Maher v. Roe

432 U.S. 464, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 53 L. Ed. 2d 484, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 129

Opinions

Mr. Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Beal v. Doe, ante, p. 438, we hold today that Title XIX of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of nontherapeutic abortions as a condition of participation in the joint federal-state Medicaid program established by that statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Beal, we must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for childbirth.

I

A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits state Medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions¹ to those that are “medically necessary,” a term defined to include psychiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public Assistance Program Manual, Yol. 3, c. Ill, §275 (1975).² Connecticut enforces this limitation through a system of prior authorization from its Department of Social Services. In order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion, the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed must submit, among other things, a certificate from the patient’s attending physician stating that the abortion is medically necessary.

This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation was brought against appellant Maher, the Commisioner of Social Services, by appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of medical necessity.³ In a complaint filed in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, as added, 79 Stat. 343, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V), and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act prohibited the funding of abortions that were not medically necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain Medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation, the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also required it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (1974). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 (1975). Upon remand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened. That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F. Supp. 660 (1975).

Although it found no independent constitutional right to a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), the view that “abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with pregnancy . . . 408 F. Supp., at 663 n. 3. Relying also on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974), the court held that the Connecticut program “weights the choice of the pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally protected right” to a nontherapeutic abortion and “thus infringes upon a fundamental interest.” 408 F. Supp., at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this infringement. The State’s fiscal interest was held to be “wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive medical response to a pregnancy.” Id., at 664 (footnote omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed constitutionally irrelevant:

“The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To sanction such a justification would be to permit discrimination against those seeking to exercise a constitutional right on the basis that the state simply does not approve of the exercise of that right.” Ibid.

The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the certificate of medical necessity for Medicaid-funded abortions.⁴ The court also struck down the related requirements of prior written request by the pregnant woman and prior authorization by the Department of Social Services, holding that the State could not impose any requirements on Medicaid payments for abortions that are not “equally applicable to medicaid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or requirements tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion or to delay the occurrence of an abortion that she has asked her physician to perform.” Id., at 665. We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Connecticut regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976).

II

The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents.⁵ But when a State decides to alleviate some of the hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limitations. Appellees’ claim is that Connecticut must accord equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classifications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis of such a claim is well settled:

“We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. ... If not, the [legislative] scheme must still be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination . . . ” San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 17 (1973).

Accord, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976). Applying this analysis here, we think the District Court erred in holding that the Connecticut regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A

This case involves no discrimination against a suspect class. An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within the limited category of disadvantaged classes so recognized by our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of the' regulation falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a different conclusion. In a sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth classification as compared to nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez, supra, at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970).⁶ Accordingly, the central question in this case is whether the regulation “impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.” The District Court read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and the subsequent cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental right to abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less than a compelling state interest would justify Connecticut’s different treatment of abortion and childbirth. We think the District Court misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental right recognized in Roe.

B

At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas law making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abortion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty affords constitutional protection against state interference with certain aspects of an individual's personal “privacy,” including a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.⁷ I’d,, at 153.

The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on the physicians and other medical personnel who performed abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety of the desired service. As Mr. Justice Stewart observed, “it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgment of a constitutional freedom . . . .” Id., at 170 (concurring opinion). We held that only a compelling state interest would justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally protected interest, and we found no such state interest during the first trimester. Even when judged against this demanding standard, however, the State's dual interest in the health of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abortions in the second and third trimesters. “These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes ‘compelling.' ” Id., at 162-163. In the second trimester, the State’s interest in the health of the pregnant woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that concern. Id., at 163. At viability, usually in the third trimester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus justifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the life or health of the mother is threatened. Id., at 163-164.

The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible interference with the pregnant woman’s decision to terminate her - pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in effect, on the woman’s freedom of choice. Thus, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 70-71, n. 11 (1976), we held that Missouri’s requirement of spousal consent was unconstitutional because it “granted [the husband] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever reason, the effectuation of his wife’s and her physician’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.” Missouri had interposed an “absolute obstacle to a woman’s decision that Roe held to be constitutionally protected from such interference.” (Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678 (1977), we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion “is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976). We recognized in Bellotti that “not all distinction between abortion and other procedures is forbidden” and that “[t]he constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its degree and the justification for it.” Id., at 149-150. We therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute regulating a minor’s access to an abortion until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the minor’s decision or the less burdensome requirement of parental consultation.

These cases recognize a constitutionally protected interest “in making certain kinds of important decisions” free .from governmental compulsion. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599-600, and nn. 24 and 26 (1977). As Whalen makes clear, the right in Roe v. Wade can be understood only by considering both the woman’s interest and the nature of the State’s interference with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified “constitutional right to an abortion,” as the District Court seemed to think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.

The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind from the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles — absolute or otherwise — in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut’s decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the service she desires. The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman’s decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there. The indigency that may make it difficult — and in some cases, perhaps, impossible — for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation. We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does not impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe.8

c

Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.⁹ Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to..impose its.will by force of law; the State’s power to encourage, actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far Jbrpader.

• This, distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in support of the pregnant woman’s right under the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), involved-' a ’Nebraska law making it criminal to teach foreign''languages to children who had not passed the eighth ’ gradé.' ‘ Id., at 396-397. Nebraska’s imposition of a .criminal .¡sanction on the providers of desired services makes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the. constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under the law, the- Court held that the teacher’s “right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children’,’ were “within the liberty of the Amendment.” 262 U. S. at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), the. Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon criminal law requiring the parent or guardian of a child to sénd’ hiíírto a public school, thus precluding the choice of a private school.' Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept' of liberty “excludes any general power of the State to standardize, its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only,” the Court held that the law “unreasonably interfere [d] with the liberty of parents and guardians, to-direct the upbringing and education of children under their control;” 268 U. S., at 534 — 535.

Both’ case|. invalidated substantial restrictions on constitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent’s right to--.have.his child taught a particular foreign language; in Pierce', the.; parent’s right to choose private rather than public school 'education. But neither case denied to a State the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action. Indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state,,that-the power of the State “to prescribe a curriculum” that included English and excluded German in its free public schools “is not questioned.” 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts no shadow over a State’s power to favor public .education, by funding it — a policy choice pursued in some . States for more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Indeed, in Norwqod v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 465, 462 (1973), we explicitly rejected .the argument that Pierce established a “right of private or. parochial schools to share with public schools in state, largesse,” noting that “[i]t is one thing to say that a State ipay. not.prohibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another -to say that such schools must, as a matter of equal, protection, receive state aid.” Yet, were we to accept appellees’ argument, an indigent parent could challenge the state. spolicy ..of favoring public rather than private schools, or of preferring instruction in English rather than German, on grounds identical in principle to those advanced here. We think it abundantly clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more, than, a State must so justify its election to fund public but not private education.¹⁰

D

The question remains whether Connecticut’s regulation can be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality that applies in the absence of a suspect classification or the impingement of a fundamental right. This test requires that the distinction drawn between childbirth and nontherapeutic abortion by the regulation be “rationally related” to a “constitutionally permissible” purpose. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 74 (1972); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S., at 314. We hold that the Connecticut funding scheme satisfies this standard.

Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State’s strong interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest exists throughout the pregnancy, “grow[ing] in substantiality as the woman approaches term.” 410 U. S., at 162-163. Because the pregnant woman carries a potential human being, she “cannot be isolated in her privacy. . . . [Her] privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.” Id., at 159. The State unquestionably has a “strong and legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth,” Beal v. Doe, ante, at 446, an interest honored over the' centuries.¹¹ Nor can there be any question that the Connecticut regulation rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs associated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased significantly in recent years. As recognized by the District Court in this case, such costs are significantly greater than those normally associated with elective abortions during the first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to childbirth is a rational means of encouraging childbirth.

We certainly are not unsympathetic to the plight of an indigent woman who desires an abortion, but “the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill,” Lindsey v. Normet, supra, at 74. Our cases uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in choosing among competing demands for limited public funds.¹² In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485, despite recognition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds involve “the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings,” we held that classifications survive equal protection challenge when a “reasonable basis” for the classification is shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this minimal level.

The decision whether to expend state funds for nonthera-peutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a weighing of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court does not strike down state laws “because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.” Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955), quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. Indeed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abortions, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature. We should not forget that “legisla tures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.” Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 270 (1904) (Holmes, J.).¹³

In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It is open to Congress to require provision of Medicaid benefits for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the Medicaid program. Also, under Title XIX as construed in Beal v. Doe, ante, p. 438, Connecticut is free — through normal democratic processes — to decide that such benefits should be provided. We hold only that the Constitution does not require a judicially imposed resolution of these difficult issues.

Ill

The District Court also invalidated Connecticut's requirements of prior written request by the pregnant woman and prior authorization by the Department of Social Services. Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not unreasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only for authorized purposes. The simple answer to the argument that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termination of a potential human life. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), we held that the woman's written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible burden under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the similar issue here.

The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

[For dissenting opinion of Me. Justice Marshall, see ante, p. 454.]

[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmun, see ante, p. 462.]

Footnotes

1

The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not challenged here.

2

Section 275 provides in relevant part:

“The Department makes payment for abortion services under the Medical Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions are met:

"1. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medically necessary. The term ‘Medically Necessary’ includes psychiatric necessity.

“2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or licensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy. . . .

“3. The written request for the abortion is submitted by the patient, and in the case of a minor, from the parent or guardian.

“4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of Medical Services, Division of Health Services, Department of Social Services.”

See n. 4, infra.

3

At the time this action was filed, Mary Poe, a 16-year-old high school junior, had already obtained an abortion at a Connecticut hospital. Apparently because of Poe’s inability to obtain a certificate of medical necessity, the hospital was denied reimbursement by the Department of Social Services. As a result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital bill of $244. Susan Roe, an unwed mother of three children, was unable to obtain an abortion because of her physician’s refusal to certify that the procedure was medically necessary. By consent, a temporary restraining order was entered by the District Court enjoining the Connecticut officials from refusing to pay for Roe’s abortion. After the remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court issued temporary restraining orders covering three additional women. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 (1975).

4

The District Court’s judgment and order, entered on January 16, 1976, were not stayed. On January 26, 1976, the Department of Social Services revised § 275 to allow reimbursement for nontherapeutic abortions without prior authorization or consent. The fact that this revision was made retroactive to January 16, 1976, suggests that the revision was made only for the purpose of interim compliance with the District Court’s judgment and order, which were entered the same date. No suggestion of mootness has been made by any of the parties, and this appeal was taken and submitted on the theory that Connecticut desires to reinstate the invalidated regular tion. Under these circumstances, the subsequent revision of the regulation does not render the case moot. In any event, there would remain the denial of reimbursement to Mary Poe, and similarly situated members of the class, under the prerevision regulation. See 380 F. Supp., at 730 n. 3. The State has asserted no Eleventh Amendment defense to this relief sought by Poe and those whom she represents.

5

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is not to the contrary. There the Court invalidated under the Due Process Clause “certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, including requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of process,” restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for divorce. Id., at 372. The Court held:

“[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society’s hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages.” Id,., at 374. Because Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for terminating pregnancies through abortion the present case is easily distinguished from Boddie. See also United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656 (1973).

6

In eases such as Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956) and Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires States that allow appellate review of criminal convictions to .provide indigent defendants with trial transcripts and appellate counsel. These cases are grounded in the criminal justice system, a governmental monopoly in which participation is compelled. Cf. n. 5, supra. Our subsequent decisions have made it clear that the principles underlying Griffin and Douglas do not extend to legislative classifications generally.

7

A woman has at least an equal right to choose to carry her fetus to term as to choose to abort it. Indeed, the right of procreation without state interference has long been recognized as “one of the basic civil rights of man . . . fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.” Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 17. S. 535, 541 (1942).

8

Appellees rely on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In those cases durational residence requirements for the receipt of public benefits were found to be unconstitutional because they “penalized” the exercise of the constitutional right to travel interstate.

Appellees’ reliance on the penalty analysis of Shapiro and Maricopa County is misplaced. In our view there is only a semantic difference between appellees’ assertion that the Connecticut law unduly interferes with a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy and their assertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most familiar to the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recognized that denial of welfare to one who had recently exercised the right to travel across state fines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to justify strict judicial scrutiny.

If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny might be appropriate under either the penalty analysis or the analysis we have applied in our previous abortion decisions. But the claim here is that the State “penalizes” the woman’s decision to have an abortion by refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right-to-travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling interest for its decision not to fund elective abortions.

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), similarly is inapplicable here. In addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of a constitutionally imposed “governmental obligation of neutrality” originating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Id., at 409.

9

In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), we drew this distinction, in sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on access to the electoral process:

“These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the candidate’s ability to run for office but also on the voter’s ability to voice preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues. In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates is not restrictive of voters’ rights and less restrictive of candidates’. Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice; the inability, if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns will derive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise private contributions. Any disadvantage suffered by operation of the eligibility formulae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denial of- the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate that the -formulae afford eligible candidates.” 424 U. S., at 94^95 (emphasis added; ’footnote-omitted).

10

In his dissenting opinion, MR. Justice Brennan rejects the’distinction, between direct state interference with a protected activity„and,.state .encouragement of an alternative activity and argues that our previous abortion decisions are inconsistent with today’s decision. But as stated above, all of those decisions involved laws that placed substantial státe-created obstacles in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion. Our recent deep sion in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678 (1977), differs only in that it involved state-created restrictions on .access, to contraceptives, rather than abortions. Mr. Justice BRENNAN.jSiinply, asserts-that the Connecticut regulation “is an obvious impairment of the fundamental right established by Roe v. Wade.” Post, at 484-485. The only suggested source for this purportedly “obvious” conclusion.is a.,quotation. from Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 (1976). Yet, as Mr. Justice Blackmun was careful to note at the beginning of his opinion in Singleton, that case presented “issues [of standing] not going to the merits of this dispute.” Id., at 108. Significantly, Mr. Justice Brennan makes no effort to distinguish or explain the much more analogous authority of Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455 (1973).

11

In addition to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State may have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth. Such concerns are basic to the future of the State and in some circumstances could constitute a substantial reason for departure from a position of neutrality between abortion and childbirth.

12

See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 Ya. L. Rev. 945, 998-1017 (1975).

13

Much of the rhetoric of the three dissenting opinions would be equally applicable if Connecticut had elected not to fund either abortions or childbirth. Yet none of the dissents goes so far as to argue that the Constitution requires such assistance for all indigent pregnant women.