Harwood v. Shoe.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Harwood v. Shoe.

53 S.E. 616, 141 N.C. 161, 1906 N.C. LEXIS 83

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedApril 17, 1906

StatusPublished

Cited by22 cases

This text of 53 S.E. 616 (Harwood v. Shoe.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Harwood v. Shoe., 53 S.E. 616, 141 N.C. 161, 1906 N.C. LEXIS 83 (N.C. 1906).

Pincite

Opinion

Brown, J.

The learned counsel for plaintiffs contended that they are entitled upon the issues as answered, to a judgment for plaintiffs, and in his argument stated that he wished to rest his whole case upon that exception to the ruling of the court below.

. The jury found in answer to the fourth issue, that the defendant’s failure to carry out his contract of maintenance of Susan Harwood was due to the acts and conduct of the plaintiffs. But the plaintiffs say that they were strangers to the contract, and that, therefore, they are not to be held responsible for the non-performance of the contract by defendant Shoe. It is a general rule of law that if a party by his contract charge himself with an obligation possible to be performed, he must make it good unless its performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, the law, or the other party. If this action were being prosecuted by Susan Harwood to set aside the deed on account of the non-performance of his obligation by defendant, this rule of law would apply although the defendant was prevented by a third person, without Susan Harwood’s consent, from performing his contract. But the plaintiffs are the heirs-at-law of Susan Harwood and inherited the land from her. They had a personal and pecuniary interest during her lifetime in a failure by defendant to comply with his agreement. If he failed, the conveyance could be avoided and they would get the land at her death. The defendant offered evidence tending to prove that during Susan Harwood’s life *163 the plaintiffs compelled defendant to leave the land and by force prevented him from carrying out his obligation to her. The jury accepted defendant’s version of the facts.

To permit plaintiffs to recover the land now upon the ground contended for by them and in the face of such a finding by the jury would be to permit them to take advantage of their own wrong.

It is a salutary rule of law that one who prevents the performance of a condition, or makes it impossible by his own act, will not be permitted to take advantage of the non-performance. This rule applies with especial fitness where the party is impelled by personal interest, as in this case. Young v. Hunter, 6 N. Y., 207; Buffkin v. Baird, 73 N. C., 283; Harris v. Wright, 118 N. C., 422; Navigation Co. v. Wilcox, 52 N. C., 481. It would be against good morals, as well as law, to allow plaintiffs to profit by their wrongful acts, although they were not parties to the contract. Nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam conditiorem facere potest.

A careful examination of the record discloses

No Error.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Brown, J.

The learned counsel for plaintiffs contended that they are entitled upon the issues as answered, to a judgment for plaintiffs, and in his argument stated that he wished to rest his whole case upon that exception to the ruling of the court below.

. The jury found in answer to the fourth issue, that the defendant’s failure to carry out his contract of maintenance of Susan Harwood was due to the acts and conduct of the plaintiffs. But the plaintiffs say that they were strangers to the contract, and that, therefore, they are not to be held responsible for the non-performance of the contract by defendant Shoe. It is a general rule of law that if a party by his contract charge himself with an obligation possible to be performed, he must make it good unless its performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, the law, or the other party. If this action were being prosecuted by Susan Harwood to set aside the deed on account of the non-performance of his obligation by defendant, this rule of law would apply although the defendant was prevented by a third person, without Susan Harwood’s consent, from performing his contract. But the plaintiffs are the heirs-at-law of Susan Harwood and inherited the land from her. They had a personal and pecuniary interest during her lifetime in a failure by defendant to comply with his agreement. If he failed, the conveyance could be avoided and they would get the land at her death. The defendant offered evidence tending to prove that during Susan Harwood’s life *163 the plaintiffs compelled defendant to leave the land and by force prevented him from carrying out his obligation to her. The jury accepted defendant’s version of the facts.

To permit plaintiffs to recover the land now upon the ground contended for by them and in the face of such a finding by the jury would be to permit them to take advantage of their own wrong.

It is a salutary rule of law that one who prevents the performance of a condition, or makes it impossible by his own act, will not be permitted to take advantage of the non-performance. This rule applies with especial fitness where the party is impelled by personal interest, as in this case. Young v. Hunter, 6 N. Y., 207; Buffkin v. Baird, 73 N. C., 283; Harris v. Wright, 118 N. C., 422; Navigation Co. v. Wilcox, 52 N. C., 481. It would be against good morals, as well as law, to allow plaintiffs to profit by their wrongful acts, although they were not parties to the contract. Nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam conditiorem facere potest.

A careful examination of the record discloses

No Error.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

53 S.E. 616, 141 N.C. 161, 1906 N.C. LEXIS 83, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harwood-v-shoe-nc-1906.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack