Hampton v. PROFESSIONAL TITLE SERVICES

2010 UT App 294, 242 P.3d 796, 667 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 2010 Utah App. LEXIS 290, 2010 WL 4117567

• Court: Court of Appeals of Utah
• Decided: October 21, 2010
• Docket: 20090942-CA
• Status: Published

Opinions

MEMORANDUM DECISION

VOROS, Judge:

11 Tonda Lynn Hampton challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Professional Title Services and Clay G. Holbrook (collectively, Defendants). We affirm on the basis that Hampton's appeal is inadequately briefed. See Utah R.App. P. 24(a).

T2 An adequately briefed argument "contain[s] the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented ... with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Id. R. 24(a)(9). " 'Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority'" State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶13, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)). A reviewing court "'s not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 Ill.App.3d 1087, 48 Ill.Dec. 510, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)). Accordingly, "we may refuse, sua sponte, to consider inadequately briefed issues." State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ¶ 22, 128 P.3d 1179 (citing Utah R.App. P. 24(j)).

13 We acknowledge that Hampton here appears pro se. She is therefore entitled to "every consideration that may reasonably be indulged." Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). "However, [als a general rule, a party who represents [herself] will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar....'" Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶11, 194 P.3d 903 (quoting Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1213) (first alteration in original). "Further, 'reasonable' indulgence is not unlimited indulgence.... Reasonable considerations do not include ... attempt{ing] to redress the ongoing consequences of the party's decision to function in a capacity for which [she is not trained." Id. (quoting Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1218). Our courts "will not engage in constructing arguments out of whole cloth," even in capital cases. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5 (Utah 1988).

#4 Hampton's brief is not close to adequate. The argument portion of her brief is three pages; excluding summary and introduction, it consists only of a bare outline. And the arguments she does advance are difficult to decipher, e.g., "The court improperly created a standard requiring that Plaintiff should have raised fraud in a prior case prevented plaintiff to enter evidence, Therefore, causing Plaintiff to become incompetent,. ... The court in this role imper-missibly put itself in the position of an assumption."

T5 We agree with the concurrence that Hampton's arguments are "earnestly stated," and her commitment to her position shines through. 'We also recognize the uncomfortable reality that our system of justice is expensive. While some pro se litigants may have made a "decision to function in a capacity for which [they are] not trained," see Allen, 2008 UT 56, T11, 194 P.8d 908, we understand that many simply cannot afford a lawyer. Nevertheless, our system is designed so that the "appellant must do the heavy lifting," State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, ¶ 21, 147 P.3d 448. We cannot do it even for an earnest pro se litigant. "An appellate court that does the lifting for an appellant distorts [the] fundamental allocation of benefits and burdens." Id.

T6 Even granting Hampton every consideration that may reasonably be indulged in light of her pro se status, we affirm on the ground that her brief on appeal is inadequate to enable us to consider the merits of her claims.

171 CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.