OPINION
STRINGER, Justice.
Relator Arturo Alcozer appeals from the dismissal of his claim for workers’ compensation. At the time of his alleged injury, Alcozer and his family were receiving as[697]*697sistance through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. In order to avoid a sanction under AFDC, Alcozer participated in the Polk County Community Work Experience Program (CWEP), which was administered for the county by the Minnesota Department of Economic Security. Alcozer alleged that he was injured while unloading a truck at North Country Food Bank (North Country) in Crookston, Minnesota, a nonprofit organization that had agreed to host Polk County CWEP participants at its facility. Alcozer asserted a workers’ compensation claim against North Country and Polk County. His claim was dismissed by the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry based on its conclusion that Alcozer was not entitled to seek workers’ compensation benefits because he was not an “employee” as defined by Minn.Stat. § 176.011, subd. 9 (2000), and because Minn.Stat. § 256.737, subd. 7 (1996), the Injury Protection Program (IPP), provided the sole remedy for injuries arising out of any community work experience program. On Alcozer’s appeal, the ruling of the compensation judge dismissing his claim on the basis that he was not an employee of either North Country or Polk County was affirmed by the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA).
We affirm.
At the time of the workers’ compensation hearing, Alcozer was divorced with children and had been living in Minnesota since 1985 when he and his family moved from Texas. He worked as a farm laborer, but then turned to public assistance for help. In December 1996, Alcozer and his family were receiving AFDC payments of $1,000 per month.1 Polk County Human Services2 informed Alcozer that in order to avoid sanctions that would reduce his family’s AFDC payments, he would need to participate in work activities.
Polk County contracted with the local Minnesota Department of Economic Security Work Force Center (Work Force Center) to provide job training and placement and administer the state and federal work activity requirements for non-exempt AFDC recipients residing in the county. When first referred to the Work Force Center, AFDC recipients like Alcozer were given an orientation and required to conduct a four-week job search. Alcozer did not secure employment during the first four weeks of his search and was therefore enrolled in CWEP, a program administered by the Work Force Center on behalf of Polk County.
The Polk County CWEP program was operating under Minn.Stat. § 256.737 (1996) which established community work experience programs, authorized by federal legislation,3 to provide AFDC recipients who were unable to secure paid employment the opportunity to gain job skills and comply with work activity requirements by participating in activities at governmental [698]*698or nonprofit social service sites.4 Federal regulations allowed states to “provide worker’s compensation or other comparable protection for CWEP participants,” 45 C.F.R. § 238.18 (1994), thus permitting the establishment of a program in lieu of workers’ compensation for CWEP participants. Accordingly, the purpose of Minnesota’s IPP program was to provide “[p]ayment of any claims resulting from an alleged injury or death of a recipient participating in a community work experience program established and operated by a county * * Minn.Stat. § 256.737, subd. 7.5 The statute authorizing the IPP program further provided:
The procedure established by this section is exclusive of all other legal, equitable, and statutory remedies against the state, its political subdivisions, or employees of the state or its political subdivisions. The claimant shall not be entitled to seek damages from any state, county, tribal, or reservation insurance policy or self-insurance program.
Id., subd. 7(f). The IPP specifically excluded coverage for “pain and suffering, lost wages, or other benefits provided in chapter 176.” Id., subd. 7(e).
When CWEP was developed, the Work Force Center approached North Country and other nonprofit organizations in the community about becoming CWEP sites and helping individuals gain work history. North Country and the Work Force Center signed a “Contractual Agreement” providing that North Country would provide supervision, a safe working environment, and sufficient job duties for CWEP participants at the site. Ron Graham, executive director of North Country, testified before the workers’ compensation judge that he asked whether North Country would be hable if a participant was injured onsite and was told that CWEP was responsible for compensation. He further testified that North Country did not carry Workers’ Compensation insurance on CWEP participants nor would North Country participate in the program if required to carry insurance for CWEP participants, stating that CWEP participants provide “marginal help to us in the first place, and it’s just not something that would make sense to us.” The only reference to responsibility for liability in the agreement signed by North Country and CWEP was North Country’s promise to report any injuries to the Department of Economic Security within seven days.
[699]*699Before participating in work activities through CWEP, Alcozer signed a “CWEP Participant Agreement” in which he agreed to participate in CWEP to avoid sanctions that would reduce his family’s AFDC benefits. Alcozer also signed an IPP medical release form that authorized the exchange of information necessary to process claims under the IPP and provided information about how to file an IPP claim. Alcozer also completed a blank “Application for Employment: CWEP Position” to be provided to the CWEP placement sites where Alcozer decided he might like to work. Alcozer began working at North Country on December 11, 1996. To maintain his full AFDC benefits, Alcozer was required to work 16 hours a week, but the federal authorizing legislation provided that he was not entitled to be paid for his participation.6 Each day when he arrived at the food bank, he would report to the foreman who would document his hours and tell him what to do. Alcozer explained that his work involved unloading trucks, making up food packages, and sweeping. Graham acknowledged that Alcozer provided a benefit to North Country.
Alcozer testified that he was injured while working at the warehouse facility of respondent North Country in Crookston, Minnesota on February 10, 1997. Alcozer stated, “I was lifting a pallet, and it pushed me up against the wall, and then it twisted, and that’s when my arm hit up against the wall.” The initial medical assessment indicated that Alcozer suffered neuropathy from a contusion of the elbow around the ulnar nerve. He received physical therapy, ultrasound, and chiropractic treatments through the spring and summer of 1997. Alcozer continued to experience pain and numbness in his left elbow and three of the fingers on his left hand, and an orthopedic evaluation revealed that he had cubital tunnel syndrome and mild carpal tunnel syndrome. After a submuscular ulnar nerve transposition was performed in December 1997, he no longer suffered from pain in his elbow, but he still experiences numbness in his fingers. His medical bills totaling $3,002.75 were initially paid by the Medical Assistance program.
Under the IPP, any claim for more than $1,000 must be presented to the legislature and payment will be made only if authorized in a bill that passes both houses and is signed by the governor. Minn.Stat. § 256.737, subd. 7(d) (1996).7 Alcozer’s medical bills were brought to the attention of Randy Rennich at the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) who is responsible for assisting counties with investigations of CWEP injury claims, authorizing payments for bills under $1,000, and submitting larger claims to the legislature’s Joint Senate-House Subcommittee on Claims. Rennich testified that to his knowledge there is no judicial review of the legislature’s action, but that all claims presented had been approved and paid.
Rennich arranged for an evaluation of Alcozer’s claim and was subsequently advised that the claims be paid. Rennich [700]*700recommended to the Joint Senate-House Claims Subcommittee that the legislature approve Alcozer’s claim for medical bills. He also advised the subcommittee that Alcozer may be applying for partial permanent disability benefits under the IPP in the future. The bill authorizing payment was passed8 and the Medical Assistance program was reimbursed for Alcozer’s medical expenses. Alcozer has not initiated any claims with the IPP, nor has he personally received any payments from the IPP.
On March 1, 1999, Alcozer filed a workers’ compensation claim listing North Country as his employer and seeking temporary total disability benefits from the date of the injury. On March 31,1999, the DHS filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings on the grounds that it was entitled to reimbursement for medical and subsistence payments made on behalf of Alcozer from the Medical Assistance program and AFDC. No action was taken on the motion. On September 27, a compensation judge issued a summary decision dismissing Alcozer’s claim petition on the basis that Alcozer was not an employee of North Country, Polk County, or the State of Minnesota. Alcozer objected to the decision by requesting a formal hearing. Following the hearing, the compensation judge again dismissed Alcozer’s claim. The judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Alcozer was not an employee or a voluntary uncompensated worker under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The judge did not address Alcozer’s arguments that the IPP is unconstitutional.
Alcozer appealed to the WCCA, which affirmed the findings and order of the compensation judge. The WCCA concluded that Alcozer was not working under a contract for hire on the basis that Alcozer’s benefits would not increase if he worked more than 16 hours a week. The WCCA stated that it would not reverse the compensation judge absent “a more definitive contract for receipt of wages or other benefits more proportionate to his work.” The court also concluded that Alcozer was not a voluntary uncompensated worker because there was no evidence that he would have volunteered for North Country if he had not been under an obligation to do so in order to receive his AFDC benefits. The court did not address the impact of the exclusive remedy provisions of the IPP nor did it evaluate Alcozer’s constitutional arguments.
On appeal to this court, Alcozer argues that he should be able to maintain an action for workers’ compensation benefits because the IPP is not the exclusive remedy for injured CWEP participants and because he was an employee of North Country under the definition of “employee” provided in the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act, Minn.Stat. § 176.011, subd. 9.9 Alcozer maintains that the IPP’s exclusive remedy provision at Minn.Stat. § 256.737, subd. 7(f) does not apply to North Country because it is not the state, a political subdivision of the state, or an employee of the state or its political subdivisions. Alcozer argues that he performed valuable services for North Country in exchange for a portion of his AFDC benefits and that this court has held that an employment relationship can be present regardless of whether wages are paid to the worker. Cristello v. Township of Irondale, 195 Minn. 264, 265, 262 N.W. 632, 633 (1935) (finding employment relation[701]*701ship remained intact even during period in which employee was providing employer services in exchange for repayment of debt). Alcozer further asserts that because payment of his AFDC benefits was dependent upon his work, he was receiving valuable consideration for his work. See 3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 64.04 (2000) (stating that “a laborer whose receipt of payment is dependent on and in proportion to his or her labor should be considered an employee”). Al-cozer cites to cases from other jurisdictions holding that public welfare recipients engaging in work activities as part of the receipt of benefits are employees and, specifically, that they are employees of those agencies and organizations that control their daily work assignments. See Dagen v. Village of Baldwin, 183 Mich.App. 484, 455 N.W.2d 318 (1990); Chichester School Dist v. W.C.A.B., 140 Pa.Cmwlth. 224, 592 A.2d 774 (1991). In the alternative, Alcozer argues that he is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because the Workers’ Compensation Act applies to “a voluntary uncompensated worker participating in a program established by a local social services agency.” Minn.Stat. § 176.011, subd. 9(10) (2000). In support of this argument, Alcozer points out that he voluntarily participated in the CWEP program organized by the local social service agency and that he was uncompensated.
Alcozer further asserts that if the IPP does provide the exclusive remedy, it is unconstitutional because it does not constitute an adequate alternative to common law remedies for injuries to employees in violation of Minn. Const. art. 1, § 8, which provides that every person is entitled to a remedy for personal injuries. He also claims that if it is the exclusive remedy, the IPP would violate the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const, art. 1, § 7. Alcozer compares the benefits available under the Workers’ Compensation Act and the IPP and concludes that the IPP does not provide comparable benefits because it does not sufficiently cover loss of future earning capacity. He cites a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court holding that coverage for injured CWEP participants was inadequate because it fell below the protection afforded by the state workers’ compensation act, violating Kansas law. See Gamblian v. City of Parsons, 261 Kan. 541, 931 P.2d 1238, 1246 (1997). Al-cozer further argues that the IPP provides insufficient procedural due process because he did not receive formal notification of a hearing and there is no judicial review or appeal process.
North Country, Polk County and DHS (hereinafter collectively referred to as respondents) deny that Alcozer was an employee or voluntary uncompensated worker, and argue that the IPP’s exclusive remedy provision precludes any recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Act and that the IPP is constitutional.
I.
On review, we will not disturb the factual findings of a compensation judge unless they are manifestly contrary to the evidence presented. Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 60 (Minn.1984). We review questions of law de novo. Kliniski v. Southdale Manor, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 7, 9 (Minn.1994).
Alcozer argues that by agreeing to be a host organization for CWEP participants seeking work experience, North Country became an employer of participants such as Alcozer and is subject to suit under the workers’ compensation statutes, despite the exclusive remedy provision of [702]*702the IPP.10 It is undisputed that under the exclusive remedy provision of the IPP, the state and its political subdivisions are not subject to suit by a CWEP participant, but Alcozer argues that the exclusive remedy provision is to be read narrowly to allow suit against non-governmental entities participating in CWEP.
We disagree. Alcozer was participating in a program administered and operated by Polk County, an entity that is unquestionably a political subdivision. The provision in Minn.Stat. § 256.737, subd. 7 that IPP is to pay “any” claims clearly indicates that Minnesota opted, as allowed by federal regulations, to provide the IPP in place of statutory workers’ compensation for CWEP participants. The interpretation urged on us by Alcozer would lead to the bizarre result that IPP is the exclusive remedy for CWEP participants at governmental sites and CWEP participants at non-governmental sites could access both IPP and workers’ compensation benefits. We do not believe the legislature intended to make such an arbitrary distinction.
Further, narrowly interpreting the exclusive remedy provision of the IPP as urged by Alcozer would distort the nature of North Country’s role in the program and ignore the federal regulatory scheme in which the IPP was enacted. A central goal of welfare reform and the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) has been to promote self-sufficiency. The CWEP program is designed to engage participants in meaningful work activities that will enhance the participant’s employ-ability. Minn.Stat. § 256.737, subd. 1 (1996). If the IPP is disregarded and CWEP participants are permitted to bring workers’ compensation actions against non-governmental placement sites, a substantial negative impact on the availability of worksites willing to host CWEP participants who need work experience is predictable. Surely the legislature enacted the IPP to further the goals of the CWEP program, not to hinder counties’ efforts to secure program sites for participants.
II.
Next, we consider Alcozer’s argument that he is an employee of North Country for purposes of workers’ compensation. The Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act defines an employee as “any person who performs services for another for hire * * *.” Minn.Stat. § 176.011, subd. 9. The definition also includes “a voluntary uncompensated worker participating in a program established by a local social services agency.” Id., subd. 9(10).
North Country provided a service to Polk County and Alcozer by allowing the county-administered CWEP program to place Alcozer at its facility to gain work skills and experience. Alcozer was given the opportunity to engage in work activities at North Country through the CWEP program to permit him to comply with the work requirements of his family’s welfare grant. He did not seek employment' at North Country, nor did North Country attempt to hire him, and he was never paid by North Country.
The dissent relies on prior case law that is clearly distinguishable. To the extent that the dissent relies on Miller v. Federated Mutual Ins. Co., the central issue there was the interpretation of automobile insurance exclusion language,11 not the [703]*703statute in question here. 264 N.W.2d 681 (Minn.1978). Further, the only protection for the program participant in Miller was through the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for the federal program— there was no statutory language requiring that a compensation system such as the IPP provide the exclusive remedy for program-related injuries.
Unlike the eases referenced by the dissent in which employment may be found where a worker receives room and board or the use of a car in exchange for services provided,12 or where wages earned were devoted to the reduction of a preexisting obligation,13 Alcozer was required to report to North Country for 16 hours a week to avoid reduction of his family’s welfare grant. Welfare is allocated on the basis of eligibility rather than the labor contributed in work skills programs. It would be impossible to attribute a monetary value to Alcozer’s efforts at North Country, as the entire sanction for noncompliance would be imposed if Alcozer failed to fulfill any of the requirements. See Minn.Stat. § 256.736, subd. 4(6) (1996). The use of sanctions to motivate recipients to engage in activities that will increase their employ-ability in today’s welfare system should not be confused with paid employment. Alcozer was not earning the cash portion of his family’s welfare benefits through an employment relationship — he was responding to incentives built into the current welfare rules and taking advantage of a program designed to assist him in moving his family out of public assistance.
The 1995 federal legislation authorizing CWEP provided:
Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed as authorizing the payment of aid to families with dependent children as compensation for work performed, nor shall a participant be entitled to a salary or to any other work or training expense provided under any other provision of law by reason of his participation in a program under this subsection.
42 U.S.C. § 682(f)(1)(C) (1995). This language leaves no doubt about congressional intent that welfare benefits are not to be construed as wages14 and that participation in CWEP programs does not constitute employment. The AFDC and CWEP programs were repealed at the federal level in August of 1996, before Alcozer’s injury, in favor of more latitude for states to design their own programs for the support of families with children; the Minnesota legislature created the IPP in the context of that federal language. The legislature clearly did not intend that the exclusive remedy clause of the IPP except CWEP participants like Alcozer or that an employment relationship be created between Alcozer and North Country simply [704]*704because North Country is a non-governmental site. We affirm the determination of the WCCA that Aleozer was not an employee of Polk County or North Country, or a voluntary uncompensated worker.
III.
Aleozer also presents arguments that Minn.Stat. § 256.737 is unconstitutional. Specifically, he maintains that the exclusive remedy provision of the IPP deprives him of his right to seek a remedy for his injury in violation of Minn. Const, art. 1, § 8, that the IPP provides insufficient procedural due process, and that denial of the benefits available under the Workers’ Compensation Act or common law actions is a denial of equal protection in violation of U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 and Minn. Const. art. 1, § 2.
As to his assertion that because the IPP does not provide the same benefits available to workers covered by workers’ compensation, the IPP fails to provide a constitutionally sufficient remedy for Alcozer’s injury, in Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc. we held that: “The purpose of [Minn. Const. art. 1, § 8] is to protect common law rights and remedies for which the legislature has not provided a reasonable substitute.” 396 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn.1986).15 In Breimhorst v. Beckman, we recognized that the guaranty of a certain remedy in the law refers to general fundamental principles of justice and that the court must grant the legislature “wide latitude” to address public needs through legislation and determine “both the form and the measure of the remedy for a wrong.” 227 Minn. 409, 435, 35 N.W.2d 719, 735 (1949) (citation omitted). We weighed the disadvantages of the Workers’ Compensation Act against its advantages, noting that in exchange for the surrender of the right to damages for injuries that do not affect employability in certain instances, the legislature imposed strict liability upon employers which provide “a certainty of compensatory relief, without the delay of litigation and without regard to any negligence or assumption of risk” on the part of the employee. 227 Minn. at 436, 35 N.W.2d at 735.
The IPP need not provide a legislative substitution for each potential common law action or defense to be constitutional. See Parson v. Holman Erection Co., Inc., 428 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Minn.1988) (upholding a challenged provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act noting that a “one-to-one balance” for abrogated common law rights is not necessary to avoid a violation of Article 1, Section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution). Like the Workers’ Compensation Act, the IPP replaces common law actions for tort with statutorily mandated recovery of the participant’s medical bills and readily ascertainable permanent partial disability benefits and death benefits that are obtainable without the risks inherent in litigation. MinmStat. § 256.737, subd. 7(e) (1996). It was not enacted for the same purpose as workers’ compensation however, and need not be identical. CWEP participants receive financial support through public assistance, their medical care is reimbursed through public assistance programs, and a number of statutory programs for the support of the disabled are available if they are to become totally disabled. The IPP program complies with regulations requiring coverage for CWEP participants, ensures that medical costs are not incorrectly [705]*705billed to other publicly funded health care programs, and obviates the need for participants to hire counsel, investigate and litigate their claims. Minn.Stat. § 256.737, subd. 7(b)-(d) (1996) (placing the burden on the county and state to investigate the injury and submit the claim to the legislative subcommittee on claims).
Regarding Alcozer’s equal protection claim, the classification here providing the exclusive remedy for CWEP participants seeking damages for program-related injuries through the IPP and the exclusive remedy for employees through workers’ compensation is constitutional as long as the classification applies uniformly to all those similarly situated, is necessitated by genuine and substantial distinctions between the groups, and effectuates the purpose of the law. Nelson v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 305 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Minn.1981). The Workers’ Compensation Act applies to “any person who performs services for hire.” Minn.Stat. § 176.011, subd. 9. The IPP similarly applies to all participants in the CWEP programs identified as “nonexempt caretakers in AFDC UP households” who are “participat[ing] in meaningful work experience and training” to develop marketable job skills and comply with work activity requirements and thereby avoid sanctions. Minn.Stat. § 256.737, subd. 1. Thus, the IPP applies uniformly to a specific group of individuals who are similarly situated by reason of their participation in CWEP.
The legislative classification is necessitated by the unique needs of CWEP participants to gain access to work opportunities that will assist them in entering the work force to earn wages and become self-sufficient, as distinguished from the needs of employees already in the work force for protection from wage loss due to injury on the job. The genuine and substantial distinction between the two groups justifies the application of different rules for the remedy of injuries, and the legislative distinction made between employees and CWEP participants is not arbitrary.
We have held it is proper to defer to the legislature in matters “concerning the desirability of statutory classifications affecting the regulation of economic activity and the distribution of economic benefits.” Tibbetts v. Leech Lake Reservation Bus. Comm., 397 N.W.2d 883, 890 (Minn.1986) (quoting Idaho Dep’t of Employ. v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100, 101, 98 S.Ct. 327, 54 L.Ed.2d 324 (1977) (internal citations omitted)). The purpose of the IPP is to provide an adequate remedy for injured CWEP participants who by definition are low-income persons participating in work requirements to avoid welfare sanction and are not earning wages. To that end the IPP provides payment for medical expenses associated with injury, permanent partial disability benefits, and death benefits in a simple and straightforward manner, with a minimum of bureaucratic hassle or need for the participant to seek legal representation or engage in an investigation of the claim. Alcozer’s request for compensation of hypothetical future wage loss is more appropriately addressed to the legislature, as it has no bearing on the question of whether a program designed to compensate non-wage-earners for injury is meeting those needs.
Turning last to Alcozer’s due process claim,16 deprivation of a protected property interest must be demonstrated. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 [706]*706L.Ed.2d 130 (1999) (“The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’ ”). Aleozer has received medical care for his injury, his medical bills of approximately $3,000 have been fully reimbursed by the program, and Aleozer is not prevented from pursuing a claim for permanent partial disability benefits if he so chooses. As we have previously recognized, “the expectation of workers’ compensation benefits is not equivalent to a vested property right * * *.” Lindell v. Oak Park Coop. Creamery, 369 N.W.2d 505, 507 (Minn.1985) (citation omitted). Aleozer did not have a reasonable expectation of the benefits provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act because he was not an employee, and he has thus far received benefits for the care of his injuries under the IPP. Because he has failed to demonstrate deprivation of a protected property interest, his due process claim fails.
We affirm the WCCA and hold that Aleozer was not an employee nor a voluntary uncompensated worker of North Country on the date of his injury for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act. We also hold that Minn.Stat. § 256.737 is constitutional and that it provides Alcozer’s exclusive remedy for the injury allegedly received in conjunction with work activity through the CWEP program.
Affirmed.