YETKA, Justice.
This case comes to us as a certified question from the Hennepin County District Court. The issue to be determined is the constitutionality of Minnesota’s wrongful birth statute, Minn.Stat. § 145.424, subd. 2 (1984). The district court, in ruling on cross motions for partial summary judgment, struck down the wrongful birth statute as unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). Noting the significance of this question, however, pursuant to Minn.R.Civ. App.P. 103.03(h), the district court certified it to us as important and doubtful.
The question posed by the district court is whether Minn.Stat. § 145.424 is constitutional under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. We answer the certified question by upholding the statute’s constitutionality and reversing the district court.1
I.
On January 28, 1984, Simin Hickman gave birth to her first child, Jessica. Jessica was born with Down’s syndrome, a genetic disease also known as mongolism. At the time Simin became pregnant, she was 34 years old. Simin’s obstetrician, Qr. Leslie Sharpe, had cared for her throughout her pregnancy. Because of her age, Si-min’s chances of bearing a genetically abnormal child were significantly increased. The risk of a 35-year-old woman bearing a Down’s syndrome child is said by medical experts to be 1 in 350. By contrast, the risk of a woman in her 20’s bearing a Down’s syndrome child is between 1 in 1,000 to 1 in 2,000.
The parties dispute whether Dr. Sharpe ever offered to test Simin’s fetus for Down’s syndrome. Simin alleges that neither Dr. Sharpe nor Group Health offered her the option of testing for Down’s syndrome. She also asserts that, when she independently learned of such testing and requested it, Dr. Sharpe advised her such testing was not necessary in her case. Dr. Sharpe, however, denies these claims. He alleges that he offered such testing to Si-min after explaining the risks of Down’s syndrome and certain risks involved in the testing itself, but that she declined such testing.
The typical procedure used to test for Down’s syndrome is an amniocentesis. The procedure involves inserting a large needle into the mother’s womb and withdrawing some amniotic fluid. The fluid is then tested to reveal the presence of Down’s syndrome. The procedure, however, does involve some risk of injury. The chances of fetal death due to amniocentesis are between 1 in 100 and 1 in 200. Also, amniocentesis typically cannot be performed until the 16th week of pregnancy because insufficient amniotic fluid exists before that time. The testing for Down’s syndrome takes approximately 4 weeks after the fluid is withdrawn.
The Hickmans brought the present suit against Dr. Sharpe and Group Health after Jessica’s birth. They assert that, had they known of Jessica’s condition as a fetus, they would have chosen abortion. They alleged several causes of action on behalf [12]*12of themselves individually based on negligence, misrepresentation, breach of a fiduciary duty, and failure to inform. They also asserted a cause of action on behalf of Jessica based on negligence. Dr. Sharpe and Group Health specifically denied the allegations and raised as a defense the statutory prohibitions against wrongful birth and wrongful life actions found in Minn.Stat. § 145.424, subds. 1, 2 (1984).
The Hickmans moved for partial summary judgment. They argued that subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 145.424: (1) unconstitutionally restricted Simin’s right to an abortion under Roe v. Wade, (2) violated Simin’s equal protection rights under both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, and (3) violated Simin’s rights under article 1, section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution, guaranteeing a remedy for every wrong. Dr. Sharpe and Group Health also moved for partial summary judgment, raising the statutory prohibitions in Minn.Stat. § 145.424, subds. 1, 2 as a bar to the Hick-mans’ action. For a proper understanding of the issues raised, we deem it convenient to set out in full section 145.424 of the statute in question.
145.424 PROHIBITION OF TORT ACTIONS.
Subdivision 1. Wrongful life action prohibited. No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on behalf of himself based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, he would have been aborted.
Subd. 2. Wrongful birth action prohibited. No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted.
Subd. 3. Failure or refusal to prevent a live birth. Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude a cause of action for intentional dr negligent malpractice or any other action arising in tort based on the failure of a contraceptive method or sterilization procedure or on a claim that, but for the negligent conduct of another, tests or treatment would have been provided or would have been provided properly which would have made possible the prevention, cure, or amelioration of any disease, defect, deficiency, or handicap; provided, however, that abortion shall not have been deemed to prevent, cure, or ameliorate any disease, defect, deficiency, or handicap. The failure or refusal of any person to perform or have an abortion shall not be a defense in any action, nor shall that failure or refusal be considered in awarding damages or in imposing a penalty in any action.
Minn.Stat. § 145.424 (1984).
The district court granted the Hickmans’ motion with respect to the wrongful birth statute in subdivision 2, finding it unconstitutional under Roe.2 The court reasoned that Roe and the cases following it established more than just a woman’s right to an abortion; it established the broader right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy within the context of the doctor-patient relationship. Minn.Stat. § 145.424, subd. 2 unconstitutionally interfered with this right because it allowed a doctor to withhold information that might have helped her form a decision on abortion. The doctor could negligently withhold such information because subdivision 2 prohibited a patient from suing her doctor for wrongful birth based upon such negligence. By allowing significant information to be withheld regarding possible problems with a pregnancy, subdivision 2 impeded Simin’s ability to make an informed decision concerning abortion. Therefore, subdivision 2 was, under Roe, held to burden significantly a woman’s right to an abortion and, because appellants demonstrated no compelling state interest, the court struck down subdivision 2 as unconstitutional.
[13]*13II.
Before addressing the Hickmans’ constitutional challenges to subdivision 2, we find it helpful to discuss the legal basis of the wrongful birth cause of action. At common law, no cause of action existed for either wrongful birth or wrongful death. See, e.g., Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng.Rep. 1033 (N.P.1808) (denying recovery for wrongful death); Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, §§ 55, 125A (W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen 5th ed. (1984)). Instead of originating in the courts, wrongful death suits were first permitted by the passage of Lord Campbell’s Act in the mid-nineteenth century. Lord Campbell’s Act (fatal accidents act), 1846, 9 & 10 Viet., ch. 93.
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YETKA, Justice.
This case comes to us as a certified question from the Hennepin County District Court. The issue to be determined is the constitutionality of Minnesota’s wrongful birth statute, Minn.Stat. § 145.424, subd. 2 (1984). The district court, in ruling on cross motions for partial summary judgment, struck down the wrongful birth statute as unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). Noting the significance of this question, however, pursuant to Minn.R.Civ. App.P. 103.03(h), the district court certified it to us as important and doubtful.
The question posed by the district court is whether Minn.Stat. § 145.424 is constitutional under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. We answer the certified question by upholding the statute’s constitutionality and reversing the district court.1
I.
On January 28, 1984, Simin Hickman gave birth to her first child, Jessica. Jessica was born with Down’s syndrome, a genetic disease also known as mongolism. At the time Simin became pregnant, she was 34 years old. Simin’s obstetrician, Qr. Leslie Sharpe, had cared for her throughout her pregnancy. Because of her age, Si-min’s chances of bearing a genetically abnormal child were significantly increased. The risk of a 35-year-old woman bearing a Down’s syndrome child is said by medical experts to be 1 in 350. By contrast, the risk of a woman in her 20’s bearing a Down’s syndrome child is between 1 in 1,000 to 1 in 2,000.
The parties dispute whether Dr. Sharpe ever offered to test Simin’s fetus for Down’s syndrome. Simin alleges that neither Dr. Sharpe nor Group Health offered her the option of testing for Down’s syndrome. She also asserts that, when she independently learned of such testing and requested it, Dr. Sharpe advised her such testing was not necessary in her case. Dr. Sharpe, however, denies these claims. He alleges that he offered such testing to Si-min after explaining the risks of Down’s syndrome and certain risks involved in the testing itself, but that she declined such testing.
The typical procedure used to test for Down’s syndrome is an amniocentesis. The procedure involves inserting a large needle into the mother’s womb and withdrawing some amniotic fluid. The fluid is then tested to reveal the presence of Down’s syndrome. The procedure, however, does involve some risk of injury. The chances of fetal death due to amniocentesis are between 1 in 100 and 1 in 200. Also, amniocentesis typically cannot be performed until the 16th week of pregnancy because insufficient amniotic fluid exists before that time. The testing for Down’s syndrome takes approximately 4 weeks after the fluid is withdrawn.
The Hickmans brought the present suit against Dr. Sharpe and Group Health after Jessica’s birth. They assert that, had they known of Jessica’s condition as a fetus, they would have chosen abortion. They alleged several causes of action on behalf [12]*12of themselves individually based on negligence, misrepresentation, breach of a fiduciary duty, and failure to inform. They also asserted a cause of action on behalf of Jessica based on negligence. Dr. Sharpe and Group Health specifically denied the allegations and raised as a defense the statutory prohibitions against wrongful birth and wrongful life actions found in Minn.Stat. § 145.424, subds. 1, 2 (1984).
The Hickmans moved for partial summary judgment. They argued that subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 145.424: (1) unconstitutionally restricted Simin’s right to an abortion under Roe v. Wade, (2) violated Simin’s equal protection rights under both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, and (3) violated Simin’s rights under article 1, section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution, guaranteeing a remedy for every wrong. Dr. Sharpe and Group Health also moved for partial summary judgment, raising the statutory prohibitions in Minn.Stat. § 145.424, subds. 1, 2 as a bar to the Hick-mans’ action. For a proper understanding of the issues raised, we deem it convenient to set out in full section 145.424 of the statute in question.
145.424 PROHIBITION OF TORT ACTIONS.
Subdivision 1. Wrongful life action prohibited. No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on behalf of himself based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, he would have been aborted.
Subd. 2. Wrongful birth action prohibited. No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted.
Subd. 3. Failure or refusal to prevent a live birth. Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude a cause of action for intentional dr negligent malpractice or any other action arising in tort based on the failure of a contraceptive method or sterilization procedure or on a claim that, but for the negligent conduct of another, tests or treatment would have been provided or would have been provided properly which would have made possible the prevention, cure, or amelioration of any disease, defect, deficiency, or handicap; provided, however, that abortion shall not have been deemed to prevent, cure, or ameliorate any disease, defect, deficiency, or handicap. The failure or refusal of any person to perform or have an abortion shall not be a defense in any action, nor shall that failure or refusal be considered in awarding damages or in imposing a penalty in any action.
Minn.Stat. § 145.424 (1984).
The district court granted the Hickmans’ motion with respect to the wrongful birth statute in subdivision 2, finding it unconstitutional under Roe.2 The court reasoned that Roe and the cases following it established more than just a woman’s right to an abortion; it established the broader right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy within the context of the doctor-patient relationship. Minn.Stat. § 145.424, subd. 2 unconstitutionally interfered with this right because it allowed a doctor to withhold information that might have helped her form a decision on abortion. The doctor could negligently withhold such information because subdivision 2 prohibited a patient from suing her doctor for wrongful birth based upon such negligence. By allowing significant information to be withheld regarding possible problems with a pregnancy, subdivision 2 impeded Simin’s ability to make an informed decision concerning abortion. Therefore, subdivision 2 was, under Roe, held to burden significantly a woman’s right to an abortion and, because appellants demonstrated no compelling state interest, the court struck down subdivision 2 as unconstitutional.
[13]*13II.
Before addressing the Hickmans’ constitutional challenges to subdivision 2, we find it helpful to discuss the legal basis of the wrongful birth cause of action. At common law, no cause of action existed for either wrongful birth or wrongful death. See, e.g., Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng.Rep. 1033 (N.P.1808) (denying recovery for wrongful death); Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, §§ 55, 125A (W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen 5th ed. (1984)). Instead of originating in the courts, wrongful death suits were first permitted by the passage of Lord Campbell’s Act in the mid-nineteenth century. Lord Campbell’s Act (fatal accidents act), 1846, 9 & 10 Viet., ch. 93. Wrongful death actions in Minnesota were also established by statute. 1858 Minn.Pub.St. ch. 68, § 3. Like wrongful death, wrongful birth presents a myriad of public policy problems, including difficulty in ascertaining damages, increased litigation, and distinguishing between legislative and judicial roles.3 An-not., 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978 & Supp.1986). Because of these problems and the fact that no such action exists at common law, we consider the establishment of wrongful birth or wrongful life suits to be best within the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislature. In Minn.Stat. § 145.424, the legislature has made its intent clear: no wrongful birth or wrongful life suits are to be permitted. The legislature has now spoken on the subject and, barring constitutional violations, that should end the matter.
Respondents argue that section 145.424, subdivision 2 is unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article 1, section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution.4 This court presumes that a statute is constitutional unless it is proven otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. Minnesota Higher Education Facilities Authority v. Hawk, 305 Minn. 97, 232 N.W.2d 106 (1975). We exercise our power to declare a statute unconstitutional only when absolutely necessary. Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, 253 Minn. 164, 91 N.W.2d 642 (1958). In our opinion, respondents did not meet their burden of proof.
First, we do not believe that the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to this case. Prerequisite to a possible violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is state action or involvement. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948). How can it be argued that state action is involved in this case? The relationship here is strictly between doctor and patient. The statute does not forbid the doctor to inform the patient of new tests and the risk they entail. It does not directly touch on the expectant mother’s right to choose an abortion. Due process does not require that the state adopt regulations prohibiting purely private conduct. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982).
Second, even if there were sufficient state action, the United States Supreme Court has clearly held to the rule that, in order to be in violation of Roe v. Wade, the state must directly affect or impose a significant burden on a woman’s right to an abortion. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977); Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983). Thus, in its most recent decision, the court invalidated laws that forced doctors to provide clients with information discouraging abortion and to use medical procedures that could put maternal health at risk for the benefit of a fetus. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, — U.S. -, [14]*14106 S.Ct. 2169, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986). Other statutes held unconstitutional have given third parties the arbitrary right to veto the woman’s choice. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 99 S.Ct. 675, 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979). Unlike these statutes, section 145.424, subdivision 2 does not directly interfere with the woman’s right to choose a safe abortion. The two parties, doctor and patient, are still left free to make whatever decision they feel is appropriate.
Furthermore, section 145.424, subdivision 3, allowing a cause of action for wrongful conception suits, does not present an equal protection problem. No suspect or quasi-suspect classification is involved, and the state has a rational basis for distinguishing a situation where a parent decides to be sterilized and the doctor negligently performs the operation from one where the parents decide to assume certain well-known risks in childbearing and then want to sue the physician for the realization of the possible consequences.5 Most adults are fully aware of the risks of childbearing when the mother is over 30 years old. In our opinion, plaintiffs stretched the United States Supreme Court abortion cases to the breaking point. Parents here were as cognizant of the risks of a late pregnancy as were the doctors. How can it be said that the plaintiffs’ right to an abortion, therefore, was in anyway impaired? These parents should not be allowed to take the risk and then sue the doctor for the consequences. What is the doctor’s choice? By advising the patient about amniocentesis, appellant contends that there is as high as a 1 to 100 chance that the fetus will be injured if the patient elects to have the test; by not advising about the test, there is as high as a 1 in 350 chance that the child will be born with mental or physical defects. With either alternative, the doctor would be subject to a possible suit. How could the court require the state to provide a cause of action against a doctor faced with this Hobson’s choice? Doctors can perform what many lay people consider to be miracles today due to advancements in medical technology, but we cannot and should not place the doctor in an impossible situation, interfering with and perhaps thwarting his or her professional judgment.
We are fully aware of the situation that existed a mere quarter of a century ago when physicians’ actions were scarcely ever challenged and there was very little or any accountability to anyone for decisions that they made. Those times have changed. The pendulum has now swung to the opposite extreme. Simply put, doctors must be returned some leeway in exercising judgment affecting the treatment of their patients without the fear of legal sanction.
Finally, article I, section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution only assures remedies for rights that vested at common law. The purpose of the section is to protect common law rights and remedies for which the legislature has not provided a reasonable substitute. See Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 201 N.W. 140 (1972); Mickelsen, The Use and Interpretation of Article I, Section Eight of the Minnesota Constitution 1861-1984, 10 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 667 (1984).
In summary, we do not believe that the mother’s right to abortion is the real issue in this case. The issue is whether the state has a right to decide what action or inaction on the part of one person is actionable by another in the courts of this state. It is illogical to us for the courts to declare that [15]*15a cause of action exists in instances where the legislature clearly and unequivocally has said there is none. To the extent that we held in the Sherlock case that a cause of action for wrongful conception existed, it must be borne in mind that that case was written prior to action by the legislature. Moreover, if the plaintiff has the right to invoke equal protection, does it follow that, if a statute has three sections, two of which specifically deny a cause of action and the third merely codifies the existence of an earlier decision of this court made prior to the express will of the legislature, this court must hold the two sections invalid on the basis of section three? We think not. The legislative intent is clear and if any section of the statute is open to question, it would most likely be section three rather than the previous two sections.
Through Minn.Stat. § 145.424, the legislature has spoken concerning the existence of wrongful birth and wrongful life suits in this state. Respondents have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates any provision of the federal or state constitution. Therefore, we uphold the statute and reverse the district court.
SIMONETT, KELLEY and COYNE, JJ., concur specially.
AMDAHL, C.J., and WAHL and SCOTT, JJ., dissent.