Opinion
LUCAS, C. J.
—In this case we consider whether unauthorized ex parte discussions that occur during the discovery phase of a medical malpractice action between a nonparty treating physician and the defendant physician’s malpractice insurer, regarding the litigant patient’s medical condition, violate either the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (Civ. Code, § 56 et seq.; all statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated), or the constitutional right to privacy (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1).
We granted review to consider whether plaintiff’s seventh and eighth causes of action in her fourth amended complaint state claims against defendants Dr. Kent Yamaguchi (plaintiff’s treating physician), and Valley [35]*35Plastic Surgeons Medical Group, Inc. (Yamaguchi’s medical services organization, and hereafter VPSMG), for violation of section 56 et seq., based on unauthorized ex parte discussions about plaintiff’s medical condition that occurred between Yamaguchi and Norcal Mutual Insurance Company (hereafter Norcal), and other nonparties, during the discovery phase of a separate malpractice action plaintiff had filed against her original physician, Dr. Geis (Yamaguchi’s associate).1 Plaintiff filed the present action (to which Geis is not a party) after settling her lawsuit against Geis for $400,000.2
We must also determine whether these same ex parte discussions support plaintiff’s 12th cause of action against Yamaguchi and Norcal (Yamaguchi and Geis’s malpractice insurer) for violation of plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.
As we explain, we conclude that because the purpose of the ex parte discussions was to assist Norcal in defending the malpractice action against Geis, Yamaguchi (and VPSMG) are exempt from liability under section 56.10, subdivision (c)(4) (hereafter, section 56.10(c)(4)), which allows health care providers and insurers to conduct ex parte discussions to facilitate preparation of a defense to a malpractice action. We also conclude that our recent decision in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633] (hereafter, Hill) is dispositive in precluding plaintiff’s 12th cause of action against Yamaguchi and Norcal for invasion of privacy. Plaintiff has failed to meet her initial burden under Hill of establishing that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information that was disclosed during the discovery phase of her malpractice action. (See Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 36-37.) Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeal judgment to the extent it concludes plaintiff has stated a cause of action under these facts.
Facts
Our review arises out of the trial court’s sustaining of defendants’ demurrers to plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint without leave to amend, and the [36]*36Court of Appeal’s reversal, in part, of the trial court judgment. We presume the facts recited in plaintiff’s complaint are true and correct. (See Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58].)
In 1987, plaintiff was admitted to Sierra Hospital for removal of a bone spur from her left hand. Shortly after the surgery, she developed a postoperative staphylococcal infection, diagnosed and treated by Geis. As a direct result of the infection, plaintiff’s third finger on her left hand had to be amputated in two separate surgeries. Both surgeries were performed by Geis, with Yamaguchi assisting. Thereafter, plaintiff dismissed Geis as her treating physician, believing his treatment of her was negligent. Yamaguchi continued to treat plaintiff for symptoms relating to the infection following the second operation. In 1988, plaintiff sued Geis for medical malpractice. Although Yamaguchi was not a party to the action, he agreed to appear as an expert defense witness on behalf of Geis.
During the discovery phase of the lawsuit, plaintiff deposed Yamaguchi, who revealed that Norcal conducted several private interviews with him (while he was still treating plaintiff), during which he discussed plaintiff’s condition and prognosis and disclosed plaintiff’s medical records. According to plaintiff, Yamaguchi also agreed with Norcal to testify falsely that the treatment provided to plaintiff by Geis was within the professional standard of care. Plaintiff claimed that Yamaguchi and Norcal attempted to coerce her into settling her case against Geis for significantly less than her eventual settlement of $400,000.
After settling her action against Geis, she brought the present action, claiming the disclosure of her medical information violated section 56 et seq., and her constitutional right to privacy. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend against all but the negligence cause of action against Yamaguchi (which was not the subject of a demurrer), on the ground that defendants’ conduct was immunized by the litigation privilege of section 47, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 47(b)), which immunizes from liability all communications that occur during the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. (See Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1196 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044] [hereafter, Rubin] [acts related to litigation and essentially communicative, as opposed to conduct, are privileged under section 47(b)]; Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 211 [271 Cal.Rptr. 191, 793 P.2d 524] [distinguishing between injury arising from communicative acts immunized under section 47(b) and injury arising from noncommunicative conduct unprotected by litigation privilege].)
Plaintiff appealed from the judgment of dismissal. In addition, plaintiff sought a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to set aside its order [37]*37sustaining the demurrers of Yamaguchi without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal consolidated the appeal with the mandamus action and ultimately reversed the portion of the trial court judgment to the extent that it sustained the demurrers to the seventh and eighth causes of action against Yamaguchi and VPSMG, and the ninth cause of action against Dr. Boro (an associate of Yamaguchi and Geis, against whom the lawsuit was dismissed after the Court of Appeal judgment became final), for wrongful disclosure of confidential medical information in violation of the act. The court also reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the 12th cause of action against Norcal and Yamaguchi for breach of plaintiff’s state constitutional right to privacy. The court affirmed the judgment of dismissal in favor of defendant Central California Faculty Medical Group.
In reversing the trial court judgment in part, the Court of Appeal observed that although the medical information obtained by Norcal from Yamaguchi may have been legally discoverable during the course of the Geis litigation, the method used to discover the information (i.e., private conversations that took place before the issuance of subpoenas and notice of depositions), violated section 56 et seq. and plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy. In so holding, the court rejected as irrelevant defendants’ claims that section 56.10(c)(4) renders inapplicable the prohibition of disclosure in section 56.10.
The court also rejected defendants’ claim that the actions were barred by the litigation privilege of section 47(b), which immunizes from liability publications or broadcasts made: In any (1) legislative or (2) judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law “to achieve the objects of the litigation . . . [and] that have some connection . . . to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 [266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365] [hereafter, Silberg].) The court concluded that the litigation privilege did not bar recovery of damages because plaintiff based her claims on defendant’s conduct rather than on publication or disclosure of the information which, the court conceded, would have been barred by section 47(b). (See Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1187.)
Defendants Yamaguchi and VPSMG challenge the Court of Appeal’s reversal of the trial court’s dismissal of the seventh and eighth causes of action for violation of section 56 et seq., and Yamaguchi and Norcal challenge the Court of Appeal’s reversal of the order dismissing the twelfth cause of action for violation of plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy. The California Medical Association, the California Association of Hospitals and Health Systems, the California Dental Association, the County of Los Angeles and the Regents of the University of California have filed amicus curiae briefs on behalf of defendants.
[38]*38Discussion
1. Section 56 et seq.
Section 56 was originally enacted in 1979 “to provide for the confidentiality of individually identifiable medical information, while permitting certain reasonable and limited uses of that information.” (Stats. 1979, ch. 773, § 1, p. 2645.) The original act caused several interpretative problems and was described in a legislative analysis as “[organizationally ... a singular horror, cluttered with superfluous and ambiguous provisions.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Background Information to Sen. Bill No. 889.) In 1981, the act was repealed and reenacted (Stats. 1981, ch. 782, §§ 1.5, 2, p. 3040).
As reenacted, section 56.10, subdivision (a), provides: “No provider of health care shall disclose medical information regarding a patient of the provider without first obtaining an authorization, except as provided in subdivision (b) or (c).” Section 56.20 requires health care providers to establish procedures to ensure the confidentiality of patient medical information, and section 56.26, subdivision (a), prohibits third party administrators of health plans from disclosing medical information processed in connection with performing administrative services. Considered together, the statutory provisions require a health care provider to hold confidential a patient’s medical information unless the information falls under one of several exceptions to the act.
Sections 56.35 and 56.36 provide remedies for violations of the act, including compensatory damages, punitive damages not to exceed $3,000, attorney fees not to exceed $1,000, and costs of suit. Section 56.36 makes a violation a misdemeanor if the patient suffers economic loss or personal injury.
Thus, in order to violate the act, a provider of health care must make an unauthorized, unexcused disclosure of privileged medical information. A provider is relieved from liability under the act if it can show that the disclosure is excepted either by the mandatory (§ 56.10, subd. (b)) or permissive (§ 56.10(c)(4)) provisions of the act, allowing disclosure of medical information under specified circumstances.
Plaintiff claims that by disclosing her medical information to Norcal without her authorization, defendants violated the act. We agree with defendants and amici curiae, however, that defendants’ ex parte contact with Norcal was contemplated by the permissive exception to the act under section 56.10(c)(4).
[39]*39Section 56.10(c)(4) provides that a health care provider may disclose medical information to “persons or organizations insuring, responsible for, or defending professional liability which a provider may incur, if the . . . organizations, or persons are engaged in reviewing the competence ... of health care professionals or in reviewing health care services with respect to medical necessity, level of care, quality of care, or justification of charges.” (§ 56.10(c)(4).) This exception to the provisions of section 56.10 allows a provider of health care to disclose medical information without patient authorization “to persons or organizations insuring, responsible for, or defending professional liability.” Under our canons of construction, we look to the language of the statute itself to determine if the ordinary meaning is unambiguous; if so, the statutory language controls, and there is no need to look to legislative intent for construction or interpretation. (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].)
The plain meaning of section 56.10(c)(4) is clear: Yamaguchi, as a health care “provider,” and Norcal, as an organization “responsible for, or defending professional liability,” were specifically exempted from the act in one of two ways. First, as an associate of Geis, and as plaintiff’s treating physician, Yamaguchi was certainly at risk of medical malpractice exposure. Indeed, that risk became a reality when plaintiff filed the present action against Yamaguchi and included a cause of action for professional negligence, which is still viable and not at issue in this appeal. Accordingly, as a potential litigant in a malpractice action and a provider who “may incur” malpractice liability, Yamaguchi was permitted to discuss with Norcal plaintiff’s medical condition under section 56.10(c)(4).
Justice Mosk’s concurring and dissenting opinion assumes section 56.10 (c)(4) describes only to whom confidential medical information may be disclosed, without allowing such disclosure by “the doctor who possesses the records.” (Cone, and dis. opn. of Mosk, J., post, p. 49.) This description of the statutory exception is misleading, for it fails to acknowledge that section 56.10 (c)(4) must be read in conjunction with section 56.10, subdivision (a), which makes it clear that the former exception applies to medical providers. As noted above, section 56.10, subdivision (a), specifically states that “no provider of health care shall disclose medical information . . . except as provided in subdivision (b) or (c).” (Italics added.) By stating that the statute as a whole applies to medical providers, the Legislature has also made it clear that it is the medical provider alone who may invoke the statutory exceptions. Thus, the concurring and dissenting opinion fails to read the applicable statutory language in pari materia and ignores the fundamental canon of statutory interpretation to “give meaning to every word and phrase in the statute to accomplish a result consistent with the legislative purpose.” [40]*40(Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1159 [278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873].)
Other provisions of the act support our interpretation. Section 56.105 provides that any demand for settlement or compromise of a medical malpractice claim made by a potential plaintiff “prior to the service of a complaint upon a defendant,” must be accompanied by an authorization to disclose medical information “to persons or organizations insuring, responsible for, or defending professional liability” regarding that claim. (§ 56.105.) Looking to legislative history for an analysis of the effect of section 56.105 on section 56.10(c)(4), we find that section 56.105 supports our interpretation of the exception.
The Legislative Counsel’s Digest describes section 56.105 as follows: “Existing law prohibits the release or disclosure of medical information about a patient without an authorization except in specified circumstances, including disclosure to persons insuring, responsible for, or defending professional liability.
“This bill would provide that whenever, prior to service of a complaint in an action arising out of the professional negligence of a physician, a demand for settlement or offer of compromise is made, the demand or offer shall be accompanied by an authorization to disclose medical information to persons or organizations insuring, responsible for, or defending professional liability.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1229 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.).)
Thus, legislative history demonstrates that prior to the enactment of section 56.105, the Legislature contemplated that a health care provider could lawfully disclose a patient’s medical information to “persons or organizations insuring, responsible for, or defending professional liability” when those persons or organizations were evaluating or defending potential malpractice claims. Section 56.105 was therefore enacted to further protect defendants from any claim that disclosure of medical information in the context of preparing a defense to a potential malpractice claim violated the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act.
Finally, section 56.16 supports defendants’ view of permissive disclosure under section 56.10(c)(4). That section provides: “Unless there is a specific written request by the patient to the contrary, nothing in this part shall be construed to prevent a provider, upon an inquiry concerning a specific patient, from releasing at its discretion any of the following information: the patient’s name, address, age, and sex; a general description of the reason for treatment (whether an injury, a bum, poisoning, or some unrelated condition); the general nature of the injury, bum, poisoning, or other condition; [41]*41the general condition of the patient; and any information that is not medical information as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 56.05.” (§ 56.16.)
As the above provisions show, section 56 et seq. contemplates release of medical information either to enable a potential defendant to prepare a defense to a medical malpractice claim or to facilitate resolution of a claim prior to filing of a lawsuit. Read together, the permissive and mandatory exceptions to section 56 et seq. enable parties to conduct time-saving and cost-efficient investigation and settlement of patient claims.
Plaintiff asserts that the common law prohibits ex parte contacts between physicians and their insurers and allows communication during “formal discovery” proceedings only in order to protect physician-patient confidentiality. Plaintiff relies on Torres v. Superior Court (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 181, 187 [270 Cal.Rptr. 401] (hereafter, Torres) to support her position. (Accord, Province v. Center for Women’s Health & Family Birth (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1673, 1684-1687 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 667] [hereafter, Province].)
The Torres court was asked to determine whether a nonparty physician who treated a malpractice claimant may testify as an expert for the defense on the standard of care employed by subsequent treating physicians. Although the plaintiff had conceded a “limited waiver” of his statutory physician-patient privilege as defined in Evidence Code section 994, he contended that the doctor owed him a “fiduciary duty to refuse affirmative assistance to [his adversary] in litigation respecting his physical condition.” (Torres, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 184; accord, Province, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1684.)
The Torres court held that the physician could testify subject to a protective order prohibiting ex parte interviews between defendant’s counsel and the physician-expert witness to ensure plaintiff’s physician-patient relationship would remain protected. (Torres, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 188.) Plaintiff asserts that Torres essentially prohibits all ex parte communication between a physician and his patient’s adversaries in litigation.
Torres is inapposite. The Confidentiality of Medical Information Act was not an issue in the case. Dr. Yamaguchi never testified, and plaintiff never challenged his ability to do so. Nonetheless, to the extent Torres and Province could be read to prohibit all ex parte contacts between a physician and his attorneys or insurers, in conflict with this opinion, those cases are disapproved.
[42]*42On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that defendants did not violate section 56 et seq. by discussing plaintiff’s medical condition with their insurer Norcal. The statute is clear that the discussions between Yamaguchi and Norcal were excepted from liability, and plaintiff has failed to convince us that we should disturb the statutory scheme. Should the Legislature deem it necessary to further limit access to a plaintiff’s medical condition, it is free to do so by amendment. Our conclusion obviates the need to discuss application of the litigation privilege of section 47(b) to plaintiff’s claim of violation of section 56 et seq.
2. Constitutional Right of Privacy
Plaintiff’s 12th cause of action names as defendants Yamaguchi and Norcal only, and alleges that Yamaguchi secretly disclosed confidential information to Norcal and its agents and employees in violation of plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s privacy action, relying on Urbaniak v. Newton (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 1128 [277 Cal.Rptr. 354] (hereafter Urbaniak), which held that an alleged unauthorized disclosure of the plaintiff’s HIV status (leading to the denial of worker’s compensation benefits) gave rise to an action for a violation plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy. This right, the Court of Appeal determined, cannot be defeated by the litigation immunity conferred by section 47(b) because a statute cannot immunize from liability conduct made actionable by the California Constitution. (See Urbaniak v. Newton, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1138; see also Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 646, 667 [165 Cal.Rptr. 347] [judicial privilege cannot defeat claim of federal privacy interest].)
Although the Urbaniak decision may have been correct in its discussion of the right to privacy in the context of unauthorized disclosure of a patient’s HIV status, we view the present plaintiff’s privacy claims in a different light. Specifically, this claim must be analyzed under our recent decision in Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th l.3
In Hill, supra, we held that “a plaintiff alleging an invasion of privacy in violation of the state constitutional right to privacy must establish [43]*43each of the following: (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Hill, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 39-40.)
We also noted in Hill, however, that “[a] defendant may prevail in a state constitutional privacy case by negating any of the three elements just discussed or by pleading and proving, as an affirmative defense, that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers one or more countervailing interests. Plaintiff, in turn, may rebut a defendant’s assertion of countervailing interests by showing there are feasible and effective alternatives to defendant’s conduct having a lesser impact on privacy interests.” (7 Cal.4th at p. 40.) We held that “in cases where material facts are undisputed, adjudication as a matter of law may be appropriate.” (Ibid.)
We conclude that, as a matter of law, plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for invasion of her state constitutional privacy interest. This conclusion is based on the fact that plaintiff did not adequately plead facts supporting a conclusion that any expectation of privacy as to her medical condition would be reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Thus, plaintiff has failed to establish the second essential element of a state constitutional cause of action for invasion of privacy.4
In Hill, we held that the extent of a privacy interest is dependent on the circumstances. We emphasized that “[e]ven when a legally cognizable privacy interest is present, other factors may affect a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, advance notice of an impending action may serve to ‘ “limit [an] intrusion upon personal dignity and security that would otherwise be regarded as serious.” ’ ” (7 Cal.4th at p. 36.)
By placing her physical condition in issue in the Geis litigation, plaintiff’s expectation of privacy regarding that condition was substantially lowered by the very nature of the action. As we stated in Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at page 37, a “ ‘reasonable’ expectation of privacy is an objective entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted community norms. (See e.g., Rest.2d Torts, [ ] § 652D, com. (c) [‘The protection afforded to the plaintiff’s interest in his privacy must be relative to the customs of the time and [44]*44place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens.’].)” Hence, even assuming arguendo that a breach of section 56.10 duties occurred, the information that Norcal discovered in the conversations between Dr. Yamaguchi and Norcal would have been inevitably discovered during the course of the Geis litigation because Dr. Yamaguchi was scheduled as an expert witness for the defense.5 Any expectation on plaintiff’s part that such information would remain confidential was thus unreasonable.
Finally, as we observed in Hill, supra, 1 Cal.4th at page 37, when determining the existence (or not) of a constitutionally protected claim, we must weigh the severity of each potential invasion of privacy: “No community could function if every intrusion into the realm of private action, no matter how slight or trivial, gave rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy. . . . Actionable invasions of privacy must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right. Thus, the extent and gravity of the invasion is an indispensable consideration in assessing an alleged invasion of privacy.”
The discussions between Yamaguchi and Norcal could not be considered sufficiently serious in their scope or impact to give rise to an actionable invasion of privacy. (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 37.) Because the information would most likely have been discovered during the ordinary course of litigation, defendants’ conduct in revealing information about plaintiff’s treatment and physical condition does not violate the state constitutional guarantee against invasion of privacy as a matter of law. Accordingly, we need not reach plaintiff’s claim that a constitutional invasion of privacy defeats application of the litigation privilege.
[45]*453. Plaintiffs Remaining Claims
Plaintiff asserts the Court of Appeal erred in upholding the trial court judgment sustaining defendants’ demurrers to the second through sixth, and eleventh, causes of action. As the Court of Appeal observed, these causes of action are all grounded on common law torts—negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with the physician-patient relationship, and concealment. Plaintiff claims she suffered injury because, in her litigation against Geis, defendants used information they had wrongfully obtained. The Court of Appeal held that the litigation privilege of section 47(b) prevents recovery on these causes of action.
We agree with the Court of Appeal. We have consistently held that communications occurring during the course of litigation are absolutely privileged under section 47(b) and cases interpreting the statute. (Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1194.) The policy behind the privilege, “to afford litigants and witnesses ... the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions,” is equally applicable to the tort causes of action in the present litigation. (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 213, citation omitted.)
Finally, plaintiff asserts that the Court of Appeal erroneously affirmed the trial court’s judgment sustaining defendants’ demurrer to the 10th cause of action against Yamaguchi, VPSMG, and Norcal for conspiring to commit unfair business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. As the Court of Appeal correctly noted, damages are not available for claims under the Unfair Business Practices Act. (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545].)
Conclusion
We conclude that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for violation of section 56 et seq. because defendants are exempted under the act by section 56.10(c)(4). In addition, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for violation of the constitutional right to privacy under article I, section 1 of the state Constitution. (Hill, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 35-39.) Plaintiff does not plead that she has either a legally protected privacy interest, or a reasonable expectation of privacy, in information that would eventually have been discovered in litigation. Moreover, in our view, plaintiff has not alleged a sufficiently serious invasion of her privacy interest to [46]*46warrant actionable relief under the privacy clause of our state Constitution. (7 Cal.4th at pp. 53-54.) The Court of Appeal’s judgment as to the seventh, eighth, and twelfth causes of action is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Arabian, J., Baxter, J., George, J., and Peterson, J.,
Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, assigned by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council.