Haddad v. Halabi

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedNovember 27, 2023
Docket1:22-cv-01906
StatusUnknown

This text of Haddad v. Halabi (Haddad v. Halabi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Haddad v. Halabi, (E.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----------------------------------------------------------------x HY HADDAD,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER -against- 22-CV-1906 (OEM) (JRC)

VICTOR HALABI, SOLY HALABI, and B & H CELLULAR WHOLESALE, INC.,

Defendants. -----------------------------------------------------------------x ORELIA E. MERCHANT, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Hy Haddad (“Haddad”) brings this action invoking federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 alleging, inter alia, that defendants Victor Halabi (“Victor”) and his brother, Soly Halabi (“Soly”) (together, the “Halabis”), and their company, B & H Cellular Wholesale, Inc. (“B&H”), engaged in securities fraud in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Soly has now moved to dismiss the claims alleged against him pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro 12(b)(6). For the reasons discussed below, however, the entire complaint is sua sponte dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. BACKGROUND1 Defendants Victor and Soly run B&H.2 B&H sells “electronics such as cellular phones. iPads, Ring camera, smart watches and the like.” Am. Compl. ¶ 51. “In November of 2018, a mutual acquaintance introduced [Haddad] to [] Victor Halabi, suggesting that they go into business together by partnering on business deals.” Id. ¶ 47. Haddad “was familiar with V[ictor] Halabi’s family, as he already knew [Soly] Halabi.” Id. “During their

1 The following facts are taken from the Amended Complaint, ECF 17 (“Am. Compl.”) and are assumed to be true for the purposes of this memorandum and order, unless otherwise indicated. 2 Soly was listed as the owner of between 2012 and 2018 and Victor was variously listed as Chairman, President, and CEO since 2010. Id. ¶ 4. introduction, Haddad’s acquaintance assured him that he had ‘done a few deals’ with [Victor] Halabi and his business, B & H Cellular, and that they had gone smoothly.” Id. “Equally if not more importantly, [Soly] Halabi, whom Haddad had known both socially and as a respected member of their community for several years, assured Haddad that his brother” Victor “was

reliable and honest.” Id. Haddad inquired about potential business deals and Victor obliged, offering “to split the profit on each deal 50/50 with Haddad in exchange for Haddad partnering with him on specific deals and providing the upfront financing.” Id. ¶ 50. The “deals” Victor offered were structured as follows: Halabi claimed that he engaged in sales of electronics and similarly valuable small goods, which he described as being pre-negotiated, often pre-paid sales or “deals” which took place either through online retailers or as wholesale transactions via a shipping forwarder located in Dubai. According to [Victor] Halabi, he would receive an order for specific goods which he would obtain and deliver with a pre- arranged profit margin. [Victor] Halabi represented that once the goods were shipped by B & H Cellular to the forwarder in Dubai, the forwarder would hold the goods until the purchaser paid for them, then send the payment back to the Halabis’ business and release the goods to the buyer. For example, a deal would be arranged as follows: $45,000 to purchase the goods to be forwarded, with the purchase price to be returned in one and a half weeks with $5,500 profit. Because the deals were pre-arranged by the end buyers and the profit margin was part of that negotiation, according to the Halabis, there was no risk.

Id. ¶ 49.

While Haddad inquired to as to the potential risk of default by the end buyer, “V[ictor] reassured him that this was rare but that finding another buyer with no change in pricing was simple because the market in Dubai was so eager for his goods.” Id. Haddad was ultimately “persuaded by the claims of people that he knew and trusted,” presumably the Halabis and his acquaintance, and began funding individual deals. Id. ¶ 51. He allegedly did so in part because of “[Soly] Halabi’s assurances … [which had] lull[ed] [Haddad] into a false sense of security.” Id. ¶ 51. The first “transactions seemed to go smoothly.” Id. However, Haddad was frequently “under constant pressure to fund new purchases by rolling over the ‘profits’ and

payments from previous purchases” and supplementing the Victor with more money to fund new deals. Id. ¶ 53. And Haddad was always rebuffed by the Halabis when he inquired further into the inner workings of B&H and its financing and accounting. Id.; see id. ¶ 63. Haddad alleges that the Halabis used a combination of feigned insult and reassurances—predicated on their “shared religious tenets” and Soly’s stature in their religious community—to keep Haddad from exiting the scheme. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 48, 51, 53. “For example, on July 30, 2019, [Victor] pushed Haddad to enter a transaction for 700 items, for a cost of $455,000, claiming that the order was prepaid and his vendors would only have the stock to fill it that day.” Id. ¶ 61. Other times, Victor claimed he would be “out on the street” if “he lost Haddad as an investor.” Id. ¶ 53.

Haddad did attempt on several occasions to find a way to view the greater financial picture of the Halabi’s purported deals. In or around April 2019, Haddad was able to persuade Victor “to conduct some business through a bank account to which both he and Haddad had access so that he could watch the flow of funds.” But Chase Bank closed the account shortly after it was opened. Id. ¶¶ 55-56. Victor again “persuaded” Haddad to keep money “flow[ing] through May 2019 despite Haddad’s growing concerns about whether Victor “could be stealing from him.” Id. ¶¶ 77, 58. Ultimately, in or around August 2019, Haddad was “given access to a Citibank account,” but “Halabi continued to use accounts at other banks, however, ensuring that Haddad was still kept in the dark as to the actual flow of funds.” Id. ¶ 60. At around that same time “[Victor] Halabi began using Haddad’s American Express account to purchase Apple products, claiming that he was getting special low prices and would be reselling them at a profit.” Id. ¶ 62.

Victor Halabi’s pressure campaign kept mounting into December of 2019 as Haddad became more recalcitrant to the Halabi’s requests that he fund more “transactions.” See id. ¶¶ 68-71. Haddad’s unwillingness stemmed from his own need to pay off tax debts and support his family’s living expenses. Id. Occasionally the two would exchange text messages when Victor became sufficiently afraid that the money would stop flowing. See, e.g., ¶ 70. “On December 5, 2019, [Victor] Halabi attempted to broaden [] the scheme by asking Haddad to join a real estate business venture with [Soly,]” who also made a similar overture. “Haddad refused to entangle himself further and declined.” Id. ¶ 72. “At the end of December, the scheme crashed to a halt.” Id. ¶ 77. “On the morning

of December 29, 2019, Haddad texted V. Halabi, asking specifically for a sit-down with him” Id. “Haddad met with [Victor] Halabi w[ho] told him that everything was a lie and confessed to the entire scheme – that all of the money was gone, that all of the deals were fake, that there was no Dubai forwarder and that he had been using Haddad’s money to fund everything the entire time.” Id. Allegedly, “V. Halabi would take money from Haddad, use it to purchase items that did not relate to pre-paid sales and which were sold by V. Halabi at a loss, and then used his multiple businesses and bank accounts to make it appear as if the business was profiting from the ‘sales’” to keep the flow of money from Haddad coming. Id. ¶ 52. DISCUSSION While only Soly moves here for a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

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