Havird Oil Company, Incorporated v. Marathon Oil Company, Incorporated, and Emro Marketing Company, Incorporated

149 F.3d 283, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 63, 41 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 86, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16192, 1998 WL 394599
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJuly 15, 1998
Docket97-1325
StatusPublished
Cited by70 cases

This text of 149 F.3d 283 (Havird Oil Company, Incorporated v. Marathon Oil Company, Incorporated, and Emro Marketing Company, Incorporated) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Havird Oil Company, Incorporated v. Marathon Oil Company, Incorporated, and Emro Marketing Company, Incorporated, 149 F.3d 283, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 63, 41 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 86, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16192, 1998 WL 394599 (4th Cir. 1998).

Opinion

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge HAMILTON wrote the opinion, in which Judge MURNAGHAN and Judge MICHAEL joined.

OPINION

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge:

This ease arose in the aftermath of Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the resulting increases in petroleum and gasoline prices. Alleging that Appellees Marathon Oil Company (Marathon) and its subsidiary, Emro Marketing Company (Emro), sold it gasoline at “an unreasonable rate,” Appellant Havird Oil Company (Havird) sued Marathon and Emro for breach of contract and violations of §§ 39-5-20 and 39-5-330 of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), S.C.Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 to 39-5-560. The district court refused to allow the jury to decide whether Havird could recover for the *285 alleged violation of UTPA § 39-5-330, but did allow the jury to decide whether Marathon and Emro’s actions were unfair trade practices. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Havird, the district court granted Marathon’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract and the unfair trade practice claims. Finding no error, we affirm.

I

Havird is a gasoline retailer or “jobber” that sells gasoline to various municipalities, police departments, fire departments, logging companies and school bus shops in South Carolina. Marathon is a large petroleum refiner and gasoline wholesaler that sells gasoline at terminals throughout the country, including a terminal located in North Augusta, South Carolina. Emro is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Marathon that sells gasoline at retail to the “motoring public.” Havird is incorporated in South Carolina and does business in Lexington, South Carolina. Marathon is an Ohio corporation whose headquarters is in Texas, while Emro is a Delaware corporation whose headquarters is in Ohio.

On August 6, 1986, Havird and Marathon entered into a written open-price contract (the Contract) for the purchase of gasoline from Marathon’s terminal in North Augusta. The Contract provided that the price would be fixed as follows:

The price per gallon for a Product shall be Marathon’s posted Wholesale Reseller Price, at the terminal where delivery is made for the particular Product concerned, in effect on the date of completion of delivery. Such price shall be exclusive of applicable taxes, inspection fees or other charges which shall be borne by Buyer.

(J.A. 286). In the industry parlance, the “posted Wholesale Reseller Price” is known as the “rack price.”

Marathon sets its rack price at its corporate headquarters through a sophisticated pricing mechanism. First, Marathon’s pricing department refers to industry-standard reports generated by the Oil Price Information Service (OPIS), which collects and reports on supplier prices in each terminal market. Marathon uses the OPIS reports to compare its prices with those of its competitors in the relevant market. Next, Marathon follows the price of gasoline on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Finally, Marathon monitors the supply of gasoline available in the area of each of its terminals. Based on the OPIS price reports, the price on the New York Mercantile Exchange and the supply of gasoline in each terminal area, Marathon sets its daily rack price.

Wholesale open-priced supply contracts were standard in the industry during the early 1990s. It was necessary for retailers like Havird to enter into such contracts with wholesalers because there was a shortage of refining capacity. By contracting with a wholesaler like Marathon, retailers gained access to supply and did not have to hunt for wholesale suppliers. Pursuant to the Contract, Havird purchased twenty percent of its gasoline from Marathon, which in 1990 totaled between four and five million gallons of gasoline.

In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. This invasion and the anticipated action by United Nations forces affected oil and gasoline prices throughout the United States. In January 1991, President Bush held a news conference and asked oil companies not to raise their gasoline prices. This plea notwithstanding, some oil companies continued to raise their wholesale prices, and soon a condition known as a “price inversion” developed, where wholesale prices exceeded retail prices.

During the Spring of 1991, Paul Edward Havird, Jr., a principal of Havird Oil Company, learned that Emro was selling gasoline viá a Speedway Gasoline Station at á retail price which was eleven cents lower than the wholesale price Marathon was charging Ha-vird. Principals of Havird discussed this situation with one of Marathon’s sales representatives and inquired whether Marathon would sell Havird gasoline at or near the price it was being sold “on the street.” Marathon’s representative told Havird that the price would remain as determined in the Contract, and, if Havird did not like Marathon’s price, it could go elsewhere to pur *286 chase its gasoline. Havird complained to the South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs, but that agency refused to take any action.

Alleging losses sustained as a result of Marathon’s refusal to sell gasoline at “a reasonable price,” Havird filed suit against Marathon and Emro on March 18, 1994, in the Court of Common Pleas for Lexington County, South Carolina. Marathon and Emro removed the case on April 15, 1994 to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The amended complaint alleged five claims against Marathon and three against Emro: (1) breach of the contractually implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, against Marathon; (2) breach of contract, against Marathon; (3) intentional interference with customer relationships, against both Marathon and Emro; (4) civil conspiracy, against both Marathon and Emro; and (5) violations of the UTPA, against both Marathon and Emro.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marathon on the claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and granted summary judgment in favor of both Marathon and Emro on the claims of intentional interference with customer relationships. Havird has not appealed these rulings. Havird then withdrew its claim for civil conspiracy. Consequently, the only claims that went to trial were those for (1) breach of contract against Marathon, and (2) violations of the UTPA against both Marathon and Emro.

At trial, Havird attempted to show that Marathon breached its contract by charging Havird an unreasonable price under § 2-305 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), S.C.Code Ann. § 36-2-305. 1 The evidence presented at trial showed that Emro, like Havird, purchased some percentage of its gasoline from Marathon at the North Augusta terminal. The evidence also showed that Havird, Emro and all of Marathon’s wholesale customers paid Marathon’s rack price. Havird and Emro, like all other gasoline retailers, also had to pay approximately thirty-four cents per gallon in fees and taxes, in addition to the rack price. Nevertheless, the evidence showed that, during the relevant time period, Emro’s retail price was lower than the sum of Marathon’s rack price plus fees and taxes. Counsel for Marathon admitted at oral argument that Emro sold gasoline below cost as a “loss leader” to attract customers, and made up the difference through the sales of hot dogs, coffee and the like.

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149 F.3d 283, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 63, 41 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 86, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16192, 1998 WL 394599, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/havird-oil-company-incorporated-v-marathon-oil-company-incorporated-and-ca4-1998.