Hewitt v. United States

606 U.S. 419

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: June 26, 2025
• Docket: 23-1002
• Status: Published

Opinion

PRELIMINARY PRINT

Volume 606 U. S. Part 1 Pages 419–460

OFFICIAL REPORTS OF

THE SUPREME COURT June 26, 2025

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. OCTOBER TERM, 2024 419

Syllabus

HEWITT v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fth circuit No. 23–1002. Argued January 13, 2025—Decided June 26, 2025* Before the First Step Act was enacted in 2018, federal judges were re- quired to sentence frst-time offenders convicted of violating 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)—a law that criminalizes possessing a frearm while committing other crimes—to “stacked” 25-year periods of incarceration. The First Step Act eliminated this harsh mandatory minimum penalty. Section 403(b) of the Act also made its more lenient penalties partially retroac- tive. Specifcally, if a sentence “has not been imposed” upon an eligible § 924(c) offender as of the date of the First Step Act's enactment, the Act applies. The question presented here concerns an edge case: What penalties apply when a § 924(c) offender had been sentenced as of the Act's enactment, but that sentence was subsequently vacated, such that the offender must face a post-Act resentencing? In 2009, petitioners Tony Hewitt, Corey Duffey, and Jarvis Ross were convicted of multiple counts of bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery, along with corresponding § 924(c) offenses for use of a frearm during a crime of violence. Each petitioner received a manda- tory 5-year sentence for his frst § 924(c) count of conviction and, despite being frst-time offenders, each received 25-year mandatory sentences on every § 924(c) count beyond his frst. Thus, each petitioner's sen- tence exceeded 325 years. Petitioners successfully challenged some of their convictions on direct appeal, and the Fifth Circuit vacated petition- ers' sentences. In 2012, the District Court resentenced each petitioner to between 285 and 305 years on the counts that remained. In 2019, the Court held that the “crime of violence” defnition the Government routinely used to support some § 924(c) convictions was un- constitutionally vague. See United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 470. Because that holding potentially affected some of petitioners' remaining convictions, the Fifth Circuit granted petitioners authorization to fle a second or successive postconviction motion. The District Court then vacated the impacted § 924(c) convictions, as well as petitioners' sen- tences. When the District Court held resentencings for the remaining convictions, petitioners argued that the First Step Act's 5-year—not 25- year—mandatory minimum penalties applied. Petitioners argued they

*Together with No. 23–1150, Duffey et al. v. United States, also on cer- tiorari to the same court. 420 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

were entitled to retroactive application of the Act's more lenient penal- ties because a vacated prior sentence is not a sentence that “has . . . been imposed” for purposes of § 403(b). The District Court disagreed and resentenced petitioners under the pre-Act sentencing scheme, giv- ing them stacked 25-year mandatory minimums for each § 924(c) count of conviction beyond their frst. Petitioners thus each received sen- tences of 130 years or more. On appeal, petitioners and the Government agreed that the First Step Act should have applied at petitioners' resentencings. The Fifth Cir- cuit denied their joint request for vacatur. In that court's view, § 403(b) applies only “to defendants for whom `a sentence . . . ha[d] not been imposed' as of the enactment date.” 92 F. 4th 304, 310. Because each petitioner had been sentenced (twice) prior to the Act's enactment, the panel concluded that petitioners were not eligible for the First Step Act's more lenient mandatory minimums. Held: The judgment is reversed, and the cases are remanded. 92 F. 4th 304, reversed and remanded. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, concluding that under § 403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence “has . . . been imposed” for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant—i. e., has not been vacated. Thus, the Act's more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act's enactment. Pp. 427–433. (a) The text of § 403(b) and the nature of vacatur support this conclu- sion. Congress employed the present-perfect tense, requiring evalua- tion of whether “a sentence . . . has . . . been imposed” upon the defend- ant, rather than the past-perfect tense that would exclude anyone upon whom a sentence “had” been imposed. The present-perfect tense can refer to “an act, state, or condition that is now completed” or “a past action that comes up to and touches the present” and thus con- veys that the event in question continues to be true or valid. The Chi- cago Manual of Style § 5.132, p. 268. When used in either sense, the present-perfect tense addresses whether something has continuing rele- vance to the present, not merely whether it occurred as a historical fact. If an event is merely a relic of history because it was voided by a subsequent action, the past-perfect (not the present-perfect) tense is usually the more appropriate verb choice. The fact that adjacent provisions of § 403 contain past-tense verbs only strengthens the conclu- sion that § 403(b)'s use of the present-perfect tense is meaningful. Pp. 427–431. Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 421

(b) Background principles regarding the legal effect of vacatur con- frm that a sentence has been imposed for § 403(b) purposes only so long as it remains valid. When interpreting statutes, the Court recognizes that Congress legislates against the backdrop of certain unexpressed presumptions. One such presumption is that vacated court orders are void ab initio and thus lack any prospective legal effect. A criminal defendant whose conviction has been vacated, for example, is to be treated going forward as though he were never convicted. By opera- tion of legal fction, the law acts as though the previous conviction never occurred. Section 403(b) refects this commonsense understanding of background vacatur principles. Just as defendants with vacated prior felony convictions are not precluded from possessing weapons under the federal felon-in-possession ban, § 403(b) retroactivity does not exclude from its scope those whose prior sentences were vacated. By authoriz- ing retroactive application of the First Step Act's more lenient penalties on any eligible offender upon whom “a sentence . . . has not been imposed,” the text of § 403(b) indicates that only past sentences with continued validity preclude application of the Act's new penalties. Pp. 431–433.

Page II, and III, inProof Pending Publication Jackson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gor- such, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., joined. Alito, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined, post, p. 440.

Michael B. Kimberly argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs for petitioner Hewitt were Paul W. Hughes, Sarah P. Hogarth, Andrew A. Lyons- Berg, Charles Seidell, Eugene R. Fidell, and Charles A. Rothfeld. Jo-Ann Tamila Sagar, Neal Kumar Katyal, Mi- chael J. West, Dana A. Raphael, Vivek Jampala, John Tor- rey Hunter, and Kevin B. Ross fled briefs for petitioner Duf- fey et al. Masha G. Hansford argued the cause for the United States in both cases as respondent in support of petitioners. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Prelogar, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Argentieri, Deputy So- licitor General Feigin, and Andrew C. Noll. 422 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Michael H. McGinley, by invitation of the Court, 603 U. S. 939, argued the cause and fled a brief as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. With him on the brief were Steven A. Engel, M. Scott Proctor, and Brian A. Kulp.† Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, ex- cept as to Parts IV and V.‡ Before the First Step Act was enacted in 2018, federal judges were required to sentence certain frst-time offenders convicted of violating 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)—a law that crimi- nalizes the possession of a frearm while committing other crimes—to “stacked” 25-year periods of incarceration. The First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194, eliminated this harsh manda- tory minimum penalty. Congress also made the Act's more lenient penalties partially retroactive. Section 403(b) speci- fes that the Act applies if a sentence “has not been imposed”

upon an eligible § 924(c) offender as of the date of the First Step Act's enactment. Id., at 5222. The question presented here concerns an edge case: What penalties apply when a § 924(c) offender had been sentenced

†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the District of Columbia et al. by Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General of the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Sean Frazzette, Assistant Attor- ney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Andrea J. Campbell of Massachusetts, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Letitia James of New York, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, and Charity R. Clark of Vermont; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Kevin Poloncarz, Barbara E. Bergman, Clark M. Neily III, Shana-Tara O'Toole, David D. Cole, Mary Price, Emma Andersson, Nathan Freed Wessler, Yasmin Cader, and Cecillia D. Wang; and for Sen. Richard J. Durbin et al. by Brent J. Gurney. ‡The Chief Justice and Justice Gorsuch join all but Parts IV and V of this opinion. Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 423

as of the Act's enactment, but that sentence was subse- quently vacated, such that the offender must face a post- Act resentencing? We hold that, under that circumstance, a sentence “has not been imposed” for purposes of § 403(b). Thus, the First Step Act's more lenient penalties apply.

I Title 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) criminalizes the use or possession of a frearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug-traffcking offense. The statute prescribes a 5-year mandatory minimum penalty for any first-time offense, which must run consecutively to any other term of imprison- ment. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (c)(1)(D)(ii). Before the First Step Act, § 924(c) also contained a recidivism enhancement that required imposition of an additional 25 years of imprison- ment (on top of the 5-year mandatory minimum) for any “second or subsequent conviction under this subsection.” § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2006 ed.). In Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129 (1993), this Court interpreted that recidivism-related language to require an enhanced penalty for each and every § 924(c) count of convic- tion beyond a defendant's frst—even if those convictions were part of the same criminal prosecution. Id., at 132–137. As a result, a frst-time offender convicted of two § 924(c) counts would receive a mandatory 25-year sentence on the second count, “stacked” upon (i. e., running consecutively to) the frst count's mandatory 5-year sentence, for a total of 30 years of imprisonment.1 And each additional § 924(c) count would add another 25 years to that defendant's total term of incarceration. See id., at 131–132. Under this “stacking” interpretation of § 924(c)'s recidivism enhancement, sen- 1 When this Court decided Deal in 1993, the enhanced mandatory mini- mum penalty under § 924(c) was 20 years. See 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) (1988 ed.). Congress increased the mandatory minimum to 25 years in 1998. See § 924(c) (1994 ed., Supp. IV); 112 Stat. 3469. 424 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

tences for § 924(c) offenses ballooned rapidly to span decades or even centuries. On December 21, 2018, a supermajority of Congress enacted the First Step Act, a landmark piece of legislation that changed the federal criminal-sentencing system in nu- merous respects. See 132 Stat. 5194. Among other things, § 403(a) of the First Step Act “clarif[ed]” that district court judges are not required to impose stacked 25-year sentences when sentencing frst-time § 924(c) offenders. Id., at 5221– 5222 (capitalization deleted). Abrogating this Court's deci- sion in Deal, the statute established instead that, for frst- time offenders, 5-year mandatory minimums apply to each count of conviction. The First Step Act also addressed the potential for retro- active application of this penalty reduction, by specifcally identifying the § 924(c) offenders to whom the Act applied. Ordinarily, because judges impose sentences based on the

statutory penalties that exist at the time defendants commit their offenses, 1 U. S. C. § 109, statutory changes to federal penalties only beneft future offenders. But Congress al- tered this default no-retroactivity rule in the Act itself. Section 403(b)—titled “Applicability to Pending Cases”—made § 403(a)'s reduced penalties applicable to cer- tain existing § 924(c) offenders, as follows: “This section, and the amendments made by this section, shall apply to any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the of- fense has not been imposed as of such date of enact- ment.” § 403(b), 132 Stat. 5222.

II In 2009, petitioners Tony Hewitt, Corey Duffey, and Jarvis Ross were convicted of multiple counts of bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery, along with correspond- ing § 924(c) offenses for use of a frearm during a crime of Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 425

violence. Each petitioner received a mandatory 5-year sen- tence as to their frst § 924(c) count of conviction. And, de- spite being frst-time offenders, each received 25-year man- datory sentences on every § 924(c) count beyond their frst. Thus, in total, each petitioner's sentence exceeded 325 years. Roughly 25 of those years were due to the robbery offenses themselves, while the rest were attributable to stacked § 924(c) counts. Petitioners successfully challenged some of their convic- tions on direct appeal, and the Fifth Circuit accordingly va- cated petitioners' sentences.2 In 2012, the District Court resentenced each petitioner to between 285 and 305 years on the counts that remained—sentences that the Fifth Circuit affrmed on direct review. Petitioners also fled postconvic- tion motions under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, which were each denied. After Congress passed the First Step Act in 2018, this

Court held that the “crime of violence” defnition the Gov- ernment routinely used to support some § 924(c) convictions was unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 470 (2019). Because that holding potentially affected some of petitioners' remaining convictions, the Fifth Circuit granted petitioners authorization to fle a second or successive postconviction motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. The District Court then vacated the impacted § 924(c) convic- tions, as well as petitioners' sentences. When the District Court held resentencings for the re- maining convictions, petitioners argued that the First Step Act's 5-year—not 25-year—mandatory minimum penalties applied. Petitioners argued that they were entitled to ret- roactive application of the First Step Act's more lenient pen-

2 Petitioners were initially convicted of attempted bank robbery, too. Those convictions—along with the corresponding § 924(c) counts—were vacated following petitioners' successful challenges on direct appeal. See United States v. Duffey, 456 Fed. Appx. 434, 444–445 (CA5 2012). 426 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

alties because a vacated prior sentence is not a sentence that “has . . . been imposed” for purposes of § 403(b).3 The Dis- trict Court disagreed and resentenced petitioners under the pre-Act sentencing scheme, giving them stacked 25-year mandatory minimum sentences for each § 924(c) count of con- viction beyond their frst. Petitioners thus each received sentences of 130 years or more—105 years of which were attributable to stacked § 924(c) penalties. On appeal, petitioners and the Government agreed that the First Step Act should have applied at petitioners' resen- tencings. The parties thus jointly requested vacatur of peti- tioners' sentences, which the Fifth Circuit denied. 92 F. 4th 304, 310 (2024) (case below). In that court's view, § 403(b) applies only “to defendants for whom `a sentence . . . ha[d] not been imposed' as of the enactment date.” Ibid. (alter- ation in original). Because each petitioner had been sen- tenced (twice) prior to the Act's enactment, the panel con-

cluded that petitioners were not eligible for the First Step Act's more lenient mandatory minimums. We granted certiorari to decide whether § 403(b) of the First Step Act confers the beneft of the Act's more lenient penalties to defendants facing post-Act resentencing follow- ing vacatur of their pre-Act sentence. 603 U. S. 904 (2024).4 3 During Duffey's and Ross's resentencings before the District Court, the Government maintained that petitioners were ineligible for First Step Act relief. But, by the time of Hewitt's resentencing, the Government had changed its position; it supported Hewitt's request for resentencing under the Act. 4 The Courts of Appeals have divided over whether offenders who were sentenced pre-Act, but whose sentences were later vacated, are eligible to receive First Step Act benefts at their post-Act resentencing. Compare United States v. Merrell, 37 F. 4th 571, 577–578 (CA9 2022) (holding that, under § 403(b), such an offender benefts from the Act at resentencing), and United States v. Mitchell, 38 F. 4th 382, 386–389 (CA3 2022) (same), with United States v. Jackson, 995 F. 3d 522, 525–526 (CA6 2021) (holding that such an offender does not beneft from the Act at resentencing, if the prior sentence was vacated after the Act's enactment); see also United States v. Uriarte, 975 F. 3d 596, 601–602, and n. 3 (CA7 2020) (en banc) Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 427

Because the United States agrees with petitioners on the merits of their appeals, the Court appointed Michael H. Mc- Ginley as amicus curiae to defend the judgment below. 603 U. S. 939 (2024). He has ably discharged his responsibilities. III The Fifth Circuit held, and amicus and the dissent con- tend, that § 403(b) excludes any defendant who was sen- tenced prior to the enactment date of the First Step Act— even if his sentence was later vacated. That is so, in their view, because the Act applies only “if a sentence for the of- fense has not been imposed as of ” the Act's enactment date, and a sentence “has . . . been imposed” upon that defendant as a matter of historical fact. 132 Stat. 5222 (emphasis added). But based on the text of § 403(b) and the nature of vacatur, we conclude that a sentence has been imposed for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is ex-

tant—i. e., has not been vacated. A To understand why this is so, focus frst on the language Congress used. Most notably, the operative phrase is not written in the past-perfect tense, excluding anyone upon whom a sentence “had” been imposed. Rather, Congress employed the present-perfect tense—thereby requiring eval- uation of whether “a sentence . . . has . . . been imposed” upon the defendant. § 403(b), 132 Stat. 5222 (emphasis added). In this context, that distinction makes a difference. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U. S. 329, 333 (1992) (“Con- gress' use of a verb tense is signifcant in construing statutes”). The present-perfect tense can refer to either (1) “an act, state, or condition that is now completed” or (2) “a past ac-

(holding that such an offender benefts from the Act if his sentence was vacated prior to the Act's enactment date, but reserving judgment as to postenactment vacatur). 428 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

tion that comes up to and touches the present.” The Chi- cago Manual of Style § 5.132, p. 268 (17th ed. 2017) (emphasis added). But when used in either sense, the tense simultane- ously “involves reference to both past and present.” R. Huddleston & G. Pullum, The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language 143 (2002). That is, while “the primary focus is on the present,” the past maintains “ `current rele- vance.' ” Ibid. (confrming that the present-perfect tense addresses “a time-span beginning in the past and extending up to now”).5 Thus, one might employ the present-perfect tense to describe situations “involv[ing] a specifc change of state” that produces a “continuing result.” Id., at 145 (bold- face deleted). Here is an example. Suppose the U. S. Olympic Commit- tee enacted a rule stating that athletes may call themselves Olympic champions if a gold medal “has been awarded” to them. Pursuant to that rule, a U. S. sprinter who took frst

place in the 2016 Summer Olympics' 100-meter fnals could validly proclaim—today—that she is “an Olympic champion.” The existence of her win as a historical event triggers the rule's proper application, because it gives rise to the infer- ence that the athlete remains an Olympic gold medalist at present, thereby justifying her continued use of the “Olympic champion” title. See ibid. (explaining that the relevant “connection with the present” here would be “that the resul- tant state still obtains now”).

5 A primary faw of the dissent's textual argument is its failure to ap- preciate that, under either meaning of the present perfect, the event in question must relate to now. In other words, while the dissent accurately observes that the present-perfect tense can be used in one of two ways, see post, at 443 (opinion of Alito, J.), it ignores that neither refers to circumstances that are wholly in the past. What makes this the present- perfect tense is that, in each of its manifestations, there exists a connec- tion to the present. See Huddleston, Cambridge Grammar of the English Language, at 143 (confrming that references “to times wholly before now”—when the present “is explicitly or implicitly excluded”—are largely “incompatible with the present perfect”). Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 429

But now imagine that the Olympic Committee stripped this sprinter of her medal after discovering that she used performance-enhancing drugs during the competition. Can that athlete, under the rule, still call herself an Olympic champion? The answer is no. Yes, she had been awarded such a medal, but it was revoked; the fact that she stood on the podium and was declared the winner in 2016 is inapposite for purposes of establishing whether she qualifies for Olympic-champion bragging rights under the rule today.6 When used in this way, the present-perfect tense conveys to a listener that the event in question continues to be true or valid. The dissent counters that, for purposes of the First Step Act, the relevant moment of analysis should not be the present, but rather the statute's date of enactment. See post, at 444. But that reframing is inconsistent with normal understandings of the present-perfect tense, which by defnition focuses on the present.7 Today, if an event is merely a relic of history because it was voided by a subse- quent action, the past-perfect (not the present-perfect) tense

6 The dissent does not dispute that a sprinter who is divested of her gold medal no longer qualifes as an “Olympic champion” under the hypothetical rule. Nor does the dissent contest that, if the Committee wanted such a disqualifed sprinter to be able to still claim the title, it could phrase the rule in the past-perfect tense to accomplish that result (i. e., bestowing the honorifc if a gold medal “had been awarded” to the athlete). The dissent's primary response to this hypothetical is, instead, to zero in on “[t]he obvious purpose of the hypothetical rule” and to explain that “the meaning of language is heavily dependent on context.” Post, at 449, n. 3. Part IV of this opinion fully addresses the context of § 403(b)'s language and Congress's primary objectives for enacting that provision—both of which support the Court's conclusion in these cases. 7 And, notably, there is a relevant connection to the present in the opera- tion of § 403(b) despite that statute's express reference to the date of the Act's enactment: the current occasion of the sentencing of the defendant in question. Sentencing courts read statutes at the moment of their appli- cation—which, here, would be the moment of resentencing, not the mo- ment of enactment. From that proper vantage point, petitioners were not subject to a sentence, as any previous sentence had been vacated. 430 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

would usually be the more appropriate verb choice. See B. Garner, Modern English Usage 1082 (5th ed. 2022) (explain- ing that the past-perfect tense “represents an action as com- pleted at some defnite time in the past—that is, before some other past time referred to”); Chicago Manual of Style § 5.133, at 268 (confrming that the past perfect “refers to an act, state, or condition that was completed before another specifed or implicit past time or past action”). Our disquali- fed sprinter could thus still boast of her Olympic-champion status if the rule were, instead, that any athlete who “had been awarded” a gold medal was entitled to use that honorifc. The fact that adjacent provisions of § 403 contain past- tense verbs only strengthens the conclusion that § 403(b)'s use of the present-perfect tense is meaningful. Cf. Barrett v. United States, 423 U. S. 212, 217 (1976) (emphasizing when Congress “used the present perfect tense . . . in contrast to its use of the present tense” elsewhere in the statute). Sec- tion 404(c), for example, utilizes the simple past tense to ad- dress a defendant's prior sentencing. See 132 Stat. 5222 (“No court shall entertain a motion made under this section to reduce a sentence if the sentence was previously imposed or previously reduced in accordance with” the relevant amendments (emphasis added)). The past tense also fea- tures earlier in § 403(b) itself. See ibid. (covering “any of- fense that was committed before the date of enactment of [the] Act” (emphasis added)). But the verb tense at issue here (“has been”) is conspicuously different—making only clearer that a past sentence must have a relevant connection to the present for purposes of the retroactivity provision. Indeed, amicus and the dissent's historical-fact reading of § 403(b) calls so naturally for the past-perfect tense that ju- rists who share this view often employ that tense by default. The Fifth Circuit below, for instance, stated that “the First Step Act applies to defendants for whom `a sentence . . . ha[d] not been imposed' as of the enactment date.” 92 F. 4th, at Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 431

310 (alteration in original). Other courts have construed § 403(b) similarly. See, e. g., United States v. Jackson, 995 F. 3d 522, 525 (CA6 2021) (noting that “as of December 21, 2018, a sentence had been imposed” upon the defendant, even though it was later vacated). Congress of course “could have phrased its requirement in language that looked to the past . . . , but it did not choose this readily available option.” Gwaltney of Smithfeld, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Founda- tion, Inc., 484 U. S. 49, 57 (1987). The natural inference, then, is that Congress meant what it said, and, thus, that § 403(b) covers only past sentences with continued legal va- lidity, not those that have been vacated.

B Background principles regarding the legal effect of vaca- tur confrm that a sentence has been imposed for § 403(b) purposes only so long as it remains valid. When interpret- ing statutes, we “recogniz[e] that `Congress legislates against the backdrop' of certain unexpressed presump- tions.” Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 857 (2014) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991)). One such presumption is that vacated court or- ders are void ab initio and thus lack any prospective legal effect. See United States v. Ayres, 9 Wall. 608, 610 (1870) (“[V]acating the former judgment . . . render[s] it null and void, and the parties are left in the same situation as if no trial had ever taken place in the cause”). By operation of legal fction, the law acts as though the vacated order never occurred. A criminal defendant whose judgment of conviction has been vacated, for example, is to be treated going forward as though he were never convicted. See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U. S. 211, 223 (1946) (confrming that one whose conviction is vacated “stand[s] in the position of any [person] who has been accused of a crime but not yet shown to have committed it”). Thus, if Congress were to pass a stimulus 432 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

provision that gives checks to any small-business owner who “has not been convicted of fraud,” an owner would not be rendered ineligible on the basis of a fraud conviction that was overturned on appeal. While the owner had been con- victed of fraud, that judgment was invalidated and therefore became legally inoperable. In other words, that vacated conviction is subsequently treated as no conviction at all. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 721 (1969) (veri- fying that vacatur causes a conviction to be “wholly nullifed and the slate wiped clean”).8 Section 403(b) refects this “common-sense” understanding of background vacatur principles. Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55, 61, n. 5 (1980). Just as defendants with vacated prior felony convictions are not precluded from possessing weapons under the federal felon-in-possession ban, § 403(b) retroactivity does not exclude from its ambit those whose

prior sentences have been vacated. See ibid.; 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1); see also Pepper v. United States, 562 U. S. 476, 507 (2011) (explaining that vacatur of a criminal sentence “wipe[s] the slate clean”).

8 The dissent erroneously suggests that, under our precedents, a vacated sentence continues to exist as a historical fact and thus retains prospective legal effect. See post, at 451–453. But the cases it cites do not support that contention. In Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55 (1980), for exam- ple, we considered whether the invalidity of one's predicate felony convic- tion precludes conviction as a felon in possession of a weapon under federal law. Id., at 58. We concluded the federal conviction could stand when the defendant's prior felony conviction had “never been overturned”—i. e., vacated—at the time he possessed the weapon. Id., at 57. But we dis- missed as “extreme” arguments suggesting that a vacated conviction could have such prospective legal effect. Id., at 61, n. 5 (confrming the “common- sense” notion that “a disability based upon one's status as a convicted felon” ceases as a matter of law as soon as “the conviction upon which that status depends has been vacated”). Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 580 U. S. 5 (2016), is similarly unhelpful. That case concerned issue pre- clusion and jury fndings and does not stand for the proposition that a vacated order itself retains continuing legal effect in the relevant sense. Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 433

Opinion of Jackson, J.

By authorizing retroactive application of the First Step Act's more lenient penalties on any eligible offender upon whom “a sentence . . . has not been imposed,” the text of § 403(b) indicates that only past sentences with continued va- lidity preclude application of the Act's new penalties. A judge would thus correctly conclude at resentencing that, if an offender's past sentence has been vacated, a sentence “has not been imposed” upon that offender for purposes of the First Step Act; hence, the court can impose a new sentence today. IV A The context and enactment history of the First Step Act and § 403(b) further demonstrate that Congress's choice of the present-perfect tense was not accidental. Rather, Con- gress was reacting to sustained criticism of the prior sen- tencing scheme, and with § 403(b), it intended to execute a clean break from the controversial and heavily contested “stacking” practice. Sentencing judges had been among the harshest critics. Before the First Step Act was enacted, more than one vet- eran District Court Judge decried how the “stacking” pun- ishment for frst-time § 924(c) offenders was “grossly dispro- portionate” and “shockingly harsh given the nature” of the offenses and a defendant's “lack of criminal history.” United States v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1309 (MD Ala. 2004) (lamenting the requirement of a 40-year term of imprisonment for a 22-year-old frst-time offender, and re- marking that it was “the worst and most unconscionable sen- tence [the judge] ha[d] given in his 23 years on the federal bench”).9 Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals also 9 See also, e. g., United States v. Holloway, 68 F. Supp. 3d 310, 312 (EDNY 2014) (noting that § 924(c) stacking “produce[d] sentences that would be laughable if only there weren't real people on the receiving end of them”); United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1244–1245, 1248 (Utah 2004) (assailing being required to give a 24-year-old who had pos- 434 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

“join[ed] in the litany of criticisms directed towards” § 924(c)'s penalty regime for requiring the imposition of sen- tences that were “ `out of this world.' ” United States v. Hunter, 770 F. 3d 740, 746–747 (CA8 2014) (Bright, J., concur- ring); see also United States v. Hungerford, 465 F. 3d 1113, 1118–1119 (CA9 2006) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in judg- ment) (deeming “irrational, inhumane, and absurd” the man- datory 159-year sentence imposed upon “a 52 year-old men- tally disturbed woman with no prior criminal record” who had otherwise “led a spotless, law-abiding existence”); United States v. Smith, 756 F. 3d 1179, 1181 (CA10 2014) (Gorsuch, J.) (observing that it was “no fanciful possibility” that § 924(c) stacking would lead to “prison term[s] of many decades” that were “certain to outlast the defendant's life and the lives of every person now walking the planet”). Meanwhile, other institutional stakeholders raised simi- larly pointed objections to Deal's stacking system. In its annual report to Congress, the United States Sentencing Commission criticized how § 924(c) stacking had “result[ed] in excessively severe and unjust sentences,” particularly in cases in which “the offense did not involve any physical harm or threat of physical harm to a person.” U. S. Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System 359 (Oct. 2011). The United States Judicial Conference expressed similar concerns.10

sessed weapons while dealing small amounts of marijuana “more than dou- bl[e]” the sentence recommended for crimes resulting in “actual violence to victims,” such as “hijack[ing]” an airplane, “detonat[ing] a bomb in a public place,” or committing “rap[e]” or “second-degree murde[r]”). 10 See, e. g., Hearing before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2014 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 113th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (2014) (testimony of the Hon. Irene Keeley, U. S. District Judge, Judicial Confer- ence of the U. S.) (explaining that § 924(c) stacking produced “particularly egregious” sentences for frst-time offenders that ran “contrary to the in- terests of justice” and “undermine[d] confdence” in its administration). Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 435

The problem, as all seemed to recognize, was not that fed- eral law permitted judges to impose lengthy sentences with respect to frst-time § 924(c) offenders—it was that the stat- ute, as Deal had interpreted it, required it. District judges could not adhere to the statutory command that they give sentences that are “suffcient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of punishment, 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a), if they were also required to sentence frst-time offenders to § 924(c)'s unduly harsh mandatory minimum pen- alties. Additionally problematic was the fact that, while federal law requires sentencing judges to “avoid unwar- ranted sentence disparities among defendants,” § 3553(a)(6), the variation among prosecutors' charging practices meant that § 924(c) stacking was a reality for only some frst-time offenders.11 With sentencing judges routinely imposing what amounted to mandatory life sentences on frst-time § 924(c) offenders, in 2018, Congress eventually heeded the public outcry. An “extraordinary political coalition” formed, as members of

11 The policies of U. S. Attorney's Offices diverged as to when—or whether—they would bring multiple § 924(c) counts, a decision over which judges lack any control. See id., at 45 (testimony of the Hon. Patti Saris, Chair, U. S. Sentencing Commission). This produced disparate sentenc- ing outcomes for similarly situated offenders across judicial districts. See U. S. Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Mini- mum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System 361–362 (Oct. 2011) (attributing the “geographic concentration” associated with § 924(c) sen- tencing “to inconsistencies in the charging of multiple violations of section 924(c)”); see also In re Hernandez, 857 F. 3d 1162, 1169 (CA11 2017) (Mar- tin, J., concurring in result) (fnding “troubling” that the defendant “might never have received this [stacked] sentence if he had been sentenced in another part of the country”). In one case in which prosecutors stacked additional § 924(c) counts after the defendant refused a plea offer, the Dis- trict Judge specifcally lamented the “risk of massive sentencing disparity between identically-situated offenders within the federal system,” because other U. S. Attorney's Offces might not have proceeded in that same fash- ion. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1253–1254 (Utah 2004). 436 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

Congress worked together to develop “a bipartisan sentenc- ing and prison reform bill” to address § 924(c) stacking. 164 Cong. Rec. S7645 (Dec. 17, 2018) (statement of Sen. Durbin); see also Brief for Sen. Richard J. Durbin et al. as Amici Curiae 5–8 (Senators Brief). The First Step Act was the much-anticipated, much-heralded fruit of their labor—and one that many in Congress hoped would yield immediate benefts. See id., at 17.12 B It is noteworthy for present purposes that the statute Congress crafted to depart from the much-maligned “stack- ing” sentencing regime did so in a two-part fashion. First, § 403(a) eliminated 25-year stacked sentences for frst-time § 924(c) offenders. Second, § 403(b) addressed the retroac- tivity of the § 403(a) beneft in a “ `targeted way,' ” so as to ensure that judges were no longer constrained to impose 25-year stacked sentences on frst-time § 924(c) offenders moving forward. Id., at 15 (quoting 164 Cong. Rec., at S7645 (statement of Sen. Durbin)). That second part of Congress's response—the focus of the cases before us today—was highly consequential. By dis- placing the background rule that changes to sentencing stat- utes apply only prospectively (to defendants who commit their offenses after the law's effective date), Congress made clear that the First Step Act's more lenient penalties were to apply to some “ `pending' ” cases, too—i. e., the new penalties would be applicable to certain defendants who had com- mitted their offenses before the First Step Act. Senators Brief 15 (quoting § 403(b), 132 Stat. 5222). Per § 403(b), any defendant who still needed to be sentenced as of the First 12 The dissent agrees that our job is to “interpret what Congress meant” by the words in § 403(b). Post, at 443. Here, Congress's desire to change the derided, draconian sentencing stacking scheme Deal had created could not be clearer. Thus, far from “march[ing] in the parade of sentencing reform,” post, at 441, we are merely observing the events and circumstances that led Congress to take up the banner of sentencing reform itself. Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 437

Step Act's effective date would receive the Act's more lenient penalties. Thus, as a practical matter, judges would no longer have to impose harsh “stacked” sentences upon frst- time § 924(c) offenders. Notably, because § 403(b) retroactivity was only partial, it differed substantially from the full retroactivity Congress employed with respect to other kinds of penalty changes it instituted in the First Step Act. See, e. g., § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5222; Terry v. United States, 593 U. S. 486, 491 (2021) (ex- plaining that Congress made the First Step Act's statutory changes to the crack-cocaine minimums fully retroactive, and thus “gave courts authority to reduce the sentences” of pre- viously sentenced crack offenders, where applicable). Con- gress certainly had the full-retroactivity option before it when it crafted § 403; indeed, earlier versions of the Act would have extended § 403(a) benefts to at least some § 924(c) offenders who were already sentenced. See, e. g., Sentencing Reform Act of 2015, H. R. 3713, 114th Cong., 2d Sess., § 5(b)(2), pp. 14–16 (2016) (providing for reduced terms of imprisonment in “certain past cases” (capitalization and italics deleted)); Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2017, S. 1917, 115th Cong., 1st Sess., § 104(b)(2), pp. 13–15 (2017) (permitting “sentence reduction” for certain “past cases” (capitalization deleted)). But authorizing the reopen- ing of closed cases upends fnality and can also be administra- tively burdensome. See Senators Brief 15 (noting that Con- gress forwent full retroactivity to serve “judicial economy” and “preserv[e] sentences that were actually valid and fnal”). Section 403's partial retroactivity avoided these problems, while still advancing Congress's aim of changing how frst-time § 924(c) defendants are sentenced. In short, § 403(b)—a middle-ground solution to the problem of harsh “stacked” sentences for frst-time § 924(c) offend- ers—refected a balance of Congress's policy objectives. By leaving intact § 924(c) sentences that judges had already imposed, Congress reinforced its interest in fnality and 438 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

avoided burdening district courts with additional litigation. But it also substantially advanced its goal of returning a sig- nifcant amount of sentencing discretion to district court judges moving forward, by giving retroactive effect to the Act's more lenient penalties for those frst-time § 924(c) of- fenders who had yet to be sentenced.

V The reading of § 403(b) that petitioners and the Govern- ment promote thus coheres with the text, context, and his- tory of that provision. Under this view, First Step Act sen- tencing benefts apply to all frst-time § 924(c) offenders sentenced after the Act's enactment date (whether it is an initial sentencing or a resentencing). This means that § 403(b)'s retroactivity line falls between those past § 924(c) offenders with fnal sentences that are still in effect, on the one hand, and those who still need to be sentenced for their § 924(c) offense, on the other. The former are stuck with their old sentences, for fnality reasons, while the latter are eligible for First Step Act benefts at resentencing, since they have to be sentenced regardless. Under amicus and the dissent's reading, however, there exists a further line of division within the group of offenders who currently lack a sentence—separating those who have been sentenced previously for the § 924(c) offense at issue from those who have not. For individuals in the former camp, per amicus and the dissent, a judge must return to the superseded sentencing scheme and impose stacked 25- year sentences when such defendants are resentenced. Carving up the yet-to-be-sentenced group of offenders in this way does not refect Congress's intent. See Senators Brief 17 (a bipartisan group of Senators, explaining that “[t]he considerations animating the First Step Act's enact- ment undermine any suggestion that Congress intentionally excluded from Section 403's reach pre-Act offenders whose sentences are invalid as a matter of law”). Nor does it com- Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 439

port with the statutory scheme that Congress enacted, for two primary reasons. First, the text and context of § 403(b) do not support differ- entiating between § 924(c) offenders on the mere basis of the historical fact of a past sentencing (as we explained in Part III, supra), and, frankly, it is not clear what distinguishing between previously sentenced and never-before-sentenced offenders would accomplish. The prior imposition of a sen- tence does not bear on fnality; if the offender currently lacks a sentence, then a court will have to resentence the defend- ant in any event. And though it would make sense to draw the line as amicus and the dissent do if the prior imposition of a sentence helped judges to more accurately identify seri- ous frst-time § 924(c) offenders—potentially justifying the harsh and outdated stacked penalties that the First Step Act supplanted—nothing in the legislative record suggests this is so. Stated simply: The distinction between previously sentenced defendants and those who have never been sen- tenced before seems to make no difference in terms of the retroactivity aims of the statute. By contrast, requiring judges to impose Deal-era stacked § 924(c) sentences at resentencings runs headlong into the animating aims of the First Step Act. See Miller v. French, 530 U. S. 327, 341 (2000) (rejecting an interpretation that would undermine the statute and run “plainly contrary to Congress' intent in enacting” it). Neither amicus nor the dissent can explain why Congress would have wanted sen- tencing judges, who are presently working to dole out pro- portionate plenary sentences under the new regime, to have to return to the draconian, pre-Act scheme for offenders who just happen to be facing resentencing, as opposed to frst sentencing. Requiring that kind of reversion prevents judges from uniformly moving past Deal, which was the pri- mary point of Congress's enactment of § 403. Second, the reading of § 403(b) that we adopt today is plainly more administrable than the one amicus and the dis- 440 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

Alito, J., dissenting

sent offer. Amicus argues that his interpretation is easy to apply, because a district judge only needs to know whether a prior sentence had ever been imposed upon the defendant for the relevant offense. But that knowledge is not enough—the sentencing judge would still need to reference, recall, and apply the superseded “stacking” regime, if appli- cable. And there is a much more straightforward way to administer § 403(b): From the Act's enactment date onward, sentencing judges impose the First Step Act's lessened man- datory minimums for any frst-time § 924(c) offender—full stop. This reading of § 403(b) requires no additional effort on the part of the judge to track down a defendant's sentenc- ing history or to confrm what mandatory minimums pre- viously governed. And it allows district judges to treat all frst-time § 924(c) defendants who appear before them for sentencing in an equitable manner that minimizes sentencing disparities, consistent with Congress's sentencing directives.

Page Proof Pending * * * Publication Under the interpretation of § 403(b) we adopt today, all frst-time § 924(c) offenders who appear for sentencing after the First Step Act's enactment date—including those whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who thus need to be resentenced—are subject to the Act's revised pen- alties. The Fifth Circuit's contrary reading of § 403(b) is reversed, and its judgment in these cases is remanded for further proceedings. It is so ordered. Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett join, dissenting. In the First Step Act of 2018, Congress reduced the mandatory-minimum sentence for certain frearm offenses. Like all changes to sentencing law, this amendment applies prospectively. But Congress also thought it wise to apply the amendment to “Pending Cases.” Of course, “Pending Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 441

Cases” does not mean “All Cases,” and Congress limited the retroactive reach of the amendment to defendants for whom “a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of [the Act's] date of enactment.” 132 Stat. 5222. In other words, the amendment applies retroactively only if the defendant had yet to be sentenced when Congress passed the Act in 2018. Petitioners, who were sentenced in 2010, do not come close to meeting that test. Today, the Court disfgures the Act in order to reach a different result. Its interpretation relies on two necessary premises. First, the Court insists that what Congress really meant to say is that the amendment applies retroac- tively unless “a legally valid sentence” is in force on the Act's date of enactment. Second, to get around the fact that petitioners did have “legally valid” sentences when the Act was passed, the Court invents a novel “vacatur” principle. The Court tells us that the 2022 vacatur of petitioners' sen-

tences rendered those sentences legal nullities from their in- ception. The Court's interpretation thus unspools the Act's carefully wound retroactivity command to mean that any de- fendant whose sentence is vacated at any time and for any reason may claim the beneft of the Act's reduced mandatory minimum. But nothing in the text or broader context sup- ports such a boundless interpretation. Indeed, the portions of today's decision that command the votes of only three Jus- tices give the game away. Animating the Court's atextual interpretation is a thinly veiled desire to march in the parade of sentencing reform. But our role is to interpret the stat- ute before us, not overhaul criminal sentencing.

I Sixteen years ago, a jury convicted petitioners Corey Duf- fey, Tony Hewitt, and Jarvis Ross of multiple 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) offenses for use of a frearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. At the time, frst-time § 924(c) offenders like petitioners could receive, after a single trial, a 5-year 442 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

mandatory-minimum sentence for an initial § 924(c) convic- tion and a consecutive 25-year mandatory-minimum sentence for each “second or subsequent” § 924(c) conviction. See §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (c)(1)(C), (c)(1)(D)(ii) (2012 ed.); Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129, 137 (1993). In 2010, the Dis- trict Court sentenced petitioners under this so-called stack- ing procedure, and after a remand, the District Court re- sentenced petitioners in 2012. Direct review of their convictions and sentences was complete by 2015. See United States v. Ross, 544 Fed. Appx. 544, 545 (CA5 2013) (per curiam) (dismissing Duffey's appeal because it pre- sented “no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review”); United States v. Ross, 582 Fed. Appx. 528 (CA5 2014) (per curiam) (affrming Hewitt's and Ross's sentences); Hewitt v. United States, 574 U. S. 1201 (2015) (denying Hewitt's petition for a writ of certiorari). Petitioners' sentences had thus long been fnal when Con-

gress enacted the First Step Act on December 21, 2018. The Act introduced a bevy of sentencing reforms, including an amendment that eliminated the practice of § 924(c) sen- tence stacking. See 132 Stat. 5221–5222. Although it had previously considered applying this amendment to all § 924(c) offenders (including those with fnal sentences), see S. 2123, 114th Cong., 1st Sess., § 104(b)(2) (2015) (reported by Com- mittee), Congress settled on a far narrower retroactivity command: “Applicability to Pending Cases.—This section, and the amendments made by this section, shall apply to any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.” 132 Stat. 5222. On the “date of enactment,” petitioners' 2012 sentences re- mained in full force. As such, petitioners did not move to reduce their sentences in the immediate aftermath of the Act's passage. Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 443

But several strokes of good fortune soon came petitioners' way. The year after Congress passed the First Step Act, we held in United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 448 (2019), that § 924(c)'s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. Then, later that same year, the Fifth Circuit determined that Davis should apply retroactively. See United States v. Reece, 938 F. 3d 630, 635 (2019). Seeking to take advantage of these fortuitous developments, petitioners successfully moved to set aside some, though not all, of their § 924(c) con- victions that were predicated on the residual clause. Al- though the District Court could have vacated petitioners' sentences for only those invalid § 924(c) counts, petitioners caught yet another lucky break. The District Court opted to vacate their entire sentences and ordered plenary resen- tencing on the remaining counts. Petitioners now try to push their luck even further, contending that the District Court should apply the First Step Act's reduced mandatory

minimum for their remaining § 924(c) counts.

II As all agree, petitioners' argument requires us to interpret what Congress meant when it said “a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of [the Act's] date of enactment.” What frst jumps out about this provision is that Congress used the present-perfect tense in the phrase “has not been imposed.” The present-perfect tense “denotes an act, state, or condition that” is either (1) “now completed” or (2) “con- tinues up to the present.” The Chicago Manual of Style § 5.132, p. 268 (17th ed. 2017). Context often indicates whether a speaker is using the for- mer sense of the present-perfect tense (e. g., “he has been awarded a trophy”) or the latter sense of the present-perfect tense (e. g., “he has trained for a trophy for the last three years”). See B. Garner, The Chicago Guide to Grammar, Usage, and Punctuation 97 (2016). Consider the following example. Suppose I ask a man passing by a courthouse, 444 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

“Has a sentence been imposed on John Smith?” He could respond either, “Yes, on July 1” or “Yes, since July 1.” The former response is perhaps the more natural one, and it as- sumes I asked for the historical fact of Smith's sentencing in the indefnite past. The latter response is correct (though perhaps awkward), and it assumes I asked about the continu- ing legal validity of Smith's sentence up to the present. The First Step Act's “grammatical structure conceivably leaves some room for either reading,” United States v. Uri- arte, 975 F. 3d 596, 607 (CA7 2020) (en banc) (Barrett, J., dissenting), but petitioners lose either way. On one hand, the phrase “a sentence . . . has . . . been imposed as of [the Act's] date of enactment” could refer to the historical fact that a district court imposed a sentence before the Act's pas- sage, regardless of whether that sentence remains legally valid in the future. This “historical-fact interpretation” plainly forecloses relief for petitioners because, as no one dis- putes, the District Court frst imposed their sentences well before the Act's passage.1 On the other hand, “a sentence . . . has . . . been imposed as of [the Act's] date of enactment” could mean that a defendant was subject to a legally valid sentence that continued to be in force on the Act's enactment date. But again, petitioners did have legally valid sen- tences “as of [the Act's] date of enactment,” so they lose under this “legal-validity interpretation” of the Act too.2

1 The Court dismisses the historical-fact interpretation out of hand be- cause, as it understands English grammar, the present-perfect tense re- quires “a connection to the present.” Ante, at 428, n. 5. But before pro- nouncing new rules of grammar, the Court might frst consider consulting the authorities it cites. See, e. g., R. Huddleston & G. Pullum, The Cam- bridge Grammar of the English Language 144 (2002) (noting the “present perfect allows for the inclusion, under restrictive conditions, of a past time adjunct”). As these authorities suggest, the present-perfect tense allows one to say, for example, “[h]e has got up at fve o'clock,” ibid. (emphasis deleted), or “he has played golf before yesterday.” 2 The Act's requirement that a sentence “has . . . been imposed as of [the Act's] date of enactment” provides an essential temporal benchmark for both the historical-fact and the legal-validity interpretation. Remark- Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 445

Realizing the Act's use of the present-perfect tense alone cannot help petitioners, the Court invents a novel “vacatur” principle to supercharge the legal-validity interpretation. The Court tells us that the First Step Act incorporates the background “presumption” that “vacated court orders are void ab initio and thus lack any prospective legal effect.” Ante, at 431. This revamped version of the legal-validity interpretation means that “a sentence . . . has . . . been im- posed as of [the Act's] date of enactment” if a defendant re- ceives a legally valid sentence before the Act's passage and that sentence is never, at any future time, vacated. Under this view, the 2022 vacatur of petitioners' 2012 sentences im- plies that, “[b]y operation of [a] legal fction,” their 2012 sen- tences “never occurred” and so could not have been legally valid as of the Act's enactment date. Ibid. The Court's vacatur-infected legal-validity interpretation thus rests on two necessary premises. First, the legal-

validity interpretation is superior to the historical-fact in- terpretation. Second, the Act incorporates the “vacatur” principle. If either premise falters, so does the Court's in- terpretation. In my view, there is little doubt that both of the necessary premises fail.

ably, however, the Court reads this requirement out of the Act entirely. The Court insists that sentencing courts should “read” the First Step Act at “the moment of resentencing,” without any reference to the Act's enact- ment date. Ante, at 429, n. 7. But the Court is mistaken. It starts on the right foot, acknowledging the “widely accepted modern legislative drafting convention that a law should not be read to speak as of the date of enactment.” Carr v. United States, 560 U. S. 438, 463 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). This “convention” provides that, “except in unusual circum- stances,” “all laws . . . should be written in the present tense” to ensure that a “ `legislative provision speaks as of any date on which it is read (rather than as of when drafted, enacted, or put into effect).' ” Ibid. (quoting Senate Offce of the Legislative Counsel, Legislative Drafting Manual § 103(a), p. 4 (1997) (emphasis deleted)). But the First Step Act is such an “unusual circumstanc[e]” in which Congress deviated from this “convention.” The Act takes the unusual steps of referencing the date on which it was “enacted” and employing the present-perfect tense, not the ordinary present tense. 446 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

III A To start, the most plausible reading of the retroactivity provision is that “a sentence . . . has . . . been imposed” when, as a matter of historical fact, a district court has sentenced a defendant. Subsequent legal changes—such as the vaca- tur of a previously imposed sentence—do not change the purely historical fact that a defendant was, at a point in time, actually sentenced. When the Act asks whether a sen- tence “has . . . been imposed,” it refers to the unchanging historical fact of sentencing and whether it occurred before the “date of enactment.” To see why, begin with the word “imposed.” A “sentence is imposed” when there is a “pronouncement of judgment.” Lott v. United States, 367 U. S. 421, 426 (1961); see Young v. United States, 943 F. 3d 460, 463 (CADC 2019) (“[I]n ordi- nary usage a sentence is `imposed' when the district court pronounces it”). The Sentencing Reform Act treats the “im- position” of a sentence as the moment when a district court “state[s] in open court the reasons for . . . the particular sen- tence.” 18 U. S. C. § 3553(c); Black's Law Dictionary 1470 (12th ed. 2024) (defning “pronounce” as “announce for- mally”). The word “imposed” is thus most naturally under- stood to refer to a concrete “action by a district court” that occurs at a specifc point in time. Uriarte, 975 F. 3d, at 607 (Barrett, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Carpenter, 80 F. 4th 790, 791 (CA6 2023) (Kethledge, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]he act of imposing a sentence could not possibly `continue up to the present'— because the imposition of a sentence occurs at a fxed point in time”). A defendant may be sentenced, resentenced, and resentenced again, and at each hearing a sentence is “im- posed” even if some of those sentences are later set aside as legally invalid. Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 447

Our cases and other provisions of Title 18 confrm that the word “imposed” marks the historical point at which a sen- tence is pronounced regardless of whether that sentence has continuing legal validity. For example, in the midst of a dis- cussion about plenary resentencing (a topic of particular rele- vance to these cases), we once noted that “[i]n remanded cases . . . trial courts have imposed a sentence on the remain- ing counts longer than the sentence originally imposed on those particular counts.” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U. S. 237, 253 (2008) (emphasis added). In another case, a joint opinion of the Court noted that the “death sentences imposed for armed robbery, however, were vacated.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 161–162 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (emphasis added). In both in- stances, our use of “imposed” signifed only that a court had, at some point in time, pronounced a sentence. Our use of “imposed” could not possibly be understood to refer to the legal validity of those later-invalidated sentences. Further, in other parts of Title 18, Congress uses “imposed” to signify the historical fact of a sentence, not its continuing legal va- lidity. See, e. g., § 3742(a)(2) (allowing a defendant to appeal “an otherwise fnal sentence if the sentence . . . was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines”); § 3742(f)(1) (empowering courts of appeals to remand on a fnding that “the sentence was imposed in violation of law”). I see no reason to think Congress in- tended a different meaning of “imposed” in another provision of Title 18. Additional support for the historical-fact interpretation is found in Congress's use of the phrase “a sentence.” The word “a” is an “indefnite article” that “points to a nonspecifc object, thing, or person that is not distinguished from the other members of a class.” B. Garner, Modern English Usage 1195 (5th ed. 2022) (Modern English Usage). “When used as an indefnite article, `a' means `[s]ome undetermined 448 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

or unspecifed particular.' ” McFadden v. United States, 576 U. S. 186, 191 (2015) (quoting Webster's New Internal Dic- tionary 1 (2d ed. 1954)). In that sense, Congress's use of the indefnite article lends a broad construction to the word “sentence,” as if to say “any sentence” ever imposed, includ- ing a later-vacated sentence. In conjunction with the word “imposed,” the phrase “a sentence” thus puts the statutory focus on the existence of any kind of sentence pronounced in the record, regardless of that sentence's present legal status. Indeed, contrary to the Court's suggestion, the word “sen- tence” does not ineluctably mean a “legally valid” sentence. Our own cases prove the point because we have often found it necessary to clarify whether a sentence is valid or invalid. See, e. g., Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U. S. 216, 220 (2011) (per curiam) (“There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence” (emphasis added)); Pollard v. United States, 352 U. S. 354, 357, 360 (1957) (“The only sentence that was en- tered at the 1952 hearing was the one of probation, admit- tedly invalid because of petitioner's absence” (emphasis added)); Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U. S. 40, 43 (1992) (“[P]eti- tioner's conviction was found valid but his sentence invalid” (emphasis added)); see also Uriarte, 975 F. 3d, at 607 (Bar- rett, J., dissenting) (“That is why it is perfectly coherent to describe the procedural posture of a case by saying, `a sen- tence was imposed last year, but it has since been vacated on appeal' ”). If Congress sought to narrow “a sentence” in a specialized way to indicate a legally valid sentence, it could have referred to “a fnal sentence,” “a legally valid sen- tence,” or more prosaically, “the sentence.” Accord, United States v. Hernandez, 107 F. 4th 965, 969 (CA11 2024). Reading the retroactivity provision in context, the phrase “a sentence has not been imposed” most straightforwardly means that a district court has not, as a matter of historical fact, sentenced a defendant for his § 924(c) offenses before the Act's “date of enactment.” So how can the Court read Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 449

the same text to refer to a presently valid sentence, rather than one that was historically “imposed” in the past? See ante, at 431. Bizarrely, the Court's analysis begins and ends with Congress's use of the present-perfect tense. Through the use of a single hypothetical, which does not resemble the structure of the provision actually before us, the Court draws the conclusion that “the present-perfect tense conveys to a listener that the event in question continues to be true or valid.” Ante, at 429. But, as I have explained, the pres- ent-perfect tense is, as a general matter, capable of support- ing either the historical-fact or legal-validity interpretation. The surrounding context and the specifc words Congress employed indicate how the present-perfect tense may sup- port one interpretation or the other. As to the actual words in the retroactivity provision (“imposed,” “a sentence”), the Court's textual analysis in Part III–A is silent.3 The

Page Proof Pending tense best capturesPublication 3 The Court's legal-validity interpretation also rests on the mistaken premise that the past-perfect the historical-fact inter- pretation. The Court claims “if an event is merely a relic of history be- cause it was voided by a subsequent action, the past-perfect (not the present-perfect) tense would usually be the more appropriate verb choice.” Ante, at 429–430. I hope readers do not look to this Court as an authority on English grammar because this broad pronouncement is badly mistaken. As support for its grammatical rule, the Court offers a hypothetical: suppose a U. S. Olympic Committee rule says that “athletes may call themselves Olympic champions if a gold medal `has been awarded' to them.” Ante, at 428. If the Olympic gold medalist is stripped of her medal, however, the Court claims she can no longer call herself an “Olym- pic champion” under the rule. To enable our athlete to still call herself an Olympic champion based on her now-stripped medal, the Court tells us “the past-perfect” tense would be “more appropriate” (e. g., “she had been awarded such a medal”). Ante, at 429–430. That is highly debatable. The only lesson taught by the Court's example is that the meaning of language is heavily dependent on context. The obvious purpose of the hypothetical rule is to restrict the class of individuals who are entitled to the honor of calling themselves Olympic champions, and the Court pre- sumes that the athlete in question lost her medal because she engaged in improper conduct, e. g., taking performance-enhancing drugs. But sup- pose the medal was taken away for an illegitimate reason. Some histori- 450 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

Court's failure to defend the legal-validity interpretation is thus an independently fatal blow to its holding.

B Assuming the Court had proved up the legal-validity in- terpretation, it would still need to establish its “vacatur” principle. That is, it would still need to prove not only that the Act is concerned with a sentence's continuing legal valid- ity up to the “date of enactment,” but also that the Act hinges on the continuing validity of a sentence after the date of enactment. The Court can prove as much only by invent- ing a “legal fction” that a vacated sentence “never oc- curred.” Ante, at 431. But one need only scratch the sur- face of this purported “legal fction” to understand how thoroughly unpersuasive it is. As a preliminary matter, the Court's “vacatur” principle does not exist. The Court assures us that there is a well- established principle in the criminal law that “vacated court orders are void ab initio and thus lack any prospective legal effect.” Ibid. It derives this rule by over-reading a few

ans think that Jim Thorpe, a legendary Native American athlete who dom- inated the 1912 Olympics, was stripped of his medals at least in part because of racism. See B. Crawford, All American: The Rise and Fall of Jim Thorpe 209–210 (2005); J. Elfers, The Tour To End All Tours: the Story of Major League Baseball's 1913–1914 World Tour 18 (2003). That was not completely undone until 2022, long after Thorpe died. See V. Mather & T. Panja, Jim Thorpe Is Restored as Sole Winner of 1912 Olym- pic Gold Medals, N. Y. Times, July 15, 2022. Suppose Thorpe had been asked: “Have you ever been awarded an Olympic medal?” Would he have been a liar if he answered “yes”? The Court seems to think so. Indeed, the Court offers no answer to the argument that the present- perfect tense may be properly used to refer to a past event that was later undone. Instead, the Court promises readers that an answer will come in Part IV of its opinion—i. e., the portions in which only three Justices join. See ante, at 429, n. 6. But this promise goes unfulflled. Part IV contains no deus ex machina to salvage the Court's interpretation; rather, Part IV throws a celebration for the First Step Act, perhaps hoping read- ers lose sight of the text behind all the confetti. Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 451

creative turns of phrase in our cases. See ante, at 432 (cit- ing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 721 (1969) (stat- ing vacatur causes a conviction to be “ `wholly nullifed and the slate wiped clean' ”); Pepper v. United States, 562 U. S. 476, 507 (2011) (noting vacatur “ `wipe[s] the slate clean' ”)). But a more careful reading of our precedents and other pro- visions in Title 18 indicates that vacatur does not erase the historical fact of a previously imposed conviction or sentence. Further, even if the “vacatur” principle exists, the Act's ret- roactivity provision does not incorporate it.

1 Our precedents foreclose the Court's “vacatur” principle. Take, for example, one of the cases the Court cites, Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55 (1980). See ante, at 432. There, the defendant challenged his conviction under a federal stat- ute prohibiting “ `[a]ny person who . . . has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State' ” from “ `receiv- [ing], possess[ing], or transport[ing] . . . any frearm.' ” 445 U. S., at 56, and n. 1 (quoting 18 U. S. C. § 1202(a) (1970 ed.)). The defendant argued that his predicate state conviction was invalid because he lacked counsel and that, as such, he could not be convicted as a felon in possession under the federal statute. We assumed that the predicate state conviction was subject to invalidation (i. e., vacatur), see 445 U. S., at 58, but we nevertheless upheld the felon-in- possession conviction. We reasoned that the statute's “sweeping” language, which is phrased in the present- perfect tense just like the First Step Act, focused on “the fact of a [predicate] felony conviction.” Id., at 60. At the time of his federal offense, the defendant's state conviction was extant and thus disabled him from frearm possession. Congress made “[n]o exception” for “a person whose out- standing [predicate] conviction ultimately might turn out to be invalid for any reason.” Id., at 62. So a subsequent in- validation of his state predicate conviction due to his lack 452 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

of counsel would not render that conviction “invalid for all purposes.” Id., at 67. Lewis thus powerfully refutes the Court's vacatur principle. If vacatur of the defendant's predicate conviction implied the conviction “never occurred,” as the Court today insists, then his felon-in-possession con- viction could not stand. Ante, at 431. But that is the very argument Lewis foreclosed.4 Although it supports the petitioners in this appeal, the United States also concedes (albeit sheepishly in a footnote) that the Court's “general background legal principle that va- catur makes a sentence void from the start for all purposes” is “incorrect.” Brief for United States 27, n. 4 (internal quo- tation marks and alterations omitted). As it acknowledges, lower courts routinely follow Lewis and uphold convictions despite the later vacatur of predicate offenses. See, e. g., Burrell v. United States, 384 F. 3d 22, 27–28 (CA2 2004) (“[I]t is the mere fact of [a prior] conviction at the time of the

charged possession, not the reliability of the conviction, that establishes the § 922(g)(1) predicate” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Roberson, 752 F. 3d 517, 522 (CA1 2014) (upholding a conviction for failure to register as a sex offender even though the predicate sex offense was later vacated). Moreover, as the United States also acknowledges, Lewis's logic crosses into the constitutional context. Consider Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 580 U. S. 5 (2016), in which we considered the application of issue preclusion 4 In responding to Lewis, the Court accidentally fres on its own position. The Court justifes Lewis's holding by explaining that “the defendant's prior felony conviction had `never been overturned'—i. e., vacated—at the time he possessed the weapon.” Ante, at 432, n. 8 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55, 57 (1980)). But that is precisely the point. Lewis afforded “prospective legal effect” to the defendant's vacated con- viction by refusing to ignore the historical fact of his predicate conviction even after the vacatur. I see no way to reconcile that reasoning with the Court's rule that a vacated sentence never “retains prospective legal ef- fect.” Ante, at 432, n. 8. Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 453

under the Double Jeopardy Clause when a jury returns in- consistent verdicts. It is well established that if a jury con- victs on one count but acquits on another count involving the same conduct, the acquittal has no issue preclusive effect. See id., at 13. Likewise, if a jury acquits on one count but fails to reach agreement on another count, the acquittal has such an effect. See id., at 13–14. In Bravo-Fernandez, a jury convicted on one count but acquitted on others that were claimed to involve the same conduct. The conviction, however, was vacated due to “an unrelated legal error,” and the defendant argued that the Court should treat the convic- tion as if it had never occurred and that the acquittal had issue preclusive effect barring reprosecution. Id., at 9. We rejected this argument, holding that the conviction's later invalidation did not “erase” its historical existence for the purposes of issue preclusion because the vacatur did not “bear on the factual determinations actually and necessarily

made by the jury.” Id., at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). Bravo-Fernandez thus treated the historical fact of a later-vacated conviction as legally relevant, which is ir- reconcilable with the Court's “vacatur” principle. The only “ `unexpressed presumptio[n]' ” I can derive from our cases and those from the courts of appeals is the opposite of the one the Court advances today. Ante, at 431 (quoting Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 857 (2014)). 2 Congress too has rejected the Court's “vacatur” principle. In the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress “se[t] forth a special . . . background principle” that is incompatible with the “va- catur” rule invented today. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U. S. 260, 275 (2012) (emphasis deleted).5 That is, after a sentence is vacated, a district court during resentencing 5 In Dorsey, 567 U. S., at 275, we referred to 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii) as establishing the relevant “background principle.” That provision in- corporates by reference the anti-vacatur rule of § 3742(g). 454 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

must apply the Sentencing Guidelines that “were in effect on the date of the previous sentencing of the defendant prior to the appeal.” 18 U. S. C. § 3742(g)(1). The vacatur of an ini- tial sentence thus does not “wipe the slate clean” in relation to the Guidelines range. Contra, Pepper, 562 U. S., at 507. Petitioners try to write off this provision as a deviation from the background presumption that vacatur voids a sen- tence ab initio. See Brief for Petitioner Hewitt 24; Brief for Petitioner Duffey et al. 47. But § 3742(g)(1)'s anti-vacatur rule cannot be described as a minor exception to an other- wise widespread principle. The rule does not appear in some “little-used backwater” of the Sentencing Reform Act. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 730 (2022). Rather, it is incorporated into the default procedures that apply in every criminal sentencing. 6 See §§ 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii), (a)(5)(B). In short, the Court's failure to “sho[w] that its own rule

. . . existed as a background matter when Congress enacted” the First Step Act is fatal to its position. Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U. S. 736, 753–754 (2023) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 3 Even assuming the “vacatur” principle is not a fgment of the Court's imagination, it lacks any foothold in the Act's text. “When called on to resolve a dispute over a statute's meaning, this Court normally seeks to afford the law's terms their ordinary meaning at the time Congress adopted them.” Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U. S. 155, 160 (2021). Of course, we sometimes look to principles beyond the four corners of

6 The portion of the opinion in which only three Justices join expresses concern that, under the historical-fact interpretation, district judges will struggle “to reference, recall, and apply the superseded `stacking' re- gime.” Ante, at 440. But I have far more faith in district judges' ability to enforce older sentencing regimes. Indeed, district judges' familiarity with 18 U. S. C. § 3742(g), which routinely requires them to apply obsolete Sentencing Guidelines in the present, is proof positive. Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 455

a statute to understand the background against which Con- gress legislated. But we typically do so in discrete situa- tions. For example, we look to background common-law principles to fll in obvious gaps in statutes, such as a missing mens rea element in a criminal statute. See, e. g., Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 619 (1994) (mens rea); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 150 (1987) (statutes of limitations); Marx v. General Rev- enue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 382 (2013) (attorney's fees and costs). Or we import extra-textual meaning when Congress employs a “term of art that had an established meaning under” a relevant “backdrop.” Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U. S. 481, 487 (2005). The First Step Act fts neither mold, and the Court makes no effort in Part III–B to analyze how its “vacatur” principle maps on to the text. The Court points to no obvious gap in the Act's retroactivity provision that could be flled with

“recognized” “background principles of construction. ” Bond, 572 U. S., at 857. Nor does the Court suggest that the utterly ordinary words in the Act's retroactivity provi- sion carry some specialized meaning related to vacatur. “In the absence of some strong contrary indication” of special- ized meaning, we must “assume that the ordinary meaning” of words like “sentence,” which captures both extant and va- cated sentences, “controls.” Monsalvo Velázquez v. Bondi, 604 U. S. 712, 751 (2025) (Alito, J., dissenting); see Part III– A, supra. C The superiority of the historical-fact interpretation and the nonexistence of the Court's “vacatur” principle are inde- pendent reasons to reject the Court's holding. But even if the matter were close, two more factors counsel against the Court's rule. First, the retroactivity provision's title—“Applicability to Pending Cases”—advises against the Court's boundless interpretation. “[T]he title of a statute and the heading of 456 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

a section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.” Dubin v. United States, 599 U. S. 110, 120–121 (2023) (internal quotation marks omit- ted); see also Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 552 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“Titles can be useful de- vices to resolve doubt about the meaning of a statute” (inter- nal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the phrase “Pending Cases” suggests Congress was concerned with the fnite pop- ulation of defendants who, on the date of the First Step Act's enactment, lacked an initial sentence for § 924(c) offenses. See Black's Law Dictionary, at 1366 (defning “pending” as “[r]emaining undecided; awaiting decision”); Modern English Usage 813 (defning “pending” as “awaiting an outcome”). But the Court's “vacatur” principle would obliterate that closed set and refashion the retroactivity provision as an open-ended entitlement for any defendant convicted of multi- ple § 924(c) offenses whose sentence is vacated at any time and for any reason. That means, as the United States con- cedes, the “universe” of “Pending Cases” would “increase,” for example, “anytime this Court issues a decision that af- fects the validity of 924(c) sentences.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 49. If Congress intended the retroactivity provision to beneft such an amorphous population that may forever grow in size, I seriously doubt it would have labeled the Act's retroactiv- ity provision with the phrase “Pending Cases.” Second, the presumption against retroactivity further weighs against the Court's unnecessarily broad interpreta- tion. The Federal Saving Statute sets forth “an important background principle of interpretation” that “a new criminal statute that `repeal[s]' an older criminal statute shall not change the penalties `incurred' under that older statute `un- less the repealing Act shall so expressly provide.' ” Dorsey, 567 U. S., at 272, 274 (quoting 1 U. S. C. § 109). Accordingly, Congress may give retroactive effect to new reductions in criminal penalties, but it must do so with “plain import” or “fair implication.” 567 U. S., at 275 (internal quotation Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 457

marks omitted). Here, the First Step Act provides a clear intent to rebut the presumption against retroactivity as to offenders for whom a sentence “has not been imposed.” Al- though I believe the scope of that retroactivity command is suffciently clear for the reasons I have already given, to the extent there is any ambiguity about how far the Act's retro- activity command should go, the presumption puts a thumb on the scale against construing the retroactivity command to its broadest extent as the Court does today.

IV After the Court is through with the text and nonexistent principles of vacatur, three Justices continue on for pages, sparing no effort, to extol the “much-anticipated, much- heralded” First Step Act. Ante, at 436. But what is the point of all this lauding? Perhaps realizing the weakness of their textual argument, the three Justices think it wise to spruce up the opinion. They attempt to do so by asserting that when a “ `bipartisan' ” “supermajority” of Congress passes “landmark” legislation, it intends to go big, down to the very last subsection (or here, application note to a sub- section). Ante, at 424; ante, at 436 (opinion of Jackson, J., joined by Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ.). So I gather they would have us broadly construe every atom of the “land- mark” First Step Act in a way that furthers Congress's sup- posedly grand ambition to turn the page on “harsh” sentenc- ing practices. Ante, at 437. There is no “landmark” canon of construction requiring the Court to construe important legislation to its furthest possible implication. “ `[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.' ” American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Res- taurant, 570 U. S. 228, 234 (2013) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U. S. 522, 525–526 (1987) (per curiam)). Indeed, just last Term we rejected the same sort of “land- mark” argument when interpreting a different provision of the First Step Act. See Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U. S. 458 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

124, 151–152 (2024). Experience shows that more often than not, “landmark” legislation refects the necessary log-rolling of the legislative process, which prizes political compromise over statutory clarity. That reality cautions against the precise move the Court makes today: an inference that Con- gress hid in an “ancillary” and intentionally circumscribed provision a retroactivity command that would “alter the fun- damental details” of how § 924(c) sentencing should work for all time. Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001). The three-Justice opinion rattles off the public criticisms that supposedly spurred Congress to reform the practice of § 924(c) sentence “stacking.” But this discussion is beside the point. Nothing in this multi-page discussion sheds light on how Members of Congress understood the retroactivity provision before us. Carried away with its enthusiasm for the changes effected

by the First Step Act, the three Justices bestow an entirely undeserved windfall on the actual petitioners in these cases. Due to the especially violent nature of their robberies,7 peti- tioners were convicted of more than a dozen § 924(c) offenses, about half of which were not predicated on § 924(c)'s resid- ual clause. In 2019 we decided Davis and provided a basis to set aside petitioners' § 924(c) convictions under the residual clause, but Davis did nothing to disturb petitioners' other § 924(c) con- 7 Dubbed the “Scarecrow Bandits” due to their plaid-shirt and foppy-hat disguises, petitioners and their confederates “violently robbed” a string of banks in the Dallas-Fort Worth area around 2008. 2009 WL 2356156, *1 (ND Tex., July 30, 2009); see FBI, Scarecrow Bandit Leader Sentenced to 355 Years in Federal Prison on Bank Robbery and Firearms Convictions (May 5, 2010). During the robberies, the Scarecrow Bandits held bank employees and customers at gunpoint and physically assaulted them with frearms and stun guns. See 2009 WL 2356156, *1. In total, the conspir- acy stole more than $350,000 before authorities caught up with them. See Brief for United States 7. Cite as: 606 U. S. 419 (2025) 459

victions and associated mandatory-minimum sentences. In cases “involv[ing] multicount indictments and a successful at- tack by a defendant on some but not all of the counts of conviction,” a court, “in such instances, may vacate the en- tire sentence on all counts” and “reconfgure the sentencing plan” in toto. Greenlaw, 554 U. S., at 253 (emphasis added).8 But, as petitioners' counsel conceded, courts are under “no obligation” to follow this convention and may instead choose to vacate only those parts of the sentence related to an inter- vening change in law. Tr. of Oral Arg. 15. Nor does this strike me as a case in which full vacatur was warranted. Section 924(c) convictions must run consecutively “with any other term of imprisonment.” § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). So § 924(c) sentences are presumably easier to identify and extract from a defendant's total term of imprisonment, often obviating the need for a plenary resentencing. The likely unnecessary va- catur of each petitioner's entire sentence was thus a stroke

of good fortune that opened the door to petitioners' First Step Act claims.9 The lower courts (correctly) rejected

8 The chief reason for vacating perfectly valid convictions in such cases is to allow the sentencing court to consider whether the sentence previously imposed on a valid count provides suffcient punishment for the defend- ant's conduct. See Greenlaw, 554 U. S., at 253–254. Suppose a defendant is convicted of two offenses, each with a 5-year mandatory minimum. The sentencing judge, thinking that the appropriate punishment for the de- fendant's criminal conduct is 10 years' imprisonment, imposes a 5-year term of imprisonment on both counts and runs the counts consecutively. If one of the counts of conviction is reversed and the case is remanded, the sentencing judge may wish to enlarge the initial 5-year sentence on the remaining count to 10 years' imprisonment. So the defendant “ulti- mately may gain nothing from his limited success on appeal.” Id., at 254. It is therefore ironic that the unnecessary vacatur of petitioners' valid convictions has given them a beneft. 9 The District Court's willingness to vacate petitioners' entire sentences appears to have been informed by the position of the United States, which “agreed” with petitioners that the “sentences on all remaining counts should be vacated.” Agreed Order in No. 3:08–cr–167 (ND Tex., Nov. 2, 460 HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

those efforts, but petitioners have found a sympathetic audi- ence in this Court. The three Justices attribute today's out- come to grand congressional design coming to fruition, but in reality, petitioners' change in fortune can be attributed only to the happenstance of legal developments with not the faintest relationship to the First Step Act. * * * The Court ignores Congress's intention to afford only lim- ited retroactive relief to certain offenders under the First Step Act. Instead, the Court embraces an interpretation that has no limiting principle and affords petitioners a wind- fall. That is an indefensible result based on indefensible reasoning. I cannot agree with the Court's decision, so I must respectfully dissent.

2021), ECF Doc. 700, p. 2 (Ross); see Agreed Order in No. 3:08–cr–167 (June 14, 2021), ECF Doc. 672, p. 2 (Duffey); Agreed Order in No. 3:08– cr–167 (Aug. 19, 2021), ECF Doc. 683, p. 2 (Hewitt). Reporter’s Note

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of

publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made:

None