Henry v. Contra Costa Department of Child Support Services

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: December 8, 2023
• Docket: 3:23-cv-04552
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RONALD HENRY, Case No. 23-cv-04552-JSC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION TO 9 v. RECUSE AND (2) DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT 10 CONTRA COSTA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, Re: Dkt. Nos., 1, 13 11 Defendant.

12 13 Ronald Henry challenges California’s attempt to enforce his past due child support, 14 including by suspending his license and by levying his bank account. Henry argues 42 U.S.C. § 15 666(e) does not authorize these actions, so state actors exceeded their statutory authority. The 16 Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis and now reviews the complaint 17 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff also moves for recusal of this Court. (Dkt. No. 13.)1 18 After carefully considering Plaintiff’s submissions, the Court concludes oral argument is not 19 required, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for recusal and 20 DISMISSES the complaint for failure to state a claim, but with leave to amend. Any amended 21 complaint must be filed by January 5, 2024. 22 BACKGROUND 23 A. Complaint Allegations 24 Plaintiff owes over $90,000.00 in child support for his son who turned 18 on June 11, 25 2008. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 51.) He alleges “violations of Title IV-D of the Social Act [42 U.S.C. § 26 666], by Defendant Contra Costa County Department of Child Support Services DCSS[.]” (Id. at 27 1 2.) Plaintiff believes DCSS “has been and is abusing its limited federal grant of authority in 2 executing California’s Child Support Enforcement Program,” and challenges the authority of the 3 DCSS to enforce his child support order including the suspension of his driver’s license and a 4 bank levy. (Id. at 6.) 5 According to the documents attached to Plaintiff’s complaint, his driver’s license has been 6 suspended since December 20, 2012. (Id. at 37.) On February 5, 2015, Plaintiff failed to appear at 7 a hearing for driving with a suspended license. (Id.) In 2017, Plaintiff contacted “the Director of 8 the Department of Motor Vehicles advising [them] that the suspension of his driving privilege was 9 in violation of his due process rights and cited case law in support of that contention.” (Id. at 6.) 10 The DMV’s response stated it “was not inclined to lift the license suspension[.]” (Id.) 11 Plaintiff seeks an injunction barring DCSS from enforcing California’s child support laws 12 under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 666. (Id. at 1.) He also seeks two declaratory judgments: (1) 13 DCSS’s enforcement actions against him 15 years after his son was last eligible for child support 14 are outside the scope of its authority and thus unconstitutional as applied; and (2) DCSS’s actions 15 “violate the privileges and immunities guarantee of the California Constitution[.]” (Id. at 13.) 16 Plaintiff seeks 15 million dollars “in compensatory and punitive damages from DCSS for 17 exceeding its limited grant of authority when it knew or should have known” it had “no authority 18 to act against him after June 11, 2008 when there was no child to ‘support and maintain.’” (Id. at 19 18.) Plaintiff also demands the refund of “any monies illegally taken since then[,]” which 20 according to his Complaint is 99 cents. (Id. at 6.) 21 B. Procedural Background 22 Plaintiff filed the current action on September 5, 2023. (Dkt. No. 1.) He filed a similar 23 action in 2011. See Henry v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue Child Support Services Div., No. 3:11-cv- 24 03255-JSC, 2011 WL 6014657 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011). In the 2011 action, Plaintiff asserted: (1) 25 a constitutional challenge to a state law and 42 U.S.C. § 666, the latter of which prohibits issuing 26 passports to persons in arrears on child support payments, and (2) a constitutional challenge to 27 California’s suspension of Plaintiff’s commercial driver’s license for failing to make child support 1 dismissing the state of Alaska and staying the claims against the state of California: “The 2 gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint is that because his son is no longer a minor it is unconstitutional 3 to require Plaintiff to suffer any consequences from his failure to pay his past child support 4 obligations.” Henry v. Alaska, 2011 WL 6014657 at *2. The Court dismissed the case without 5 prejudice at Plaintiff’s request because there was ongoing state litigation. Henry v. California 6 Dept. of Child Support Services, No. 11-cv-03255-JSC, 2012 WL 1965860, at *2 (N. D. Cal. May 7 31, 2012). Before dismissing the case, the Court noted the theory underpinning Plaintiff’s action 8 was “novel and defie[d] common sense.” Henry v. Alaska, 2012 WL 1965860, at *3. 9 MOTION TO RECUSE 10 Plaintiff moves to disqualify the Court under 28 U.S.C. § 455. (Dkt. No. 13.) “[A] judge 11 has as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as [s]he does to recuse when 12 the law and facts require.” Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 13 1179 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “Since a federal judge is 14 presumed to be impartial, the party seeking disqualification bears a substantial burden to show that 15 the judge is biased.” Torres v. Chrysler Fin. Co., No. C-07-00915-JW, 2007 WL 3165665, at *1 16 (N. D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2007); see also Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 924 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We 17 presume that Judge Newhouse was impartial because he was a judicial officer.”). 18 Plaintiff cites two main reasons for disqualification. First, “of primary concern” is 19 “Plaintiff’s choice to not proceed before a Magistrate Judge,” which Plaintiff believes has been 20 “disregarded.” (Dkt. No. 13 at 2.) While Plaintiff is correct, this judge was formerly a Magistrate 21 Judge; President Biden nominated Judge Corley to be an Article III District Court Judge, which 22 the Senate confirmed on March 17, 2022. See “About District Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley,” 23 United States District Court: Northern District of California, 24 https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/judges/corley-jacqueline-scott-jsc/; see also “San Francisco 25 Courthouse: Article III Judges,” United States District Court: Northern District of California, 26 https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/judges/ (listing “Jacqueline Scott Corley, District Judge” under 27 “Article III Judges” for the San Francisco Courthouse). So, no consent is required. 1 Second, Plaintiff asserts recusal is warranted because “during the prior case[,] Judge 2 Corley demonstrated bias toward him and appears to have been advocating from the bench.” (Dkt. 3 No. 13 at 2.) Specifically, Plaintiff remonstrates the Court’s statement “Plaintiff’s theory is novel 4 and defies common sense,” Henry v. Alaska, 2011 WL 6014657 at *3, because “[o]ne would 5 presume this to be an argument advanced by Plaintiff’s adversary during litigation and not by a 6 neutral trier of fact.” (Id. at 3.) He feels this statement is “particularly prejudicial and insulting.” 7 (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff asserts this was a “personal (as opposed to legal) opinion” which “indicates to 8 the Plaintiff that she is not competent to hear this case and that she is likely to adjudicate it with 9 this same prejudice and bias.” (Id.) 10 Plaintiff has identified no facts indicating the Court has any financial or personal interest in 11 this proceeding. See Johnson v. Barr, 79 F.4th 996, 1007 (9th Cir. 2023) (“To prevail on a motion 12 to disqualify a judge, the party filing the motion must show extrajudicial bias or prejudice.”). 13 Disagreeing with a judge’s legal ruling is insufficient for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455. See 14 United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Provisions of section 455(a) & (b)(1) 15 require recusal only if the bias or prejudice is directed against a party and stems from an 16 extrajudicial source” and finding a judge need not excuse himself after the judge concluded a 17 particular legal strategy was “meritless” and “legally frivolous”). The Court’s statement that 18 Plaintiff’s claim defies common sense does not evidence bias; it reflects analysis of Plaintiff’s 19 contention that a parent can avoid paying child support merely by refusing to pay until his child 20 reaches the age of majority. 21 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for recusal is DENIED. 22 28 U.S. CODE § 1915 ANALYSIS 23 I. LEGAL STANDARD 24 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court has a continuing duty to dismiss any case in which a 25 party seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis if the Court determines the action fails to state a 26 claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 27 1 When a plaintiff representing himself files a complaint, as is the case here, courts must 2 “construe the pleadings liberally . . . to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. 3 Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 4 II. DISCUSSION 5 The Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted because (1) there is no 6 private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 666, (2) even so, DCSS’s actions are authorized by 7 statute, (3) any alleged constitutional challenges fail, (4) as do claims brought under the 8 Administrative Procedures Act. 9 A. Merits 10 1. No Private Right of Action 11 To the extent Plaintiff attempts to bring his claim directly under § 666, the statute does not 12 contain a private right of action allowing him to do so. “[P]rivate rights of action to enforce 13 federal law must be created by Congress.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) 14 (citations omitted). Thus, courts interpret statutes “to determine whether it displays an intent to 15 create not just a private right but also a private remedy.” Id. (citations omitted). 16 There is no private right of action under the specific provision Plaintiff challenges. 17 Plaintiff specifically cites 42 U.S.C. § 666(e), which defines “overdue support” and does not 18 provide a private right of action. 19 Even looking at the entirety of 42 U.S.C. § 666, no provision explicitly creates a private 20 right of action or suggests an intent to do so. This conclusion is supported by the lack of any 21 general private right of action for the overarching statutory scheme, Title IV-D. Blessing v. 22 Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 330 (1997). Although the Supreme Court did “not foreclose the 23 possibility that some Title IV-D provisions give rise to individual rights,” id., nothing in the statue 24 at issue suggests the intent to do so. See 42 U.S.C. § 666. 25 Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 666 is directed at states and their agencies because it requires 26 “statutorily prescribed procedures to improve effectiveness of child support enforcement.” 42 27 U.S.C. § 666(a). Indeed, the statute does not mention individuals; instead, it promulgates 1 prerequisites for states to receive funding, including requiring states to enforce child support 2 judgments. See id. at (a). So, no private right of action exists under 42 U.S.C. § 666. See also 3 Mosier v. Att’y Gen. of Texas, 2015 WL 417984, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 30, 2015) (finding no 4 private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 666). 5 Accordingly, 42 U.S.C. § 666 does not create a private right of action which alone bars 6 Plaintiff’s claims. 7 2. DCSS Was Acting within Statutory Authority 8 Plaintiff’s central argument is that the DCSS’s actions are not authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 9 666(e) or any California statutes. However, neither the statute’s plain language nor case law 10 supports his argument because DCSS’s actions are authorized by the plain language of the 11 statutes. 12 To interpret the meaning of a statute, courts “begin by determining ‘whether the language 13 at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.’” 14 Dept. of Human Services, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Hoopono-Services for the Blind 15 v. U.S. Dept. of Edu., Rehabilitation Services Admin., 46 F.4th 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2022) 16 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)). The language in 42 U.S.C. § 17 666 has a plain and unambiguous meaning. The statute allows for the collection of overdue 18 support “owed to or on behalf of a child who is not a minor child.” 42 U.S.C. § 666(e). 19 Therefore, Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are foreclosed by the unambiguous plain language 20 of the statute. 21 Plaintiff also argues DCSS is defying California statutes because there are “statutory 22 limitations found within the California Family Code,” which Plaintiff insists DCSS has exceeded. 23 (Dkt. No.1 at 10-11.) These limitations derive from the definition of “current support” and “child 24 support payments[,]” which Plaintiff again contests because his son is now an adult. (Id.) 25 However, Plaintiff has not pled any allegations indicating DCSS has exceeded its statutory 26 authority; to the contrary, Plaintiff’s allegations indicate DCSS is acting in accordance with 27 California statutes. California law provides: “An order for child support . . . continues in effect 1 Code § 3601. So, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the court order requiring him to pay child 2 support did not terminate automatically when his son turned 18. This result is reinforced by a 3 California statute specifying that “[i]f a parent has been ordered to make payments for the support 4 of a minor child, an action to recover an arrearage in those payments may be maintained at any 5 time within the period otherwise specified for the enforcement of such a judgment, 6 notwithstanding the fact that the child has attained the age of 18 years.” Cal. Fam. Code § 4503. 7 Also, California law provides for suspending one’s driver’s license, Cal. Fam. Code § 17520, and 8 withholding money from one’s bank account. Cal. Fam. Code § 17450 et seq. 9 Accordingly, DCSS’s actions are within federal and California state statutory authority. 10 3. Any Alleged Constitutional Challenges Fail 11 a. Federal Constitutional Claims 12 Construing the Complaint broadly to allege Fourth Amendment and Due Process 13 violations, Plaintiff’s arguments still fail. (See Dkt. No 1. at 6 (claiming California has violated 14 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights and Plaintiff “mailed a letter to the Department of Motor 15 Vehicles (“DMV”) advising that the suspension of his driving privilege was in violation of his due 16 process rights.”).) 17 “To establish a viable Fourth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show not only that there 18 was a search and seizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment, but also that said search 19 and seizure was unreasonable and conducted without consent.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 20 143 (1978). Enforcing child support orders implicates important state interests. See Matter of 21 Reynolds, 726 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The obligation of parents to support their 22 children is a matter of paramount social concern.”). Plaintiff alleges he owes past-due child 23 support pursuant to a valid court order. (Dkt. No. 1 at 44.) So, revoking Plaintiff’s driver’s 24 license is reasonable given the “paramount” state interest in enforcing child support orders. See 25 e.g., Franceschi v. Yee, 887 F.3d 927, 935-936 (9th Cir. 2018) (revoking a driver’s license for 26 “major” tax delinquency). Accordingly, any Fourth Amendment claims must be dismissed for 27 failure to state a claim. 1 Construing the Complaint liberally, Plaintiff alleges a substantive due process challenge to 2 DCSS’s enforcement actions—asserting that because DCSS has exceeded its statutory authority, 3 its action is not “rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.” Matsuda v. City & Cnty. 4 of Honolulu, 512 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In evaluating a substantive due process claim . 5 . . state action which neither utilizes a suspect classification nor draws distinctions among 6 individuals that implicate fundamental rights will violate substantive due process only if the action 7 is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”). Collecting overdue child support 8 payments is rationally related to the government interest in supporting children financially because 9 collecting such payments incentivizes timely child support payments. Further, as explained above, 10 Plaintiff has not alleged facts that plausibly support an inference DCSS has exceeded its statutory 11 authority. Therefore, for the same reasons this Court noted in the 2011 action, Plaintiff’s 12 substantive due process claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim. 13 b. California Constitutional Claims 14 Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that DCSS violated “the privileges and immunities 15 guarantee of the California Constitution (Article 7) by unreasonably interfering with his right to 16 pursue and obtain a commercial driver’s license necessary for his chosen occupation and violates 17 the due process guarantee of the California Constitution by unreasonably interfering with 18 Plaintiff’s right to pursue a commercial driver’s license.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 13-14). 19 Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution2 states: “A citizen or class of citizens 20 may not be granted privileges or immunities not granted on the same terms to all citizens. 21 Privileges or immunities granted by the Legislature may be altered or revoked.” Cal. Const. Art. I, 22 § 7(b). California courts have held this provision is “governed by the same standards as those 23 prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution.” Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. 24 App. 3d 1, 20 (Ct. App. 1971). “Under privileges and immunities jurisprudence, legislation that 25 favors one class of citizens over another does not violate the clause unless the classification of 26 2 Plaintiff cites “Article 7” of the California Constitution. (Dkt. No. 1 at 13.) However, Article 7 27 of the California Constitution is titled “Public Officers and Employees” and appears unrelated to 1 citizens is unreasonable and arbitrary.” City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Flying Dutchman Park, 2 122 Cal. App. 4th 74, 87 (2004). Under California law, the suspension of Plaintiff’s commercial 3 driver’s license was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. See Tolces v. Trask, 76 Cal. App. 4th 285, 4 291 (1999) (holding the suspension of a driver’s license due to overdue child support payments “is 5 rationally related to a legitimate government purpose”). So, Plaintiff fails to state a viable cause of 6 action as to the privileges and immunities clause of the California constitution. Plaintiff’s due 7 process claims under the California constitution also fail for the same reasons his federal due 8 process claims fail. 9 So, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted under either the 10 federal or California constitutions. Accordingly, no declaratory judgment is warranted. 11 4. Administrative Procedure Act 12 Plaintiff’s complaint also accuses the DCSS of acting “arbirar[ily] and capricious[ly].” 13 (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Insofar as Plaintiff attempts to raise claims under the Administrative Procedure 14 Act (“APA”), these claims must be dismissed as the APA only applies to federal agencies. See 15 Sw. Williamson Cnty. Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Slater, 173 F.3d 1033, 1035 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 16 Gilliam v. Miller, 973 F.2d 760, 764 (9th Cir. 1992)). Therefore, any claims under the APA are 17 dismissed. 18 5. Leave to amend 19 “Leave to amend should be granted if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct 20 the defect.” Breier v. N. Cal. Bowling Proprietors’ Ass’n, 316 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1963) 21 (cleaned up). Moreover, courts grant leave to amend liberally, particularly when the plaintiff 22 represents themselves without the assistance of a lawyer. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 23 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff, a non-lawyer, is representing himself. (Dkt. No. 1.) As this is the first 24 Order addressing his complaint, the Court grants leave to amend. 25 6. CONCLUSION 26 For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 27 (Dkt. No. 1.) If Plaintiff believes he can correct the defects identified in this Order, he may file an 1 amended complaint on or before January 5, 2024. If no amended complaint is filed by that date, 2 || judgment will be entered against Plaintiff. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 This Order disposes of Dkt. Nos. 1, and 13. 5 Dated: December 8, 2023 vl 7 ne JACQ INE SCOTT CORLEY 8 United States District Judge 9 10 11 12

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