Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Systems, Inc.

925 F. Supp. 1042, 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1651, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6595, 1996 WL 254888
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 14, 1996
Docket92 Civ. 8097 (HB)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 925 F. Supp. 1042 (Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Systems, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Systems, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1042, 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1651, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6595, 1996 WL 254888 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

BAER, District Judge:

Plaintiff, Harbor Software, Inc., brings this action for, inter alia, copyright infringement. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Applied Sys.- *1045 terns, Inc. infringed several of its copyrights in a computer program called the “Sales Center Manager” (SCM). SCM is designed to provide automated marketing services to insurance agencies. In brief, the program automates aspects of client development and management, such as direct mailing campaigns and client follow-up. The program also calculates various statistics that track client activity and business development. Plaintiff claims that several key elements of its program were copied by Applied Systems and incorporated into the defendants’ competing product called “The Agency Manager.”

This decision determines the nonliteral elements of SCM that are protectable under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. For the reasons discussed below, certain elements represented in exhibits 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,11, 12,14,25, and 28-36 are protectable.

I. Discussion

To establish a claim of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show both ownership of a valid copyright and that the defendant copied protectable elements of the copyrighted work. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1295-96, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir.1992). Copying may be shown either by direct or circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence of copying consists of proof that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that the defendant’s work is substantially similar to the copyrightable elements of the plaintiffs work. Id.

The Copyright Act defines a computer program as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. In addition to protecting the actual text of the program, i.e., the source or object code, the Act also protects nonliteral elements of a computer program. Altai, 982 F.2d at 702; see also Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir.1994), opinion supplemented on denial of reh’g en banc, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir.1995); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir.1993).

Although nonliteral aspects may be pro-tectable, the scope of such protection will vary from ease to case. The Act provides that:

In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.

17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 25 L.Ed. 841 (1879). In determining which nonliteral components of SCM are protectable, the Court must analyze the program and remove from consideration those elements that are excluded from copyright protection by § 102(b) and related doctrines of copyright law.

In Altai the Second Circuit adopted a three-part test to weed out unprotectable elements of a computer program and determine substantial similarity. Under this analysis, the Court must first abstract the program, breaking it into its structural parts at varying levels of abstraction. Altai, 982 F.2d at 706. Next, the Court filters out those elements that are not protectable. Id. Finally, the Court compares the remaining pro-tectable elements of the plaintiffs program to the defendant’s work to determine if substantial similarity exists. Id.

To assist in this inquiry, the Court appointed David B. Hurry as the Court’s expert pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 706. Mr. Hurry has a bachelor’s and master’s degrees in electrical engineering and approximately twelve years of professional experience in various aspects of computer systems development. For the last ten years Mr. Hurry has been employed by the Department of Defense where he designs and builds large scale information processing systems, and is currently a systems engineer. I find Mr. Hurry fully qualified to act as a scientific expert in this case.

Mr. Hurry worked with the parties during the abstraction process to develop a series of exhibits that graphically represent the nonli- *1046 teral elements of SCM for which the plaintiff seeks copyright protection. The claimed elements were described in detail in the plaintiffs filtration memorandum and thus the exhibits themselves do not constitute nonli-teral aspects of the program. In addition, Mr. Hurry submitted a Report to the Court that detailed his recommendations as to the which elements of SCM were protectable.

This decision addresses the first two stages of the Altai analysis: abstraction and filtration. I determined that the filtration analysis is a matter of law for the Court, rather than for the jury. I based this decision on an analogy to the Federal Circuit’s holding in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.Cir.1995), aff'd, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996), that interpretation of patent claims is an issue of law. Just as patent claims determine the boundaries of an inventor’s monopoly, “filtration serves ‘the purpose of defining the scope of plaintiffs copyright.’ ” Altai, 982 F.2d at 707 (quoting Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 869, 113 S.Ct. 198, 121 L.Ed.2d 141 (1992)). I find further support for my decision in the more broadly based unanimous decision by the Supreme Court affirming the Federal Circuit in Markman. See

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925 F. Supp. 1042, 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1651, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6595, 1996 WL 254888, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harbor-software-inc-v-applied-systems-inc-nysd-1996.