M. J. Kelly, J.
Plaintiff Wayne E. Hall, Sr. was arrested July 20, 1973 at the scene of a minor property damage accident in Delta Township, Eaton County. The accident occurred at about 6 p.m. He was handcuffed at the scene, placed under arrest and taken in the police car to the Eaton County Jail at Charlotte. Plaintiff was charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, MCLA 257.625; MSA 9.2325. According to his testimony, plaintiff refused a Breathalyzer test under the following circumstances:
"He [the deputy] asked me if I would take a Breathalyzer test, and I told him I would but I would like my attorney’s opinion before I did, and I would also like to make a phone call to him * * * .”
"He said 'no,’ that I didn’t need no attorney, and I [435]*435asked him — I says: If I could call my wife because she should be notified, and he says, 'no, you’re not even calling her.’
"Question: Now what time of the day was this?
"Answer: Approximately around oh probably quarter to seven.”
The License Appeal Board held on August 29, 1973 that plaintiffs refusal to take the Breathalyzer test was in violation of the section of the Michigan Motor Vehicle Code dealing with implied consent. An order of the Secretary of State suspending plaintiffs license for 90 days was affirmed on appeal to the Eaton County Circuit Court. Application for leave to appeal to this Court was granted.
At the hearing before the License Appeal Board the police officer gave as his reason for refusing plaintiff an opportunity to make a telephone call the refusal to sign a "booking card”. This was verified at the de novo hearing in circuit court when plaintiff was questioned by the prosecutor:
"Question: You refused to sign the booking card and the receipt for your valuables, didn’t you? * * *
"Answer: I did not refuse to sign for my valuables
"Question: Did you sign anything?
"Answer: Nope.”
Plaintiff contended at the License Appeal Board hearing and at the de novo hearing in circuit court that under the circumstances his refusal to submit to the Breathalyzer test was reasonable. Defendant Secretary of State urges that any refusal to take a Breathalyzer test based upon a claimed right to be represented by counsel or even to consult with counsel is per se unreasonable because "[t]here is [436]*436no provision in the Michigan Implied Consent Law [sic] either calling for or prohibiting involvement of an attorney in the administration of the [B]reathalyzer test”.
The issue raised is one of first impression in this state. In Michigan’s landmark implied consent case, Collins v Secretary of State, 384 Mich 656, 668; 187 NW2d 423, 429 (1971), the Court noted the facts under which the accused driver refused to take a test. The Court then said, "[w]e now consider whether this refusal was reasonable”. The ultimate determination of that case was based upon its circumstances and its facts but we find it significant that when Collins was offered a breath test pursuant to the statute he was also granted permission to call his attorney.
In the case at bar the refusal of the arresting officer to permit plaintiff to make a phone call appears to be arbitrary. Plaintiff testified that the officer gave no reason. The officer asserted at the License Appeal Board hearing that it was the policy of the department to refuse prisoners a telephone call unless and until they signed a booking card. Although appellant never did sign a booking card apparently the requirement was declared "inoperative” after 7 hours and he was allowed to call his wife. We think it is reasonable to infer that if appellant had signed the booking card he would have been permitted to make his telephone call. The procedure appears to be coercive rather than an attempt to expedite the test.
The conceptual problem permeating the issue arises from the fact that defendant was arrested for a criminal offense, driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, MCLA 257.625(a); MSA 9.2325(1). That arrest set in motion the chain of events which leads to the instant civil appeal. The [437]*437Breathalyzer test itself has apparent and serious consequences both civilly and criminally.
If the arrestee decides to take the test and the results show that his blood contains at least 0.10% alcohol, he is presumed to have been under the influence of intoxicating liquor. MCLA 257.625a(l)(c); MSA 9.2325(l)(l)(c). A conviction, aided by the statutory presumption, may result for a first offender in a fine of $100 and a jail sentence of 90 days. The third conviction within 10 years is a felony conviction.
If the arrestee refuses to take the test and thereafter fails to request a hearing within 14 days or fails to prevail at the hearing, he may lose his license for up to two years. MCLA 257.625f(l); MSA 9.2325(6X1), MCLA 257.625f(3); MSA 9.2325(6)(3). For many occupations, possession of a valid driver’s or chauffeur’s license may be indispensable. In our mobile society the loss of driving privileges may impair and, in some cases, effectively preclude a man from pursuing his livelihood.
We agree with defendant that since this is a civil proceeding revoking a governmentally granted privilege, the right to drive, a constitutional right to counsel is not afforded as in the landmark criminal cases of Escobedo v Illinois, 378 US 478, 486; 84 S Ct 1758, 1762; 12 L Ed 2d 977, 983 (1964) and Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1062; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). However, while this is a civil proceeding it is one on which serious consequences rest. In Bell v Burson, 402 US 535, 539; 91 S Ct 1586, 1589; 29 L Ed 2d 90, 94 (1971), the United States Supreme Court said:
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus [438]*438involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Sniadach v Family Finance Corp, 395 US 337; 89 S Ct 1820; 23 L Ed 2d 349 (1969); Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254; 90 S Ct 1011; 25 L Ed 2d 287 (1970). This is but an application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a 'right’ or a 'privilege.’ ”
Therefore, we must examine the proceedings to see if they meet the due process requirement of fundamental fairness, especially where in the early stages of this controversy the trappings were akin to criminal proceedings. We are guided by the language of Cafeteria Workers v McElroy, 367 US 886, 895; 81 S Ct 1743, 1748; 6 L Ed 2d 1230, 1236 (1961):
"The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.
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M. J. Kelly, J.
Plaintiff Wayne E. Hall, Sr. was arrested July 20, 1973 at the scene of a minor property damage accident in Delta Township, Eaton County. The accident occurred at about 6 p.m. He was handcuffed at the scene, placed under arrest and taken in the police car to the Eaton County Jail at Charlotte. Plaintiff was charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, MCLA 257.625; MSA 9.2325. According to his testimony, plaintiff refused a Breathalyzer test under the following circumstances:
"He [the deputy] asked me if I would take a Breathalyzer test, and I told him I would but I would like my attorney’s opinion before I did, and I would also like to make a phone call to him * * * .”
"He said 'no,’ that I didn’t need no attorney, and I [435]*435asked him — I says: If I could call my wife because she should be notified, and he says, 'no, you’re not even calling her.’
"Question: Now what time of the day was this?
"Answer: Approximately around oh probably quarter to seven.”
The License Appeal Board held on August 29, 1973 that plaintiffs refusal to take the Breathalyzer test was in violation of the section of the Michigan Motor Vehicle Code dealing with implied consent. An order of the Secretary of State suspending plaintiffs license for 90 days was affirmed on appeal to the Eaton County Circuit Court. Application for leave to appeal to this Court was granted.
At the hearing before the License Appeal Board the police officer gave as his reason for refusing plaintiff an opportunity to make a telephone call the refusal to sign a "booking card”. This was verified at the de novo hearing in circuit court when plaintiff was questioned by the prosecutor:
"Question: You refused to sign the booking card and the receipt for your valuables, didn’t you? * * *
"Answer: I did not refuse to sign for my valuables
"Question: Did you sign anything?
"Answer: Nope.”
Plaintiff contended at the License Appeal Board hearing and at the de novo hearing in circuit court that under the circumstances his refusal to submit to the Breathalyzer test was reasonable. Defendant Secretary of State urges that any refusal to take a Breathalyzer test based upon a claimed right to be represented by counsel or even to consult with counsel is per se unreasonable because "[t]here is [436]*436no provision in the Michigan Implied Consent Law [sic] either calling for or prohibiting involvement of an attorney in the administration of the [B]reathalyzer test”.
The issue raised is one of first impression in this state. In Michigan’s landmark implied consent case, Collins v Secretary of State, 384 Mich 656, 668; 187 NW2d 423, 429 (1971), the Court noted the facts under which the accused driver refused to take a test. The Court then said, "[w]e now consider whether this refusal was reasonable”. The ultimate determination of that case was based upon its circumstances and its facts but we find it significant that when Collins was offered a breath test pursuant to the statute he was also granted permission to call his attorney.
In the case at bar the refusal of the arresting officer to permit plaintiff to make a phone call appears to be arbitrary. Plaintiff testified that the officer gave no reason. The officer asserted at the License Appeal Board hearing that it was the policy of the department to refuse prisoners a telephone call unless and until they signed a booking card. Although appellant never did sign a booking card apparently the requirement was declared "inoperative” after 7 hours and he was allowed to call his wife. We think it is reasonable to infer that if appellant had signed the booking card he would have been permitted to make his telephone call. The procedure appears to be coercive rather than an attempt to expedite the test.
The conceptual problem permeating the issue arises from the fact that defendant was arrested for a criminal offense, driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, MCLA 257.625(a); MSA 9.2325(1). That arrest set in motion the chain of events which leads to the instant civil appeal. The [437]*437Breathalyzer test itself has apparent and serious consequences both civilly and criminally.
If the arrestee decides to take the test and the results show that his blood contains at least 0.10% alcohol, he is presumed to have been under the influence of intoxicating liquor. MCLA 257.625a(l)(c); MSA 9.2325(l)(l)(c). A conviction, aided by the statutory presumption, may result for a first offender in a fine of $100 and a jail sentence of 90 days. The third conviction within 10 years is a felony conviction.
If the arrestee refuses to take the test and thereafter fails to request a hearing within 14 days or fails to prevail at the hearing, he may lose his license for up to two years. MCLA 257.625f(l); MSA 9.2325(6X1), MCLA 257.625f(3); MSA 9.2325(6)(3). For many occupations, possession of a valid driver’s or chauffeur’s license may be indispensable. In our mobile society the loss of driving privileges may impair and, in some cases, effectively preclude a man from pursuing his livelihood.
We agree with defendant that since this is a civil proceeding revoking a governmentally granted privilege, the right to drive, a constitutional right to counsel is not afforded as in the landmark criminal cases of Escobedo v Illinois, 378 US 478, 486; 84 S Ct 1758, 1762; 12 L Ed 2d 977, 983 (1964) and Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1062; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). However, while this is a civil proceeding it is one on which serious consequences rest. In Bell v Burson, 402 US 535, 539; 91 S Ct 1586, 1589; 29 L Ed 2d 90, 94 (1971), the United States Supreme Court said:
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus [438]*438involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Sniadach v Family Finance Corp, 395 US 337; 89 S Ct 1820; 23 L Ed 2d 349 (1969); Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254; 90 S Ct 1011; 25 L Ed 2d 287 (1970). This is but an application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a 'right’ or a 'privilege.’ ”
Therefore, we must examine the proceedings to see if they meet the due process requirement of fundamental fairness, especially where in the early stages of this controversy the trappings were akin to criminal proceedings. We are guided by the language of Cafeteria Workers v McElroy, 367 US 886, 895; 81 S Ct 1743, 1748; 6 L Ed 2d 1230, 1236 (1961):
"The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation. * * * ' "[D]ue process,” unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.’ It is 'compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions * * * .’
"Consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” (Citations omitted.)
Regarding governmental interest, it may be that prudent police practice in arresting a drunk driving suspect is to give the Miranda warnings to avoid the risk that inculpatory statements will later be declared inadmissible in the drunk driving [439]*439prosecution. The warnings would include advice as to the right of counsel. Adopting defendant’s position, that the person arrested is not entitled to a single phone call to his attorney, would result in a contradictory situation. The arrestee would be told that he has a right to consult counsel, and then, when he sought to exercise that right, he would be told that the previously given advice was inoperative. Presumably this would be accomplished with a pedagogical explanation of the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings, either of which may result in the loss of a driver’s license.
Courts in other jurisdictions have confronted the situation where an arrestee is told, pursuant to Miranda, of his right to counsel and then refuses to take the test until given an opportunity to call counsel. Rust v Department of Motor Vehicles, 267 Cal App 2d 545; 73 Cal Rptr 366 (1968), Wiseman v Sullivan, 190 Neb 724; 211 NW2d 906 (1973), State Department of Highways v Beckey, 291 Minn 483; 192 NW2d 441 (1971). All have held that because of the inherent confusion of the suspect, his refusal to take the test is reasonable and license revocation is improper.
MCLA 257.625f(2)(c); MSA 9.2325(6)(2)(c) provides for a hearing to decide "[w]hether the person reasonably refused to submit to the test upon the request of the officer”. Thus, urges the plaintiff, the implicit statutory mandate that one’s license not be revoked where the refusal to submit is reasonable raises the question of whether the plaintiff should be allowed advice of counsel to make an informed decision.
Plaintiff was impaled on the horns of the civil/ criminal dilemma. He could participate in the Breathalyzer test possibly to later find that his participation was ill-advised. Alternatively, he [440]*440could refuse to take the test and face the loss of his license.
The Legislature saw fit, and properly so, to provide an agonizing choice for one accused of the serious crime of drunk driving. But the legislation does permit a choice. An arrestee can reasonably refuse to take the test. That deliberate legislative alternative takes on significance when one considers that the Legislature could have constitutionally set forth the unconditional requirement that the person arrested take the Breathalyzer test.
In weighing the individual interest against the governmental interest, it is suggested that to avoid the problems mentioned above, the governmental interest is best served by allowing the suspect a phone call to his attorney. A caveat: We are not suggesting a constitutional right to counsel — we are suggesting a reasonable due process approach to a certain set of circumstances. We are not unaware of the fact that the probative value of the test decreases with the delay in taking it. Here, however, approximately one hour had already elapsed, and a five minute telephone conversation with counsel would not constitute undue delay. It is noteworthy that the trial judge misperceived the importance of the decision facing plaintiff. The court inquired:
"What is there about these particular events that you felt it was necessary to call your attorney more than, shall we say, any other event that takes place in your life day by day?”
Plaintiff argues strongly that fundamental fairness and the statutory language require that the tactical choice allowed be knowingly made. Particularly so when one considers the impact of the choice and the fact that by hypothesis, the person [441]*441arrested is intoxicated and probably not at his best. A similar fact situation set in the context of a criminal proceeding led the Court in Escobedo v Illinois, 378 US 478, 486; 84 S Ct 1758, 1762; 12 L Ed 2d 977, 983 (1964), to note:
"The 'guiding hand of counsel’ was essential to advise petitioner of his rights in this delicate situation.”
However, we do not find it necessary to ground our decision on appellant’s "right to counsel”. We do not say he has such an unqualified or absolute right in these proceedings. We do say that a stationhouse policy which prohibits a suspect from making a telephone call does not constitute commendable police practice.
Was appellant’s refusal unreasonable? It does not seem to us unreasonable for a person to refuse to succumb to the wishes of a police officer employing an arbitrary device to "persuade” him to cooperate. It is indefensible to hold a man entirely incommunicado for 7 hours and only then, at 2 a.m., to permit him to call his wife. We won’t speculate on her concern — he was arrested at about the supper hour. The state is hardly in a position to complain of plaintiffs negative response to the officer’s draconian tactics. We are persuaded that the great weight of the evidence shows that the plaintiffs refusal to take the Breathalyzer test was reasonable under these circumstances.
We reverse the decision of the trial court and reverse the order suspending plaintiffs license. No costs, a public question being involved.
T. M. Burns, J., concurred.