Highland Park Inc. v. United States

161 F. Supp. 597, 142 Ct. Cl. 269, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 135
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMay 7, 1958
DocketNo. 375-55
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 161 F. Supp. 597 (Highland Park Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Highland Park Inc. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597, 142 Ct. Cl. 269, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 135 (cc 1958).

Opinion

Whitaker, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit for just compensation for the alleged taking of plaintiff’s property resulting from the flight of heavy airplanes over its land.

In February 1951 McIntosh & Company, Inc., purchased a 7514-acre tract of land about a mile east of Hunter Field, an airport on the outskirts of Savannah, Georgia, for the purpose of subdividing it for residential use. In December 1951 McIntosh & Company organized plaintiff corporation, to which it deeded the property in February 1952.

In 1950 the United States acquired Hunter Field from the City of Savannah for use as a military airfield. Before that it had been used as a municipal airport. There were three runways on it, one running northeast-southwest, another northwest-southeast, each about 5,000 feet in length, and a third, running roughly east and west, and somewhat shorter than the other two. Between 1947 and 1949 the northeast-southwest runway was extended 2,000 feet, making it 7,000 feet long. This runway was used almost exclusively by the heavier planes. The east-west runway, only about 5,000 feet long, was used by heavy planes only in exceptional circumstances, when there were unusually high winds.

In February 1952, the defendant completed a new east-west runway, 10,500 feet in length. Its eastern end was 5,500 feet from plaintiff’s property. In May 1952, the use of the other runways was discontinued and all flights from then on used only the new east-west runway. The center of this runway, if extended, would run along the northern boundary of plaintiff’s property, with the result that from 85 to 90 percent of plaintiff’s property lies within the eastern approach zone to this runway, as plotted by the defendant.

Prior to December 31, 1953, propeller driven airplanes, using the east-west runway, passed over plaintiff’s property at altitudes from 200 to 1,200 feet and higher. However, these flights did not seriously interfere with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of its property. However, on December 31, 1953, the first of some 90 six-engine B-47 Stratojet Bombers arrived, and others followed at a rate of approximately 15 a month, replacing the propeller driven planes, formerly using the airfield. These jet bombers flew over plain[271]*271tiff’s property at a lower altitude than the propeller driven planes had.1 They made a greater and more piercing noise, and caused much greater vibration than the propeller driven planes had. They flew over plaintiff’s property at the rate of from 30 to 60 a day. • When they passed over the property, all conversation had to cease, radio and television reception was disrupted, the windows in the houses shook, dishes rattled on the shelves, sleep was disrupted, and the noise was so great as to be painful to the ears of some of the residents. Some were in a constant state of anxiety, and even had to undergo medical care for nervous disorders, said to have been induced by anxiety over the passage over their homes of these jets.

McIntosh & Company had purchased the property in order to subdivide it into building lots for sale as medium cost homesites. The property, known as Highland Park, was divided in the middle by a county drainage canal.2 The property to the east of this canal had been developed by the construction of streets and sewers, gas, water, and electric lines. In the eastern half there were 76 lots.

From July 1952 until April 1955 plaintiff disposed of 48 of the 76 lots in the eastern half. On these 48 lots sold, 43 houses were constructed. Of the 48 lots sold, 15 were sold in 1952, 25 in 1953, 6 in 1954, and 2 in 1955. No lots have been sold since April 1955, and no houses have been constructed since that time.

Subsequent to April 1955 no private lending institution in the Savannah area was willing to finance the sale of any property or the construction of a home in the Highland Park subdivision. One real estate mortgage correspondent, who had made 37 out of a total of 41 mortgage loans on the Highland Park property, refused in the spring of 1954 to make any further loans in the subdivision, and in April 1955 the Veterans Administration refused to make an appraisal of property in the subdivision, as a preliminary to guaran[272]*272teeing a loan on it, because “the property lies too close to the runway zone of Hunter Air Force Base.” The Veterans Administration Technical Bulletin, TB-4A-121, forbade appraisals of property within a runway zone, and gave “special consideration” to property within an approach zone.

In April 1951 McIntosh & Company gave to the local Board of Education a five-acre plot in the eastern half of Highland Park, conditioned on the building of a grammar school thereon. In January 1952 the commanding officer at Hunter Field asked the county authorities to construct an access road to the school from Hunter Field. However, on May 20, 1952, even before the advent of the B-47 S trato jet Bombers, the commanding officer of Hunter Field wrote the Board of Education as follows:

Respectfully, your attention is invited to the new East-West runway system in operation at this Base. I feel that the construction of a school near the approach zone of a runway undesirable. The two sites, as located on the inclosed map, are near the take-off and approach zone to this runway system.
Since present and future aircraft flying from this runway system will produce noises of variable intensity, we feel the noise level will be an impediment to classroom instruction and recitation. The normal operation of aircraft does not present a danger, however, it is recognized that an emergency can and may develop which could become hazardous.

Thereafter, this property was returned to McIntosh & Company by the Board of Education, and by it deeded to the plaintiff.

Defendant, of course, does not deny that it has taken an easement in the air space over plaintiff’s property, and it must be concluded from the foregoing that the passage of these planes over plaintiff’s property seriously impaired its value for residential purposes.

It follows, therefore, under the holding of this court in Causby v. United States, 104 C. Cls. 342, 109 C. Cls. 768, and the holding of the Supreme Court in United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, that the defendant is liable for just compensation for the taking of the easement, and the resulting damage to the remainder of the property.

[273]*273The first question is the date of the taking of an easement. Of course, if defendant had already taken an easement before plaintiff acquired the property, plaintiff would not be entitled to recover. Defendant says an easement was taken immediately after its acquisition of Hunter Field and when its planes began to fly over it, which was before plaintiff acquired the property. We do not think this is so.

As the Supreme Court said in Causby v. United States, supra, the air space over the land is a part of the public domain, which may be used by airplanes with impunity so long as the flights do not substantially interfere with the use and enjoyment of the surface of the ground. The proof here shows that flights of propeller driven planes over plaintiff’s property did not substantially interfere with the use and enjoyment thereof.

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Bluebook (online)
161 F. Supp. 597, 142 Ct. Cl. 269, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 135, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/highland-park-inc-v-united-states-cc-1958.