URBIGKIT, Justice.
These cross appeals involve two automobile accidents where the same person was victimized by two rear-end collisions in about eight months. Victim Lloyd K. Hashimoto (Hashimoto) is appealing his jury verdict awarded damages as inadequate based on several contended trial errors. The colliding vehicle’s driver, Penton Jerry Dixon (Dixon), and his employer, Marathon Pipe Line Company (Marathon), are appealing the award of deposition costs to Hashimoto and contended inadequate award to them of other litigative costs. Hashimoto comprehensively phrases the issues for which he seeks review as:
1. Is it fair to relieve the defendant of any burden of proof as to affirmative defenses asserted by him?
2. Is it fair to force the plaintiff to disprove affirmative defenses asserted by the defendant?
3. Should the Wyoming Supreme Court adopt the comprehensive Restatement rules as to apportioning damages in cases involving multiple tort-feasors?
4. Between an injured victim and a negligent wrongdoer, who should bear the burden of proof as to whether the harm and the damages are divisible and can be apportioned?
5. Is it fair to relieve a wrongdoer from any burden of proof on his claim that a second collision caused some or all of the injured victim’s damages?
6. Is it fair to force the plaintiff to prove his damages to a “reasonable certainty” in a case involving apportionment of damages?
7. Should the “reasonable certainty” standard be abandoned in Wyoming as to the proof of damages?
8. Is it time to replace “reasonable certainty” and “reasonable medical certainty” with “reasonable probability” and “reasonable medical probability” in civil cases? [Emphasis in original.]
Dixon and Marathon tender these issues:
1. The trial court abused its discretion in the award of discovery deposition costs to the Plaintiff for a deposition not used during the course of trial proceedings or during the trial itself.
2. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to award costs to the Defendant for pretrial interviews with Plaintiff’s examining physicians and for expert medical witness fees for the time actually spent in court by subpoenaed medical witnesses.
We affirm on Hashimoto’s appeal, although determining that reasonable certainty is not the appropriate standard of [160]*160damage proof in civil cases, and affirm awarded costs on the cross appeal.
FACTS
Hashimoto, while stopped to make a left turn, was rear-ended by Dixon as driving a Marathon vehicle. Dixon was speeding, ran a stop sign, and having consumed several beers within working hours immediately before, was under the influence of alcohol — with a blood alcohol test of .197%. Neck injuries to Hashimoto resulted from this first collision.
The second collision occurred about eight months later on October 9,1984; coincidentally while Hashimoto was again stopped, waiting to make another left-hand turn. As now rear-ended by Todd Morgan (Morgan), this second collision caused injuries to Hashimoto’s lower spine, with some aggravation of the earlier collision neck injuries.1
Hashimoto filed a suit for damages resulting from both collisions on December 16, 1985, by suing Dixon, Marathon,2 and Morgan,3 including claims for punitive damages against Marathon and Dixon. Marathon was awarded summary judgment on punitive damages. In advance of trial, the trial court ruled that because of the second collision, Hashimoto had to meet the burden of proving to a “reasonable certainty” that his subsequent problems were caused by the first collision and not the second to recover from the two remaining defendants, Dixon and Marathon. Jury instructions as subsequently given also reflected that same decision. The jury returned a judgment awarding Hashimoto $4,500 for actual damages and punitive damages against Dixon of $3,000. Various motions were heard regarding awardable costs with judgment for a net award to Hashimoto of $241.49 ($806.49 as offset by Marathon’s and Dixon’s awarded costs of $565). Following a denied motion for new trial by Hashimoto, both parties timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
Although the parties collectively phrased numerous issues, we choose to address them by three categorizations: (1) burden of proof; (2) reasonable certainty; and (3) costs.
1. Burden of Proof When Successive Injuries Occur.
Hashimoto contends that Marathon and Dixon have the burden in a successive impact case to prove and apportion the damages resulting from injuries for which they are responsible or, if that apportionment is not possible, Marathon and Dixon may then be liable for all damages. We disagree.
For this first impression issue in this state, the trial court correctly applied the reasoning of Bruckman v. Pena, 29 Colo. App. 357, 487 P.2d 566 (1971). Bruckman is a case remarkably similar where the plaintiff was injured in two automobile accidents occurring within a little less than a year of each other. Defendants were the owner and driver of the truck involved in the first collision, and the plaintiff claimed aggravation of the first injuries caused by a second collision. That court held it was error to give an instruction which placed the burden of proving plaintiff’s disability on the defendants since their liability should be limited to the damages proxi[161]*161mately caused by their negligence. Bruckman, 487 P.2d at 568.
We are cognizant, as was the Bruckman court, of the principle that when a tort-feasor injures someone with a pre-existing condition, he is liable for the total damage when no apportionment between the pre-ex-isting condition and the damage defendant caused can be made. Thus, the defendant must take his victim as he finds him. See Alexander v. White, 488 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Colo.App.1971), where the Bruckman situation is distinguished from a pre-existing condition scenario.
[B]ut it is quite another thing to say that a tort-feasor is liable, not only for the damage which he caused, but also for injuries subsequently suffered by the injured person.
Bruckman, 487 P.2d at 568.
The ultimate injuries were caused by the second collision which is a distinct intervening cause because the first injuries had stabilized. Consequently, it would be inappropriate to hold Marathon and Dixon liable for the entire damage when no correlation between the two accidents was shown. Essentially, Hashimoto did not prove that the second collision, which was the subsequent injury-producing act, was a sequela of the first collision. Additionally, no foreseeability of the second accident was shown by Hashimoto and consequently, the first injuries were not the proximate cause of the second accident. Proximate cause cannot be established by mere guess or conjecture, but rather must be proved by evidence of probative force as “based upon reasonable probabilities and which precludes the fact finder from having to make an arbitrary choice between unproved conclusions.” State Nat. Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 691 (Tex.App.1984).
Hashimoto has shown no reason for this court to abandon the general rule
that one injured by the negligence of another is entitled to recover the damages proximately caused by the act of the tort-feasor, and the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish that the damages he seeks were proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant.
Bruckman, 487 P.2d at 568. See also Annotation, Proximate Cause: Liability of Tortfeasor for Injured Person’s Subsequent Injury or Reinjury, 31 A.L.R.3d 1000, 1003-04 (1970).
In accord with our result, see Guerrero v. Bailey, 658 P.2d 278, 279 (Colo.App. 1982), where the original and subsequent injuries were not physical in nature; Brown v. Kreuser, 38 Colo.App. 554, 560 P.2d 105, 109 (1977); Alexander, 488 P.2d at 1125-26; Jurney v. Lubeznik, 72 Ill. App.2d 117, 218 N.E.2d 799, 806 (1966); Becker v. D & E Distributing Co., 247 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Iowa 1976); McGuire v. Oliver, 227 So.2d 149 (La.App.1969), where the plaintiff was involved in three accidents within seventeen days; Bolin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 204 So.2d 49, 51 (La. App.1967); Watkins v. Hand, 198 Neb. 451, 253 N.W.2d 287, 289 (1977); Armstrong v. Bergeron, 104 N.H. 85, 178 A.2d 293, 294 (1962); Williams v. Gragston, 7 Ohio App.3d 369, 455 N.E.2d 1075 (1982); and 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 115 (1988). See also G. Douthwaite, Jury Instructions on Medical Issues, ch. 9 at 512 (3d ed. 1987) which differentiates the Bruckman situation from one where the second injury is a result of ordinary medical malpractice.
This decision on burden of proof disposi-tively resolves Hashimoto’s first five issues as presented by these facts.
2. Reasonable Certainty.
Hashimoto’s next three issues concern the phraseology of jury instructions. Hashimoto alleges error in giving three instructions:
INSTRUCTION NO. 13
The defendants in this case have admitted liability and therefore you must fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate Hashimo-to for those elements of damage proved by the evidence to have been caused by the negligence of the Defendants, taking [162]*162into consideration the nature, extent and duration of the injury.
The claimed elements of damage are:
(a) The pain and suffering experienced as a result of the injuries and those reasonably certain to be experienced in the future.
(b) Disability.
(c) Loss of enjoyment of life. The award for this specific element should not duplicate the award given for any other element of damage, and any loss of enjoyment of life reasonably certain to be experienced in the future.
Whether any of the elements have been proved is for you to determine. [Emphasis added.]
INSTRUCTION NO. 14
The objective sought in awarding damages is to compensate the Plaintiff for loss, and although damages can not always be calculated with absolute certainty, they must be susceptible of ascertainment with a reasonable degree of certainty to be recoverable. Remote, uncertain and conjectural or speculative damages are not allowed. [Emphasis added.]
INSTRUCTION NO. 15
There is no formula the court can give you for the determination of damage for pain and suffering or loss of enjoyment of life or disability, or any future damages as may be reasonably certain to arise. It is not necessary that any witness shall have expressed any opinion as to the dollar amount of damages therefor. Your award, if any, should be such sum as will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff. Furthermore, the arguments of counsel as to the amount of damages is not evidence of reasonable compensation. The amount awarded, if any, rests within your sound discretion and is for you to determine, taking into consideration all the evidence in this case and from your knowledge, observation, and experience in life. Your award, if any, should be for what damages are reasonable and just.
It is insufficient for the litigant in objection to merely state that the instruction is not complete or an accurate statement of the law. Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d 1307 (Wyo.1975). See also Condict v. Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, P.C., 743 P.2d 880, 885 (Wyo.1987); Logan v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 400 P.2d 488 (Wyo.1965); Com. v. Duke, 750 S.W.2d 432 (Ky.1988); and W.R. C.P. 51.
Error may not be assigned unless objection has been made thereto with a distinct statement of the matter to which objection is made and the grounds for this objection, and indicating with definiteness and particularity the error asserted, * * *.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Robles, 511 P.2d 963, 968 (Wyo.1973).
“In reviewing alleged errors in jury instructions, a finding of error is not alone sufficient to reverse; prejudicial error must be found. Walton v. Texasgulf Inc., Wyo., 634 P.2d 908 (1981). Prejudicial error is never presumed; it must be established by the parties. Pure Gas and Chemical Company v. Cook, supra [526 P.2d 986 (Wyo.1974) ].”
Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1292 (Wyo.1985) (quoting from Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Wyo.1983)).
In order to hold an improper instruction reversible, the record must show that substantial rights were affected. Rule 7.04, W.R.A.P. For an error to be harmful, there must be a reasonable possibility that, in the absence of error, the verdict might have been more favorable to a party, and the burden is on the appellant to show where the error is prejudicial. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925 (1981). Merely showing an error occurred does not create a presumption of prejudice as injury to an appellant. Anderson v. Bauer, Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316 (1984).
Condict, 743 P.2d at 885.
Hashimoto’s claimed error with the jury instructions pertains to the burden of proof and that the future damages had to be [163]*163proven on a basis of “reasonable certainty” rather than “reasonable probability” or “reasonable medical probability.” The issue as to the burden of proof was properly dealt with in the preceding section and thus, there was no error giving the instructions that required Hashimoto to prove his own damages.
Initially, we note that Instruction No. 15 was not objected to by Hashimoto. W.R.C.P. 51 mandates in part that “[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.” Thus, this court is precluded from reviewing any potential error with this instruction unless the giving of it amounted to plain error. Cutbirth v. State, 663 P.2d 888 (Wyo.1983); Morris v. State, 644 P.2d 170 (Wyo.1982); Alberts v. State, 642 P.2d 447 (Wyo.1982).
Instruction Nos. 13 4 and 145 were properly objected to below; therefore, the propriety of giving these two instructions which utilized the “reasonable certainty” standard will be addressed.6
While we note that the phrase “reasonable certainty” is used in many of the [164]*164pattern civil damage instructions,7 we find the standard to be illogical and thus improper.8 McElroy v. Luster, 254 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.Civ.App.1953) provides a discussion of the three views and differentiated approaches. The first comes from jurisdictions which adopt the “reasonable probability” rule, the second view as an acceptance by some jurisdictions of the “reasonable certainty” rule with a liberal interpretation of the phrase which equates “reasonable certainty” with “reasonable probability,” and the third view utilizes the “reasonable certainty” rule with a strict requirement that “reasonable certainty” means “free from doubt” or “reasonably free from doubt.”9
Wyoming’s view of apparently accepting the “reasonable probability” rule can be traced back to an early case of Mahoney v. Pearce, 38 Wyo. 151, 265 P. 446, 449 (1928), interpreting the phrase “reasonably compensate” in a jury instruction involving personal injury to not be prejudicial because “future annoyance and pain was probable * * *.” See Borzea v. Anselmi, 71 Wyo. 348, 258 P.2d 796, 805 (1952) where Chief Justice Blume was faced with a situation where the trial court refused the requested instruction which included the “reasonable [165]*165certainty” terminology, and one issue on appeal was whether the deletion of the phrase "reasonable certainty” was in error in the future pain and suffering jury instruction. This court found no error because the instruction amounted to the Ma-honey requirement. Borzea, 258 P.2d at 806.
“The use of the terms ‘reasonably certain’ in defining the degree of proof required of the defendant, was clearly objectionable. ‘Certain’ means ‘free from doubt,’ (Webst. Diet, word ‘certain;’) and to say that proof of a fact must be made reasonably certain is by the literal import of the words tantamount to saying the proof must be made beyond a reasonable doubt. This has been expressly held as to the phrase ‘moral certainly,' * * * which we take it is equivalent to the words ‘reasonable certainty,’ * *
McElroy, 254 S.W.2d at 895 (quoting from St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. Co. v. Burns, 71 Tex. 479, 9 S.W. 467, 468 (1888)).
The phrase “with reasonable certainty” went far beyond the simple requirement of a preponderance of the evidence. It put the unwarranted burden on plaintiff of proving defendant’s negligence by a much higher degree of proof. To require plaintiff to prove defendant’s negligence to “a reasonable certainty” was to require him to prove it to such degree as to leave no reasonable doubt, which was equivalent to saying that he must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. It is of course well known that in prosecutions by the State the guilt of a defendant must be proved “beyond a reasonable doubt” but that requirement has no place whatsoever in a civil action. Payne v. Reed, 332 Mo. 343, 59 S.W.2d 43 [(1933)].
Stephens v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 215 S.W.2d 50, 55 (Mo.App.1948).
We note in DeLuna v. State, 501 P.2d 1021 (Wyo.1972) that this court used the terms "reasonable certainty” and “reasonable probability” interchangeably in a case involving exhibit tampering. However, the concepts behind the two phrases are not the same, and we hold that the words “reasonable probability” should more precisely be the standard employed in civil personal injury jury instructions to avoid confusion. As the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in Johnson v. Connecticut Co., 85 Conn. 438, 83 A. 530, 531 (1912) aptly phrased it;
“Reasonable certainty” and “reasonable probability” bear no resemblance to each other, and judicial construction which brings them into apposite relation seems to us forced, perhaps, to save the appearance of a rule which violates a fundamental of the theory of evidence. This attempt has been aided by text-book writers who no doubt saw that the requirement of proof of future injuries to a reasonable certainty was an exception to the ordinary requirement of proof.
Justice Rose, dissenting in Olson v. Federal American Partners, 567 P.2d 710,719 (Wyo.1977), pointed out the difference between “possible” and “probability,” as both terms are used in a medical setting:
We are involved in an area which does not lend itself to medical certainties— only to probabilities and likelihoods.
Id. at 724. Consequently, with damages in a personal injury situation dependent upon medical testimony as much as worker’s compensation injuries are dependent upon medical certainty,10 it makes no sense to hold injured parties to a standard of “reasonable certainty.” See Ortkiese v. Clar[166]*166son & Ewell Engineering, 126 So.2d 556 (Fla.1961) for a case finding error with the phrase “reasonable medical certainty” in the worker’s compensation arena.
From Hippocrates to the Mayos and the Oschners, the medical profession has progressed by research and experimentation, by chasing the guinea pig through the laboratory. In this manner it has progressed so rapidly to new and better methods of treatment, if it knew any such rule as reasonable medical certainty today, it would be discarded for a different one tomorrow, * * *.
Id. at 564.
For cases clearly finding fault with proving damages to a reasonable certainty as exceeding the burden of proof in civil cases, see Leggett v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 72 Ill.App. 577 (1897); and St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. Co. v. Burns, 71 Tex. 479, 9 S.W. 467, 468 (1888). In applying the English language as it is written, we would not find the phrases “reasonable probability” and “reasonable certainty” to be equivalent. State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Shain, 350 Mo. 316, 165 S.W.2d 428, 430 (1942); Johnson, 83 A. at 531. The term “reasonable probability” is equivocal, and is not synonymous with reasonable certainty. Hallum v. Village, of Omro, 122 Wis. 337, 99 N.W. 1051, 1053 (1904).
For a case that refers to “reasonably certain” in an instruction for damages for future consequences of the injury as not equating with “reasonable probability,” and finding the appropriate standard to be “reasonable probability,” see Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Harriett, 80 Tex. 73, 15 S.W. 556, 558-59 (1891). See Brown v. Forrester & Nace Box Co., 243 S.W. 330, 331 (Mo.1922) for the proposition that changing the word “likely” in a jury instruction to “reasonably certain” caused the meaning of the instruction to substantially change, since “likely” referred to “probable” injury which would be one more reasonably expected to happen than not to happen, and a “reasonably certain” injury would be one that human experience shows nearly always results from such a defect.
Contrarily, some authorities have construed the phrases “reasonable certainty” and “reasonable probability” to be equivalent which redefinition we choose not to follow. See Lane v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 396, 308 N.W.2d 503, 512 (1981); Marion v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 192 Neb. 457, 222 N.W.2d 366, 368 (1974); Wilkinson v. Dunbar, 149 N.C. 20, 62 S.E. 748, 750 (1908); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Hughes, 53 Ohio App. 255, 4 N.E.2d 700, 705 (1935); and Holt v. School District No. 71 of King County, 102 Wash. 442, 173 P. 335, 338 (1918). For a case finding the words “reasonably certain” to be the same as “probable,” see Swift & Co. v. Raleigh, 54 Ill.App. 44 (1894).
We find error in the standard utilized to prove future earnings in both instructions given and the substitute instruction proposed by Hashimoto; however, we fail to see where Hashimoto has demonstrated a prejudicial error.
Although we find the use of “reasonable certainty” as an improper phrase, borrowed from the criminal context into the civil context, we do recognize the jury in this case still found for Hashimoto even when applying this greater burden of proof. See St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Burke, 81 S.W. 774, 775 (Tex.App.1904), where the court construes the phrase “reasonable degree of certainty” to “mean a higher degree of evidence than is furnished by a preponderance of the evidence.” Therefore, for the jury to have concluded that the damages were proven to a “reasonable certainty” they necessarily had to find implicitly that they were proven well over the “reasonable probability” standard. As such, Hashimoto was not prejudiced by this error of instructing on the improper standard. The evidence was relatively specific and generally uncontrovert-ed. The $4,500 jury compensatory award was solely general damages. The apparent medical expenses of $428 had been advanced in behalf of Marathon and Dixon, and by Instruction No. 13A, the jury was instructed not to include that amount in any award. Medical testimony referencing [167]*167injury from the first impact considered as physically minor in force, indicated that Hashimoto was “asymptomatic” and “essentially healed from the first impact” until the second significantly more severe impact occurred causing substantial aggravation as well as new injury. Considering the record presented, we do not find prejudicial error in the instructions since all evidence was available and the jury accorded a substantial verdict considering the relatively minor impact and injury.11
In summary, the phrase “reasonably certain” or “reasonable certainty” connotes freedom from doubt. Since none of us can see into the future, it appears quite illogical to attach such a standard to proving future pain and suffering in a personal injury case. The law is encumbered by human infirmities and thus should not reflect a standard that can only be met by a mind reader. Therefore, we find error in the standard of proof utilized in the jury instructions, but also find that Hashimoto was not prejudiced with respect to Instruction Nos. 13 and 14. Concerning Instruction No. 15, Hashimoto did not appropriately preserve this issue as a challenge in appeal for which reversal of the jury verdict is justified. Likewise, a plain error premise12 for reversal is not denominated by the injury testimony presented to the jury as sufficient to demonstrate the miscarriage of justice character of a jury verdict decision. Goggins, 704 P.2d at 1291; Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1169 (Wyo.1981).
3. Litigative Court Costs.
The area of costs is a nebulous topic as found with reference within many statutes which include the word “costs” as never expressly defined. Additionally, this court has never considered this subject of the relative relation of rules of court in regard to the definition of allowable costs as related to the statutory provisions which provide that costs may be awarded.13 This confusion is clouded in this case because in addition, a pretrial offer by Marathon and Dixon of judgment in accordance with W.R. C.P. 68 was made of $10,000 to include all costs accrued to offer date. That offer was not accepted and the case proceeded to trial resulting in the recovery of only the $4,500 in compensatory damages and $3,000 in punitive damages. In post-trial proceedings, both parties filed their bills of costs and each objected to what the other had submitted. Following hearing, the court awarded Hashimoto in final judgment his costs incurred to date of offer of judgment.14 Consequently, to determine if the [168]*168court abused its discretion in award of costs, it is necessary again to consider for disposition of the cross appeal what is properly included by case law and precedent to come within the term “allowable costs.” Clearly within the confines of definition terms, the determination of allowable costs to be taxed pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(d) is within the discretion of the trial court. Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433 (Wyo.1985). See also Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (Wyo.1986), and for criminal cases, Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698 (Wyo.1987) and Note, The Assessment and Collection of the Costs of a Criminal Prosecution in Wyoming, 13 Wyo.L.J. 178 (1959).
By their cross appeal, Marathon and Dixon claim discretional error by the court in four items:
a. Discovery deposition costs awarded to Hashimoto for the deposition of co-defendant Morgan whose case was settled before trial. The amount involved if allocated from a joint bill would total $203.50;
b. Reduced witness fees for Dr. San-deen, Marathon’s and Dixon’s medical witness, as ultimately approved on an hourly rate of $250 but applied only to the time of testimony and not “show up and wait” time resulting in the billed total of $750 to be reduced by $221 to an award of $529;
c. Pretrial consultation time between Marathon’s and Dixon’s counsel and the medical witness of $50; and
d. Pretrial consultation by both counsel and Dr. Peter W. Beall as another medical witness of $45.50.
Consequently at issue in this cross appeal is allowed costs to Hashimoto of $203.50 and disallowed costs to Marathon and Dixon of $316.50, as totalling $520.
We will not yield to temptation by the broad scope of issue argument by litigants or the plethora of Wyoming case law touching on awardable costs to expand consideration for this opinion beyond the subject presented:
1. Discovery deposition costs of witnesses whose depositions were not used at trial but for whom the discovery was determined by the trial court to be reasonably necessary for case preparation; and
2. Witness fees of expert witnesses as allowable for trial time appearance only and excluding show up time and pretrial conference sessions with counsel.
Among the myriad of Wyoming piecemeal cases,15 we would apply Weaver, [169]*169715 P.2d 1361; State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1 (Wyo.1985); and Duffy, 708 P.2d 433 as controlling.16
Applying current precedent to the specifics involved here as avoiding the generalized confusion obviously existent, it is directly concluded that:
1. Award of costs including subpoena, reporter and witness fees for discovery deposition is discretionary with the trial court as coming within the criteria of “reasonably required for trial preparation.” Weaver, 715 P.2d 1361; Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1;
2. Expert witness fees as determined by the court to be reasonable in amount should include actual time for testimony and do not include charges of the experts for pretrial conferences or time during the trial session while waiting to actually testify-
In the absence of a defining rule or a controlling statute, it should be recognized that we do not deny the right to charge daily witness costs pursuant to W.S. 1-14-102 for witnesses who are attending court or deposition sessions under subpoena even though on particular days they may not testify. We limit the expert witness provision provided here to a higher hourly rate to be assessable against the opposing party only for the time that the expert may actually testify as the court may, in its discretion, limit the amount of the award by that restriction.17 Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1. Cf. Kaess, 748 P.2d 698 and Weaver, 715 P.2d 1361. Consequently, we affirm the exercise of discretion by the trial court in award of costs from which the cross appeal was taken.
SUMMARY
Since the trial court found that the discovery deposition of Morgan was reasonably necessary as, at that point in time he was still a party in the proceeding, it was appropriate for the costs of his discovery deposition to be assessed under the Dieringer standard for expert witness fees in accord with Weaver, 715 P.2d 1361. The trial court was justified in only assessing testimony time. In the same vein, the pretrial interview expenses were properly disallowed as preparation and not trial expenses.
AFFIRMED.