Idaho Department of Employment v. Smith

434 U.S. 100, 98 S. Ct. 327, 54 L. Ed. 2d 324, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 156
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedDecember 5, 1977
Docket76-1291
StatusPublished
Cited by82 cases

This text of 434 U.S. 100 (Idaho Department of Employment v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Idaho Department of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100, 98 S. Ct. 327, 54 L. Ed. 2d 324, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 156 (1977).

Opinions

Per Curiam.

Petitioner challenges a ruling of the Idaho Supreme Court that the denial of unemployment benefits to otherwise eligible persons who attend school during the day violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Idaho Code § 72-1312 (a) (1973) states that “no person shall be deemed to be unemployed while he is attending a regular established school excluding night school . . . The Idaho Supreme Court held that this provision impermissibly discriminates between those unemployed persons who attend night school and those who attend school during the day and that petitioner could not constitutionally deny unemployment benefits to an otherwise eligible person such as respondent whose attendance at daytime classes would not interfere with employment in her usual occupation and did not affect her availability for full-[101]*101time work. We grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Idaho Supreme Court.

The holding below misconstrues the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause in the field of social welfare and economics. This Court has consistently deferred to legislative determinations concerning the desirability of statutory classifications affecting the regulation of economic activity and the distribution of economic benefits. “If the classification has some 'reasonable basis/ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ ” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970), quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911). See also Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307 (1976); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181 (1976); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972). The legislative classification at issue here passes this test. It was surely rational for the Idaho Legislature to conclude that daytime employment is far more plentiful than nighttime work and, consequently, that attending school during daytime hours imposes a greater restriction upon obtaining full-time employment than does attending school at night. In a world of limited resources, a State may legitimately extend unemployment benefits only to those who are willing to maximize their employment potential by not restricting their availability during the day by attending school. Moreover, the classification serves as a predictable and convenient means for distinguishing between those who are likely to be students primarily and part-time workers only secondarily and thus ineligible for unemployment compensation and those who are primarily full-time workers and students only secondarily without the necessity of making costly individual eligibility determinations which would deplete available resources. The fact that the classification is imperfect and that the availability of some students desiring full-time [102]*102employment may not be substantially impaired by their attendance at daytime classes does not, under the cases cited supra, render the statute invalid under the United States Constitution.

Reversed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

More v. Department of Retirement Systems
137 P.3d 73 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2006)
Alcozer v. North Country Food Bank
635 N.W.2d 695 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 2001)
State, Dept. of Ins. v. Keys Title
741 So. 2d 599 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1999)
Barton v. Ducci Electrical Contractors, Inc.
730 A.2d 1149 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1999)
Leavitt v. Jane L.
518 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Texas Workers' Compensation Commission v. Garcia
893 S.W.2d 504 (Texas Supreme Court, 1995)
Haney v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau
518 N.W.2d 195 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1994)
Buckwald v. Board of Review
632 A.2d 548 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1993)
Podberesky v. Kirwan
764 F. Supp. 364 (D. Maryland, 1991)
Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co.
791 P.2d 1285 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1990)
Sonneman v. Knight
790 P.2d 702 (Alaska Supreme Court, 1990)
Idaho State Tax Commission v. Railbox Co.
788 P.2d 180 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1989)
Lee v. Job Service North Dakota
440 N.W.2d 518 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1989)
Faraci v. Connecticut Light & Power Co.
558 A.2d 234 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1989)
Tibbetts v. Leech Lake Reservation Business Committee
397 N.W.2d 883 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
434 U.S. 100, 98 S. Ct. 327, 54 L. Ed. 2d 324, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 156, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/idaho-department-of-employment-v-smith-scotus-1977.