Rakas v. Illinois

439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 2452

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: January 15, 1979
• Docket: 77-5781
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners were convicted of armed robbery in the Circuit Court of Kankakee County, Ill., and their convictions were affirmed on appeal. At their trial, the prosecution offered into evidence a sawed-off rifle and rifle shells that had been seized by police during a search of an automobile in which petitioners had been passengers. Neither petitioner is the owner of the automobile and neither has ever asserted that he owned the rifle or shells seized. The Illinois Appellate Court held that petitioners lacked standing to object to the allegedly unlawful search and seizure and denied their motion to suppress the evidence. We granted certiorari in light of the obvious importance of the issues raised to the administration of criminal justice, 435 TJ. S. 922 (1978), and now affirm.

I

Because we are not here concerned with the issue of probable cause, a brief description of the events leading to the search of the automobile will suffice. A police officer on a routine patrol received a radio call notifying him of a robbery of a clothing store in Bourbonnais, Ill., and describing the getaway car. Shortly thereafter, the officer spotted an automobile which he thought might be the getaway car. After following the car for some time and after the arrival of assistance, he and several other officers stopped the vehicle. The occupants of the automobile, petitioners and two female companions, were ordered out of the car and, after the occupants had left the car, two officers searched the interior of the vehicle. They discovered a box of rifle shells in the glove compartment, which had been locked, and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat. App. 10-11. After discovering the rifle and the shells, the officers took petitioners to the station and placed them under arrest.

Before trial petitioners moved to suppress the rifle and shells seized from the car on the ground that the search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. They conceded that they did not own the automobile and were simply passengers; the owner of the car had been the driver of the vehicle at the time of the search. Nor did they assert that they owned the rifle or the shells seized.¹ The prosecutor challenged petitioners’ standing to object to the lawfulness of the search of the car because neither the car, the shells nor the rifle belonged to them. The trial court agreed that petitioners lacked standing and denied the motion to suppress the evidence. App. 23-24. In view of this holding, the court did not determine whether there was probable cause for the search and seizure. On appeal after petitioners’ conviction, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third Judicial District, affirmed the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ motion to suppress because it held that “without a proprietary or other similar interest in an automobile, a mere passenger therein lacks standing to challenge the legality of the search of the vehicle.” 46 Ill. App. 3d 569, 571, 360 N. E. 2d 1252, 1253 (1977). The court stated:

“We believe that defendants failed to establish any prejudice to their own constitutional rights because they were not persons aggrieved by the unlawful search and seizure. . . . They wrongly seek to establish prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search and seizure directed at someone else and fail to prove an invasion of their own privacy. Alderman v. United States (1969), 394 U. S. 165 . . . Id., at 571-572, 360 N. E. 2d, at 1254.

The Illinois Supreme Court denied petitioners leave to appeal.

II

Petitioners first urge us to relax or broaden the rule of standing enunciated in Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960), so that any criminal defendant at whom a search was “directed” would have standing to contest the legality of that search and object to the admission at trial of evidence obtained as a result of the search. Alternatively, petitioners argue that they have standing to object to the search under Jones because they were “legitimately on [the] premises” at the time of the search.

The concept of standing discussed in Jones focuses on whether the person seeking to challenge the legality of a search as a basis for suppressing evidence was himself the “victim” of the search or seizure. Id., at 261.² Adoption of the so-called “target” theory advanced by petitioners would in effect permit a defendant to assert that a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of a third party entitled him to have evidence suppressed at his trial. If we reject petitioners’ request for a broadened rule of standing such as this, and reaffirm the holding of Jones and other cases that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be asserted vicariously, we will have occasion to re-examine the “standing” terminology emphasized in Jones. For we are not at all sure that the determination of a motion to suppress is materially aided by labeling the inquiry identified in Jones as one of standing, rather than simply recognizing it as one involving the substantive question of whether or not the proponent of the motion to suppress has had his own Fourth Amendment rights infringed by the search and seizure which he seeks to challenge. We shall therefore consider in turn petitioners’ target theory, the necessity for continued adherence to the notion of standing discussed in Jones as a concept that is theoretically distinct from the merits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim, and, finally, the proper disposition of petitioners’ ultimate claim in this case.

A

We decline to extend the rule of standing in Fourth Amendment cases in the manner suggested by petitioners. As we stated in Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165,174 (1969), “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.” See Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223, 230 (1973); Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 492 (1963); cf. Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961); Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 304 (1921). A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Alderman, swpra, at 174. And since the exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974), it is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the rule’s protections.³ See Simmons v. United States, supra, at 389. There is no reason to think that a party whose rights have been infringed will not, if evidence is used against him, have ample motivation to move to suppress it. Alderman, supra, at 174. Even if such a person is not a defendant in the action, he may be able to recover damages for the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), or seek redress under state law for invasion of privacy or trespass.

In support of their target theory, petitioners rely on the following quotation from Jones:

“In order to qualify as a ‘person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure’ one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else.” 362 U. S., at 261 (emphasis added).

They also rely on Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U. S. 543, 548 n. 11 (1968), and United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 (1951).

The above-quoted statement from Jones suggests that the italicized language was meant merely as a parenthetical equivalent of the previous phrase “a victim of a search or seizure.” To the extent that the language might be read more broadly, it is dictum which was impliedly repudiated in Alderman v. United States, supra, and which we now expressly reject. In Jones, the Court set forth two alternative holdings: It established a rule of “automatic” standing to contest an allegedly illegal search where the same possession needed to establish standing is an essential element of the offense charged;⁴ and second, it stated that “anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress.” 362 U. S., at 264, 267. See Combs v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 n. 4 (1972); Mancud v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364, 368 n. 5 (1968) ; Simmons v. United States, supra, at 390. Had the Court intended to adopt the target theory now put forth by petitioners, neither of the above two holdings would have been necessary since Jones was the “target” of the police search in that case.⁵ Nor does United States v. Jeffers, supra, or Bumper v. North Carolina, supra, support the target theory. Standing in Jeffers was based on Jeffers’ possessory interest in both the premises searched and the property seized. 342 U. S., at 49-50, 54; see Mancusi v. DeForte, supra, at 367-368 ; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 301 (1966); Lanza v. New York, 370 U. S. 139, 143, and n. 10 (1962). Similarly, in Bumper, the defendant had a substantial possessory interest in both the house searched and the rifle seized. 391 U. S., at 548 n. 11.

In Alderman v. United States, Mr. Justice Fortas, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, argued that the Court should “include within the category of those who may object to the introduction of illegal evidence 'one against whom the search was directed.’ ” 394 U. S., at 206-209. The Court did not directly comment on Mr. Justice Fortas’ suggestion, but it left no doubt that it rejected this theory by holding that persons who were not parties to unlawfully overheard conversations or who did not own the premises on which such conversations took place did not have standing to contest the legality of the surveillance, regardless of whether or not they were the “targets” of the surveillance. Id., at 176'. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring and dissenting, did squarely address Mr. Justice Fortas’ arguments and declined to accept them. Id., at 188-189, n. 1. He identified administrative problems posed by the target theory:

“[T]he [target] rule would entail very substantial administrative difficulties. In the majority of cases, I would imagine that the police plant a bug with the expectation that it may well produce leads to a large number of crimes. A lengthy hearing would, then, appear to be necessary in order to determine whether the police knew of an accused’s criminal activity at the time the bug was planted and whether the police decision to plant a bug was motivated by an effort to obtain information against the accused or some other individual. I do not believe that this administrative burden is justified in any substantial degree by the hypothesized marginal increase in Fourth Amendment protection.” Ibid.

When we are urged to grant standing to a criminal defendant to assert a violation, not of his own constitutional rights but of someone else’s, we cannot but give weight to practical difficulties such as those foreseen by Mr. Justice Harlan in the quoted language.

Conferring standing to raise vicarious Fourth Amendment claims would necessarily mean a more widespread invocation of the exclusionary rule during criminal trials. The Court’s opinion in Alderman counseled against such an extension of the exclusionary rule:

“The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.” Id., at 174-175.

Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 489-490 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S., at 348-352. Since our cases generally have held that one whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated may successfully suppress evidence obtained in the course of an illegal search and seizure, misgivings as to the benefit of enlarging the class of persons who may invoke that rule are properly considered when deciding whether to expand standing to assert Fourth Amendment violations.⁶

B

Had we accepted petitioners’ request to allow persons other than those whose own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a challenged search and seizure to suppress evidence obtained in the course of such police activity, it would be appropriate to retain Jones’ use of standing in Fourth Amendment analysis. Under petitioners’ target theory, a court could determine that a defendant had standing to invoke the exclusionary rule without having to inquire into the substantive question of whether the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of that particular defendant. However, having rejected petitioners’ target theory and reaffirmed the principle that the “rights assured by the Fourth Amendment are personal rights, [which] . . . may be enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search and seizure,” Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S., at 389, the question necessarily arises whether it serves any useful analytical purpose to consider this principle a matter of standing, distinct from the merits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim. We can think of no decided cases of this Court that would have come out differently had we concluded, as we do now, that the type of standing requirement discussed in Jones and reaffirmed today is more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine. Rigorous application of the principle that the rights secured by this Amendment are personal, in place of a notion of “standing,” will produce no additional situations in which evidence must be excluded. The inquiry under either approach is the same.⁷ But we think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing. The Court in Jones also may have been aware that there was a certain artificiality in analyzing this question in terms of standing because in at least three separate places in its opinion the Court placed that term within quotation marks. 362 U. S., at 261, 263, 265.

It should be emphasized that nothing we say here casts the least doubt on cases which recognize that, as a general proposition, the issue of standing involves two inquiries: first, whether the proponent of a particular legal right has alleged “injury in fact,” and, second, whether the proponent is asserting his own legal rights and interests rather than basing his claim for relief upon the rights of third parties. See, e. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975); Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 152-153 (1970). But this Court’s long history of insistence that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature has already answered many of these traditional standing inquiries, and we think that definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than' within that of standing. Cf. id., at 153, and n. 1; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 256 n. 4 (1953); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 69-70 (1906).⁸

Analyzed in these terms, the question is whether the challenged search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it. That inquiry in turn requires a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect. We are under no illusion that by dispensing with the rubric of standing used in Jones we have rendered any simpler the determination of whether the proponent of a motion to suppress is entitled to contest the legality of a search and seizure. But by frankly recognizing that this aspect of the analysis belongs more properly under the heading of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of standing, we think the decision of this issue will rest on sounder logical footing.

C

Here petitioners, who were passengers occupying a car which they neither owned nor leased, seek to analogize their position to that of the defendant in Jones v. United States. In Jones, petitioner was present at the time of the search of an apartment which was owned by a friend. The friend had given Jones permission to use the apartment and a key to it, with which Jones had admitted himself on the day of the search. He had a suit and shirt at the apartment and had slept there “maybe a night,” but his home was elsewhere. At the time of the search, Jones was the only occupant of the apartment because the lessee was away for a period of several days. 362 U. S., at 259. Under these circumstances, this Court stated that while one wrongfully on the premises could not move to suppress evidence obtained as a result of searching them,⁹ “anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality.” Id., at 267. Petitioners argue that their occupancy of the automobile in question was comparable to that of Jones in the apartment and that they therefore have standing to contest the legality of the search — or as we have rephrased the inquiry, that they, like Jones, had their Fourth Amendment rights violated by the search.

We do not question the conclusion in Jones that the defendant in that case suffered a violation of his personal Fourth Amendment rights if the search in question was unlawful. Nonetheless, we believe that the phrase “legitimately on premises” coined in Jones creates too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights.¹⁰ For example, applied literally, this statement would permit a casual visitor who has never seen, or been permitted to visit, the basement of another’s house to object to a search of the basement if the visitor happened to be in the kitchen of the house at the time of the search. Likewise, a casual visitor who walks into a house one minute before a search of the house commences and leaves one minute after the search ends would be able to contest the legality of the search. The first visitor would have absolutely no interest or legitimate expectation of privacy in the basement, the second would have none in the house, and it advances no purpose served by the Fourth Amendment to permit either of them to object to the lawfulness of the search.¹¹

We think that Jones on its facts merely stands for the unremarkable proposition that a person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place. See 362 U. S., at 263, . In defining the scope of that interest, we adhere to the view expressed in Jones and echoed in later cases that arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to control. Id., at 266; see Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505 (1961). But the Jones statement that a person need only be “legitimately on premises” in order to challenge the validity of the search of a dwelling place cannot be taken in its full sweep beyond the facts of that case.

Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), provides guidance in defining the scope of the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. In the course of repudiating the doctrine derived from Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 (1942), that if police officers had not been guilty of a common-law trespass they were not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment from eavesdropping, the Court in Katz held that capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. 389 U. S., at 353; see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7 (1977); United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 752 (1971). Viewed in this manner, the holding in Jones can best be explained by the fact that Jones had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises he was using and therefore could claim the protection' Of the Fourth Amendment with respect to a governmental invasion of those premises, even though his “interest” in those premises might not have been a recognized property interest at common law.¹² See Jones v. United States, 362 U. S., at 261.

Our Brother White in dissent expresses the view that by rejecting the phrase "legitimately on ![the] premises” as the appropriate measure of Fourth Amendment rights, we are abandoning a thoroughly workable, “bright line” test in favor of a less certain analysis of whether the facts of a particular case give rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy. Post, at 168. If “legitimately on premises” were the successful litmus test of Fourth Amendment rights that he assumes it is, his approach would have at least the merit of easy application, whatever it lacked in fidelity to the history and purposes of the Fourth Amendment. But a reading of lower court cases that have applied the phrase “legitimately on premises,” and of the dissent itself, reveals that this expression is not a shorthand summary for a bright-line rule which somehow encapsulates the “core” of the Fourth Amendment's protections.¹³

The dissent itself shows that the facile consistency it is striving for is illusory. The dissenters concede that “there comes a point when use of an area is shared with so many that one simply cannot reasonably expect seclusion.” Post, at 164. But surely the “point” referred to is not one demarcating a line which is black on one side and white on another; it is inevitably a point which separates one shade of gray from another. We are likewise told by the dissent that a person “legitimately on private premises . . . , though his privacy is not absolute, is entitled to expect that he is sharing it only with those persons [allowed there] and that governmental officials will intrude only with consent or by complying with the Fourth Amendment.” Ibid, (emphasis added). This single sentence describing the contours of the supposedly easily applied rule virtually abounds with unanswered questions: What are “private” premises? Indeed, what are the “premises?” It may be easy to describe the “premises” when one is confronted with a 1-room apartment, but what of the case of a 10-room house, or of a house with an attached garage that is searched? Also, if one’s privacy is not absolute, how is it bounded? If he risks governmental intrusion “with consent,” who may give that consent?

Again, we are told by the dissent that the Fourth Amendment assures that “some expectations of privacy are justified and will be protected from official intrusion.” Post, at 166 (emphasis added). But we are not told which of many possible expectations of privacy are embraced within this sentence. And our dissenting Brethren concede that “perhaps the Constitution provides some degree less protection for the personal freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusion when one does not have a possessory interest in the invaded private place.” Ibid. But how much “less” protection is available when one does not have such a possessory interest?

Our disagreement with the dissent is not that it leaves these questions unanswered, or that the questions are necessarily irrelevant in the context of the analysis contained in this opinion. Our disagreement is rather with the dissent's bland and self-refuting assumption that there will not be fine lines to be drawn in Fourth Amendment cases as in other areas of the law, and that its rubric, rather than a meaningful exegesis of Fourth Amendment doctrine, is more desirable or more easily resolves Fourth Amendment cases.¹⁴ In abandoning “legitimately on premises” for the doctrine that we announce today, we are not forsaking a time-tested and workable rule, which- has produced consistent results when applied, solely for the sake of fidelity to the values underlying the Fourth Amendment. Rather, we are rejecting blind adherence to a phrase which at most has superficial clarity and which conceals underneath that thin veneer all of the problems of line drawing which must be faced in any conscientious effort to apply the Fourth Amendment. Where the factual premises for a rule are so generally prevalent that little would be lost and much would be gained by abandoning case-by-case analysis, we have not hesitated to do so. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 235 (1973). But the phrase “legitimately on premises” has not been shown to be an easily applicable measure of Fourth Amendment rights so much as it has proved to be simply a label placed by the courts on results which have not been subjected to careful analysis. We would not wish to be understood as saying that legitimate presence on the premises is irrelevant to one’s expectation of privacy, but it cannot be deemed controlling.

D

Judged by the foregoing analysis, petitioners’ claims must fail. They asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest in the property seized. And as we have previously indicated, the fact that they were “legitimately on [the] premises” in the sense that they were in the car with the permission of its owner is not determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile searched. It is unnecessary for us to decide here whether the same expectations of privacy are warranted in a car as would be justified in a dwelling place in analogous circumstances. We have on numerous occasions pointed out that cars are not to be treated identically with houses or apartments for Fourth Amendment purposes. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S., at 12; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 561 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion) ,¹⁵ But here petitioners’ claim is one which would fail even in an analogous situation in a dwelling place, since they made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passengers. Like the trunk of an automobile, these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy. Supra, at 142.

Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960) and Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), involved significantly different factual circumstances. Jones not only had permission to use the apartment of his friend, but had a key to the apartment with which he admitted himself on the day of the search and kept possessions in the apartment. Except with respect to his friend, Jones had complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it. Likewise in Katz, the defendant occupied the telephone booth, shut the door behind him to exclude all others and paid the toll, which “entitled [him] to assume that the words he utter [ed] into the mouthpiece [would] not be broadcast to the world.” Id., at 352.¹⁶ Katz and Jones could legitimately expect privacy in the areas which were the subject of the search and seizure each sought to contest. No such showing was made by these petitioners with respect to those portions of the automobile which were searched and from which incriminating evidence was seized.¹⁷

Ill

The Illinois courts were therefore correct in concluding that it was unnecessary to decide whether the search of the car might have violated the rights secured to someone else by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Since it did not violate any rights of these petitioners, their judgment of conviction is

Affirmed.

1 Petitioners claim that they were never asked whether they owned the rifle or shells seized during the search and, citing Combs v. United States, 408 U. S. 224 (1972), argue that if the Court determines that a property interest in the items seized is an adequate ground for standing to object to their seizure, the Court should remand the case for further proceedings on the question whether petitioners owned the seized rifle or shells. Reply Brief for Petitioners 4 n. 2. Petitioners do not now assert that they own the rifle or the shells.

We reject petitioners’ suggestion. The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure. See Simmons v. United States, 39(0 U. S. 377, 389-390 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 261 (1960). The prosecutor argued that petitioners lacked standing to challenge the search because they did not own the rifle, the shells or the automobile. Petitioners did not contest the factual predicates of the prosecutor’s argument and instead, simply stated that they were not required to prove ownership to object to the search. App. 23. The prosecutor’s argument gave petitioners notice that they were to be put to their proof on any issue as to which they had the burden, and because of their failure to assert ownership, we must assume, for purposes of our review, that petitioners do not own the rifle or the shells. Combs v. United States, supra,-vas quite different. In Combs, the Government had not challenged Combs’ standing at the suppression hearing and the issue of standing was not raised until the appellate level, where the Government conceded that its warrant was not based on probable cause. Because the record was “virtually barren of the facts necessary to determine” Combs’ right to contest the search and seizure, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. 408 U. S., at 227. The Government had requested the Court to remand for 'further proceedings on this issue. Brief for United States in Combs v. United States, O. T. 1971, No. 71-517, pp. 40-41.

2 Although Jones v. United, States was based upon an interpretation of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (e), the Court stated in Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 173 n. 6 (1969), that Rule 41 (e) conforms to the general standard and is no broader than the constitutional rule. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348-349, n. 6 (1974).

There is an aspect of traditional standing doctrine that was not considered in Jones and which we do not question. It is the proposition that a party seeking relief must allege such a personal stake or interest in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which Art. Ill requires. See, e. g., O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 493 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 99 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). Thus, a person whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a search or seizure, but who is not a defendant in a criminal action in which the illegally seized evidence is sought to be introduced, would not have standing to invoke the exclusionary rule to prevent use of that evidence in that action. See Calandra, supra, at 352 n. 8.

3 The necessity for a showing of a violation of personal rights is not obviated by recognizing the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174. Despite the deterrent aim of the exclusionary rule, we never have held that unlawfully seized evidence is inadmissible in all proceedings or against all persons. See, e. g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S., at 348. “[T]he application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” Ibid.

4 We have not yet had occasion to decide whether the automatic-standing rule of Jones survives our decision in Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377 (1968). See Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223, 228-229 (1973). Such a rule is, of course, one which may allow a defendant to assert the Fourth Amendment rights of another.

5 The search of the apartment in Jones was pursuant to a search warrant naming Jones and another woman as occupants of the apartment. The affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant alleged that Jones and the woman were involved in illicit narcotics traffic and kept a supply of heroin and narcotics paraphernalia in the apartment. 362 U. S., at 267-269, and n. 2; App. in Jones v. United States, O. T. 1959, No. 69, p. 1.

6 For these same prudential reasons, the Court in Alderman v. United States rejected the argument that any defendant should be enabled to apprise the court of unconstitutional searches and seizures and to exclude all such unlawfully seized evidence from trial, regardless of whether his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the search or whether he was the “target” of the search. This expansive reading of the Fourth Amendment also was advanced by the petitioner in Jones v. United States and implicitly rejected by the Court. Brief for Petitioner in Jones v. United States, O. T. 1959, No. 69, pp. 21-25.

7 So, for example, in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 352 (1967), the Court focused on substantive Fourth Amendment law, concluded that a person in a telephone booth “may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment,” and then proceeded to determine whether the search was “unreasonable.” In Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968), on the other hand, the Court concentrated on the issue of standing, decided that the defendant possessed it, and with barely any mention of the threshold substantive question of whether , the search violated DeForte’s own Fourth Amendment rights, went on to decide whether the search was “unreasonable.” In both cases, however, the first inquiry was much the same.

8 This approach is consonant with that which the Court already has taken with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which also is a purely personal right. See, e. g., Beilis v. United States, 417 U. S. 85, 89-90 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 327-328 (1973); United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 698-699 (1944).

9 The Court in Jones was quite careful to note that “wrongful” presence at the scene of a search would not enable a defendant to object to the legality of the search. 362 U. S., at 267. The Court stated: “No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him. This would of course not avail those who, by virtue of their wrongful presence, cannot invoke the privacy of the premises searched.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Despite this clear statement in Jones, several lower courts inexplicably have held that a person present in a stolen automobile at the time of a search may object to the lawfulness of the search of the automobile. See, e. g., Cotton v. United States, 371 F. 2d 385 (CA9 1967); Simpson v. United States, 346 F. 2d 291 (CA10 1965).

10 The Court in Mancusi v. DeForte, supra, also must have been unsatisfied with the “legitimately on premises” statement in Jones. DeForte was legitimately in his office at the time of the search and if the Mancusi Court had literally applied the statement from Jones, DeForte’s standing to object to the search should have been obvious. Instead, to determine whether DeForte possessed standing to object to the search, the Court inquired into whether DeForte's office was an area “in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion.” 392 U. S., at 368; see id., at 376 (Black, J., dissenting).

Unfortunately, with few exceptions, lower courts have literally applied this language from Jones and have held that anyone legitimately on premises at the time of the search may contest its legality. See, e. g., Garza-Fuentes v. United States, 400 F. 2d 219 (CA5 1968); State v. Bresolin, 13 Wash. App. 386, 534 P. 2d 1394 (1975).

11 This is not to say that such visitors could not contest the lawfulness of the seizure of evidence or the search if their own property were seized during the search.

12 Obviously, however, a “legitimate” expectation of privacy by definition means more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered. A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as “legitimate.” His presence, in the words of Jones, 362 U. S., at 267, is “wrongful”; his expectation is not “one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.’ ” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). And it would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases. Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others, see W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 2, ch. 1, and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude. Expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, of course, need not be based on a common-law interest in real or personal property, or on the invasion of such an interest. These ideas were rejected both in Jones, supra, and Katz, supra. But by focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by that Amendment. No better demonstration of this proposition exists than the decision in Alderman v. United States, 394 U, S. 165 (1969), where the Court held that an individual’s property interest in his own home was so great as to allow him to object to electronic surveillance of conversations emanating from his home, even though he himself was not a party to the conversations. On the other hand, even a property interest in premises may not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular items located on the premises or activity conducted thereon. See Katz, supra, at 351; Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206, 210 (1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559, 563 (1927); Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57, 58-59 (1924).

13 An examination of lower court decisions shows that use of this purported “bright line” test has led to widely varying results. For example, compare United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690 (EDNY 1977) (defendant has standing to object to search of co-defendant’s person at airport because defendant was lawfully present at time of search), with Sumrall v. United States, 382 F. 2d 651 (CA10 1967), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 1055 (1968) (defendant did not have standing to object to search of codefendant’s purse even though defendant present at time of search). Compare Holloway v. Wolff, 482 F. 2d 110 (CA8 1973) (defendant has standing to object to search of bedroom in house of third person because lawfully in house at time of search even though no showing that defendant had ever been given permission to use, or had ever been in, bedroom), with Northern v. United States, 455 F. 2d 427 (CA9 1972) (defendant lacked standing to object to search of apartment-mate’s bedroom even though present in apartment at time of search since no showing that defendant had permission to enter or use roommate’s bedroom), and United States v. Miller, 145 U. S. App. D. C. 312, 449 F. 2d 974 (1971) (defendant lawfully, present in third person’s office has standing to object to police entry into office since lawfully .present but lacks standing to object to search of drawer of third person’s desk since no showing that he had permission to open or use drawer). Compare United States v. Tussell, 441 F. Supp. 1092 (MD Pa. 1977) (lessee does not have standing because not present at time of search), with United States v. Potter, 419 F. Supp. 1151 (ND Ill. 1976) (lessee has standing even though not present when premises searched). Compare United States v. Fernandez, 430 F. Supp. 794 (ND Cal. 1976) (defendant with authorized access to apartment has standing even though not present at time of search), with United States v. Potter, supra (defendants with authorized access to premises' lack standing because not present at the time of the search). Compare United States v. Delguyd, 542 F. 2d 346 (CA6 1976) (defendant stopped by police in parking lot of apartment house which he intended to visit lacks standing to object to subsequent search of apartment since not present in apartment at time of search), with United States v. Fay, 225 F. Supp. 677 (SDNY 1963), rev’d on other grounds, 333 F. 2d 28 (CA2 1964) (defendant-invitee stopped in hallway of apartment building has standing to object to search of apartment he intended to visit).

14 Commentators have expressed similar dissatisfaction with reliance on “legitimate presence” to resolve Fourth Amendment questions. Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 41 Brooklyn L. Rev. 421, 448 (1975); White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 333, 344-345 (1970). And, as we earlier noted, supra, at 142 n. 10, the Court in Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968), also implicitly recognized that the phrase “legitimately on premises” simply does not answer the question whether the search violated a defendant’s “reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion.” See id., at 368.

15 As we noted in Martinez-Fuerte, “[o]ne’s expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence.” 428 U. S., at 561.

16 The dissent states that Katz v. United, States expressly recognized protection for passengers of taxicabs and asks why that protection should not also extend to these petitioners. Katz relied on Bios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253 (1960), as support for that proposition. The question of Bios’ right to contest the search was not presented to or addressed by the Court and the property seized appears to have belonged to Bios. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 (1951). Additionally, the facts of that case are quite different from those of the present case. Bios had hired the cab and occupied the rear passenger section. When police stopped the cab, he placed a package he had been holding on the floor of the rear section. The police saw the package and seized it after defendant was removed from the cab.

17 For reasons which they do not explain, our dissenting Brethren repeatedly criticize our “holding” that unless one has a common-law property interest in the premises searched, one cannot object to the search. We have rendered no such “holding,” however. To the contrary, we have taken pains to reaffirm the statements in Jones and Katz that “arcane distinctions developed in property . . . law . . . ought not to control.” Supra, at 143, and n. 12. In a similar vein, the dissenters repeatedly state or imply that we now “hold” that a passenger lawfully in an automobile "may not invoke the exclusionary rule and challenge a search of that vehicle unless he happens to own or have a possessory interest in it.” Post, at 156, 158-159, 163, 165, 166, 168, 168-169. It is not without significance that these statements of today’s “holding” come from the dissenting opinion, and not from the Court’s opinion. The case before us involves the search of and seizure of property from the glove compartment and area under the seat of a car in which petitioners were riding as passengers. Petitioners claimed only that they were “legitimately on [the] premises” and did not claim that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas of the car which were searched. We cannot, therefore, agree with the dissenters’ insistence that our decision will encourage the police to violate the Fourth Amendment. Post, at 168-169.