Heryford v. Davis

102 U.S. 235, 26 L. Ed. 160, 1880 U.S. LEXIS 2031
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedDecember 18, 1880
Docket79
StatusPublished
Cited by150 cases

This text of 102 U.S. 235 (Heryford v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Heryford v. Davis, 102 U.S. 235, 26 L. Ed. 160, 1880 U.S. LEXIS 2031 (1880).

Opinions

Mr. Justice Strong

delivered the opinion-of the court.

The correct determination of this case depends altogether upon the .construction that must be given to .the • contract between the Jackson & Sharp' Company and the railroad company, against which the defendants below recovered their judgment and obtained-their execution. If that contract, was amere lease of the cars to the railroad company, or if it was only a conditional sale, which did not pass.the ownership until the condition should be performed, the property was not subject to levy and sale under execution at the' suit of the defendant against the company. But if, on the other hand, the title passed by the contract, and what was reserved by'the Jackson’ & Sharp Company was a lien or security for the payment of the price, or what is called sometimes a mortgage back to the vendors, the cars were subject to levy and sale as.the property of the railroad company.. The statute of the State of Missouri enacts that “ no mortgage or deed of trust of personal property shall be valid against any other person than the parties thereto, unless possession of the mortgaged or trust property 'be' delivered to ’ and retained by the mortgagee or cestui que trust, or unless the mortgage or deed of trust be acknowledged or proved and recorded in the county in which the mortgagor or grantor resides, in such manner as conveyances of land are, by -law, directed to ..be acknowledged or proved and recorded.” 1 Wagn. Stat.,’ c. 35, art. 2, sect. 8. The plain purpose of this statute was to render secret "liens upon personal property ineffectual as against purchasers or' creditors. The property in this case^-was in the possession" of .the railroad company when the levy upon it was made’, and the contract under which the company held it was not recorded.

What, then* is the true construction ’ of the contract ? The [244]*244answer to this question is not to be found in any name which .the parties may have given -to the instrument, and not alone in any particular provisions it contains, disconnected front all others, but in the ruling intention of the parties, gathered from all the language they have used. It is the legal effect of the whole which is to be sought for. The form of the instrument is of little account.

Though the contract industriously and repeatedly spoke of loaning the cars to the railroad company for hire, for four months, and delivering them for use for hire, it is manifest that no mere bailment for. hire was intended. No price for the hire was mentioned or alluded to, and in every bailment of letting for hire a price or compensation for the hire is essential. The amount may not be stipulated. It may be a. reasonable compensation or a quantum valebat, but the contract must contemplate payment for the use of the thing let or bailed. Not only was no such payment provided for or required, but all intention to demand it is negatived by the strongest implications. The manufacturing company exacted and took promissory notes for the entire selling price of the property, $6,138.40, and, in addition thereto, collaterals to a large amount to secure payment of the notes-. The aggregate of- the notes was equal to that price; two of them for $1,919.20 each, one payable at sixty days and the other at four months, bearing interest from their date at the rate of ten per cent; and the third note, at four months, being for $2,583, interest at that rate having been added to the principal sum. One of these notes fell due only nine days after the cars were delivered to the railroad company, and both the others before the expiration of four months from the date of the agreement. The notes were to be collected at maturity, and thus it was conte'mplated that before the end of four months the manufacturing company should have in hand in cash the full valué or price of the cars. It is needless to say that all this. ;is totally inconsistént with the idea that the parties intended a mere letting or. bailment for hire.

It appears equally clear to us that the contract was not one for a conditional sale. It is true it said the manufacturing company were to hold the three notes as collateral security, [245]*245and collect the same at their maturity, and “hold the proceeds when collected for the safe custody and return to the party of the first part, when .demanded, of said passenger, mail,,baggage, and express cars, delivered to the party of the second part for the term of four months for hire,” “ the said party of'the second-part to have the right and privilege to purchase ” (the cars) “ at any time within the said period of four .months, upon payment to the party of the first part, in cash, the sum of $6,338.40, with interest at the rate of ten per cent from the date of the agreement until day of payment, but, until such payment is made in full, the said party of the second part shall have no right, title, claim, or interest in and to said'passenger and mail, baggage, and express cars, except as-to their use or hire, nor any fight or authority in any way to dispose of, hire, sell, mortgage, or. pledge the same, but that the said cars are and shall remain the property of the party of the first part, to be accounted for by the party of the second part to the party of the first par.t, and to be redelivered ,to the party of the first part, when demanded in default of the payment of the. aforesaid sum of $6,338.40, with interest as aforesaid, .hereinbefore described, anything to the contrary herein contained notwithstanding.”

- If this were all, it would necessarily be held that a conditional sale was intended. But it is not all. It' is quite unmeaning for parties to a contract to say it shall not amount to a sale, when it contains every element of a sale, and transmission of ownership. This,..part of the contract is to be construed in connection with the other provisions, so that if ■ possible, or so far as is possible, they all may harmonize. Thus construed, it is quite plain these stipulations were inserted to enable the manufacturing .company tó enforce payment, not. of any, rent or hire, but of .the- selling price of the cars for; which the company took the notes of the railroad company. They were intended as additional security for- the payment of- the debt the latter company assumed. This is shown most clearly by the other provisions of the contract. The notes became the absolute property of the vendors. As has been stated, they all fell due within four months, and it was expected they would be paid. The vendors were -expressly [246]*246allowed to collect them at their maturity, and it was agreed that whatever sums should be collected on account of them should be retained by the vendors for their own use.

. No , part of the money was to be returned to the railroad company in any event, not even if the cars should be returned. On the contrary, it was stipulated expressly that if the manufacturing company should elect to take the cars into their own possession, which they reserved the right to do in case o'f default of payment of the notes, the property should be sold, and of the net amount realized from the sale, so much as should .be needed to make the amount remaining due and unpaid on' the promissory notes, with the interest that • might have accrued thereon, should be retained by the manufacturing company,' and the surplus, if any, should be paid over to the railroad company.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
102 U.S. 235, 26 L. Ed. 160, 1880 U.S. LEXIS 2031, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/heryford-v-davis-scotus-1880.