Heard v. Doe

• Court: District Court, M.D. Florida
• Decided: April 25, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00073
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MARQUIS EZEKIEL HEARD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-73-MMH-LLL

JOHN DOE, Food Service Director, et al.,

Defendants. ___________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff, Marquis Ezekiel Heard, an inmate of the Florida penal system, is proceeding on a pro se Civil Rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1; Complaint). He also filed a request to proceed as a pauper (Doc. 2). In the Complaint, Heard names the following individuals at Florida State Prison (FSP) as Defendants: (1) John Doe, Food Service Director; (2) John Doe, Warden; (3) John Doe, Food Service Employee; and (4) John Doe, Correctional Officer. See Complaint at 1, 10. Heard alleges that on July 13, 2024, he “was poisoned[] due to [b]leach being inside the milk container” on his breakfast tray. Id. at 10, 13. After drinking the bleach, Heard “had nausea feelings, lighthead[ed]ness, dizziness, [a] very bad headache, and was throwing up [his] food and medications.” Id. at 13. In response to Heard and other inmates advising the dorm sergeant of the issue, the sergeant “checked the milk container and smelled and seen that, in fact, it was bleach inside the milk

container.” Id. The sergeant requested new milk and food trays for the inmates. Id. at 14. That same day, Heard submitted a sick-call request and a nurse provided him with medications, but the medications did not help. Id. at 14-15. Heard submitted more sick-call requests because some of his issues worsened.

Id. at 15. He lost twenty pounds and still endures sour stomach, headaches, dizziness, vomiting, stomach pain, and emotional distress. Id. at 15-17. Heard contends that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety in the following ways: the Warden and Food Service Director failed to

adequately train and/or supervise their subordinates; the Food Service Employee failed to prepare “the beverages the right way” and failed to “supervise[] the inmates” preparing the food and beverages; and the Correctional Officer failed to supervise the inmates preparing the beverages.

Id. at 19-20; see also id. at 10-12, 16. As relief, Heard seeks a declaratory judgment, monetary damages, and any other just relief. Id. at 18-19. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

2 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the PLRA mirrors the language

of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.1 Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show “an affirmative causal connection

between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

1 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 3 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-

63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

4 (alternation and internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts

or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 679. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant. In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Heard’s pro se

allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1175. And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th

Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Alford v. Consol. Gov’t of Columbus, Ga., 438 F. App’x 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2011)2 (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132

2 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent; however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022); see 5 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

Here, Heard’s Complaint is due to be dismissed pursuant to this Court’s screening obligation. To state a claim that his conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment, Heard must allege that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to conditions that were “sufficiently serious.” Chandler

v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ standard applies to the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement.”). Conditions of confinement are sufficiently serious under the Eighth Amendment only if they are so extreme that they expose the prisoner to “an

unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health or safety.” Id. at 1289. Allegations of merely harsh conditions do not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has instructed that to establish liability on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must

show: First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,” id. at 839, and to do so he must show that the defendant was

generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”). 6 actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844-45.

Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1261 (11th Cir. 2024) (enumeration and emphasis omitted).3 It follows that negligence does not amount to deliberate indifference. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”). Heard’s allegations fall short of stating a plausible deliberate indifference claim against any Defendant. Indeed, Heard fails to allege that any Defendant personally put the bleach in the milk container or that any Defendant knew that bleach was in the milk. He fails to allege facts that would

3 For decades, the Eleventh Circuit has described a “more than mere negligence” or “more than gross negligence” standard in determining whether an official acted with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical need. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255. In Wade, the Eleventh Circuit determined that those standards conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer and clarified that courts in this circuit should apply the “subjective recklessness” standard “as used in the criminal law.” Id. at 1253. The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan wrote a concurrence to the majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue to be cited as binding precedent.” Id. at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring). 7 lead to a reasonable inference that any Defendant acted with subjective recklessness.

Insofar as Heard seeks to raise an official-capacity claim against any Defendant for failure to train or supervise, such claim would be the equivalent of suing the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC). See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991). But the FDOC is not a “person”

within the meaning of § 1983. Gardner v. Riska, 444 F. App’x 353, 355 (11th Cir. 2011). And the FDOC is immune from § 1983 liability for damages. Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1986). Although injunctive relief may be available against the FDOC, Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab.

Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1511 (11th Cir. 1986), Heard fails to allege that any violation of his rights was caused by an FDOC custom, policy, or practice. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“[A] governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when the entity itself is a moving force behind the

deprivation; thus, in an official-capacity suit the entity’s policy or custom must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Moreover, he alleges no incidents, outside of his own, to support the conclusion that additional training or supervision in the food

service area was necessary. Indeed, Heard asserts no well pled factual allegations that would allow the Court to infer that the FDOC “knew of a need

8 to train and/or supervise” its employees and it “made a deliberate choice not to take any action.” Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998).

Finally, to the extent Heard seeks to hold Defendants liable based on their supervisory positions, he cannot do so. “Supervisory officials are not vicariously liable under section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates.” Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022); see

Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). Indeed, “[s]upervisory officials cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for the actions of their subordinates unless the supervisor ‘personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct’ or ‘there is a causal connection between the actions

of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.’” Smith v. Deal, 760 F. App’x 972, 975 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360). There are three ways to establish a causal connection between a supervisor’s actions and the unlawful conduct: 1) “when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so”; 2) “when a supervisor’s custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights”; or 3) “when facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (citations and quotations omitted). “The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify 9 the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted). This “standard by which a supervisor is held liable in his individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1048 (11th Cir. 2014). Dickinson v. Cochran, 833 F. App’x 268, 272 (11th Cir. 2020). Here, again, Heard does not allege that any Defendant was personally involved in the alleged violation of his rights. He does not allege who put the bleach in the milk, that any Defendant directed the bleach be put into the milk, or that any Defendant knew that bleach was in the milk. Instead, he attempts to hold Defendants liable based on their supervisory positions. His allegations, without more, fail to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim. In light of the foregoing, this case will be dismissed without prejudice for Heard’s failure to state a claim. Heard may refile his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with factual allegations sufficient to support a claim for relief if he elects to do so. Notably, pro se litigants are subject to the same law and rules of court

that govern other litigants who are represented by counsel. See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). All filings with the Court must be made in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules.

10 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice. 2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file. 3. The Clerk of Court shall send Heard a civil rights complaint form and an application to proceed in forma pauperis (prisoner filings) form. If Heard chooses to refile his claims, he may complete and file the appropriate forms. He should not include this case number on any form, as the Clerk will assign a new case number upon receipt. In initiating such a case, Heard should either file a fully completed application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the $405 filing fee. DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 24th day of April, 2025.

United States District Judge

JAX-3 4/23 Marquis Ezekiel Heard, #X74711