated, the rational basis test applies. See McGinnis v. 9 Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1973) (applying rational basis review to state statutory 10 scheme that treated inmates held in county facilities differently than those held in state 11 facilities). In the prison context, such equal protection claims are “judged by a standard of 12 reasonableness—specifically, whether the actions of prison officials are ‘reasonably 13 related to legitimate penological interests.’” Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 14 2004) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). 15 First, Higuera has not established that individuals sentenced to state prison and those 16 sentenced to county jail under California’s Realignment Act are similarly situated. Equal 17 protection does not extend to individuals who are, in fact, differently situated. Michael M. 18 v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cnty, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (citations omitted); Klinger v. 19 Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Dissimilar treatment of dissimilarly 20 situated persons does not violate equal protection.”). When defining a class subject to 21 legislation, the distinctions drawn must have “some relevance to the purpose for which the 22 classification is made.” Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 539 (1975). Here, in passing 23 the Realignment Act the state legislature specifically differentiated between two groups of 24

25 completed the training required to be assigned as a firefighter to a Department of Forestry 26 and Fire Protection fire camp or as a firefighter at a Department of Corrections and 27 Rehabilitation firehouse or (3) inmates who are housed at a Department of Forestry and Fire Protection fire camp in a role other than firefighter. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 28 1 felons based on the nature of underlying conviction and criminal history. The stated 2 purpose for this distinction was to improve “public safety outcomes among adult felons” 3 and facilitating “their reintegration back into society” by allowing more individuals to 4 serve their sentences in local custody. In re Cuenca, 80 Cal. App. 5th 194, 201 (Cal. Ct. 5 App. 2022). In Cuenca, the court concluded inmates sentenced to county jail and those 6 sentenced to state prison under the Realignment Act were not similarly situated, noting that 7 “[t]he Legislature explicitly excluded non-low-level offenders convicted of serious, 8 violent, or sex offenses from being designated into local prisons.” Id. Given this deliberate 9 distinction, this Court also finds the two groups are not “similarly situated.”3 McQuery v. 10 Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834–35 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 11 (1963) (“Inmates are not entitled to identical treatment as other inmates merely because 12 they are all inmates.”)). 13 In addition, even assuming arguendo that inmates sentenced to county jail and 14 inmates sentenced to state prison are “similarly situated,” Higurera has failed to satisfy his 15 burden to show a lack of a rational basis for the differential treatment. Under the rational 16 basis standard, a state law will survive an equal protection challenge if there is “any 17 reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the 18 classification.” Armour v. City of Indiannapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 681 (2012) (internal 19 quotation omitted). The inquiry is not whether the challenged action “actually furthered a 20

21 3 Furthermore, despite his assertion to the contrary, Higuera has not shown that had he been 22 sentenced to state prison, he would have been eligible for “66% time off [his] sentence.” 23 See ECF 1 at 3. Petitioner could be eligible to earn credits at that rate, but as discussed above, only if he receives a “custody classification” of “Minimum A” or “Minimum B,” 24 which would enable him to be assigned to a minimum-security facility or fire camp; or if 25 he completes the training required to be assigned to a fire camp or California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation firehouse. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3043.2(b)(5). 26 Higuera makes no showing he would be eligible for such a classification, which is based 27 on numerous factors, including age, offense, criminal history, gang affiliation, and past conduct. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 3375, 3375.3. 28 1 legitimate interest; it is enough the governing body could have rationally decided that the 2 action would further that interest.” Crawford v. Antonio B. Won Pat Int’l Airport Auth., 3 917 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2019). Put another way, to prevail on an equal protection 4 claim, Higuera must “negative every conceivable basis which might support the 5 [government action] that he challenges.” Id. (quoting Armour, 566 U.S. at 681). 6 Petitioner has failed to meet his burden. As discussed above, the objective of the 7 realignment legislation was to “decrease recidivism and improve public safety, while at the 8 same time reducing corrections and related criminal justice spending.” People v. Zamudio, 9 12 Cal. App. 5th 8, 13 (Cal. 2017). “The purpose of justice reinvestment is to manage and 10 allocate criminal justice populations more cost-effectively, generating savings that can be 11 reinvested in evidence-based strategies that increase public safety while holding offenders 12 accountable.” Cal. Penal Code § 17.5 (a)(7); People v. Rajanayagam, 211 Cal. App. 4th 13 42, 54–55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). As such, the Realignment Act distinguishes between 14 individuals convicted of felonies deemed less serious (and which carry relatively short 15 sentences) and those with felony convictions for more serious offenses, and for which an 16 individual is generally sentenced to a longer term of imprisonment. See Cal. Penal Code § 17 1170(h). The distinction made by the California Legislature between individuals who must 18 serve their sentences in county jail as opposed to state prison bears a rational relationship 19 to its legitimate government interests in improving public safety (and health) by avoiding 20 overcrowded state prisons while also saving taxpayer money. See e.g. Ledezma-Cosino v. 21 Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating the government has a legitimate 22 interest in public safety). For his part, Petitioner has failed “to negative” these conceivable 23 bases for the distinction and therefore fails to show an equal protection violation. See 24 Armour, 566 U.S. at 681; see also Mason v. Holt, 2016 WL 6136076, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25 21, 2016) (dismissing prisoner’s equal protection challenge with regard to eligibility for 26 work credits because the distinctions made between county and prison custody credits as a 27 result of realignment are “not arbitrary and bear a rational relationship to a legitimate 28 government interest.”). ] In sum, after an independent review of the record, the Court finds the state court’s 2 || denial of Higuera’s equal protection claim was neither contrary to clearly established law, 3 objectively unreasonable. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; see also Williams v. Illinois, 399 4 ||U.S. 235, 243 (1970) (noting a mere demonstration of inequality is not enough to establish 5 ||a violation of the equal protection clause). The Petition is therefore denied. 6 V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 7 The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district 8 court that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny a certificate of 9 || appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a). The district court may issue 10 certificate of appealability if the petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial 11 |/of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must 12 || show that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 13 ||clatms debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, the Court 14 || finds Petitioner has failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 15 |/right,” and reasonable jurists would not find debatable this Court’s assessment of his 16 claims. See id. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 17 VI. CONCLUSION 18 Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus, 19 DENIES a certificate of appealability. 20 || IT ISSO ORDERED. 21 ||Dated: January 11, 2024 22 Bay Til Wyss Honorable Barry Ted Moskowit 23 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28