Helmac Products Corp. v. Roth (Plastics) Corp.

814 F. Supp. 581, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1928, 1993 WL 4213
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedFebruary 18, 1993
DocketCiv. A. 84-CV-8225-FL
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 814 F. Supp. 581 (Helmac Products Corp. v. Roth (Plastics) Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Helmac Products Corp. v. Roth (Plastics) Corp., 814 F. Supp. 581, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1928, 1993 WL 4213 (E.D. Mich. 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

NEWBLATT, District Judge.

This lawsuit concerns Helmac’s damages for Roth (Plastics)’ violation of the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Act of September 8, 1916,39 Stat. 798,15 U.S.C. § 72 (1980) (“the Act” or “the 1916 Act”).

Pending before the Court are the following:

(1) whether there will be a jury trial on damages;
(2) Helmac’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Relating to Competitive Effects;
(3) Roth’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Helmac from Introducing Damage Evidence Which Incorporates Losses Attributable to Roth’s Lawful Conduct;
(4) Roth’s Motion Regarding the Appropriate Choice of Damages Methodology;
(5) Roth’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Relating to the Sale of Products
*583 Manufactured or Assembled in the United States;
(6) Helmac’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Relating to Helmac’s Motivation for Bringing Suit;
(7) Helmac’s Motion in Limine to Exclude David Ettinger from Roth Plastics’ Witness List;
(8) Roth’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Hearsay Evidence of Statements Allegedly made by Actual or Potential Helmac Customers.

I. Trial on Damages

A. Is a Jury Trial Necessary?

Helmac seeks a default judgment for damages, claiming that Roth’s prior document destruction supports such a finding. The Court finds sufficient information remains available for Helmac to demonstrate damages to a jury. For example, Helmac has been able to produce an expert’s opinion calculating the damages. Roth has obtained an expert with different views. There is no reason to decide the factual question of damages without recourse to a trial.

Where necessary documents are unavailable, this Order establishes how Helmac can proceed.

B. Must Intent Be Proven at Trial?

Intent is an element of a violation of the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916. Order of July 14, 1992, 814 F.Supp. 560 (“Order”). This Court has already issued a default judgment against Roth for violating the Act. This issue need not be proven at trial to calculate damages. Helmac also argues convincingly that it would unduly burden Hel-mac given Roth’s destruction of documents that might otherwise show intent. The jury will be instructed that the Court has already determined that Roth has shown the requisite intent for liability under the Act.

II. Calculation of Damages

A. No Damages for Pricing Above Average Variable Cost

The incremental damages due to lawful and unlawful pricing must be separated. As even Helmac acknowledges, “[a]s a general principle, courts evaluating amounts of claims have agreed that only damages attributable to unlawful conduct should be recovered.” Helmac’s Brief on its Damages Methodology at 10.

Helmac contends that since this Court has ruled that the 1916 Act requires proof of intent to injure, then Roth violated the Act even when it set prices at or above cost. This Court cannot determine how damages could be assessed, however, when Roth violated the Act but did not price below cost. The alternative that Helmac posits is to count as damages all lost profits incurred by Helmac as a result of competition by Roth during the years in question.

Nothing in the language of the 1916 Act supports such an outcome, and the public policy implications are considerable. The Act’s plain language refers to “a price substantially less than the actual market value or wholesale price.” Regardless of how the Act is interpreted, it is somewhat of a stretch to suggest the Act justifies damages when Roth’s prices equalled or exceeded average variable cost.

In addition, this outcome seems draconian and inconsistent with the body of foreign trade laws of which the Act is merely one part. See e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2901(a) (West Supp.1992) (“The overall trade negotiating objectives of the United States are to obtain — (1) more open, equitable, and reciprocal market access; (2) the reduction or elimination of barriers and other trade-distorting policies and practices; and (3) a more effective system of international trading disciplines and procedures.”).

Foreign competitors found liable under the Act would be liable for treble damages on the entire effect of their competition in the United States market. The result would surely stifle competition beyond that intended by Congress when it enacted this admittedly protectionist statute. Therefore, this Court shall limit damages to those cases where Roth set prices below average variable cost.

B. The Admissibility of Evidence Concerning the Calculation of Damages

Helmac postulates that as a result of Roth’s illegal pricing, a customer might have *584 told Helmac its prices were higher than Roth’s, but not by how much. As a result, Helmac would have lowered prices (“price suppression”) and lost profits. Helmac claims that “the entire amount of price suppression is still properly viewed as due to Roth Plastics’ unlawful activities.” Id., at 11.

The Court disagrees for the reasons discussed swpra regarding damages for lawful pricing. Only the extent of Helmac’s price suppression that is a result of Roth’s illegal prices should constitute damages. For example, suppose that Helmac charged $2 per unit and Roth charged $1.50 per unit. Hel-mac then lowered its price to $1.25 per unit and obtained the contract. First, a jury would determine the extent to which Roth illegally lowered its price, based upon an analysis of Roth’s cost data. E.g., the jury might find that Roth illegally shaved .25 cents off the price per unit. Then, the jury would determine what Helmac would have done had Roth’s price been set without violation of law, e.g., if Roth’s unit had been priced at $1.75. A reasonable jury in this example could find any of the following: that Helmac would not have lowered its price at all; that it would have lowered its price to $1.75 per unit, $1.50 per unit, or any other amount, depending upon the evidence presented of Helmac’s pricing decisions. The jury need not presume, as Helmac would have it, that the entire price suppression of fifty cents per unit constitutes damages. .

Helmac also claims, however, that Roth’s prior destruction of price quotation sheets severely hampers the calculation of price suppression. This Court previously stated that it would not be likely to exclude Helmac’s evidence of price suppression if Helmac could not distinguish damages results ing from illegal conduct from losses resulting from legal competition. See Order.

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814 F. Supp. 581, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1928, 1993 WL 4213, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/helmac-products-corp-v-roth-plastics-corp-mied-1993.