Hastings v. United States

279 F. Supp. 13, 20 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5633, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10951
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedSeptember 26, 1967
DocketCiv. Nos. 41263, 41264
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 279 F. Supp. 13 (Hastings v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hastings v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 13, 20 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5633, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10951 (N.D. Cal. 1967).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

GEORGE B. HARRIS, Chief Judge.

These consolidated actions were initiated by plaintiff taxpayers to recover alleged overpayment of income taxes for the calendar years 1955 and 1958 in the amounts of $7,039.47 and $15,616.54, respectively, in Civil Action 41263, and $5,073.78 and $21,385.25, respectively, in Civil Action 41264, plus interest. The controversy arose when the government redetermined the allowable depreciation deductions on three office buildings held for the production of rental income by the Associated Investment Company, a partnership in which plaintiff Martin has a 51% interest and plaintiff Hastings, a 49% interest.

According to the provisions of § 167(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, “There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) — (1) of property used in the trade or business, or (2) of property held for the production of income.” Since the purpose behind a depreciation allowance is to permit the taxpayer to recover his cost or basis of the property over the useful life of the investment, it is apparent that any computations must take into account (1) the cost of the property, (2) its useful life and (3) the salvage value, if any.

Considerations one and three are uncontested. The inquiry narrows itself therefore to the singular issue: What were the useful lives of the various assets comprising the Tioga, Bermuda, and El Dorado Buildings, the property in question, for the purpose of computing Associated’s depreciation for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1958.

THE LAW

Treasury Regulations § 1.167(a)-l(b) provide that * * * the estimated useful life of an asset is not necessarily the useful life inherent in the asset but is the period over which the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade or business or in the production of income. This period shall be determined by reference to his experience with similar property taking into account present conditions and probable future developments. Some of the factors to be considered in determining this period are (1) wear and tear and decay or decline from natural causes, (2) the normal progress of the art, economic changes, inventions, and current developments within the industry and the taxpayer’s trade or business, (3) the climatic and other local conditions peculiar to the taxpayer’s trade or business, and (4) the taxpayer’s policy as to repairs, renewals, and replacements.”

Further, “Obsolescence may render an asset economically useless to the tax[15]*15payer regardless of its physical condition. Obsolescence is attributable to many causes, including technological improvements and reasonably foreseeable economic changes.” Treas.Reg. § 1.167 (a)-9.

These same Regulations indicate that the taxpayer must bear the responsibility for establishing the reasonableness of the depreciation deduction claimed. Reg. § 1.167(b)-(0)(a). The Commissioner’s determination is presumptively correct. Nevertheless, the taxpayer may demonstrate by definite factual proof that the position of the Commissioner is arbitrary, unreasonable or improper.

THE FACTS

Applying these guidelines to the evidence adduced at trial, it is abundantly clear and certain that the decision of the Commissioner cannot be sustained. Each taxpayer testified as to his extensive experience in dealing with other commercial property similar to the buildings involved in the present proceeding. They stated categorically that the assets were acquired with the purpose of capitalizing on a particular need of the time of specific tenants, i. e., cheap, bulk office space. The minimum cost of construction and remodeling plus the poor and inflexible design of the buildings demonstrates this proposition and indicates a situation type investment. Further, cheapest obtainable materials were used, and creature comforts almost totally omitted. The taxpayers have followed a consistent plan of not keeping the buildings in a state of good repair with the view of replacing the facilities well within the physical life of the plant.

In addition, depreciation deductions were computed only after a careful survey was made by the taxpayers’ expert who also testified at trial that such structures could not compete and were not intended to compete with the modern office buildings which have since appeared in the same area and those which are in the process of construction. The technological advances in the engineering and building materials trade have established a higher standard in accord with the needs and demands of commercial tenants. Moreover, the taxpayers started with property into which more than average obsolescence was built.

The expert for the Government, Mr. Niethammer, on the other hand, indicated that he estimated a longer useful life for the property because of their prime location, increased land values and commercial development in the East Bay. His survey was performed well after the tax years in question, unlike the 1959 appraisal submitted by Mr. Shiach so Mr. Niethammer was able to to benefit from hindsight. Nevertheless, the court is of the opinion that his testimony and report were geared to an incorrect theory and standard and based for the most part on irrelevancies and hypothetical.

He failed to consider that “useful life is measured by use in a taxpayer’s business, not by the full abstract economic life of the asset in any business.” Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 97, 80 S.Ct. 1411, 1415, 4 L.Ed.2d 1592 (1964). That the building may have a structural life far in excess of its useful life is likely and that there will always be some tenants who would make use of relatively inexpensive, bulk office space is also probable, but these are not the relevant criteria. Rather, we must look to the taxpayers’ particular and reasonable use of the property and that is to achieve maximum revenue production in keeping with the ratio of floor space to lot value which both experts agreed had substantially increased and will continue to increase because of renewal and redevelopment.

The prime commercial location of the buildings supports and gives credence to the plaintiff’s plan to replace the present structures within the depreciation schedule limits rejected by the government. Moreover, the report of Mr. Shiach and his testimony, as well as that of the taxpayers, present the evidentiary [16]*16predicate upon which this court may fairly determine the useful lives of the shells and components of the Bermuda, El Dorado and Tioga buildings

Accordingly, and based on a consideration of all the evidence, including stipulations, exhibits and testimony and the arguments and memoranda of counsel, the court finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. These are consolidated civil actions to recover income taxes and interest thereon erroneously collected from the plaintiffs. The actions are brought pursuant to the authority conferred by Section 1346(a) (1) of Title 28, United States Code, as amended.

2. The plaintiffs are all citizens of the United States, residing in the Northern District of California.

3. The plaintiffs, Edward L. and Jeanne Martin, are husband and wife.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Carter v. Durkan
W.D. Washington, 2020
Watson Land Co. v. Commissioner
1983 T.C. Memo. 187 (U.S. Tax Court, 1983)
Louismet v. Commissioner
1982 T.C. Memo. 294 (U.S. Tax Court, 1982)
Fieland v. Commissioner
73 T.C. 743 (U.S. Tax Court, 1980)
Potter v. Comm'r
1969 T.C. Memo. 227 (U.S. Tax Court, 1969)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
279 F. Supp. 13, 20 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5633, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10951, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hastings-v-united-states-cand-1967.