Dolliver, J.
Beginning in May 1966, Plaintiff, Thomas M. Henson, worked as a shipping clerk for Tam Engineering Corporation (Tam). In June 1983, Tam perceived that Henson might have an alcohol problem. At the suggestion of Tam, Henson went to Puget Sound Hospital for an evaluation. The director of treatment did not diagnose Henson but suspected an alcohol problem based on Henson's [376]*376drinking habits and denial of any problem. Henson returned to work and at this time Tam took no further action.
In October 1984, Henson came to work with the odor of alcohol about his person. Although Henson never drank on the job and it was not alleged his performance was impaired by drinking, his duties required contact with customers. Consequently, Tam felt the odor of alcohol about Henson was in itself detrimental to Tam's interests.
Following at least six warnings, Tam insisted Henson attend the Northwest Treatment Center (NTC) for 21 days. Tam agreed to pay half of the costs of the program not covered by Henson's medical insurance. Henson agreed in order to save his job.
On November 16, 1984, Henson was released from the treatment center with a diagnosis of "[mjiddle stage alcoholism". NTC recommended that Henson comply with the following aftercare program: (1) that he attend 12 weeks of aftercare group therapy at the treatment center; (2) that he return home and to work; and (3) that he attend at least three Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings per week and get a sponsor.
When Tam inquired whether Henson would comply with all the recommendations of the treatment center as part of the complete program, Henson refused to commit to the AA meetings. Tam warned Henson that discharge was the consequence of refusal. Henson still refused. Tam placed Henson on a 3-day suspension so he could reconsider. Henson left work and never returned. Tam waited a few more days and then discharged Henson.
Henson applied for unemployment benefits. After a hearing, the Employment Security Department (ESD) denied Henson unemployment benefits on the basis that he was discharged for work-connected misconduct. On appeal the administrative law judge upheld the denied. That denial was then affirmed by the Commissioner of the ESD. When the Superior Court upheld the Commissioner's decision, [377]*377plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. After oral argument and extensive conferencing, the Court of Appeals certified the appeal to the Supreme Court. We accepted certification and affirm.
I
The preliminary issues are the standard of review and the burden of proof.
Issues of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. RCW 34.04.130(6)(e). Franklin Cy. Sheriffs Office v. Sellers, 97 Wn.2d 317, 324, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983). Issues of law are reviewed under the error of law standard, in which the reviewing court may "essentially substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body." Sellers, at 325. With mixed questions of law and fact, the court determines the correct law independent of the agency's decision and then applies it to the facts as found by the agency. Sellers, at 329-30. We recently applied this mixed question standard to the meaning of "misconduct". Macey v. Department of Empl. Sec., 110 Wn.2d 308, 313, 752 P.2d 372 (1988). This standard applies here.
After review of the record, we find that the facts found by the Superior Court are not clearly erroneous. The remaining and primary issue before us is one of law, that is, whether this refusal to attend the AA meetings fits the legal definition of disqualifying "misconduct."
As to the burden of proof, on appeal the burden is on Henson, as the party attacking the decision, to prove that his conduct did not amount to disqualifying misconduct. See RCW 50.32.150; Schuffenhauer v. Department of Empl. Sec., 86 Wn.2d 233, 235, 543 P.2d 343 (1975), (citing In re All-State Constr. Co., 70 Wn.2d 657, 425 P.2d 16 (1967)).
II
RCW 50.20.060(1) provides:
An individual shall be disqualified from benefits beginning with the first day of the calendar week in which he or she has [378]*378been discharged or suspended for misconduct connected with his or her work . . .
(Italics ours.)
The question here is whether an employee's refusal to attend AA meetings which were part of the overall NTC program as a condition of his continued employment constitutes "misconduct" within the statute. In Macey v. Department of Empl. Sec., supra, we formulated the following 3-part test to establish disqualifying misconduct: (1) the employer's rule must be reasonable under the circumstances; (2) the conduct of the employee must be connected with the work; and (3) the conduct of the employee must in fact violate the rule. Macey, at 319.
The Macey test, however, applies only to on-duty misconduct, as opposed to the off-duty test established in Nelson v. Department of Empl. Sec., 98 Wn.2d 370, 375, 655 P.2d 242 (1982). Because Macey only applies to on-duty conduct, we must first determine whether Henson's conduct was on duty or off duty.
We find that Henson's conduct was on duty. Henson was not discharged for being an alcoholic, for having alcohol on his breath or even for not going to the AA meetings. He was discharged strictly for his refusal to complete the NTC program which he had previously agreed to enter. The refusal itself was made on the premises and during working hours; it constitutes on-duty misconduct. Furthermore, although work performance was not impaired, Henson's alcohol problem did manifest itself more than once on duty in the odor of alcohol about his person. The employer had a legitimate interest in being assured that the agreed alcohol treatment program would be fully completed to guard more reliably against future on-duty problems.
Because the conduct was on duty, Macey applies. The first prong, whether the employer's rule was reasonable under the circumstances of employment, is satisfied. The key is the qualifying phrase "under the circumstances". While the employer simply could have required Henson to eliminate the problem and left the method up to Henson, [379]*379the employer's chosen course of action was also reasonable. The employer desired to retain Henson as an employee, but the ineffectiveness of past warnings demonstrated that the problem was unlikely to be resolved without a reliable treatment program.
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Dolliver, J.
Beginning in May 1966, Plaintiff, Thomas M. Henson, worked as a shipping clerk for Tam Engineering Corporation (Tam). In June 1983, Tam perceived that Henson might have an alcohol problem. At the suggestion of Tam, Henson went to Puget Sound Hospital for an evaluation. The director of treatment did not diagnose Henson but suspected an alcohol problem based on Henson's [376]*376drinking habits and denial of any problem. Henson returned to work and at this time Tam took no further action.
In October 1984, Henson came to work with the odor of alcohol about his person. Although Henson never drank on the job and it was not alleged his performance was impaired by drinking, his duties required contact with customers. Consequently, Tam felt the odor of alcohol about Henson was in itself detrimental to Tam's interests.
Following at least six warnings, Tam insisted Henson attend the Northwest Treatment Center (NTC) for 21 days. Tam agreed to pay half of the costs of the program not covered by Henson's medical insurance. Henson agreed in order to save his job.
On November 16, 1984, Henson was released from the treatment center with a diagnosis of "[mjiddle stage alcoholism". NTC recommended that Henson comply with the following aftercare program: (1) that he attend 12 weeks of aftercare group therapy at the treatment center; (2) that he return home and to work; and (3) that he attend at least three Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings per week and get a sponsor.
When Tam inquired whether Henson would comply with all the recommendations of the treatment center as part of the complete program, Henson refused to commit to the AA meetings. Tam warned Henson that discharge was the consequence of refusal. Henson still refused. Tam placed Henson on a 3-day suspension so he could reconsider. Henson left work and never returned. Tam waited a few more days and then discharged Henson.
Henson applied for unemployment benefits. After a hearing, the Employment Security Department (ESD) denied Henson unemployment benefits on the basis that he was discharged for work-connected misconduct. On appeal the administrative law judge upheld the denied. That denial was then affirmed by the Commissioner of the ESD. When the Superior Court upheld the Commissioner's decision, [377]*377plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. After oral argument and extensive conferencing, the Court of Appeals certified the appeal to the Supreme Court. We accepted certification and affirm.
I
The preliminary issues are the standard of review and the burden of proof.
Issues of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. RCW 34.04.130(6)(e). Franklin Cy. Sheriffs Office v. Sellers, 97 Wn.2d 317, 324, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983). Issues of law are reviewed under the error of law standard, in which the reviewing court may "essentially substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body." Sellers, at 325. With mixed questions of law and fact, the court determines the correct law independent of the agency's decision and then applies it to the facts as found by the agency. Sellers, at 329-30. We recently applied this mixed question standard to the meaning of "misconduct". Macey v. Department of Empl. Sec., 110 Wn.2d 308, 313, 752 P.2d 372 (1988). This standard applies here.
After review of the record, we find that the facts found by the Superior Court are not clearly erroneous. The remaining and primary issue before us is one of law, that is, whether this refusal to attend the AA meetings fits the legal definition of disqualifying "misconduct."
As to the burden of proof, on appeal the burden is on Henson, as the party attacking the decision, to prove that his conduct did not amount to disqualifying misconduct. See RCW 50.32.150; Schuffenhauer v. Department of Empl. Sec., 86 Wn.2d 233, 235, 543 P.2d 343 (1975), (citing In re All-State Constr. Co., 70 Wn.2d 657, 425 P.2d 16 (1967)).
II
RCW 50.20.060(1) provides:
An individual shall be disqualified from benefits beginning with the first day of the calendar week in which he or she has [378]*378been discharged or suspended for misconduct connected with his or her work . . .
(Italics ours.)
The question here is whether an employee's refusal to attend AA meetings which were part of the overall NTC program as a condition of his continued employment constitutes "misconduct" within the statute. In Macey v. Department of Empl. Sec., supra, we formulated the following 3-part test to establish disqualifying misconduct: (1) the employer's rule must be reasonable under the circumstances; (2) the conduct of the employee must be connected with the work; and (3) the conduct of the employee must in fact violate the rule. Macey, at 319.
The Macey test, however, applies only to on-duty misconduct, as opposed to the off-duty test established in Nelson v. Department of Empl. Sec., 98 Wn.2d 370, 375, 655 P.2d 242 (1982). Because Macey only applies to on-duty conduct, we must first determine whether Henson's conduct was on duty or off duty.
We find that Henson's conduct was on duty. Henson was not discharged for being an alcoholic, for having alcohol on his breath or even for not going to the AA meetings. He was discharged strictly for his refusal to complete the NTC program which he had previously agreed to enter. The refusal itself was made on the premises and during working hours; it constitutes on-duty misconduct. Furthermore, although work performance was not impaired, Henson's alcohol problem did manifest itself more than once on duty in the odor of alcohol about his person. The employer had a legitimate interest in being assured that the agreed alcohol treatment program would be fully completed to guard more reliably against future on-duty problems.
Because the conduct was on duty, Macey applies. The first prong, whether the employer's rule was reasonable under the circumstances of employment, is satisfied. The key is the qualifying phrase "under the circumstances". While the employer simply could have required Henson to eliminate the problem and left the method up to Henson, [379]*379the employer's chosen course of action was also reasonable. The employer desired to retain Henson as an employee, but the ineffectiveness of past warnings demonstrated that the problem was unlikely to be resolved without a reliable treatment program. Therefore, because the employer was not an expert in the treatment of alcoholism, it was reasonable for the employer to insist that Henson follow the recommendation of its experts, in this case, NTC.
Tam could have fired Henson for coming to work with the odor of alcohol. Instead, it had Henson take 21 days off work for the treatment program. The employer also helped pay for the treatment. Because of the time and money which the employer had already invested in Henson's recovery, it was reasonable for the employer to expect Henson to complete the entire treatment program.
Furthermore, Tam had reasonable interests at stake in requiring assurances that Henson would complete the entire treatment program. When Henson refused to complete the program, the risk that he would come to work with alcohol on his breath was substantially increased. It was reasonable for the employer to require Henson's promise to cooperate with NTC's recommendations before allowing Henson to return to work, just as it was reasonable in the first place for the employer not to wait until a customer complained before insisting Henson get reliable, professional treatment.
Finally, Henson had agreed to the NTC treatment program. In doing so, Henson made an implied contract. This court has repeatedly defined an implied contract as "an agreement of the parties arrived at from their acts and conduct viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances". Davis v. Niagara Mach. Co., 90 Wn.2d 342, 347, 581 P.2d 1344 (1978) (quoting Milone & Tucci, Inc. v. Bona Fide Builders, Inc., 49 Wn.2d 363, 368, 301 P.2d 759 (1956); Western Oil Ref. Co. v. Underwood, 83 Ind. App. 488, 491, 149 N.E. 85 (1925)).
We find the conduct of the parties sufficient in light of the circumstances to show an agreement. The employer [380]*380offered to retain Henson as an employee but insisted that he complete the NTC treatment program as a condition of continued employment. Henson accepted his employer's offer by attending the 21-day treatment portion and also by allowing his employer to pay part of the costs. The facts indicate that Henson would not have taken the NTC program except to save his job. Neither would his employer have paid the program costs if it had known Henson would not complete the program. The only interpretation of these events is that Henson and his employer had an agreement.
Henson argues that he agreed only to the initial 21 days of treatment and not to the aftercare portion. It is not, however, crucial as to whether Henson specifically agreed to follow the aftercare portion of the NTC program. In agreeing to enter the NTC program, Henson had agreed to deal with his drinking problem as directed by NTC. It was reasonable then for the employer to require Henson to follow NTC's recommendations, regardless of whether Henson concurred with the diagnosis. Henson's refusal willfully violated this implied contract.
Given the reasonable solution chosen for Henson's continued employment, the reasonable interests of the employer in the completion of the program and Henson's initial agreement to enroll in the program, the employer's rule was sufficiently reasonable to satisfy the first prong of the Macey test.
The second prong is that the conduct must be connected with the work. We said in Macey that the proper inquiry should be the effect of the employee's conduct on his work performance in particular and on the work force in general. Macey, at 319.
Though actual work performance was not impaired, Henson's duties required contact with the public. This meant that the employer could not have Henson working in that capacity unless the employer could be ensured that Henson would no longer smell of alcohol. Another employee would have to perform Henson's public duties until the [381]*381employer could trust that Henson's problem had been adequately resolved. Consequently, Henson's later refusal to complete the program had a direct effect on both work performance and the work force.
Finally, it is within the legitimate interests and expectations of an employer that all employees come to work without smelling of alcohol. For these reasons, Henson's refusal is sufficiently connected with the employer's work to satisfy the second prong in Macey.
The third prong, that the conduct must in fact violate the rule, is also satisfied. The employer's rule was that Henson attend three AA meetings per week. Henson's refusal is uncontested.
Henson has not met the burden to prove that the employer's order was unreasonable. See RCW 50.32.150; Schuffenhauer v. Department of Empl. Sec., supra.
We hold Henson's on-duty refusal to complete the aftercare portion of the agreed alcoholic treatment program constituted misconduct connected with work disqualifying Henson for unemployment benefits under RCW 50.20-.060(1).
The Superior Court of Pierce County is affirmed. Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees is denied.
Utter, Pearson, Andersen, and Smith, JJ., concur.