(HC) Arzate v. Andrews

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: August 4, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00942
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 JORGE LUIS GALINDO ARZATE, No. 1:25-cv-00942-KES-SKO (HC) 10 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 11 v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 12 TONYA ANDREWS, Administrator of Doc. 2 Golden State Annex Detention Facility, 13 POLLY KAISER, Acting Field Office Director of the San Francisco Immigration 14 and Customs Enforcement Office, TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director of United 15 States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of 16 the United States Department of Homeland Security, and PAMELA BONDI, Attorney 17 General of the United States, 18 Respondents. 19 20 21 Petitioner Jorge Luis Galindo Arzate is a 42-year-old noncitizen. Petitioner presents 22 evidence that, in 2023, an immigration judge ordered him conditionally released from 23 immigration detention after concluding that he was not a flight risk or danger to the community. 24 Notwithstanding this order, on July 28, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 25 agents rearrested petitioner when he appeared for a scheduled in-person check-in. Petitioner was 26 later informed that he was being re-detained because local authorities had arrested him for a 27 misdemeanor offense in July 2024, although no charges were ever filed against petitioner in that 28 matter. 1 When the government conditionally releases an individual from physical restraint, that 2 individual gains a constitutionally protected interest in his “continued liberty.” Morrissey v. 3 Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). The government may not unilaterally take that liberty away. 4 Typically, “the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the [government] deprives a 5 person of liberty.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). 6 On August 1, 2025, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, Doc. 1, and a 7 motion for temporary restraining order, Doc. 2. Plaintiff seeks an order (i) requiring respondents 8 to immediately release petitioner from detention and reinstate his bond order, and (ii) enjoining 9 respondents from re-detaining petitioner subject to further order. For the reasons set forth below, 10 the Court grants petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order. 11 I. Background 12 Petitioner is a 42-year-old citizen of Mexico who has resided in Fresno, California for 13 most of his life. Pet. ¶¶ 25–31. His wife, five children, and five grandchildren are citizens of the 14 United States. Id. ¶ 25; Doc. 2-1 at ¶ 19; Doc. 2-2 at ¶ 2; Doc. 2-3, Ex. A. He has extensive ties 15 to the Fresno community: he is the lead foreman for a solar battery technology company, he 16 regularly volunteers for the UFW Foundation and St. James Episcopal Cathedral, and he coaches 17 a local soccer team. Doc. 2-1 at ¶¶ 19–20; Doc. 2-2 at ¶¶ 13–14; Doc. 2-3, Ex. A, Tabs B–F, H–S 18 (letters from family and community members). 19 Petitioner first arrived in the United States when he was nine years old, and he attended 20 elementary through high school in Fresno. Id. ¶ 26. When he was eighteen years old, he pled 21 guilty to one count of misprision of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4 and was sentenced to 21 22 months in prison, which he served. Doc. 2-3, Ex. A, Tab Y. In 2003, shortly after being released 23 from prison, he was deported to Mexico but reentered illegally the same year. Doc. 2-3, Ex. A., 24 Tab A at ¶ 6. Seventeen years later, in 2020, petitioner was detained and deported to Mexico 25 again. Id. ¶ 7. While there, he lived with his brother-in-law in Sinaloa, but he fled back to the 26 United States after someone murdered his brother-in-law in front of him and threatened his life. 27 Id. 28 In February 2023, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested 1 petitioner, reinstated his prior removal order, and detained him at Golden State Annex in 2 McFarland, California. Id. ¶ 8. Petitioner applied for withholding of removal and protection 3 under the Convention Against Torture. Id. An immigration judge denied petitioner’s application, 4 and he timely appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, where his case remains pending. 5 Doc. 2-3, Ex A, Tabs A, AA–BB; Doc. 2-3, Ex. G. 6 On August 3, 2023, after having spent six months in detention, petitioner was given a 7 bond hearing before an immigration judge due to a preliminary injunction entered in a separate 8 class action case. Pet. ¶ 32 n.2; Doc. 2-1 at ¶ 2; see Aleman Gonzalez v. Sessions, 325 F.R.D. 616 9 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2018), aff’d Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F.3d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 2020), rev’d 10 and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543 (2022). 11 The immigration judge ordered that petitioner be released from detention upon the posting of a 12 $5,000 bond because the government had not demonstrated that petitioner was a danger to the 13 community or a flight risk. Doc. 2-3, Ex. B. The order specified that the government could 14 utilize certain supervision measures other than electronic ankle monitoring. Id. 15 On August 4, 2023, petitioner posted bond and was released from detention. Doc. 2-1 at 16 ¶¶ 2–3. Upon his release, ICE issued an Order of Supervision which required him to periodically 17 report to the ICE field office in Fresno. Doc. 2-3, Ex. C. In compliance with the Order of 18 Supervision, he appeared on August 8, 2023, and November 8, 2023. Doc. 2-1 at ¶¶ 3–4. When 19 he appeared on November 8, 2023, ICE told him that his future supervision would be through the 20 Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (“ISAP”). Doc. 2-1 at ¶ 4. 21 When his ISAP monitoring began, petitioner was required to report where and with whom 22 he would live and work. Id. ¶ 5. From then on, he was required to complete virtual check-ins 23 every Thursday, and he was also subject to random video calls in which he was required to report 24 where he was and whom he was with. Id. He was required to download an app called 25 SmartLINK to his cell phone which enabled ISAP officers to see his physical location during any 26 virtual check-in. Id. ¶ 4; Alternatives to Detention, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, 27 https://www.ice.gov/features/atd. Additionally, he was subject to home visits, and during days 28 when there would be a home visit, he was required to be home from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. because 1 ISAP officers could show up at any time between those hours. Id. ¶ 6. 2 Petitioner’s evidence indicates that petitioner complied with his ISAP requirements. Id. 3 ¶¶ 4–9; Doc. 2-2 at ¶ 3; Doc. 2-3, Exs. D–E (correspondence from ICE on December 8, 2023 and 4 November 20, 2024 confirming that petitioner had complied with the Order of Supervision). The 5 government granted petitioner lawful work authorization, and he returned to work in the solar 6 industry full-time. Doc. 2-1 at ¶ 2; Doc. 2-2 at ¶¶ 13–14; Doc. 2-3 at ¶ 4. In July 2024, petitioner 7 was arrested for a misdemeanor by local police in Las Vegas, Nevada, where he had traveled with 8 his wife after obtaining permission from ISAP officers. Doc. 2-1 at ¶¶ 15–16; Doc. 2-2 at ¶ 11. 9 Petitioner denied any wrongdoing, he was released within several hours, and no charges were 10 pursued against him. Doc. 2-1 at ¶¶ 16–17; Doc. 2-2 at ¶ 11; Doc. 2-3, Ex. I. 11 On July 24, 2025, during a weekly check-in, ISAP officers informed petitioner that he was 12 required to report to the ISAP office in Fresno on July 28, 2025 to discuss his passport. Doc. 2-1 13 at ¶ 7; Doc. 2-2 at ¶ 4. As petitioner did not have a passport, he scheduled a passport appointment 14 with the Mexican consulate, then contacted an ISAP officer to confirm whether he still needed to 15 appear in person for the visit. Doc. 2-1 at ¶ 7; Doc. 2-2 at ¶ 4. The ISAP officer told petitioner 16 that he was still required to appear in person and that the officer would explain more when 17 petitioner arrived. Doc. 2-1 at ¶ 7; Doc. 2-2 at ¶¶ 4–5; Doc. 2-3, Ex. F (text message 18 screenshots). 19 On July 28, 2025, ICE agents arrested petitioner when he appeared at the ISAP office as 20 instructed. Doc. 2-1 at ¶ 10; Doc. 2-2 at ¶ 6. Agents transported petitioner to the ICE field office 21 in Fresno. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. Petitioner’s assigned deportation officer informed petitioner’s wife that 22 petitioner was being detained due to the 2024 arrest in Las Vegas. Doc. 2-2 at ¶ 10. 23 On August 1, 2025, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, Doc. 1, and a 24 motion for temporary restraining order, Doc. 2. 25 II. Legal Standard 26 The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are 27 “substantially identical.” See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Bush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 28 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of 1 right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 2 U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008)). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is 3 likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 4 preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the 5 public interest.” Id. at 20 (citing Munaf, 553 U.S. at 689–90; Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of 6 Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 7 (1982)). “Likelihood of success on the merits is a threshold inquiry and is the most important 8 factor.” Simon v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 135 F.4th 784, 797 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 9 Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Carlson, 968 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2020)). “[I]f a plaintiff can only 10 show that there are serious questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of 11 success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships 12 tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor, and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Friends of the 13 Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations 14 omitted). The final two Winter factors merge “when the Government is the opposing party.” 15 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 16 III. Discussion 17 The Court finds that the requirements for issuing a temporary restraining order are met. 18 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Petitioner notified respondents’ counsel on August 1, 2025 of the filing 19 of the motion, see Doc. 2 at 6, and counsel for respondents filed a notice of appearance the same 20 day, Doc. 5. While respondents have not filed a response, petitioner has set out specific facts 21 demonstrating that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage may result before 22 respondents can be heard in opposition. See Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632-RML, 2025 WL 23 1853763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2025) (granting ex parte temporary restraining order in similar 24 circumstances). 25 a. Petitioner is Likely to Succeed on the Merits. 26 Petitioner argues that the Due Process Clause bars the government from re-detaining him 27 without first providing a bond hearing. Doc. 2 at 16–27. “Courts analyze [] due process claims in 28 two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process 1 Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that 2 protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-cv-01884- 3 TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of 4 Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). These two steps are examined in turn. 5 1. Petitioner Possesses a Protected Liberty Interest. 6 A protected liberty interest may arise from a conditional release from physical restraint. 7 Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147–49 (1997). Even when a statute allows the government to 8 arrest and detain an individual, a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause may 9 entitle the individual to procedural protections not found in the statute. See id. (Due Process 10 requires pre-deprivation hearing before revocation of preparole); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 11 778, 782 (1973) (same, in probation context); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) 12 (same, in parole context). To determine whether a specific conditional release rises to the level of 13 a protected liberty interest, “[c]ourts have resolved the issue by comparing the specific 14 conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by 15 Morrissey.” Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 16 marks and citation omitted). 17 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole “enables [the parolee] to do a wide 18 range of things open to persons’” who have never been in custody or convicted of any crime, 19 including to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring 20 attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “Though the [government] properly 21 subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring 22 and seeking authorization to work and travel, “his condition is very different from that of 23 confinement in a prison.” Id. “The parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole 24 will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions.” Id. The revocation of parole 25 undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee.” Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, a 26 parolee possesses a protected liberty interest in his “continued liberty.” Id. at 481–84. 27 Petitioner’s conditional release is similar. It allows him to be with his family and 28 contribute to the community where he has spent most his life, under certain terms of supervision. 1 Here, the immigration judge ordered petitioner to be released on bond pending his immigration 2 appeal. Petitioner’s evidence indicates that he thereafter complied with his release conditions. 3 Nonetheless, the government rearrested petitioner without a new bond hearing before the 4 immigration judge, which plainly contradicts the “implicit promise that [petitioner’s bond] will be 5 revoked only if he fails to live up to the [bond] conditions.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. 6 The Court finds that petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his release as previously 7 ordered by the immigration judge. See Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-05436-RFL, 2025 8 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (recognizing that “the liberty interest that arises 9 upon release [from immigration detention] is inherent in the Due Process Clause”); Ortega v. 10 Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05259-JST, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) (collecting 11 cases finding that noncitizens out on bond have a strong liberty interest). The Court must 12 therefore determine what process is due before the government may terminate his liberty. 13 2. A Pre-Deprivation Bond Hearing Is Required. 14 Due process “is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation.” Zinermon v. 15 Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). The procedural protections required in a given situation are 16 evaluated using the Mathews v. Eldridge factors:

17 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 18 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government’s 19 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 20 requirement would entail. 21 Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); see Hernandez, 872 F.3d 976, 993 22 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in immigration detention context). 23 Turning to the first factor, petitioner has a substantial private interest in remaining free 24 from detention. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other 25 forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” 26 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Petitioner has been out of custody for over two 27 years, and during that time, has cared for his five children and grandchildren, lawfully worked 28 1 full-time, and volunteered in his community. His detention denies him that freedom. See Singh 2 v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00801-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025) 3 (analogizing to Morrissey). 4 Second, considering that petitioner “was previously found to not be a danger or a flight 5 risk, the risk of erroneous deprivation” is particularly high if, as is the case now, no hearing has 6 been provided. Garcia, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5. Petitioner was arrested without notice while 7 appearing for a check-in with ICE and was not provided any procedural safeguards to determine 8 whether the circumstances had changed such that his re-detention was justified. 9 There are numerous reasons to doubt that petitioner’s detention is justified. Civil 10 immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is justified only when a 11 noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; 12 Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). In 2023, an immigration judge 13 concluded that petitioner was not a flight risk or danger. The only change in circumstances 14 appears to be petitioner’s misdemeanor arrest in 2024. Doc. 2-3, Ex. B. However, following his 15 arrest, petitioner was promptly released and no charges were filed. Doc. 2-1 at ¶ 16; Doc. 2-2 at 16 ¶ 11; Doc. 2-3, Ex. I. “[P]ublic safety is not jeopardized by [someone who has only been arrested 17 for a nonviolent misdemeanor] and has never even been charged with a crime.” Doe v. Noem, 18 No. 2:25-cv-01103-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 1134977, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2025); Doe v. 19 Becerra, No. 2:25-CV-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025) 20 (explaining that an immigration judge’s prior determination that petitioner was not a flight risk or 21 danger had “largely borne out” because petitioner had only been arrested for a misdemeanor in 22 the interim). This apparent lack of justification is a strong indication that the risk of erroneous 23 deprivation is high, and “allowing a neutral arbiter to review [these] facts would significantly 24 reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation.” Guillermo M. R., 2025 WL 1983677, at *4. 25 Third, the government’s interest in detaining petitioner without a hearing is “low.” 26 Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Doe, 2025 WL 691664, at *6. In 27 immigration court, custody hearings are routine and impose a “minimal” cost. Doe, 2025 WL 28 691664, at *6. The government’s interest is further diminished where a person “has consistently 1 appeared for [his] immigration hearings,” Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at *2, as it appears that 2 petitioner has done. 3 On balance, the Mathews factors show that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, which 4 should have been provided before petitioner was detained. “‘[T]he root requirement’ of the Due 5 Process Clause” is “‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived 6 of any significant protected interest.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 7 (1985) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)); see Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127 8 (“Applying [the Mathews] test, the Court usually has held that the Constitution requires some 9 kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty . . . .”). The Supreme Court has 10 held that Due Process required a pre-deprivation hearing before those released on parole from a 11 criminal conviction can have their bond finally revoked. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480–86. The 12 same is true for those subject to revocation of probation. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 782. 13 It is true that Morrissey permits the arrest of someone pending the final revocation of 14 parole, with a prompt hearing to follow. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485–86. But “decisions 15 defining the constitutional rights of prisoners establish a floor for the constitutional rights of 16 [noncitizens in immigration custody],” who are “most decidedly entitled to more considerate 17 treatment than those who are criminally detained.” Unknown Parties v. Johnson, No. CV-15- 18 00250-TUC-DCB, 2016 WL 8188563, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 18, 2016) aff’d sub nom. Doe v. 19 Kelly, 878 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up) (emphasis added); see Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d 20 at 970 (“Given the civil context [of immigration detention], [petitioner’s] liberty interest is 21 arguably greater than the interest of parolees in Morrissey.”); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 22 (“[G]overnment detention violates [the Due Process] Clause unless the detention is ordered in a 23 criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections or, in certain special and narrow 24 nonpunitive circumstances, where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, 25 outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” 26 (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 27 Here, the government’s justification for detaining petitioner appears to be a misdemeanor 28 arrest that occurred over one year ago in a matter in which petitioner was not charged. Petitioner 1 presents evidence that, since then, immigration authorities have twice taken his fingerprints to 2 confirm his compliance with his Order of Supervision. Doc. 2-3 at ¶ 4. Moreover, in 3 November 2024 — over four months after petitioner’s misdemeanor arrest — petitioner’s 4 supervisory detention and deportation officer confirmed in writing that “as of November 20, 5 2024, [petitioner] is compliant with the terms of his supervision.” Doc. 2-3, Ex. E at 111. 6 Given the absence of “evidence of urgent concerns,” the Court concludes that “a pre- 7 deprivation hearing [was] required to satisfy due process.” Guillermo M. R., 2025 WL 1983677, 8 at *9. Numerous district courts have reached a similar conclusion. E.g., id.; Garcia, 2025 WL 9 1927596, at *5; Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at *3–4; Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; Singh, 2025 10 WL 1918679, at *8–9; Doe, 2025 WL 691664, at *6; Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-05071, 2025 11 WL 1676854, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025); Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-02508-TSH, 2022 12 WL 1443250, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022); Vargas v. Jennings, No. 20-cv-5785-PJH, 2020 WL 13 5074312, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020). 14 With these considerations in mind, petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits. 15 b. Petitioner Will Face Irreparable Harm Without Injunctive Relief. 16 Turning to the second Winters factor, the Court notes that “[i]t is well established that the 17 deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Hernandez, 18 872 F.3d at 994 (quoting Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)). “When an 19 alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing 20 of irreparable injury is necessary.” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 21 2005) (quoting Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2948.1 (2d ed. 2004)). 22 As the Supreme Court has recognized, incarceration “has a detrimental impact on the individual” 23 because “it often means loss of a job” and “disrupts family life.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 24 532–33 (1972). Thus, petitioner faces irreparable harm absent a temporary restraining order. 25 c. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 26 When the government is the nonmoving party, “the last two Winter factors merge.” Baird 27 v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal citations omitted). Faced with a choice 28 “between [minimally costly procedures] and preventable human suffering,” as discussed above, 1 the Court concludes “that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in [petitioner’s] favor.” 2 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996 (quoting Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983)). 3 The public interest also weighs in petitioner’s favor. “The public has a strong interest in 4 upholding procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has 5 recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Diaz, 2025 WL 6 1676854, at *3 (citing Jorge M.F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-CV-01434-JST, 2021 WL 783561, at *3) 7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021); see also Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 8 838 (9th Cir. 2020) (“It is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s 9 constitutional rights.”) (citing Padilla, 953 F.3d at 1147–48). 10 In conclusion, the Court finds that the requirements for issuing a temporary restraining 11 order are met. Respondents are ordered to release petitioner immediately. They may not re- 12 detain petitioner unless the government proves by clear and convincing evidence at a bond 13 hearing before an immigration judge that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community. 14 Petitioner’s immediate release is required to return him to the status quo ante—“the last 15 uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at *3; 16 Kuzmenko v. Phillips, No. 2:25-cv-00663-DJC-AC, 2025 WL 779743, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 17 2025); see also Valdez v. Joyce, 25 Civ. 4627, 2025 WL 1707737, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025) 18 (ordering immediate release of unlawfully detained noncitizen); Ercelik v. Hyde, No. 1:25-CV- 19 11007-AK, 2025 WL 1361543, at *15–16 (D. Mass. May 8, 2025) (same); Günaydın v. Trump, 20 No. 25-CV-01151, 2025 WL 1459154, at *10–11 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025) (same). 21 The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. Courts 22 regularly waive security in cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 23 2011); Garcia, 2025 WL 1676855, at *3; Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at *4; Singh, 2025 WL 24 1918679, at *9. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 IV. Conclusion and Order 2 Accordingly, petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order, Doc. 2, is GRANTED. 3 | Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release petitioner from custody and to reinstate his 4 | bond order. 5 Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner without 6 | first providing petitioner with a bond hearing before an immigration judge at which the 7 | government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner is a flight risk or danger 8 | to the community such that his re-detention is warranted. 9 Respondents may move for modification or dissolution of this Order on two (2) days’ 10 | notice. See Fed. Rule Civ. P. 65(b); Local Rule 231(c)(8). 11 Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE before this Court why a preliminary 12 || injunction should not issue pending a final disposition of this matter. The hearing on the order to 13 | show cause will be held on August 18, 2025 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 6 before District Judge 14 | Kirk E. Sherriff. Respondents shall file a response to petitioner’s motion by August 11, 2025, at 15 | 4:00 p.m. Petitioner may file a reply by August 13, 2025, at 4:00 p.m. The parties may stipulate 16 | to an extended briefing schedule and hearing date, provided that the parties also stipulate that the 17 || temporary restraining order will continue in effect until that hearing date. 18 19 | IT IS SO ORDERED. _ 20 Dated: _ August 4, 2025 4h UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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